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Abstract
This thesis will discuss how fragmented UK ﬁrms are and how they have changed
between 1997  2008. We examine possible explanations for fragmentation and try
to capture the eﬀects of fragmentation on employment and labour productivity. We
consider an organisational and a spatial dimension of fragmentation for the manu-
facturing and the tradable service sector. The data used comes from the Business
Structure Database  a ﬁrm and plant level database which captures 99 percent of
UK economic activity.
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1. Introduction
One man draws out the wire, another one straights it, a
third cuts it, a fourth points it, a ﬁfth grinds it at the top
for receiving the head; . . .Those ten person, therefore,
could make among them upwards of forty-eight thou-
sand pins a day . . .But if they had wrought separately
and independently . . . they certainly could not each of
them make twenty, perhaps not one pin a day . . . 
Adam Smith  The Wealth of Nations
The main aim of this work is to provide new evidence on the structure of UK ﬁrms, and
how this has changed over the period 1997  2008. The appearance of new organisational
structures of ﬁrms has always had a large impact on societies and the development of
nations (see Heilbroner, 1999). In the medieval ages until the 17th century typical busi-
nesses were rather small with few workers, where the workshop was often part of the
worker's home. The workers were responsible for many diﬀerent activities, for example,
a shoemaker made a pair of shoes from raw materials to the ﬁnished product. In the
early 18th century a period of inventions appeared, caused, amongst others, by a fun-
damental change of people's ideology from an after-life to a more secular orientation.
Physical inventions like steam engines to run textile machines, and also new organisa-
tional entities such as companies led to dramatic changes in the structure of production.
In this environment specialisation was possible. Workers sold their labour to capitalists,
and specialised in a small number of speciﬁc tasks. This increased labour productivity
massively. Production started to be geographically concentrated in diﬀerent regions of
the UK.
Until the 19th century typical manufacturing ﬁrms were . . . predominantly organized as
traditional single-unit ﬁrms . . . operated in a local or regional market, produced a single
line of product, and were owned and managed by a single individual or a partnership
(Kim, 1999). At the end of the 19th century a new kind of ﬁrm appeared, the multi-unit
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ﬁrm. Single-unit ﬁrms producing one output reached their limits. By setting up several
plants a ﬁrm was able to experience further economies of scale and economies of scope
by oﬀering diﬀerent products. Vertical linkages also gained importance. By owning the
supplier of raw materials a ﬁrm could secure its input supply, and exclude competitors
from this source. The main condition for the appearance of multi-unit ﬁrms was a new
management structure which was able to coordinate more than one production unit.
However, most of the plants of a ﬁrm were located within a country.
After the mid 20th century, a decline in trade barriers, an increase in capital mobility
and technological developments caused the `Death of Distance'. Transportation and
communication costs were plummeting, and technological improvements changed the
production process itself. Products are far more complex today than they were at the
beginning of the 20th century. Longer production chains create more possibilities to
fragment production, therefore ﬁrms started slicing up the value-added chain (Krugman,
1995). This was the ideal business environment for multi-national enterprises to arise.
The whole world became a potential playing ﬁeld for companies. Firms were able to
concentrate production stages in those regions and countries where the required input
factors were abundant. Recent OECD data shows that the total real UK outward FDI
stock increased by nearly 650 percent between 1987 and 2009.1
FDI stocks can capture how many ﬁrms disperse their production chain over diﬀerent
regions, but the fragmentation of ﬁrms went even further. Firms started to outsource
the production of intermediate inputs to unrelated, specialised companies. Currently,
we live in a world of outsourcing. Campa and Goldberg (1997) show that for UK ﬁrms
imported inputs as a share of the value of production increased in every industry between
1974 and 1993. For example, in the electrical machinery industry the share increased
from 15 percent to 35 percent. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) data shows that the total amount of imported intermediate goods and services
1See http://stat.oecd.org, access on 02/12/11. We use OECD deﬂators with base year 2008.
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of the UK increased from ¿303bn to ¿340bn between 2000 and 2005.2 These measures
face some limitations because they capture international outsourcing only partly. They
cannot distinguish between intra- and inter-ﬁrm trade. Also, outsourcing is not just
an international phenomenon. Many small and medium sized ﬁrms hire, for example,
specialised domestic cleaning companies instead of employing their own cleaning staﬀ.
Theory suggests that by focusing on its core activities, a ﬁrm can increase its eﬃciency,
will become more competitive and therefore will experience higher proﬁts. Several studies
take account of those two aspects. For example, Abraham and Taylor (1996) show that
the share of US manufacturing ﬁrms which outsourced janitorial services increased from
20 percent in 1979 to 24 percent in 1986/87.3 Girma and Görg (2004) ﬁnd that in the
UK the outsourcing intensity of the electronics sector increased from around 6 percent
to more than 13 percent.4
This thesis will focus on the last evolutionary stage of the organisational structure of
ﬁrms. We present evidence to show that the organisational structure of UK ﬁrms has
changed even over the relatively short period from 1997  2008. We examine which
types of ﬁrms and industries experienced greater organisational change, and what the
consequences of changing an organisational structure can be. There is already a large
theoretical literature on ﬁrm organisation and fragmentation, but until recently most
empirical studies about international fragmentation used aggregated data. While these
can provide certain aggregated trends in fragmentation, they cannot explain the variety
of organisational structures and the distribution of ﬁrm types and how they have changed
over time. Firm level datasets can shed light on this. However, ﬁrm level datasets face
certain limitations, for example, they might include only selected ﬁrms of certain sectors
or have only information for the year, when a survey has been conducted.
2Real values are presented with 2005 as the base year.
3They ﬁnd similar increases for machine maintenance, engineering and drafting, accounting and com-
puter services.
4Abraham and Taylor (1996) and Girma and Görg (2004) use a diﬀerent deﬁnition of outsourcing. We
will discuss the diﬀerences in section 2.1.3.
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In this thesis we will use the Business Structure Database (BSD), a dataset produced by
the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS), to examine the organisational structure of UK
ﬁrms. The BSD includes the great majority of all UK ﬁrms for the period 1997  2008.5
The beauty of the BSD is that it includes ﬁrm level as well as plant (local unit) level
information. We take advantage of this to calculate a vertical integration measure. A SIC
code for each plant allows us to identify the main product produced and an eight digit
postcode allows to identify its exact location. With the use of input-output tables it is
possible to identify if goods produced by one plant are required as intermediate inputs in
another one. A drawback of this database is that only vertical production linkages within
the UK can be observed. Nevertheless, because the majority of ﬁrms do not engage in
FDI, we are able to analyse how the average UK ﬁrm sources its inputs.
The following example illustrates what can be measured with the BSD. Assume a com-
pany owns two local units. One produces bricks and one is a clay pit. Because bricks
require clay as intermediate input, this ﬁrm will be regarded as vertically integrated. If
the ﬁrm sells the pit, it has to source the clay from the market. We will refer to this as
organisational fragmentation. If the company maintains ownership of the clay pit, we
can also calculate the distance between the vertically connected plants. We will refer to
this distance as a measure of geographical fragmentation If the bricks factory and the
clay pit are next to each other, the company will be referred to as geographically concen-
trated. If it moves the brick factory to another region, the company will geographically
fragment its production.
As far as we are aware, this is the ﬁrst ﬁrm level analysis of the organisational and
geographical fragmentation of UK ﬁrms.6 The structure of the thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 contains the literature review. It discusses how fragmentation is deﬁned in the
literature, what theories exist to explain diﬀerent fragmentation patterns and the main
5At the end of 2011 new data up to 2010 was released.
6Note some papers from the literature review which do anything similar.
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ﬁndings of the empirical literature. We will provide an overview of how fragmentation
can be measured and give some reference values. In the last part of chapter 2 we will
summarise the eﬀects of fragmentation on employment and labour productivity.
Chapter 3 describes the BSD. This chapter should also serve as useful guidance for other
researchers to see which questions can be answered with the BSD and what cleaning pro-
cedure is required. We will discuss the data sources and what information is included.
We also provide information on raw data in this chapter, for example, how many manu-
facturing and service ﬁrms exists, what the total and average turnover in each sector is,
etc. We conduct several checks to test the reliability of the BSD and compare the BSD
with another large dataset of the ONS, the Annual Respondents Database (ARD). We
conclude this chapter with a discussion about the usefulness of the BSD for the research
on fragmentation.
Chapters 4 to 6 are the main chapters of the thesis. In Chapter 4 we describe the extent
of organisational and geographical fragmentation in UK ﬁrms, and we show how this has
changed over the sample period. At the time of writing it is the ﬁrst analysis of changes in
the organisational structure of UK ﬁrms over time. We examine both the manufacturing
sector and what we call the tradable service sector. We start the chapter with a general
overview of the UK business landscape. One main ﬁnding is that the average employment
of ﬁrms, regardless of the sector, has decreased signiﬁcantly during the sample period.
This could be the ﬁrst indicator of increased fragmentation. We then conduct a static
and a dynamic analysis, discussing organisational and spatial fragmentation separately.
The static analysis considers the stock of diﬀerent ﬁrm types at each point in time. For
example, how many multi-plant ﬁrms there are, how many vertically integrated ﬁrms,
and so on. The dynamic analysis considers how the stock of diﬀerent ﬁrm types evolves
over time. For example, whether the change in the number of fragmented ﬁrms has arisen
because of the entry of new ﬁrms or because of existing ﬁrms changing their structure.
In the static analysis we show that the average degree of vertical integration is extremely
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low and decreasing over time. The share and degree of vertical integration is on average
much lower in the tradable service sector, but once a tradable service ﬁrm is vertically
integrated, it will tend to be integrated to a higher degree. According to our deﬁnition
of fragmentation, only vertically integrated local units can be spatially dispersed. We
ﬁnd that vertically integrated ﬁrms are becoming signiﬁcantly more dispersed. Again,
this result is independent of the sector. A decomposition of the change reveals that the
change in the average degree of organisational and spatial fragmentation is mainly caused
by new ﬁrms. We conclude that the average UK ﬁrm in 2008 is more fragmented than
in 1997.
Chapter 5 describes which factors can explain the organisational structure chosen by a
ﬁrm. We consider regional, industry and ﬁrm characteristics and link them to common
economic theories. The analysis is conducted in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage we
analyse the choice of a ﬁrm to be a single-plant or a multi-plant ﬁrm. In the second
stage we analyse the decision to vertically integrate, and in the third stage we analyse
the decision to be geographically dispersed or concentrated. In the ﬁrst stage we do not
diﬀerentiate between vertical and horizontal local units, therefore the pool of theories
explaining multi-unit structures is very comprehensive. Galliano et al. (2007) and Audia
et al. (2000) stress the importance of market concentration and the size of a ﬁrm. We
can conﬁrm their ﬁndings. In the second stage we analyse how technological variables
(Acemo§lu et al., 2007), knowledge capital and incomplete contracts aﬀect the results.
While we ﬁnd evidence for a similar inﬂuence of the technological variables on the choice
of fragmentation, we get ambiguous results for the knowledge capital and incomplete
contracts variables. Depending on the measure of knowledge capital, we ﬁnd positive and
negative coeﬃcients for the probability of being vertically integrated in the manufacturing
sector. We ﬁnd positive, but mainly insigniﬁcant results for the tradable service sector.
The third stage links the factor price diﬀerences and the knowledge capital intensity with
the degree of dispersion of vertically integrated ﬁrms. Those two factors cannot explain
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the spatial distribution of ﬁrms. Instead we ﬁnd, that large ﬁrms, which are close to the
technological frontier and in a concentrated market are more dispersed. Additionally,
tradable service ﬁrms in agglomerated regions are more concentrated.
Chapter 5 provides the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis of common theories of organisational
structure for both the UK manufacturing and tradable service sector. Changing organi-
sational structure is a very uncommon event, but the large sample of the BSD allows us
to identify a remarkable number of those events. Therefore we expect the results to be
more reliable.
Finally, chapter 6 discusses the eﬀects of fragmentation over time. To be more precise,
how does the exit of a vertically integrated plant within a ﬁrm aﬀect the employment and
the productivity of that ﬁrm over time? We can follow ﬁrms up to ﬁve years after they
fragmented. The total employment eﬀect can be decomposed into a direct and indirect
eﬀect. After a ﬁrm fragments, the direct employment eﬀect is the number of jobs lost be-
cause of the exiting plant. We expect indirect eﬀects to arise, for example, because some
jobs are moved from the exiting to the remaining plants or that, through specialisation,
new jobs within the remaining plants will be created. This indirect eﬀect may outweigh
or at least mitigate the eﬀect of the direct eﬀect over time. If ﬁrms specialise, or if ﬁrms
close down their most labour intensive plants, we also expect to observe an increase in
labour productivity as a result of fragmentation. We use a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence ap-
proach where we compare the performance of fragmenting ﬁrms with ﬁrms which did not
fragment in the treatment year. Our results suggest that even up to ﬁve years after the
treatment no positive employment eﬀects can be observed. In contrast, employment con-
tinues to decrease in ﬁrms which fragment. In manufacturing, immediately after a ﬁrm
closes a plant it will reduce total employment on average by 14 workers (-17%). After
ﬁve years the absolute value increases gradually up to 18 workers (-23%). One year after
a tradable service ﬁrm fragments it will reduce total employment by 5 workers (-16%),
but 3 years later it will decrease by 4 workers (-13%). Large productivity gains are found
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for manufacturing ﬁrms. Productivity increases immediately by 27 percent and remains
15 percent higher after 5 years. Regression results suggest that productivity may even
increase further over time. We do not ﬁnd a clear picture for the tradable service sector.
The innovation of this chapter is that no other paper has looked at the within ﬁrm
employment and labour productivity eﬀects of the closure of a vertically integrated plant
for the UK. An important caveat to the results in this chapter is that we may not be
able to determine the causal eﬀect of changes in organisational structure on employment
and labour productivity, because changes in structure are endogenously determined by
the ﬁrm.
We conclude this thesis with a summary about the questions we were able to answer and
the limitations of the study. We will also provide an outlook of follow-up works which
can be conducted.
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2. Literature Review
2.1. Fragmentation and Integration
In the ﬁrst part of the chapter we will derive our deﬁnition of fragmentation which
will be used for the whole thesis. This is followed by a review about the theoretically
and empirical literature of the determinants of fragmentation. We ﬁnish this part with
a discussion about diﬀerent ways how to measure fragmentation. In the second part
we describe other determinants which can aﬀect the organisational structure of a ﬁrm,
speciﬁcally the Proximity-Concentration Trade-oﬀ. Thirdly, we look at the eﬀects of
fragmentation on employment and productivity of ﬁrms. We ﬁnish this review with a
short discussion about the implications from the literature for this work.
2.1.1. What is fragmentation?
Jones and Kierzkowski were the ﬁrst to use the term fragmentation to refer to the sep-
aration of previously vertically integrated production processes into separated fragments
or blocks (Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). These blocks
are then connected via service links, where the proximity between them is negatively
correlated with coordination costs. Under the umbrella of service links services, like
transport and telecommunication, needed to connect the fragmented production steps
with other production stages, are gathered. This deﬁnition of fragmentation will be
more precisely deﬁned and a new classiﬁcation introduced. We will distinguish between
organisational  and geographical  fragmentation.
The distinction is necessary because the analysis of spatial and organisational fragmen-
tation is inﬂuenced by diﬀerent factors. For example, factor price diﬀerences between
areas might aﬀect a company to geographically separate its plants, but does not neces-
sarily result into an organisational split up. Another reason is that empirical measures
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available only cover one type of fragmentation.
To examine organisational fragmentation, I will refer to Williamson (1975) who examined
the boundaries of the ﬁrm. He wanted to clarify why it is the case that some activities
of ﬁrms are performed within and some activities are performed between ﬁrms. To put
it diﬀerently, when will a ﬁrm conduct a production stage itself, and when will it be
bought from the market. If intermediate inputs are sourced from an unrelated party we
will refer to this as organisational fragmentation. An organisationally fragmented ﬁrm
is therefore just the opposite of a vertically integrated ﬁrm. Like Grossman and Hart
(1986), pages 693f, I deﬁne a (vertically integrated) ﬁrm to consist of those assets that it
owns or over which it has control . It does not matter where the assets are located, it is
only important that they are owned or controlled by the ﬁrm. Therefore, the higher the
share of assets (for example machines) owned by a ﬁrm A needed to produce a product
P , the higher the degree of integration will be. If most of the assets are employed by
unrelated companies to manufacture P , company A is said to be highly fragmented.
At ﬁrst it seems that fragmentation is just the reverse of vertical integration, but this is
only half of the story. A closer look at Jones and Kierzkowski's fragmentation deﬁnition
reveals that separation of a production process can also happen within a ﬁrm (see Ven-
ables, 1999 and Price, 2001). If a production process is split up, but the ownership of the
assets remains, this type of fragmentation will be called geographical  or spatial  frag-
mentation. In an international framework vertical foreign direct investment falls within
this classiﬁcation.
Table 2.1, which is based on Price (2001), contrasts organisational with geographical
fragmentation. Her table was based on international fragmentation, so I will alter it
slightly to be more general. The spatial dimension informs us about the local content
of a product, but does not say anything about the ownership of assets. The organisa-
tional dimension is independent from where the intermediate input producing plants are
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located. It shows if the production of the good is mainly determined by one management
or by market forces. This table should not be looked at in a discrete context, which only
diﬀerentiates between ﬁrms being fragmented and integrated. A continuous framework
is more suitable, where the degree of organisational fragmentation is always between 0
and 1. 0 represents complete fragmentation and 1 complete integration. Five diﬀer-
ent outcomes are displayed. In the right top corner highly integrated companies which
are highly concentrated are gathered and therefore represent the complete opposite of
fragmented ﬁrms. The bottom left corner shows two dimensional fragmented ﬁrms. It
could also be the case that a ﬁrm is highly vertically integrated but the ﬁrm owned
plants producing intermediate inputs are widely dispersed (spatially fragmented, bottom
right cell) or most of the inputs are sourced from independent local suppliers (top left
cell). Another important option, which is hardly mentioned in the empirical literature,
is picked up by Beladi and Mukherjee (2009) and is called bi-sourcing. It can be the case
that a ﬁrm chooses to integrate a production block of an intermediate input I but also
engage in a contractual relationship with other suppliers providing I simultaneously.
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Table 2.1: Classiﬁcation of fragmentation, by Price (2001), altered by author.
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Finally, I want to highlight another diﬀerence to Jones and Kierzkowski's deﬁnition of
fragmentation. First, they only refer to a company as being fragmented if a previously
integrated production stage is separated from the remaining production process of the
company. This assumption is not necessary, because, according to the deﬁnition dis-
cussed above, it only matters how many assets of the production process are owned by
a ﬁrm (organisational fragmentation) or if the production blocks are located diﬀerently
(geographical fragmentation). We deﬁne fragmentation as a state when intermediate
inputs are provided by a separate unit. This separation can be caused by missing organ-
isational linkages or geographical dispersion. According to this deﬁnition, all ﬁrms are
to a certain degree fragmented because it is very unlikely that all intermediate inputs
are provided within a ﬁrm. Therefore in empirical research a measure of the degree of
vertical integration should be preferred to simple integration dummies.
Two expressions are often mentioned in the discussion about fragmentation, both by
academics and more widely, namely outsourcing and oﬀshoring. The former is de-
ﬁned by the OECD as: Delegating (part of) activities to an outside contractor 7 and ﬁts
perfectly in the description of organisational fragmentation. According to OECD . . . ,
oﬀshoring is used to describe a business's (or a government's) decision to replace domes-
tically supplied service functions with imported services produced oﬀshore.8 This is more
related to geographical fragmentation because no distinction between ownership of the
intermediate input supplier has been made. The important characteristics for oﬀshoring
are that the intermediates are sourced from a distant location abroad.
2.1.2. Why does fragmentation happen?
Many theories exist explaining geographical or organisational fragmentation and usually
focus only on one of those and quite often in an international framework. A good starting
7See http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4950, access on 15/06/10.
8See http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6271, access on 15/06/10.
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point is Dunning (1981)'s OLI paradigm, which is usually used to explain under which
circumstances Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) come into existence, but provides also
insight into fragmentation.
OLI is the abbreviation for Ownership-, Location- and Internalisation-Advantages. O-
advantages arise, when companies possess, or gain access to, assets or rights which
foreign enterprises do not possess or to which cannot gain access  at least on such
favourable terms.9 Typical examples for O-advantages are blueprints, intangible assets
(reputation and know-how), mining rights, etc. These O-advantages are essential for a
company to survive in its market or to produce at distant locations. The O-advantages are
directly connected to internalisation advantages. According to Dunning, internalisation is
about whether the enterprise possessing the assets perceive it to be in their best interests
to internalise their use, or sell this right (but not the assets themselves) . . . . If a
company faces I-advantages it has an incentive to keep the ownership advantage within
a ﬁrm, otherwise it could oﬀer them to other market participants through contractual
agreements. An example of an Ownership and Internalisation advantage can be found
in the pharmaceutical industry. Inventing new drugs is extremely knowledge capital
intensive and expensive but the actual production of drugs experiences high economies
of scale. To license the right of production to an outside ﬁrm bears the risk that the ﬁrm
will break the contract, copies the new drug and sells it at a lower price. Therefore in
countries with weak intellectual property right laws it is expected that ﬁrms are more
likely to keep their ownership advantages internally.
The L-advantages comprise of those factors to which extent enterprises ﬁnd it prof-
itable to locate any part of their production facilities outside their home countries.10
L-advantages can be factors like taxation, market potential, social factors like the ac-
ceptance of locals of foreign companies, political factors like political risk and especially
9See Dunning (1981), page 30.
10See Dunning (1981), page 30.
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factor price diﬀerences.
Table 2.1 reveals which advantages have to exist so that one of the four possible outcomes
can arise. An O-advantage has always to exist, because without it a company would not
survive in the market. In the case of a company only facing an O-advantage, it will be
organisationally fragmented but not spatially. No locational advantages exist, therefore
there is no incentive to source the inputs from other locations. The company also will
not be vertically integrated because of missing internalisation advantages, so it will be
better oﬀ by sourcing its inputs from the market. Now an I-advantage is added. The
company will be interested in vertical integration, but geographical fragmentation is still
not eligible for the company because of missing L-advantages. A vertically integrated ﬁrm
with dispersed plants can only arise if all three OLI advantages appear at the same time.
The highest degree of fragmentation (geographical and organisational fragmentation) is
achieved if only O- and L-advantages exist, so the company has an incentive to source
its inputs from diﬀerent areas, but, because of missing internalisation advantages, it is
better oﬀ by organisational fragmentation. O- and I-advantages are linked to the ﬁrm
level, but L-advantages refer to the industry or country level. This distinction is crucial
because the ﬁrst category is an important part for the explanation of organisational and
the latter one for geographical fragmentation.11 Two popular theories about the question
of organisational fragmentation are the incomplete contract theories and the Knowledge
Capital Model (KCM) and will be discussed precisely below.
Locational factors aﬀect geographical fragmentation. One popular theory which explains
the location decision for vertical production steps is the Factor-Proportion theory which
concludes that, if factor price diﬀerences are big enough, a ﬁrm will consider splitting
up the production process and producing at diﬀerent locations. This theory is based on
11The diﬀerentiation between ownership and internalisation shows that ownership does not necessarily
imply control over a speciﬁc good. For example, a company A owning a mine has a contractual
agreement with another ﬁrm B to allow B to mine coal from A's pit. Therefore A is the owner of
the mine but B is in control of it. In the theoretical literature this distinction is not always made
and ownership often implies being in control.
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an international framework, but note that even within a country factor prices can diﬀer
signiﬁcantly (Bernard et al., 2002, 2008).
Organisational fragmentation
Knowledge-Capital Model
The Knowledge Capital Model (KCM) by Markusen (2002) is one of the most comprehen-
sive models regarding the existence of horizontal and vertical Multinational Enterprises
(MNEs). A horizontal MNE is a ﬁrm which produces the same good at home and abroad,
for example, a brick producer has many plants producing the same output at diﬀerent
locations. A vertical MNE produces goods of diﬀerent production stages of the same
production process at diﬀerent locations. For example, a fashion company conducts all
the R&D and the creation of new designs and advertisements in the UK and produces
the actual clothes in Asia. The KCM is based on Dunning's OLI paradigm. The model
is named after its main reason for the existence of MNEs: knowledge capital. In contrast
to domestic ﬁrms foreign ﬁrms face additional costs. To overcome those costs foreign
companies need ownership advantages which may arise through knowledge capital to be
competitive to local ﬁrms. Markusen assumes that knowledge capital can be easily sepa-
rated from the headquarters and transferred to other production units and is non-rival in
its consumption. For example, a blueprint can be used by every plant. The focus of this
section lies on internalisation advantages, so to decide if a product is going to be pro-
vided within a company or sourced via arms-length transactions. If a speciﬁc knowledge
capital exists which is needed for producing a certain good, it can be employed within a
ﬁrm or licensed to an outside ﬁrm. However, the licensing of the knowledge capital can
lead to moral hazard of the agents (licensee).
Markusen provides a model about technological knowledge to explain why in- and out-
15
sourcing can happen.12 Technological knowledge is needed to produce a speciﬁc good.
This good can be produced domestically in Home and exported to Host, by foreign
production, through licensing (which is equivalent to fragment the production organisa-
tionally), or FDI (vertical integration). A product has a product-cycle of two periods,
after which the product becomes obsolete on the market and a new product has to be
created. If a company decides to produce abroad an agent will be employed for the
foreign subsidiary. She is informed about the technology used by the MNE. Moving the
knowledge from Home to Host generates costs F . In the second period the agent can
quit her job and use her knowledge to establish a ﬁrm on her own. On the other hand
the MNE can also give notice to the agent and hire a new agent. Besides ﬁxed costs of
quitting G or training costs for new agents a penalty P has to be paid for the party who
is cancelling the relationship. If the MNE wants to create a long-term relationship with
the agent (that is the case of FDI) it has to give parts of the rents from producing abroad
to the manager, otherwise she has an incentive for opportunistic behaviour. Licensing
(fragmentation) is characterised by a single product speciﬁc relationship, so potential
future income from a long-term relationship between MNE and agent over more than
one product cycle is insigniﬁcant. Three outcomes can arise. If the ﬁxed costs F are very
high the MNE will service the market via exports. If G, the costs of an agent to resign
from his job, is relatively high a company will prefer licensing. If it is the case that G or
the penalty P for breaking the relationship are low, integration will be more likely. This
is because low costs for the agent to resign from a job and low penalties for breaching
the contract will result into a higher probability of opportunistic behaviour. A company
can overcome this ineﬃciency by integration.
Even though this model is based on a horizontal framework its variables also aﬀect vertical
12Markusen (2002) provides three diﬀerent models based on Reputation, technological knowledge and
foreign market knowledge to explain when insourcing or outsourcing is going to happen. All are
based on horizontal motives, but only the model about technological knowledge can be extended to
a vertical context.
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integration decisions. For example, in the computer industry, technological knowledge
is crucial for the production of intermediate inputs. The technological knowledge of
required computer chips leads again to the problem of internalisation. To prevent moral
hazard of a manager, integration will be preferred. All the costs mentioned above will
create a similar result for vertical integration.
Incomplete contracts
Another stream of research tries to explain why companies have an incentive to engage in
vertical integration through transaction costs. The transaction costs approach highlights
the cost diﬀerences between integration and fragmented production. For example, accord-
ing to Coase (1937) in an economy the price mechanism leads to an eﬃcient allocation of
resources and inﬂuences the behaviour of a country's individuals. But there are islands of
conscious powers where the price mechanism is substituted by an entrepreneur who can
delegate to her workers, within certain limits. Those limits are determined by contracts
and ﬁnally deﬁne a ﬁrm. Coase (1937) describes why establishing a ﬁrm can be superior
to a market transaction. Often it is assumed that market transactions are suﬃcient to
coordinate and make production eﬃcient, but there are certain costs arising. For exam-
ple, it is not always possible to identify the relevant prices. If a non-standardised input
is required, expert knowledge might be needed to identify the actual costs of production.
Another problem is the re-negotiation of contracts for market transactions. An employee
of a ﬁrm has a contract to fulﬁl a range of diﬀerent tasks. If the economic environment
is changing the principal does not have to re-negotiate the contract to have the employee
to do diﬀerent tasks. During an economic boom the principal does not have to write
a new contract for the employee to work more hours. Also long-term contracts create
some stability in an environment of uncertainty. All those factors lead to an increase
in the size of a ﬁrm, which will come to an end if the advantages of integration cannot
outweigh the ineﬃciencies of a ﬁrm becoming too large, for example through increasing
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bureaucracy. The transaction cost approach is a static theory, saying nothing about how
the behaviour of a former unrelated manager of the intermediate input supplying ﬁrm
changes if she is employed by the downstream ﬁrm. As Grossman and Hart (1986) point
out, if integration leads to a reduction of transaction costs, the ﬁrm can employ strategies
which makes integration always better than sourcing from the market. Why that is not
the case can be explained with incomplete contracts.
Assume that two parties, a buyer and a supplier of intermediate inputs, want to trade
with each other. The transaction is going to happen within two periods. In the ﬁrst
period (ex-ante) both parties decide their relationship-speciﬁc investments and in the
second period (ex-post) further production decisions are made and the buyer and supplier
will bargain about the share of proﬁt both parties will receive after the transaction has
taken place. If they cannot agree no trade will happen. With complete contracts the
story would be over and an eﬃcient market outcome would be achieved. Unfortunately
complete contracts do not exist. It is impossible to include all potential scenarios within
a contract. Therefore residual rights become crucial. If an unforeseen event happens the
owner of the residual rights can still react to it. For example, if the owner of a construction
company realises that the amount of bricks ordered is not suﬃcient she can, as owner
of a brick factory, just increase the production. If she does not own the brick plant or
the residual rights respectively, the owner (manager) of the brick factory can decide if
he wants to supply more output or not. Grossman and Hart (1986) assume that in the
ﬁrst period no aspects of the good produced are contractible, but in the second period
those characteristics are revealed and the production can be adapted. The owner of a
company is also the owner of residual rights, so if the quality or quantity of intermediates
produced does not fulﬁl the expectations of a ﬁnal good producer, the company owner
can react to that situation. An important point is that the ownership structure aﬀects
the proﬁt distribution, and therefore aﬀects the relationship speciﬁc investments of the
ﬁrst period. Exactly those ex-ante investment distortions create an ineﬃcient outcome,
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which a ﬁrm can minimise by choosing the right organisational form.
Grossman and Hart (1986) compare the eﬃcient outcomes of perfect contracts with the
outcomes of imperfect contracts and integration and non-integration decisions of compa-
nies. They conclude that if an upstream company does not care about non-contractibles
(for example the quality of an intermediate good) it is better for the downstream ﬁrm
to own the intermediate input supplier. The reason is the following: Ownership leads to
a higher degree of power ex-post, therefore a company has an incentive to over-invest in
the ﬁrst period. If non-integration has been chosen the investment level will be moderate
for both ﬁrms. So if ex-ante investments are crucial for company A, but not for ﬁrm
B non-integration can lead to under-investment and therefore not to an eﬃcient out-
come.13 To summarise, incomplete contracts can lead to distorted investment decisions
in the ﬁrst period. This under-investment problem is a hold-up problem (Tirole, 1988).
An intermediate input supplier can choose how much she wants to invest to specialise
its intermediates. The upstream ﬁrm will under-invest because an eﬃcient amount of
specialisation might create the fear that if the trade fails, it will be more diﬃcult to sell
the goods to other market participants and all the investments are forgone.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) employ incomplete contracts to illustrate the choice of a
company to integrate or outsource the production of intermediate inputs. Three kinds
of ﬁrms exist, where one is completely vertically integrated, one only assembles the ﬁnal
product and the last only produces intermediate inputs. In comparison to an integrated
ﬁrm, outsourcing is characterised by a more eﬃcient production and therefore lower costs
but also confronted with search costs of a supplier to ﬁnd a ﬁnal good producer and vice
versa, and a hold-up problem through incomplete contracts. The incomplete contract
will lead again to a lower output and a higher price than with a complete contract. If
13The idea of ex-ante contracts needs further explanation. Someone could assume that in theory a breach
of contract can be penalised by a third party (for example a court). In reality it can be impossible to
specify all the details within a contract and it could be impossible for a court to tell if, for example,
the quality of the intermediate input meets its standards.
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a partner cannot be found, the ﬁrm will exit the market. These cost diﬀerences arising
through the organisational form require a diﬀerent level of industry demand to let a ﬁrm
break even. As all ﬁrms are similar, industry characteristics decide which organisational
form will be prevailing.14 One result is that it is extremely unlikely that in one industry
vertical integration and outsourcing is prevailing simultaneously. Furthermore, ﬁve fac-
tors will inﬂuence the probability of an industry having integrated or specialised ﬁrms
(ﬁnal and component producers) only. Some are rather obvious, for example the higher
the production costs advantages of specialised component producers are and the lower
the ﬁxed costs for ﬁnal and component producers are, the higher will be the propensity
of having an outsourcing equilibrium in that particular industry. An improvement in the
search technology, so it is easier for specialised ﬁrms to ﬁnd a complementary ﬁrm, will
increase the expected proﬁts of those ﬁrms and also has a positive eﬀect on outsourc-
ing. More complex is the eﬀect of the substitutability of ﬁnal goods. A high degree of
substitutability is similar to a highly competitive market. If the cost disadvantages of
outsourcing through search costs and incomplete contracts are lower than the costs aris-
ing through dis-economies of scales through vertical integration, then a higher degree of
competition leads to more ﬁrms engaging in fragmenting the production. Another chan-
nel aﬀects the number of specialised component suppliers. In an industry with similar
goods the advantage of specialisation is diminishing, therefore the number of specialised
intermediate input suppliers will decrease. This will increase the probability of an in-
termediate input supplier to ﬁnd a matching partner and decrease the market demand
needed to break even and will boost outsourcing. Finally, the bargaining share of the
surplus from selling the ﬁnal good is inﬂuential. Firstly, the higher the bargaining power
of the component supplier, the higher is the expected proﬁt and the easier it is to break
even. Secondly, a larger share of the surplus leads to a disincentive of the intermediate
input supplier to under-invest because of incomplete contracts. Thirdly, higher expected
14For example, if the industry demand to have zero expected proﬁts is higher for a vertical integrated
ﬁrm than for a fragmented ﬁrm within an industry, the latter can produce at a lower price.
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proﬁts lead to an increase in the number of entering component ﬁrms which decreases the
matching probability with ﬁnal good producers and aﬀects the required market demand
negatively.
Acemo§lu et al. (2010) oﬀer a theoretical model heavily based on Grossman and Hart
(1986). Again, two kinds of market participants are considered, a risk neutral supplier
and producer. Those ﬁrms can be independent, or integrated, where the supplier can own
the producer (forward integrated) or the producer can own the supplier (backward inte-
grated). As in Grossman and Hart (1986) ownership leads to an increase in investments.
Investments can only ﬂow into plants owned by the ﬁrm; in other words, the producer
cannot conduct investments for the supplier. Acemo§lu et al. (2010) show why invest-
ment incentives diﬀer depending on the organisational form. They put their focus on
outside options of ﬁrms, meaning how much a ﬁrm will receive if the supplier cannot pro-
vide the good ordered or the producer declines to accept it. The outside option depends
on the organisational form. For example, if the contract between a backward vertically
integrated producer and the integrated supplier is cancelled ex-post, then the supplier
will have an outside option of zero, because the producer is the owner of the residual
rights and owns all the assets. The supplier will leave with nothing. The producer can
still use the produced intermediate inputs, but her output will decrease. This is caused
by not using the appropriate intermediate inputs. The higher the outside option of a ﬁrm
the higher will be the share of revenue they will receive for sure. This leads to a decrease
of revenue for the other ﬁrm in the contractual agreement. The higher the revenues, the
higher the investments will be, but while the ﬁrm with the higher revenues will invest
more, the other ﬁrm is confronted with less revenue and will invest less. Three factors
determine which organisational form will be the best outcome. First, technology mat-
ters. The more technology intensive a ﬁrm is the likelier it is to be vertically integrated.15
15Acemo§lu et al. (2010) use in their model a parameter indicating the relative importance of investment.
They interpret it like the more important the investment of a ﬁrm is, the more value added it brings
and the better technology the ﬁrm uses.
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The next factor is the importance of the input of the supplier for the ﬁnal good of the
producer. For example, an engine producer is the supplier and the car producer is the
ﬁnal good producer. The engine is crucial for a car, so not supplying the engine would
be devastating for the car producer. To ensure that the engine is delivered, backward
integration will be likely to happen. Finally, a larger number of producers relative to
suppliers will lead to an increase of non-integrated ﬁrms. Because a supplier can more
easily ﬁnd a producer he can sell his products, the outside option will increase for the
supplier.
Antràs and Helpman (2004) combine the incomplete contract theory with the Melitz
model of heterogeneous ﬁrms.16 The main concept is that ﬁrms diﬀer in their productiv-
ity, which will be decided by a random draw at the beginning period. The least productive
ﬁrms will exit the market, the more productive ﬁrms will service the domestic market
and the most productive ﬁrms will be exporters.17 Antràs and Helpman (2004) also
add a fragmentation dimension to the model. Two countries, called North and South,
are given, where the wages in North are always higher than the wages in South and
labour is the only primary input. The assembling of the ﬁnal good always happens in
the North, the production of the headquarters services like R&D likewise and of the in-
termediate component in both countries. The production of the intermediate inputs can
be outsourced to another supplier. Regarding the costs the crucial assumption is that
the highest ﬁxed costs are related to vertical integration abroad (in the South) and the
lowest to outsourcing at home (the North). The outside option of ﬁrms depends on the
organisational form. On the one hand, a ﬁnal good producer engaged in outsourcing will
have an outside option of zero if there is a breach in the contract. On the other hand,
vertically integrated ﬁrms can, even if negotiations fail because the quantity/quality sup-
plied by the supplier is not what the buyer has expected, still ﬁre the manager of the
16See Melitz (2003).
17Head and Ries (2003) get the same result with a much simpler model.
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intermediate input supplying aﬃliate and use the intermediate inputs produced. The
ﬁnal outcome would be lower than if the negotiations had not failed. The expected share
of revenue will therefore be higher for integrated ﬁrms, but the supplier will produce less
components. This setting leads to the following main results: Only the most productive
ﬁrms will be vertically integrated, less productive ﬁrms have to exit the market or en-
gage in outsourcing. Besides ﬁrm characteristics, industry characteristics are crucial for
the organisational dimension. Antràs and Helpman (2004) show that only in headquar-
ters service intensive sectors fragmentation will happen, in component intensive sectors
outsourcing will be prevailing. The reason for this is that incomplete contracts lead to
an underinvestment in the component and in the headquarters service production. The
higher the bargaining share is the lower will be the underinvestment. A proﬁt maximis-
ing ﬁrm will prefer outsourcing to insourcing if the ﬁnal good is component intensive
and integration if it is headquarters service intensive because the relevant proﬁt share is
closer to the proﬁt maximising bargaining share.
On ﬁrst appearances technological diﬀerences are closely related to the KCM. While in
the latter model the main reason for integration is moral hazard behaviour of agents, using
already existing knowledge capital for their own advantage, the technological diﬀerence
approach deals with what organisational form should be applied so a new technology
can be implemented eﬃciently. To be more speciﬁc, Acemo§lu et al. (2007) examine
when it will be more likely for a ﬁrm to shift the decision making process to managers
and when will it be better oﬀ by keeping the power concentrated. Their model works
as follows: A company can decide how a new technology should be implemented. If it
is implemented correctly the ﬁrm will experience a productivity growth. If it chooses
the wrong way, nothing will happen and the company remains at the same productivity
level. Two systems are considered: concentration or delegation of power. If the ﬁrst one is
chosen, the principal will be solely responsible for deciding how a new technology will be
implemented. Her decision will be based on the history of other companies' actions (which
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are available to the public). If nothing is known about the correct way of implementation,
it is diﬃcult for the principal to make the right decision. If the power of decision has been
delegated to a manager, the manager will always know the correct way to implement a
new technology. Unfortunately it is not always the case that the manager's decisions are
congruent to the principal's decisions. The manager gets a private beneﬁt if his preferred
choice has been chosen, even if that means that the right technology will not be employed.
According to Aghion and Tirole (1997) reasons for that could be less eﬀort to implement
it, better future career opportunities, etc. Now a trade-oﬀ arises. Through assumptions
it is the case that, on the one hand, it is more likely for the principal and the manager
to follow the same aims. This means the owner will accept the manager's advice. At
the ﬁrst look it will always be better for a company to delegate power to a manager.
Another assumption states that if there is suﬃcient information about the reference
action available, the probability of a principal choosing the right action will be higher
than the manager and the principal having the same opinion. This creates the trade-oﬀ.
Acemo§lu et al. (2007) assume that an increase (decrease) in technological heterogeneity
(homogeneity) will lead to an increase in the degree of decentralisation within a ﬁrm.
The more (less) homogeneous (heterogeneous) the ﬁrms are, the more information can be
gained by other ﬁrms that have been implementing the new technology already. If a ﬁrm
is producing at the technological frontier, then delegation will be the preferred structure,
because no public information is available how to implement new technologies. Therefore
it is more likely that delegation leads to a better outcome. This theory is based on ﬁrm
internal decisions18, but how it will be applied for fragmentation can be found on page
154.
18Aghion and Tirole (1997) focus on the diﬀerences between real and formal authority within a ﬁrm,
and show that real authority can deviate from formal authority. We only have information at the
formal authority level.
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Geographical fragmentation
In addition to the decision of the organisational structure a company also has to choose
where the intermediate inputs should be sourced from.
Factor-Proportion models
Factor Proportion Models (FPMs) can explain why a company splits up its production
and establish plants at diﬀerent locations, even if that leads to unused economies of scale.
The reasons are factor price diﬀerences between countries (or regions). The analysis
by Helpman (1984), and Helpman and Krugman (1985), is based on the Heckscher-
Ohlin model of international trade, but the capital intensive or manufacturing sector is
extended. It is assumed that the home country is relatively capital and the host country
relatively labour abundant and no transport costs exist. Three factors are needed for the
production of ﬁnal manufacturing products: Labour L, capital K and a general purpose
input factor H.19 H, headquarters services, are intangible assets of a company, which
can be transferred easily to other plants in diﬀerent countries, for example, management
and product speciﬁc R&D. Capital and labour cannot move between countries. Because
of large factor price diﬀerences no factor price equalisation can arise through trade. If
the diﬀerences are large enough it can be worth for a company of the home country
to specialise the production of headquarters services in the home country and shift the
labour intensive production stages into the host country. This can lead to factor price
equalisation, but not necessarily.
Even though the FPM are presented in an international framework it can also be consid-
ered for national fragmentation decisions. Even within countries factor prices diﬀerences
can matter. A comparison between Nottinghamshire and Inner London reveals that me-
dian hourly paid wage of all full time workers is ¿11.86 for the former and ¿16.55 in
19Note that in Helpman (1984) capital K was neglected.
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the latter in 2009.20 Big diﬀerences may exist in property prices. To set up a factory
in London is much more expensive than in the Midlands. The headquarters can still
be located in London, but the production facilities will be moved to other regions. An
empirical testing of factor price diﬀerences between administrative regions and post code
areas was conducted by Bernard et al. (2002) for the UK for the years 1986 and 1992.
They show that for six out of ten regions the factor price equalisation hypothesis can
be rejected. More disaggregated geographical data leads to a similar result. One main
assumption of the model is that workers can move from one industry to another but no
migration between countries is assumed, because otherwise factor price equalisation can
be achieved even without fragmentation.
Venables (1999) oﬀers a model which is more general than Helpman's model because it
does introduce trade barriers. Again there are two countries, the capital abundant home
country and the labour abundant foreign country. The production of a manufacturing
good requires intermediate inputs, which on their own require capital and labour. The
intermediate good can only be transferred within a company. While the ﬁnal good
can be traded freely, the intermediate goods are confronted with a tariﬀ. Of course,
the tariﬀs will only arise in an international context. In a national framework tariﬀs
may be substituted by the costs of service linkages, which will be explained in the next
paragraph. If the tariﬀ is too high, no fragmentation will happen. Now suppose that
the tariﬀ is reduced. If it is assumed that the ﬁnal assembly is more capital intensive
than the production of intermediate inputs then the production of the intermediates will
be move abroad. Vertical FDI arise, where the intermediate input is exported back to
the home country. If the upstream production process is more capital intensive than
the downstream production process, the home country will specialise in intermediate
inputs and the ﬁnal assembling will happen at home and abroad, because the export of
20See online Oﬃcial Labour Market Statistics of the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS) at http:
//www.nomisweb.co.uk, access on 11/01/10.
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intermediates on its own is facing trade costs. Horizontal FDI will arise.
Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), focus their analysis on factor cost diﬀerences and the cost
of service linkages. Service linkages comprise of telecommunication, transport, etc., to
connect fragmented production stage with each other. They show with a two factor model
that a country can improve its welfare by changing from an integrated to a fragmented
scenario. Two intermediate inputs with diﬀerent factor intensities are needed to assemble
a ﬁnal good. They compare the situation of a totally integrated production and the
production of a ﬁnal good, where the intermediate inputs are traded on the world market,
with a decathlon athlete.21 If an athlete is only good at one contest and horrible at others
she will not be able to win the competition. A sportswoman who is average at all contests
is likely to win. If you add up the result of only the best athletes of all contests, the ﬁnal
result would be superior to the integrated results. Fragmentation causes increased ﬁxed
costs which arise because of the service linkages, but, through increasing returns to scale
of services, the variable marginal costs will be lower for fragmented than for integrated
ﬁrms. They conclude that small companies will tend to be integrated, medium sized
companies to be nationally fragmented and large companies will engage in international
fragmentation.
Services in the manufacturing sector are theoretically discussed in a paper by Van Long
et al. (2005) who focus on the link between fragmentation and services. The idea of
the paper is based Jones and Kierzkowski (2001). According to Jones and Kierzkowski
services are needed for fragmentation to happen, if services are facing increasing returns
to scale. Van Long et al. (2005) stick to this approach. Two countries exist, where one is
characterised by lower wages (the host country, for example India) and a more developed
country oﬀering more specialised services (the home country, for example the United
Kingdom). Labour is the only primary input factor. The production of a manufacturing
21Of course, this example depends on the form of the production function. A function which requires
some minimum level of all inputs would have this property. But other functions would not have this
property.
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good requires components as an input factor. Components on their own need what
are called aggregated services. The idea behind aggregated services is the following: A
country can produce a certain amount of diﬀerent specialised services. Services consist of
R&D, accounting, transport, telecommunication, infrastructure, etc. Aggregated services
arise through the combination of specialised services, where the higher the amount of
diﬀerent specialised services used will lead to a decrease in the production costs of the
ﬁnal good. The bigger the country is, the more of those specialised services it can oﬀer.
The authors distinguish between non-tradable and tradable services. If services are non-
tradable the result will be that service intensive components will be exported by UK,
labour intensive components will be exported by India. UK is appreciating a positive
home market eﬀect. Furthermore, if India is going to increase its variety of specialised
services the range of goods exported will also increase. In the second scenario tradable
services are introduced. If no transport costs exist the home market eﬀect will disappear.
The price for the aggregate services will be the same then for all countries. Therefore
the production of components will happen in the country with lower wages.
The Knowledge-Capital Model
The very comprehensive KCM by Markusen (2002) is not only able to describe when
internalisation occurs, but also when geographical fragmentation will happen. The KCM
can explain the existence of companies being only domestically active, of horizontal and
of vertical MNEs. We will focus on vertical MNEs.
There are two countries, two homogeneous goods and two input factors (unskilled labour
and skilled labour). These factors are able to move freely between industries but cannot
be shifted to other countries. Also transport costs exist. The manufacturing good is
produced with increasing returns to scale at the ﬁrm and at the plant level. Vertical
and domestic ﬁrms can service foreign markets via exports. Fragmentation costs are low
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and jointness is high.22 Fixed costs depend on which strategy is chosen. All of those
assumptions lead to the result that the choice of strategy depends on the market size of
both countries, the ﬁxed costs of the strategy chosen and on the price mark-ups, which
also depend on transport costs.
If both countries are of similar size and factor prices are quite similar then only horizontal
MNEs will exist. If the factor prices are diverging from each other than a mixed strategy
with national and multinational ﬁrms will arise. The more the factor prices diﬀer from
each other, the higher is the possibility of the appearance of vertical ﬁrms.23 Given
trade costs, elasticity of substitution, low fragmentation costs and high jointness, the
strategy chosen depends solely on the diﬀerences in factor endowments. The KCM shows
that geographical fragmentation depends on factor price diﬀerences and furthermore
if transport costs are too high, then no vertical integration will happen. But those
conditions are not suﬃcient to have geographical fragmentation to arise. It also depends
on the market size and which country is relatively skilled labour abundant.24
Markusen modiﬁes the model by allowing a fragmented production process where one
block of it is producing physical intermediate inputs which are needed to assemble a ﬁnal
good. Factor price diﬀerences are still important but, unlike before, too large diﬀerences
have a negative eﬀect on vertical fragmentation. The market size aﬀects the decision of
vertical fragmentation. If the host country is small in comparison to the home country
a proportionally larger amount of goods has to be exported back to the home country,
22See page 15 for the deﬁnition of fragmentation costs and jointness.
23Under certain circumstances, large diﬀerences in factor endowments and size of the countries, a do-
mestic exporting ﬁrm equilibrium can exist.
24If one country A is large and the other one called B is quite small, the ﬁnal production stage will
happen in A, mainly because the proximity to the ﬁnal market reduces costs. The decision of where
the headquarters are located will constitute then if a company is internationally fragmented or not. If
the small country B is skilled labour abundant, and the factor costs of skilled labour are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent, then companies will locate their headquarters in B. If the large country is well endowed
with skilled labour, then the optimal strategy is concentration in the large country. But even if both
countries have the same size, but one country C is skilled labour abundant in comparison to country
D, vertical integration can still come into existence if the price diﬀerences between the ﬁnal good
prices are high enough. Then companies might skim the rents in D by setting up a local production
in D and keeping the headquarters in C.
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which leads to an increase in transport costs.
Summary
Organisational and geographical fragmentation require diﬀerent explanations, where the
former one is dependent on internalisation advantages and the latter one on locational
advantages. Organisational fragmentation can be explained by two streams of literature.
The KCM focuses on opportunistic behaviour of agents which arise through the exis-
tence of knowledge-capital. This leads to internalisation (integration) being preferred to
licensing (fragmentation). The second stream deals with incomplete contracts. Because
perfect contracts do not exist, the decision of generating the second best outcome out
of the contractual relationship through external or internal sourcing depends on how
important speciﬁc intermediate input factors are for the production of the ﬁnal good.
Geographical fragmentation can be explained by the KCM as well as with the Factor
Proportion models. Both lead to the same result that factor price diﬀerences matter.
2.1.3. Empirical evidence on the determinants of fragmentation
Many studies have been conducted to ﬁnd determinants of the organisational structure
of ﬁrms, but often the theoretical diﬀerentiation between the organisational and spatial
dimension has not been accounted for. A second drawback of the empirical literature is
that often only a multi-plant structure is considered without taking account of whether
those plants are vertically integrated or not. This empirical literature review will start
with summarising aggregated studies from the 1970s and will lead to recent ﬁrm level
studies.
Early studies were mainly based on cross-section data but, over time, time-series data
became available. The majority of studies are based on aggregate FDI data. Those FDI
ﬂows are actually ﬁnancial ﬂows and might lead to an under- or overestimation of the
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real activity of a company abroad.25 An often quoted study about the causes of FDI is
by Caves (1974). This study was already published before Dunning introduced his OLI
classiﬁcation. Caves used data from the manufacturing sector of Canada and the UK to
conduct two separate cross industry studies by taking average values for the variables be-
tween the years 1965  1968. The dependent variable used is the share of sales accounted
for by foreign owned ﬁrms. The independent variables are categorised into three diﬀer-
ent groups called intangible capital, multi-plant enterprises and entrepreneurial resources.
The ﬁrst one comprises assets which are necessary to be able to compete with local ﬁrms
which already possess knowledge of the local market. These assets must be assets which
can be used in the foreign market without losing its functionality. The multi-plant enter-
prise factors consist of all advantages having multiple ﬁrms in relation to a concentrated
production. Low economies of scale at the plant level and transport costs would be part
of this category. Finally, if a company possesses excessive entrepreneurial resources it can
use them abroad, for example, if it has unused resources of skilled workers, those can be
employed abroad to use full production capacities. Because higher proﬁts are expected
in sectors where higher entrepreneurial skills are required MNEs will predominantly be
located in those sectors.26 In all regressions the intangible assets variable were signiﬁ-
cant and had the expected positive impact. The multiple plant variable is signiﬁcant and
positive for Canada but insigniﬁcant for the UK. The entrepreneurial resources factors
lack on empirical evidence. Caves must confess that even the theoretical foundation is
rather weak. This model gives already insight into how many factors can inﬂuence FDI
decisions.
With increasing worldwide FDI ﬂows in the 1980s, the determinants of FDI attracted
25See Riegler (2007) for a precise explanation of how FDI are measured and what the actually include.
26A lot of those arguments were included in theoretical models decades after this paper. For example,
the intangible assets which can be easily transferred to foreign countries and excessive entrepreneurial
resources like headquarters services are an important part of the Helpman (1984)-model. Brainard
(1993), formalises the trade-oﬀ between trade costs and economies of scale at the plant level in the
Proximity-Concentration trade-oﬀ model.
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more and more attention of the scientiﬁc world. After the OLI-paradigm by Dunning
(1981) was published, researchers tried to classify determinants of FDI according to this
scheme.27 As an example an article by Pugel (1981) will be discussed. Pugel uses US
industry average data for the period 1967  1970. He includes intangible assets which can
be easily transferred to foreign subsidiaries in his study. He divides these O-advantages
into proprietary technology, marketing and promotional activities and organisational
and managerial techniques. All these factors can be summed up as headquarters services.
Another O-advantage is the ability of established MNE to get access to favourable funding
sources. L-factors aﬀect the choice of exporting vs. outward FDI. For Pugel factors like
transport costs and economies of scale are part of this category, which favours centralizing
or decentralising of production. Another argument, already used by Caves (1974), is that
MNEs will usually be located in oligopolistic markets, because it is easier for them to
surpass existing entry barriers. These barriers lead to a high concentration of companies.
Therefore a positive relation between FDI and concentration is expected. Finally a
positive relationship between FDI and ﬁrm size is assumed. The bigger the ﬁrm the
easier it is to raise capital and are better suited for engaging in international production.
He ﬁnds evidence for a signiﬁcant positive impact of ownership advantages. Economies of
scale at the plant level have a signiﬁcant negative impact on FDI but distance measured
as transport radius is not signiﬁcant.
From the 1980s onwards, many studies about FDI have been focused on locational advan-
tages which is the important factor for spatial fragmentation. One area of concern was
tax rates. One early paper is by Hartman (1984) who saw tax rates as the main reason
for FDI and did not account for any other covariates. Hartman used time-series data,
had few observations and the data quality is questionable. He pointed out that direct
investors respond to eﬀective and not to statutory tax rates. Slemrod (1989) explains
27See Dunning (1985), for an overview about diﬀerent case studies about determinants and eﬀects of
FDI.
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that Hartman's view is too narrow and highlighted the importance of inclusion of other
independent variables. He shows the shortcomings of Hartman's approach and estimated
his own model using an eﬀective marginal tax measure, and also takes non-tax variables
which might inﬂuence the ﬂows of FDI into account, like, for example, the real exchange
rate, a measure of relative size of the US to the investing countries and a measure for cap-
turing business cycle eﬀects. Slemrod's result, contrary to Hartman's, is that taxes have
a negative impact on total FDI and transfers of funds but not on reinvested earnings.
The estimation methods and the theoretical foundations improved a lot over time. The
famous gravity model of Newton, which became popular in economics for estimating
trade ﬂows between countries, also became a crucial part of the FDI literature. The
main idea is that the larger two masses (countries), and the lower the distance between
those masses is, the higher the amount of trade-ﬂows between those countries will be. The
eﬀect of distance on FDI is ambiguous. Proximity means there are less cultural barriers
and therefore it is easier to set up a business in close markets. If potential markets
are rather far away then high transport costs can make it worthwhile to do FDI.28 An
augmented gravity model using panel data is very common nowadays for studies looking
at aggregated FDI ﬂows.
For example, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) and Bellak and Leibrecht (2009) using panel
data and the gravity model to look closer at the eﬀects of taxes on FDI ﬂows.29 Both
ﬁnd a negative impact of taxation and in, general, signiﬁcant eﬀects of gravity variables.
Surprisingly, the Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) measure of relative unit labour costs is
positive, meaning that the higher the unit labour costs the more inward FDI will be
28The gravity model with FDI suﬀered from the same problem as trade ﬂows  the lack of theoret-
ical foundation. The popular theoretical justiﬁcation of gravity models for trade ﬂows is based on
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). With some delay a framework was also found for FDI models.
The application of the gravity model for FDI ﬂows was theoretically justiﬁed by Kleinert and Toubal
(2005). They derive the gravity model based on the FDI theories mentioned in 2.1.2.
29See Devereux (2006) for an explanation which tax rate should be used for FDI decisions and de Mooij
and Ederveen (1999) for a meta study about the impact of taxes on FDI.
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attracted.30 Distance is insigniﬁcant, which is interpreted as a proof for the proximity
concentration trade-oﬀ. Bellak and Leibrecht (2009) mention that the importance of
taxation should not be overrated because other determinants have an equal or even
greater impact, for example, the higher the unit labour costs in the host countries are
the lower will be the amount of FDI ﬂows into those regions. Razin and Sadka (2007)
estimate a gravity model but diﬀerently to above their focus was not on taxes but on
diﬀerent estimation methods. Data used comes from 24 OECD countries from 1981
to 1998. Using a gravity model can lead to a large loss of data, because zero and
negative values are omitted through the logarithmic calculus. Additionally, ﬁxed costs
can prevent companies to invest abroad. A two stage Heckman model can take account
of these factors.31 Their results can diﬀer strongly based on the estimation method.
The coeﬃcient for distance is signiﬁcantly negative. The cultural distance measured by
a common language dummy is positive and signiﬁcant. The size variables are with the
exception of the selection stage of the Heckman model signiﬁcant, the same applies for
GDP per capita in the host and the home country. Görg et al. (2007) look at the eﬀect
of the interaction between taxes and social expenditures on inward FDI ﬂows of OECD
countries. Their main result was that the overall impact of taxation (social expenditure)
is softened by social expenditures (taxation). Furthermore, market size attracts FDI,
but unit labour costs and capital costs are positive but insigniﬁcant.
The international literature proves that ownership advantages are necessary to become
a MNE. A company needs some knowledge capital to be able to compete in diﬀerent
markets, but also that sourcing from the market would be less proﬁtable. The choice of
where a company will locate its plants will be then based on locational factors, like unit
labour costs. Still, to be able to look at the eﬀect of certain factors on organisational
or spatial fragmentation, more precise data is necessary. For example, for organisational
30They explain it with the Balassa Samuelson eﬀect.
31Other models estimated are a model where zero values of FDI inﬂows are substituted with the smallest
amount of FDI ﬂow prevailing in the data, a model where all zeros are omitted and a Tobit model.
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fragmentation it is more important to have data about how many inputs of a ﬁrm are
sourced from the market.
At the end of the last century there was an increase in papers discussing this topic. Most
of those papers are based on ﬁrm level data, but nearly every paper uses a diﬀerent
concept for measuring fragmentation. Abraham and Taylor (1996) is one of the most
cited papers in this area. They are using US manufacturing data from the manufacturing
Industry Wage Survey (IWS) for the year 1979, 1983 and 1986/87 and do not diﬀerentiate
between foreign and domestic outsourcing. Only ﬁrms with at least 20 to 100 employees
can be part of the survey. Five diﬀerent services are considered: janitorial services,
machine maintenance services, engineering and drafting services, accounting services and
computer services. Firms have to report what share of those services has been outsourced
to outside contractors. In the regression a sample between 1,500 and 2,000 observations
is used. Three diﬀerent categories of determinants are considered. The ﬁrst ones are cost-
savings advantages. High wages and high beneﬁts, because of strong trade unions, provide
an incentive for outsourcing to reduce costs. The second argument is based on volatility
of output demand. It can be better for ﬁrms to hire outside suppliers during peak time to
satisfy demand instead of producing everything internally and having unused capacities
during oﬀ-peak periods. Finally, there is an argument of the availability of specialised
skills possessed by outside suppliers. Examples are complex computer problems which
can be better dealt with outside IT experts. Specialised services are also connected
to regional aspects. The more concentrated a region is the more specialised service
provider will be available and therefore the likelihood of outsourcing should increase.
The model estimated is a ordered Probit model because the dependent variable is divided
into six diﬀerent categories.32 They add industry dummies to take account of unobserved
industry eﬀects. The main results are that cost-savings advantages are the main reason to
32The categories are 0%, 1%  25%, 26%  74%, 75%  99%, 100% and outsourcing has happened but
the percentage is unknown.
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outsource low skilled janitorial services. The eﬀect of trade unions is not clear. With the
exception of janitorial services, larger ﬁrms are more likely to contract out the other four
services. Finally, a metropolitan region has a positive signiﬁcant impact on outsourcing
for accounting and computer services.
A paper dealing with the determinants of fragmentation in the UK is by Girma and
Görg (2004). They use ﬁrm level data of the Annual Respondents Database (ARD)33 for
three diﬀerent manufacturing sectors, chemicals, mechanical and instrument engineering
and electronics for the period 1980  1992. Firms with more than 100 employees and
some smaller ﬁrms are included. They deﬁne outsourcing as cost of industrial services
received by an establishment. Therefore non-industrial services like accounting, janitorial
services etc., which were part of the Abraham and Taylor (1996) deﬁnition, are not
included. Besides Abraham and Taylor's determinants they put a special focus on foreign
ownership. They expect foreign owned ﬁrms to be more likely to be fragmented. Being
part of a MNE means that ﬁrms will be more specialised by deﬁnition, they can easier ﬁnd
outside contractors and because of being expected to use better technology than domestic
ﬁrms, more likely to outsource low-skilled activities. The number of observations varies
between 5,700 and 23,600 depending on the sector and estimation method. OLS and
ﬁrst diﬀerence regressions with using lagged outsourcing as explanatory variable are
used. The latter regression can take care of time invariant unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity
and the correlation between outsourcing now and in the past periods. Both models show
a positive eﬀect of foreign ownership on outsourcing activities. The level analysis also
ﬁnds evidence that high wages are positively correlated with outsourcing.
Tomiura (2005) provides evidence for Japan. He uses cross-sectional ﬁrm level data for
the year 1998. The data captures the whole Japanese manufacturing sector and does not
have any ﬁrm size restrictions. The beauty of the data is that a diﬀerentiation between
foreign and domestic outsourcing is possible. Outsourcing is deﬁned as the yen value
33This database will be discussed on section 3.6.
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outsourced to ﬁrms located overseas and that to ﬁrms located inside the country, respec-
tively. Firms outsourcing non-production overhead services or arm's length purchases of
standardised goods are not included. Finally contracting out to own subsidiaries is not
diﬀerentiated from outsourcing. Therefore the actual organisational fragmentation can
be overstated. This paper shows diﬀerent characteristics of ﬁrms which are or are not
foreign and/or domestically outsourcing. Tomiura (2005) focuses on technological diﬀer-
ences between ﬁrms, namely productivity, computer usage, physical capital per labour
ratio and R&D intensity. Additionally, ﬁrm size eﬀects are taken into account. Descrip-
tive statistics show that ﬁrms which are outsourcing overseas (oﬀshoring) are generally
much bigger, more productive and require a higher amount of human skills. In the empir-
ical model the correlation between technology and foreign outsourcing intensity measured
by value of outsourcing divided by sales is tested. Because of the large number of ﬁrms
without any foreign outsourcing activities Tomiura (2005) employs a two-stage Heckman
selection model.34 His results are that there are signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs for entry, more
productive ﬁrms and ﬁrms using more computers are more likely to outsource. The cap-
ital to labour ratio has a negative correlation with foreign outsourcing. Finally R&D is
an important determinant for domestic and foreign outsourcing.
A recent study by Díaz-Mora (2008) deals with the Spanish manufacturing sector for the
period 1993  2002. In contrast to the three studies mentioned above, industry level data
for 93 industries is used. Outsourcing is deﬁned as parts of the production process carried
out by other ﬁrms. Again, the range of activities included in this concept is rather limited
and contains only product related tasks. The determinants are similar to Girma and Görg
(2004) but she adds an export propensity indicator. It is expected that exporting ﬁrms
have a better international network and can therefore ﬁnd a specialised supplier more
34This model deals with the problem of censored data. For example, it could be the case that a ﬁrm
would engage in foreign outsourcing but, because of certain ﬁxed costs, it will not be able. Therefore
the selection of ﬁrms actually engaging in foreign outsourcing is not exogenous any more (Razin and
Sadka, 2007, ch. 7). The Heckman model deals with this selectivity bias.
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easily. This paper estimates a dynamic model by using a Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM) estimator and at least three lagged variables for endogenous variables. Her main
result is that outsourcing is persistent, because of high costs of setting up an outsourcing
relationship. Again, there is evidence that high unit labour costs increase the probability
to outsource. Interestingly, she ﬁnds that a higher share of domestic ﬁrms leads to a
higher outsourcing level, which is in contrast to the result of Girma and Görg (2004).
Furthermore, in industries with high skilled requirements more outsourcing will appear.
Another stream of literature focuses on locational factors like, for example, geographical
concentration, as determinants of fragmentation. Already Abraham and Taylor (1996)
used a regional concentration measure to indicate the amount of specialised services
oﬀered. Taymaz and Kiliçaslan (2005) look at how regional development aﬀected out-
sourcing in Turkey. They have ﬁrm level data for the textile and engineering sector for
the period 1993  2000. Only ﬁrms with at least 10 employees are part of the sample.
A random eﬀect Tobit model with two diﬀerent dependent variables is estimated. Sub-
contracting intensity is measured as share of subcontracted inputs and as the share of
subcontracted outputs but those inputs or outputs are not speciﬁcally deﬁned. To show
the importance of networks and clusters they use the number of ﬁrms in the same in-
dustry and the same province and expect a positive relation with subcontracting. Many
ﬁrm characteristics are controlled for like average wage, ﬁrm size, capital intensity and
the share of skilled workers. Taymaz and Kiliçaslan (2005) ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that
geographical concentration has a positive eﬀect on outsourcing in the textile and engi-
neering industry. The eﬀect of capital intensity on the share of subcontracted inputs is
positive in both sectors.
Holl (2008) links sub-contracting decisions with the location of Spanish ﬁrms of the man-
ufacturing sector for the period 1990  1999. Only ﬁrms with more than ten employees
are considered. For the ﬁnal estimations more than 16,000 observations exist. Like Tay-
maz and Kiliçaslan (2005), Holl expects agglomeration to have a positive inﬂuence on
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outsourcing. First, search costs for ﬁnding a suitable subcontracting partner are lower.
Second, through tougher competition between providers, prices for intermediaries will go
down. Finally, proximity to upstream and downstream industry will lead to time-savings
and lower transportation costs, which supports subcontracting. Outsourcing is deﬁned
as a contractual relationship in which the ﬁrm commissions a third party company to
produce products, parts, or components made to the ﬁrms speciﬁcation. Arm's length
trade is not included. The variable of interest, agglomeration, is measured as the to-
tal regional industrial employment density. Other ﬁrm characteristics controls are wage
costs, size, age and foreign ownership. Holl highlights simultaneity issues, for example, it
could be the case that more productive ﬁrms are active in agglomerated regions and that
also more productive ﬁrms are more fragmented, which could lead to an overestimation
of the eﬀect of agglomeration on outsourcing. To take account of the correlation of the
error term and the covariates, a Chamberlain random eﬀects model is employed. The
results are that agglomeration has a positive impact on subcontracting decisions. Also
age, wage and size have a positive impact on the probability to outsource.
Acemo§lu et al. (2010) test the property rights theory of Grossman and Hart (1986)
for UK ﬁrms.35 To be more precise, they diﬀerentiate between how the technological
intensity of the ﬁnal good producer and intermediate inputs supplier aﬀect the decision
to be vertically integrated. They expect that if the producer is technology intensive,
then ﬁrm i will be integrated, if the supplier is technology intensive, than ﬁrm i will be
fragmented.36 Acemo§lu et al. (2010) use a vertical integration dummy and a continuous
vertical integration measure which uses input-output tables to link together plants within
ﬁrms.37 The unit of observation is the ﬁrm industry pair level, for example how much
of an speciﬁc intermediate input required to produce a good are produced by a ﬁrm.
If the good requires three intermediate inputs than three observation of that ﬁrm will
35See page 17 for a description of incomplete contract theories.
36See pages 21 for the theoretical background of the paper.
37We use a similar measure in this thesis. See page 49 for a detailed explanation.
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exist. R&D intensity is measured by R&D expenditures divided by value added at the
industry level. The databases used for the vertical integration measures are the ARD
and input-output tables, and for the R&D intensities the Business Enterprise Research
and Development (BERD) database, all provided by the ONS. Acemo§lu et al. (2010)
use a linear probability model for the vertical integration dummy (rather than a binary
model), because it is easier to interpret, easier to estimate if the sample is large and
individual ﬁxed eﬀects can be used to control for unobserved ﬁrm eﬀects. The cross
section sample consists of nearly 3m observations. The results conﬁrm the theoretical
model, regardless of whether the dummy or the continuous measure are used.
In contrast to the papers mentioned above, Acemo§lu et al. (2007) are interested in
whether the decision-making power of a ﬁrm is concentrated or delegated to managers.
They test how the distance to the technological frontier, technological industry hetero-
geneity and age aﬀects the power delegation. The dependent variable is a dummy indicat-
ing if a ﬁrm has the decision power delegated to aﬃliates, which can act as proﬁt centres
autonomously or it is concentrated and aﬃliates are just cost centres with much less au-
tonomy. The main analysis is based on French data from Changements Organisationnels
et Informatisation (COI) merged with Format Uniﬁé Total d'Entreprises (FUTE) ﬁles
and leaves a cross section ﬁle with 3,570 observations, where all independent variables
are lagged. Because of a dichotomous dependent variable a Probit model with industry
dummies was estimated and all results are in accordance with the theory. Firms closer to
the technological frontier, ﬁrms active in a technological heterogeneous environment and
younger ﬁrms are more likely to delegate power. Many diﬀerent robustness checks have
been conducted to address speciﬁcally the endogeneity topic. As instrument for French
industry characteristics British industry data sourced from the Annual Business Inquiry
(ABI) is employed. The IV-Probit supports the baseline results. Furthermore, the model
with French data is also estimated for the UK by using the Workplace Employee Rela-
tions Survey (WERS), but was facing several limitations, for example, many covariates
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are not available for British ﬁrms. Still, also this analysis supports their theory.
The empirical literature about spatial fragmentation is less evolved and often based on
anecdotal evidence. Chandler (1990) oﬀers a descriptive analysis about how ﬁrms have
changed over time. He describes through his observations what kind of ﬁrms will be
geographically dispersed. First, ﬁrms have to reach a certain size, so they can make use
of their economies of scale and scope. After reaching a certain level, ﬁrms start to set
up plants in diﬀerent locations. Most arguments are based on horizontal local units,
like increasing market size and product diversiﬁcation. The vertical argument is mainly
based on defensive reasons. A company wants to secure the ﬂow of inputs (for example
from mines) if they are not available in the local area. Audia et al. (2000) ﬁnd evidence
to support Chandler's claims. They are interested in how the organisational structure of
a dispersed ﬁrm will aﬀect the performance of the ﬁrm. Evidence is found that geograph-
ically dispersed ﬁrms perform better than concentrated ﬁrms. They focus their study on
US manufacturers from 1949  1989. Data comes from the Annual Shoemaking Direc-
tory of Shoe Manufacturers. Their explanation is that dispersed ﬁrms beneﬁt from lower
transport costs and risk diversiﬁcation, which is similar to Chandler's results. In contrast
to the often stated assumption that knowledge can be easily transferred between local
units, Audia et al. (2000) ﬁnd evidence that after reaching a certain distance knowledge
can be hardly transferred any more and also the usefulness of knowledge is declining.38
But as will be shown in the following studies, geographical dispersion is based on more
factors than just risk diversiﬁcation.
That risk diversiﬁcation is not the only factor for spatial dispersion show Landier et al.
(2009). They ﬁnd evidence for the link between spatial dispersion of a ﬁrm and the
tendency of managers towards employees and shareholders. It is easier for a ﬁrm to
lay-oﬀ workers and sell-oﬀ of local units which are further away. They argue that social
38They measure this eﬀect by interacting an experience variable based on Ingram and Baum (1997) with
geographical dispersion and ﬁnd that dispersed ﬁrms beneﬁt less from operating experience.
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pressure of the local community will inﬂuence managers. This social pressure seems to
be much stronger in smaller villages than in big cities, where the employee protection
seems to be absent. Concluding, a ﬁrm can choose to be spatially dispersed to conduct
a more shareholder than employee friendly policy. Data comes from a variety of sources,
for example ﬁnancial information is provided by Compustat, employee information comes
from SOCRATES, division data from Hewitt Associates and divestiture data from Secure
Data Corporation (SDC).
A study which looks at the determinants of spatial fragmentation is by Galliano et al.
(2007). They use a two stage Heckman model. In the ﬁrst stage they estimate which
ﬁrms will be more likely to become multi-plant ﬁrms. In the second stage they focus on
the spatial fragmentation of the local units. The determinants tested are ﬁrm internal
characteristics like ﬁrm size, economies of scale and economies of scope, and ﬁrm envi-
ronment factors, for example, in which area the headquarters are located. It is assumed
that if the headquarters are located in urban areas then ﬁrms will be more likely to be
multi-plant and geographically dispersed ﬁrms. This argument is related to the factor-
price diﬀerence argument, where production stages will be moved to less populated areas
to decrease the costs of production, but keeping the headquarters in cities because of the
higher number of skilled people and a bigger variety of services oﬀered. The beauty of
the study is that the authors were able to diﬀerentiate between horizontal and vertical
multi-plant ﬁrms. The authors use French data from the Annual Survey of Firms (ASF)
of 2001 which consists of around 22,000 observations. They ﬁnd strong evidence of ﬁrms'
size having a positive eﬀect on the probability of becoming a multi-plant ﬁrm and being
dispersed and a negative eﬀect of economies of scale at the plant level. Many ﬁrm charac-
teristics have similar eﬀects on the dispersion of horizontal and vertical local units. The
main diﬀerences are that investment in ICT matter for the degree of dispersion of vertical
local units. Higher ICT expenditures are positively correlated with vertical dispersion.
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Firms with headquarters in cities and local units in peri-urban39 areas have the spatial
proﬁle for being most spatially dispersed.
Another related stream of literature focuses on the location decision of production and
service stages of companies. Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) discuss headquarters location
and relocation decision of ﬁrms. Headquarters are likely to be found in regions with
concentrated business services, same industry specialisation and agglomeration of other
headquarters. Henderson and Ono (2008) add another dimension to the Strauss-Kahn
and Vives (2009) analysis. They look at how important the distance between production
local units and ﬁrst stand-alone headquarters are. They ﬁnd that the location of the
headquarters depends on the distance to the production facilities. This result is supported
by Defever (2010). His analysis is focused on the location decision of production and
service activities of multi-national ﬁrms in Europe. He ﬁnds that ﬁrms mainly reinvest
into the same regions. Proximity to existing production plants matters for the location
of new production facilities, however this does not seem to be of importance for service
activities.
There is not always a clear separation of organisational and spatial fragmentation in the
empirical literature. The literature focusing purely on organisational fragmentation is
more comprehensive than the literature about spatial fragmentation. The results for the
former are sometimes ambiguous, which is often related with diﬀerent kind of variables
employed to capture outsourcing. Papers about international fragmentation show that
factor price diﬀerences matter for spatial fragmentation. Additionally, agglomeration
eﬀects seem to inﬂuence the spatial dimension of a ﬁrm.
39Areas which are between the suburbs and the countryside.
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2.1.4. How can fragmentation be measured?
While it is the case that the theory behind fragmentation has been very elaborately
investigated, the literature of how to measure fragmentation has still to catch up. An
improvement in the availability of data leads to an enhancement of the quality and
precision of the measurement. There is no unique measure for fragmentation because
of its complexity mentioned in table 2.1. To be able to provide a precise measure for
organisational and spatial fragmentation, we will present them separately.
Organisational fragmentation
The pioneer of measuring vertical integration was Adelman (1955), and since then there
have been further developments to improve that measure. The measures used in the
literature can be classiﬁed in diﬀerent ways. One way is according to the aggregation level,
for example, the degree of vertical integration at the economy, industry, ﬁrm and local
unit (establishment) level. Furthermore, vertical integration can be conducted in diﬀerent
direction. A company can be forward or backward vertically integrated. A downstream
ﬁrm which buys a supplier would become backward-integrated. An upstream ﬁrm40
which buys a ﬁrm which it supplies would become forward-integrated. Some empirical
measures distinguish between these two cases, and some do not. Finally a classiﬁcation
into classical and input-output tables based measures of vertical integration helps to
give a clearer picture of how the degree of vertical integration can be calculated. Table
2.2 overviews existing measures of vertical integration. Vertical integration is just the
opposite of organisational fragmentation and can be calculated by one minus the degree
of vertical integration. The reader should be reminded that this way of calculation is
only suitable for creating a measure of organisational fragmentation and does not capture
40Antràs et al. (2012) created recently a measure for the distance of an industry to the ﬁnal customer
(upstreamness). For example, car producers deliver in general straight to the ﬁnal customers, but
products of ﬁrms in the petrochemical industry will pass several stages before they reach the ﬁnal
customer.
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information about geographical fragmentation.
Classical
Backward Forward no diﬀ.
Local Unit   
Firm Adelman (1955), Gort
(1962), Tucker and
Wilder (1977)
Adelman (1955),
Tucker and Wilder
(1977)

Industry Adelman (1955),
Tucker and Wilder
(1977)
Adelman (1955),
Tucker and Wilder
(1977)

Modern
Local Unit measure used in this
thesis
measure used in this
thesis

Firm Acemo§lu et al.
(2010), measure used
in this thesis
measure used in this
thesis
Maddigan (1981),
Davies and Morris
(1995)
Industry Davies and Morris
(1995)
Caves and Bradburd
(1988), Davies and
Morris (1995)

Table 2.2: Vertical integration measures used in literature
Classical measures of vertical integration
As mentioned above, Adelman (1955) is regarded as the starting point of measuring
integration. He presents a value-added to sales measure at the economy and the ﬁrm
level. The latter, which is also used by Tucker and Wilder (1977), looks like
viadelk =
Vk
Sk
(2.1)
where Vk is the value-added by ﬁrm k and Sk the sales of ﬁrm k. If a ﬁrm is completely
vertically integrated, then the value added is equal to sales and viadelk equals unity, for
example a self-suﬃcient farmer who produces everything by using his own intermediate
inputs. Outsourcing leads to a constant amount of sales but a decreasing amount of
value added, therefore the measure will decrease. The ﬁrm measure is criticised, because
it strongly depends on where the ﬁrm is located in a production chain. The closer the
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ﬁrm produces to a primary sector the more likely it will be having a high degree of
vertical integration (Adelman, 1955; Tucker and Wilder, 1977; Maddigan, 1981; Caves
and Bradburd, 1988; Davies and Morris, 1995).41 Note that, according to Adelman,
the industry classiﬁcations of ﬁrms depend on the industry of the ﬁnal good producer.
For example, an iron ore extracting company which is producing intermediates for the
car industry is part of the same industry as the actual ﬁnal car assembler. The value
added to sales ratio will be lower for the car assembler than for the iron ore producer.
It is therefore diﬃcult to compare the degree of vertical integration of ﬁrms in the same
production chain. If we only consider the industry of a ﬁrm and not of the ﬁnal product,
this problem will not arise. The Adelman (1955) measure can also be calculated at the
industry level and can avoid the problems mentioned.42
Gort (1962) identiﬁes which production steps are separable and which are not. Only if
it can be observed that, within an industry, some ﬁrms exist which source goods from a
vertical production stage externally, then those ﬁrms who source them in-house will be
regarded as integrated. To solve this problem a 4-digit SIC code is used. Gort (1962)
got information about products produced from public records. The more SIC activities,
which are needed to produce the ﬁnal good, a ﬁrm performs, the higher will be the
degree of vertical integration. The ﬁnal good or the main activity is identiﬁed by the
highest employment share which can be allocated to an activity. The rest are regarded as
auxiliary activities. Employment data was gained through Census of Manufacturing.
To gain the degree of vertical integration Gort (1962) calculated the number of people
41Adelman (1955) illustrates the problem with the following example: Imagine three ﬁrms in a given
industry exist where a company A is a primary production ﬁrm, B a manufacturing ﬁrm and C a
retail ﬁrm. All of them are responsible for a value added of ﬁve currency units. viadelk will be one for
A, 0.5 for B and 0.33 for C. If B acquires A, than its degree of vertical integration will increase to one
(out of B's sales of ten currency units, all value added is generated internally). If forward integration
happens (B buys C) then the viadelk will only be 0.67 (Five units of value added are still produced by
unaﬃliated company A). Forward and backward integration lead to a diﬀerent result and forward
integration can even lead to a decrease in the degree of vertical integration, if the downstream ﬁrm
is sourcing the majority of intermediate inputs from other ﬁrms.
42Eckard (1979) and Davies and Morris (1995) further point out that many datasets only allow to
generate an intra-industry ﬁrm measure, and not an inter industry measure.
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employed in auxiliary activities in relationship to the number of people employed in total
by the ﬁrm. It looks like as follows and is a measure for the ﬁrm level.
vigortk =
Lauxk
Ltotk
(2.2)
Again this measure is confronted with certain problems. The selection of main and
auxiliary activities is sometimes arbitrary, the data collection can be very laborious and
the interpretation of data often requires expert knowledge (Davies and Morris, 1995).
Input-output measures of vertical integration
The new generation of vertical integration measures is based on an idea by Maddigan
(1981), where all of those new measures use information of input-output tables. Maddigan
focuses on the ﬁrm level.
vimaddk = 1−
[
1∏n
i=1(Ci)
T (Ci)(Di)T (Di)
]
(2.3)
where T stands for transpose and n for the number of industries ﬁrm k is part of. Ci and
Di need further explanations. Ci (Di) represents the i
th column (row) of ﬁrm k's input
(output) matrix. Those matrices are generated through input-output tables. So to get
Cij someone has to calculate the share of net-output of industry j caused by intermediate
inputs from industry i. Then only those industries are selected in which ﬁrm k is active.
Dij is calculated similarly with the exception that the share of industry i's net-output
delivered to industry j is used. A numerical example in the appendix on page 264 can
help to improve the understanding for that measure. Davies and Morris (1995) point
out that this measure treats all ﬁrms with the same distribution of local units over the
industries equally, regardless the amount of the local units' output.
Caves and Bradburd (1988) create a forward oriented measure of vertical integration for
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industry i, where the size of the activities of ﬁrms belonging to industry i in industry
j are considered. They use the share of intermediate inputs of industry i delivered to
industry j of the IO-tables to identify the vertical connection between each sectors. Then
the number of ﬁrms are counted which are located in sector i and j and the share is then
used as a weight, see the following equation.
vifC&Bi =
∑
j
bij
(
NVij
Nij
)
(2.4)
where bij is the share of output from industry i delivered to industry j, weighted by the
share of companies from industry i which are also active in industry j, divided by the
total number of ﬁrms in industry i or j, depending on where the smaller number of ﬁrms
exist. Unfortunately this measure only provides information at the industry level.
Davies and Morris (1995) circumvent the problems of the two measures mentioned above.
Three diﬀerent measures are presented, a ﬁrm level measure of vertical integration with
no distinction between forward and backward integration and a forward and backward
measure at the industry level. Similarly to above, relative shares from use or supply
matrices are used and weighted then by the market share of each company, instead of
the relative share of the number of ﬁrms Caves and Bradburd (1988) are using.
viD&Mk =
R∑
i=1
R∑
j 6=i
bij
Xim
k
ij
Xk
(2.5)
vifD&Mi =
R∑
j 6=i
N∑
k=1
bijm
k
ij (2.6)
vibD&Mi =
R∑
j 6=i
N∑
k=1
ajim
k
ij (2.7)
whereN is the number of ﬁrms, R the number of industries, aji is the technical coeﬃcient,
bij the sales destination coeﬃcient and m
k
ij a market share coeﬃcient.
43 The measure
43mkij represents the minimum of the market share either in industry i or industry j.
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for forward integration of industry i aggregates the share of output of industry i sold
in industry j weighted by the ﬁrms market share. The same procedure is used for the
backward integration measure, where instead of bij the share of goods from industry i
demanded by industry j is used. Finally the ﬁrm level measure of equation 2.5 identiﬁes
all intra-ﬁrm ﬂows and divides it by ﬁrm k's total sales.44 No diﬀerentiation between
backward and forward vertical integration is made.
Two strong assumptions are considered: On the one hand, ﬁxed technical and sales
destination coeﬃcient are assumed, meaning that all ﬁrms of the same industry have the
identical input and the same customer structure. While the assumption of a Leontief
technology where all ﬁrms use the same technology seems reasonable, the assumption of
the same customer structure seems rather far-fetched. On the other hand, it is further
assumed that internal transactions are always preferred to arms-length trade. So if a ﬁrm
has a local unit in an intermediate good supplying industry it will source the good from
its aﬃliate and not from other ﬁrms. We will use similar assumptions for our vertical
integration measure in this thesis. Those assumptions have advantages but also face
certain limitations. We will discuss this further in section 4.4.1 on pages 114ﬀ.
Finally, Acemo§lu et al. (2010) generate a dummy variable and a continuous variable for
vertical integration. In contrast to above the measure is less aggregated and displays the
degree of vertical integration of ﬁrm k for an industry pair ij. They focus on backward
integration but the measure could also be used for forward integration. The dummy is
created by looking if a ﬁrm has a local unit in a sector which is an intermediate input
supplier for one of ﬁrm k's products:
vidacekij =


0 . . . if ﬁrm k does not own a plant in industry j supplying industry i
1 . . . if the ﬁrm k owns at least one plant in industry j supplying industry i
(2.8)
44It does not matter if aji or bij is used.
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The continuous measure at the ﬁrm level requires more information. The demand of ﬁrm
k for intermediate input j for its output of good i is calculated by total costs of ﬁrm k to
produce output i and the technical coeﬃcient. For the vertical integration ratio this value
is used as the denominator and the amount of ﬁrm k's production of j as numerator. This
is formally presented in equation 2.9. For example, a ﬁrm k is producing footballs, which
is product i. One intermediate input j is leather. The total costs cki of footballs are 10,
the technology coeﬃcient derived from the input-output tables shows that 50 percent
of intermediate inputs come from the leather industry, therefore the whole demand for
leather of company k is 5. If the ﬁrm produces leather worth of 5 internally (xkj), then
the ﬁrm will be vertically integrated to 100 percent.
vibacekij = min
{
xkj
ckiaij
, 1
}
(2.9)
The measure is diﬀerent from the other measures. While all measures have been focused
on the industry, ﬁrm or local unit level, this one is a within ﬁrm measure. For example,
for a ﬁrm A producing bricks many diﬀerent vertical integration measures can be derived.
One could be about how much clay needed for the production is mined by company A.
Another one might be about how much saw dust is provided ﬁrm internally. Because
both measures, the dummy and the continuous, look only at the pair-wise connection of
supplying and demanding industries for every ﬁrm, it is not aggregated enough to give
information about the degree of integration at ﬁrm level.45 The problem of the dummy is
obvious, no diﬀerentiation between the degree of integration can be made. The advantage
is that it is easy to calculate. The continuous measure is more accurate but more data
is needed.
Summary of measures of vertical integration
A broad range of measures of vertical integration has been oﬀered in the empirical liter-
45It would be possible to aggregate the industry pairs to a ﬁrm level measure though.
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ature. They can be broadly classiﬁed in classic and input-output tables based measures
where the latter use information from input-output tables to identify the technology
structure or sales structure of ﬁrms or industries. Examples of classical measures are
value added to sales ratios or the size of auxiliary activities to main activities. The main
drawback of those measures is their sensitivity to the position of a ﬁrm in a production
chain or the diﬃculty to gain information needed to identify auxiliary and main activities.
The input-output tables based measures have to deal with the problem of strict assump-
tions regarding the technology or sales distribution of ﬁrms. For example, ﬁrms in the
same industry are using the same technology, if ﬁrms are producing intermediate inputs,
then those intermediate inputs will be suﬃcient to satisfy the ﬁrm's demand. Therefore
bi-sourcing cannot happen. Only the major activity of a plant can be measured. If a ﬁrm
produces diﬀerent intermediate inputs in the same plant, then the vertical integration
link may not be captured. However, although there are certain limitations we will use
this measure, because we can generate it for every ﬁrm in our sample, it requires little
information and the measure is straightforward to interpret.
Geographical fragmentation
An obvious measure of geographical dispersion is by looking at aggregated FDI data. An
increase in outward FDI means that domestic companies are conducting more activities
abroad. This measure has several drawbacks. First aggregated FDI data is very crude, it
does not diﬀerentiate between vertical and horizontal FDI, can be a camouﬂaged portfolio
investment, and (maybe the most important point) does not capture domestic dispersion.
The majority of ﬁrms is not acting at an international level. Therefore by ignoring the
domestic dispersion of ﬁrms the actual degree of dispersion will be strongly undervalued
by FDI ﬁgures. Additionally, aggregated data can disguise the actual level of dispersion
of an average ﬁrm. Therefore other ﬁrm level measures of dispersion are needed.
An easily derived measure is a multi-location dummy which is 1 if a ﬁrm has local units
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in more than one region. Landier et al. (2009) use a same or adjacent region dummy
instead. This dummy is 1 if divisions are in the same or in an adjacent region of the
headquarters. This measure does not take account if a ﬁrm has local units in two or in
all regions of a country. To improve this situation Landier et al. also create a continuous
measure. They use longitudes and latitudes of cities to measure the spherical distance
between headquarters and its divisions.46
Audia et al. (2000) use a similar continuous measure. They calculate a spherical distance
between all local unit pairs (dyads) within a ﬁrm by using information on longitudes
and latitudes of cities where the plants are located. Then the Logarithm is taken and a
within ﬁrm measure is calculated.
Galliano et al. (2007) use a diﬀerent approach by calculating a multi-location intensity
measure. This intensity is derived by looking at the employment share of a ﬁrm in
diﬀerent regions. By applying equation 2.10 a value of one implies that all ﬁrms are
within the some region. The bigger the multi-location intensity gets the more dispersed
the ﬁrm is.
ML intensity = 10E with E =
∑
r
Ar log
(
1
Ar
)
(2.10)
Ar represents the share of employment of a ﬁrm in region r
2.1.5. Empirical evidence
Most studies are focused on vertically integrated multi-plant ﬁrms47, because most data
is available for those ﬁrms to measure the degree of organisational and geographical
fragmentation. Furthermore, it is much easier to allocate diﬀerent production blocks to a
speciﬁc company than if the intermediate inputs are supplied by an unaﬃliated company.
46Because only information exists, in which states the divisions are located, Landier et al. (2009) use the
most populated area as measurement point for the distance between local units and headquarters.
They admit that this measure is rather noisy.
47This would be the right bottom cell in table 2.1
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The degree of organisational fragmentation is calculated at the national level in a couple
of studies. Geographical fragmentation is mainly dealt with in an international context,
where no diﬀerentiation between the sourcing from aﬃliated and unaﬃliated companies
is made.
Organisational Fragmentation
All the measures presented in this section are calculating the degree of vertical integration
at the ﬁrm level. The measures presented cannot be compared with each other directly,
but it is still possible to look at the trend or degree of vertical integration. Not many
studies exist applying classical vertical integration measures at the ﬁrm level for empirical
analysis. The main problems are data restrictions and limitations of its explanatory
power. For example, Adelman (1955) ends up with a ﬁrm sample of 183 large companies
to calculate his value added to sales ratio. The measure is just calculated for the year
1949 and, because of a lack of comparable estimates, nothing can be said about whether
the overall degree of vertical integration of a company is high or low. Tucker and Wilder
(1977) create a time series of value added to sales ratios using data for the period 1953
 1973, but again, only 54 companies sourced from the COMPUSTAT database are
included in the analysis. They conclude that there was hardly any change in the degree
of vertical integration within those 20 years. It is questionable how representative the
result is because of its very low number of observations and inclusion of large ﬁrms only.
The input-output measures of vertical integration might have speciﬁc advantages regard-
ing to the traditional measures, but one severe problem could not have been solved at
the beginning of the 80s: the small number of observations. Maddigan (1981) used US
input-output tables for 1947, 1958, 1963, 1967 and 1972 and Moody's Industrial Manual
to identify the industries a company is part of. 96 US ﬁrms which incorporated before
1947 were randomly chosen from the COMPUSTAT database and then analysed. The
degree of vertical integration can ﬂuctuate a lot over time (for example if a company sells
53
one of its aﬃliates) and across ﬁrms. Maddigan ﬁnds that the mean of the degree of ver-
tical integration of ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly increasing over time. 96 companies are a rather
small sample to explain the change of average degree of vertical integration of US ﬁrms
and Maddigan on his own confesses that the random selection is not actually random,
because only ﬁrms are considered which were incorporated before 1947 and reappeared
then in the sample for the next 25 years.
Davies and Morris (1995) use input-output tables from 1985 and create a market share
database, which is based on individual company reports and information from the UK
census. The latter one contains information about the market share of the ﬁve largest
companies within one of the 97 industries of the input-output tables. With 306 ﬁrms
left only a fraction of the whole manufacturing population can be covered. Nevertheless
they ﬁnd some interesting results. Half of the large companies included are completely
fragmented (have a vertical integration measure equal to zero), and even if a company
is integrated, the degree is rather low. The most highly-integrated ﬁrm sources only
8.3 percent internally, and the mean value of integration within integrated ﬁrms is only
about 1.38 percent.
Acemo§lu et al. (2010) use a more detailed measure, namely the degree of vertical inte-
gration of the backward link between industries i and j of ﬁrm k. The ARD is used to
gain information of total costs of a company and how much of an input it is producing.
The input-output table of 1995 delivers the share of total of a speciﬁc input. Their sam-
ple consists of 2,973,008 observations on 46,392 ﬁrms. The sample is aggregated for the
period 1996  2001. They reveal that the degree of vertical integration of an industry
pair of a company is with an average of 0.008 very low, but a high deviation can be
observed. Those variations do not only appear across but also within industry pairs.
Geographical Fragmentation
Geographical fragmentation is predominantly a topic in international economics. An of-
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ten cited paper by Krugman (1995) explains the increase in slicing up the value chain of
production, meaning that the complexity of goods is increasing which creates more possi-
bilities of production stages being separately conducted. It is becoming more common to
have diﬀerent production stages generating only a small amount of value added. Feenstra
(1998) gives support to international fragmentation. He discusses how oﬀshoring aﬀects
today's international trade ﬂows. Oﬀshoring is measured by the share of imported in-
termediated inputs to domestic intermediate inputs. No diﬀerentiation is made between
international outsourcing and sourcing through aﬃliates abroad. The results he presents
from other studies are that oﬀshoring has become more important. For example, the
ratio of imported to domestic intermediate inputs increased for US manufacturing ﬁrms
from 5.7 percent (1972) up to 13.9 percent (1990) (based on Feenstra and Hanson, 1997)
and also the results of Campa and Goldberg (1997) are similar with increasing ratios for
Canada, the US and the UK, only for Japan a counterfactual trend is observed.
There are several problems with these studies. Firstly, those studies only diﬀerentiate
between domestic production and outsourcing abroad. So if geographical fragmentation
should happen within a country, those measures would not take account of that. Secondly,
no information is given where the intermediate inputs come from. It is a diﬀerence if
the geographical fragmentation happens in the same or in a distant region (for example
within the European Union or in Asia). Thirdly, it is unknown if the extensive and/or
intensive margin of ﬁrms engaging in spatial fragmentation has increased.
2.2. Crucial Determinants for Other Organisational Structures
So far we have mainly been concerned with the vertical relationship between diﬀerent
production stages. But another dimension has not been discussed yet. As we will show
below in the empirical part of the thesis, many multi-plant ﬁrms exist without any
vertical linkages. One important reason for that is the proximity to ﬁnal markets, which
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was theoretically discussed and put into a formal framework by Brainard (1993).
2.2.1. The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Oﬀ
Brainard (1993), uses a two sector, two country model and a similar framework like
Helpman (1984). In contrast to Helpman (1984) a company can still have an incentive
in becoming a multi-plant ﬁrm even if factor price equalisation does happen. The crucial
factors in this model are ﬁrm level economies of scale, plant level economies of scale and
transport costs, which were assumed to be zero in the Factor-Proportion Model. Firm
level economies of scale arise through headquarters services, so that the more a company
spends on R&D, the lower will be the production costs in every plant. The generated
knowledge can be used in every subsidiary without diminishing value.
The proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ exists because, on the one hand, a company can
beneﬁt from economies of scale at the plant level if the production is concentrated in
one or just a few locations. On the other hand, proximity to the target market reduces
transport costs. Additionally, if economies of scale at the ﬁrm level are high, then
production costs will be decreasing for every plant and therefore setting up another local
unit will be more likely.
To be more precise, a ﬁrm confronted with high ﬁxed costs at the plant level faces a
lower propensity to become a multi-plant ﬁrm. Setting up another car factory can be
very expensive, therefore, for example, Toyota does not have production facilities in every
European country. In contrast, headquarters service intensive industries will be charac-
terised by a higher number of multi-plant ﬁrms. The costs for producing headquarters
services can be spread among all aﬃliates without a loss in value. Transport costs are
increasing in distance, this would mean that the further the target market is away, the
more likely it will be for a ﬁrm to have several plants.
Empirical international studies show that intra industry trade is a very important part
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of total trade and MNEs are responsible for a signiﬁcant part of trade.48 To take account
of these facts Brainard improved the model by introducing a three stage production in a
diﬀerentiated good sector. Additionally to the R&D and the manufacturing production
stage, sales activities are included. The input factors for the sales stage is the output from
the manufacturing stage. An increase in the amount of inputs will decrease the variable
costs of selling. This is similar to the relationship between R&D and the manufacturing
process with the diﬀerence that R&D can be spread amongst all aﬃliates and inputs
from the manufacturing sector just for one sales aﬃliate. If the sales facility is near the
manufacturing unit then no transport cost will arise, but if they are in diﬀerent locations
the ﬁrm will face additional transport costs. A ﬁrm has to check if the ﬁxed costs through
establishing an aﬃliate abroad can be outweighed by the decrease in variable transport
costs. The extension of the model shows that the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ model
can explain why MNEs are responsible for a signiﬁcant amount of total and intra industry
trade.
2.3. The Eﬀects of the Organisational Structure on the Performance
of Firms
The last bit left is to ﬁnd out how fragmentation aﬀects the performance of ﬁrms. Espe-
cially, we examine the eﬀects of outsourcing on employment and productivity. The most
closely related literature is the international outsourcing and oﬀshoring literature.
2.3.1. Employment eﬀects of fragmentation
A good overview of the deﬁnition of oﬀshoring, measurement issues, theoretical founda-
tion and empirical evidence on the eﬀects of oﬀshoring on the employment level of the
developed and developing countries is provided by Bottini et al. (2007). The predictions
48See Brainard (1993), page 24.
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of the theoretical literature are ambiguous. One stream of literature sees oﬀshoring as
a way to increase labour supply. If foreign workers are perfect substitutes for domes-
tic workers, then the domestic unemployment rate will increase. This fear is normally
associated with unskilled workers. Blinder (2006) mentions that also high skilled jobs
are at risked of being moved to foreign countries, as services are getting more and more
tradable. The positive eﬀects of outsourcing can come from eﬃciency gains which then
reduce unemployment rates. A ﬁrm can become more competitive in the world market
and therefore can increase its exports. Furthermore, the fragmentation of production can
also lead to an increase in the demand for headquarters jobs to co-ordinate and supervise.
One important contribution is by Feenstra (2004), who set up a simple theoretical model
which can explain how the implementation of intermediate inputs can change the sectoral
relative labour demand between skilled and unskilled workers causing increasing relative
wages for skilled workers. This model was also empirically tested by Feenstra and Hanson
(1996). They ﬁnd evidence that 31  51 percent of the increase in relative demand for
skilled labour can be related to outsourcing.
Greenaway et al. (1999) empirically assess the impact of trade on UK employment, where
trade also includes trade in intermediate inputs. The main result is that trade has an
impact on employment, the higher the trade volume is the lower will be the labour
demanded. However, trade is an imprecise proxy for outsourcing and therefore any
conclusions may be adventurous. Falk and Wolfmayr (2005) look at how outsourcing to
regions with diﬀerent labour endowments is aﬀecting the employment of EU countries.
They use two digit manufacturing industry data for seven EU countries. If only imports
from low wage countries are considered, then an increase in imports of intermediates will
have a negative eﬀect on industry employment. Outsourcing to industrialised countries
does not have any impact on employment.
One shortcoming of aggregate studies is that most theories are based on a micro founda-
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tion, for example, how will oﬀshoring change the behaviour of a ﬁrm. Therefore channels
through which an increase in oﬀshoring is aﬀecting aggregated employment, might not
be revealed. A solution is to use ﬁrm level data.49 In general the empirical literature
follows two approaches: First, some studies compare the employment growth of ﬁrms
which started to outsource with ﬁrms which did not. One paper following this approach
is by Biscourp and Kramarz (2007). They use French ﬁrm level data to analyse the
eﬀects of importing intermediate inputs and ﬁnal goods on the employment level of man-
ufacturing ﬁrms. The data consists of 330,000 observations, if only continuing ﬁrms are
kept, the sample still has around 150,000 ﬁrms. They ﬁnd evidence that an increase
in imports per ﬁrm will reduce the ﬁrms employment rate. This eﬀect is even worse if
goods produced are ﬁnal and not intermediates. They compare the rates of employment
growth between 1986  1992 of ﬁrms with distinctive characteristics, like new-born ﬁrms,
dying ﬁrms, continuing ﬁrms which have been further classiﬁed into ﬁrms which have
never imported, started importing, stopped importing or continuously imported. In this
part just raw changes have been compared and other explanatory variables have not
been taken into account. Therefore Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) conduct also a ﬁrst
diﬀerence regression for all continuing ﬁrms.
Another paper using a similar approach is by Hijzen et al. (2011). The authors focus
on the eﬀect of importing (oﬀshoring) of producer services on the labour employed at
UK ﬁrms of the manufacturing and ﬁnancial and business services sector for the period
1996  2004. They use two ﬁrm level datasets of the ONS, the ABI and the Inquiry into
International Trade in Services (ITIS). Like Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) they start
their analysis with a similar descriptive approach and conduct a slightly modiﬁed ﬁrst
diﬀerence regression. Additionally to standard regressions Hijzen et al. (2011) conduct
a quantile regression analysis and propensity score matching. The results are diﬀerent
to the outcome predicted by Biscourp and Kramarz (2007): There is no evidence that
49On the other hand, ﬁrm level data might miss out the bigger eﬀects.
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oﬀshoring of services leads to a decrease in employment. Firms which start oﬀshoring are
experiencing an even higher employment growth than ﬁrms which have never imported
services.
Ando and Kimura (2007) conduct a similar analysis for Japanese ﬁrms for the Period
1998  2003. The authors focus on oﬀshoring of Japanese manufacturing and service ﬁrms
in East-Asia. They found evidence that oﬀshoring does have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
on a company's decision not to reduce employment. They ﬁnd diﬀerent results for non-
manufacturing ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm is increasing the amount of oﬀshoring abroad it leads to
growth rates of employment of 3  8 percentage points higher than of other manufacturing
ﬁrms. Again, for non-manufacturing ﬁrms those results cannot be observed.
The main reason for a positive employment eﬀect are according to Hijzen et al. (2009)
that vertical FDI lead to eﬃciency gains to withstand competitive pressures in manufac-
turing and therefore experience a higher employment growth. Ando and Kimura (2007)
conclude that at least for manufacturing domestic and foreign production processes are
complements rather than substitutes. Another could be that the increased demand for
outsourced inputs coincides with a positive (unobserved) demand shock, which would
question the causality of above's results.
The second way to deal with the problem is by using a quasi-experimental technique.
One group of ﬁrms is experiencing a treatment, for example, ﬁrms start outsourcing. The
change of the variable of interest is then compared with the change of the same variable
of the untreated group. This can be done by propensity score matching (Hijzen et al.,
2011, 2009) or by using a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DiD) estimator (Hijzen et al., 2010).
Hijzen et al. (2010) look at how mass lay-oﬀs or plant closures aﬀect the earning of a
displaced workers in the following ﬁve years. UK data of one percent of UK employees
for the period 1994  2003 is used. Even though this paper does not directly touch the
question of the ﬁrm employment eﬀects after the closure of a plant, the empirical strategy
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used in this paper will be one of the main foundation chapter 6. Their main result is
that after a plant closure workers are confronted with earnings 20  34 percent lower
over the following ﬁve years. They highlight that the results are very sensitive to the
chosen control group. Besides implementing a DiD estimator they also use propensity
score matching techniques. Hijzen et al. (2009) follow this approach and analyse the
eﬀects of internationalisation of a ﬁrm on the performance of the ﬁrm or, more precisely,
on the domestic employment, skill-intensity, productivity and exports. French data-sets
are used, which include manufacturing ﬁrms with more than 20 and service ﬁrms with
more than 30 employees for the period 1984  2002. The authors are diﬀerentiating
between manufacturing and service sectors and horizontal and vertical FDI. They ﬁnd
that FDI of the service sector and horizontal FDI of manufacturing ﬁrms into a high
income countries and industries, where the ﬁrm has a comparative advantage in, have
a signiﬁcant positive impact on domestic employment in comparison to ﬁrms which did
not internationalise. Even for vertical FDI of manufacturing ﬁrms no evidence for job
losses for the parent ﬁrms was found.
Finally a completely diﬀerent approach is taken by Görg and Hanley (2005). They look at
the eﬀects of outsourcing on the labour demand on the plant level. This study is focused
on the short-run and on the Irish electronics sector. The data comes from the Irish
Economy Expenditure Survey. They use a GMM technique for estimation, because they
include lagged dependent variables on the right hands side to introduce adjustment costs
in their model.50 The result is that an increase in outsourcing leads to a decrease of the
plant level employment. The measure of outsourcing consists of imported intermediate
inputs. This outsourcing measure is calculated at the industry level, so, to be more
precise, an increase in the propensity of an industry to outsource leads to a decrease of
the plant level employment. Concluding, there is mixed empirical evidence about the
eﬀects of oﬀshoring on employment.
50Standard panel data estimators would lead to biased results in a dynamic model.
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2.3.2. Productivity eﬀects of fragmentation
An excellent overview of the empirical literature about the eﬀects of fragmentation on
productivity is provided by Olsen (2006). He separates studies into studies at the in-
dustry and at the ﬁrm level and also presents studies providing indirect evidence. The
empirical evidence for the eﬀect of outsourcing on productivity is not as straight forward
as expected.
Two often cited studies at the industry level are by Fixler and Siegel (1999) and ten Raa
and Wolﬀ (2001). The former analyse whether outsourcing of services of manufacturing
ﬁrms aﬀects the labour productivity of the manufacturing and service sector. If manu-
facturing ﬁrms outsource services and source them cheaper from the market, then their
output per labour will increase. The eﬀect in the service sector can be ambiguous. Fixler
and Siegel expect positive eﬀects on the service sector productivity only in the long-run,
when demand for external services of manufacturing ﬁrms stabilises and service ﬁrms can
adjust their production function. US industry data (450 manufacturing and 57 service
industries) from 1959  1990 was used and divided into three sub-periods. Productivity is
measured as output per worker. They ﬁnd empirical evidence for their expected results.
ten Raa and Wolﬀ (2001) analyse what caused the increase in TFP in the manufacturing
sector in the 1980s and 1990s after years of productivity stagnation. They suggest that
manufacturing ﬁrms could boost their productivity by outsourcing services. The data
used for analysis comes from US input-output tables for six years within the period 1947
 1996, which allows us to decompose the TFP growth into growth caused by a change
in productivity of manufacturing and of service ﬁrms. Ten Raa and Wolﬀ conclude that
the manufacturing productivity increase is related with outsourcing.
For a more detailed analysis ﬁrm level data is required. An early ﬁrm level study is by
Görzig and Stephan (2002). Return on sales and return per employee are the dependent
performance variables of the estimated model. Diﬀerent types of outsourcing activities
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are measured: the change in (a) material inputs to capture material outsourcing, (b)
external contract work to capture subcontracting and (c) costs not related to production
to capture service outsourcing. A panel data with 43,000 manufacturing ﬁrms between
1992  2000 is used. To capture long-run eﬀects they use a between-ﬁrm and to capture
the short-run eﬀects a within-ﬁrm estimator. In the long-run all types of outsourcing
have a positive eﬀect on the return per employee, but in the short-run outsourcing of
services decreases proﬁtability. The authors conclude that in the short-run ﬁrm may
overestimate the beneﬁts of outsourcing and therefore and outsource above an optimal
level.
Girma and Görg (2004) use the ARD to estimate the eﬀect of outsourcing intensity on
labour productivity and TFP for the chemical, the electronics and the engineering sector.
To mitigate the problem of endogeneity, they follow an IV-regression approach with past
outsourcing intensity as instrument. They ﬁnd that outsourcing leads in the chemical and
especially in the engineering sector to ﬁrms experiencing a positive productivity eﬀect,
but not in the electronics sector. Those eﬀects are larger for foreign owned ﬁrms.
Hijzen et al. (2009) examine, besides employment eﬀects, also productivity eﬀects of
French ﬁrms through oﬀ-shoring. They distinguish between manufacturing and service
sectors and horizontal and vertical FDI. They ﬁnd large but imprecise positive produc-
tivity gains through vertical FDI, but no productivity gains through horizontal FDI or
oﬀ-shoring in the service sector.
Görg et al. (2008) focus on the plant level. Detailed Irish plant data from 1990  1998
enables the calculation of TFP and a distinction between international outsourcing of
materials and services. Many diﬀerent econometric techniques, like ﬁxed eﬀects and IV
regressions, were used to mitigate endogeneity problems. They ﬁnd that for exporting
plants, independent of being foreign owned or not, outsourcing of services has a positive
impact on TFP.
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To summarise, the eﬀect of fragmentation on labour productivity depends on the industry
of the ﬁrm, the industry of the outsourced production stage and whether short- or long-
run eﬀects are considered.
2.3.3. Implications of the literature
We conclude this chapter by illustrating what hypotheses and methods are being derived
from the literature for consideration in this thesis. We show this for each of the following
chapters separately.
Are UK ﬁrms becoming more fragmented?
Measure of fragmentation: We are going to use a measure for organisational and
spatial fragmentation. The organisational measure is based on input-output tables, sim-
ilar to Davies and Morris (1995) and Acemo§lu et al. (2010). For the degree of spatial
dispersion the distance between local units will be used.
Expectations of results: Based on Davies and Morris (1995) and Acemo§lu et al.
(2010) we expect a low degree of vertical integration at the ﬁrm level. The literature
provides a heterogeneous picture about the change in the degree of fragmentation, be-
cause many diﬀerent measures, industries and minimum ﬁrm sizes have been used. The
increase in international oﬀ-shoring leads us to expect that ﬁrms got spatially more dis-
persed over time.
Explanations for the organisational structure of ﬁrms
Causes of Fragmentation: Theory suggests that knowledge capital, technology and
incomplete contracts are the driving forces behind organisational fragmentation. Factor-
price diﬀerences should be crucial for spatial fragmentation.
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Expectations of results: The empirical literature highlights the importance of those
factors. Even within the UK factor-price diﬀerences exists and should therefore matter
for spatial fragmentation.
Methods used: Estimation will be based on Acemo§lu et al. (2010), using dummies and
continuous integration measures as dependent variables and a linear probability model
as estimator, which allows us to employ ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
The eﬀects of fragmentation on employment and productivity
Eﬀects of fragmentation: Outsourcing can have positive eﬀects on employment in
the medium-rum, because ﬁrms start to focus on their core activities and will get more
competitive, which can create new jobs within the ﬁrm. Focusing on the core activity
will also have a positive eﬀect on the productivity of the ﬁrm.
Expectations of results: While the theory is quite clear, the empirical evidence is not
as straightforward. Positive and negative employment eﬀects can be found. Also the
results for productivity are not as clear as expected.
Methods used: Estimation will be based on Hijzen et al. (2010) and Hijzen et al.
(2009) using a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence estimator which compares ﬁrms which outsource
with ﬁrms which did not.
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3. The Business Structure Database: A Portrait of UK
Firms and Establishments 1997  2008
The Business Structure Database (BSD), provided by the UK Oﬃce for National Statis-
tics (ONS) provides information about all UK ﬁrms and local units which are registered
for UK VAT or part of the PAYE scheme for the period 1997  2008. 99 percent of UK
economic activities are captured by this data. The outline of this chapter is as follows:
First, the data sources of the BSD will be discussed. Second, the three levels of observa-
tion, local units, enterprises and enterprise groups, will be deﬁned. Third, the available
information of the BSD will be presented. Before using the BSD the data has to be
cleaned. This cleaning procedure is discussed in the fourth section. A quick summary
of the most important changes of the UK company landscape is part of section 5. In
section 6 we discuss an alternative source of data to the BSD, the Annual Respondent's
Database (ARD) and compare the two datasets. Conclusions will be presented in section
3.7.
3.1. Data Sources
The BSD is based on the Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR) which is a live
register of UK ﬁrms and was introduced in the mid 1990s. Multiple sources are employed
to gain information and reach a high degree of coverage of UK entities. Those sources are
the Value Added Tax (VAT) system, the Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) system, Companies
House (CH) data and the Annual Register Inquiry (ARI). Other minor sources are the
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) for the agricultural sector and the
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) for the construction
sector. The ONS is only responsible for collecting data on British ﬁrms, while Northern
Irish ﬁrms are recorded by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment Northern
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Ireland (DETINI).51
The strength of the IDBR is that 99 percent of all economic activities are covered. ONS
(2006) reports that companies which are too small to be registered for VAT, or do not
apply for the PAYE system, are not included. Those ﬁrms will be mainly self-employed
proprietors and partnerships. Data on self-employed individuals is legally prohibited
from being transferred to the ONS (ONS, 2001). Even if their relative importance in
terms of economic output is very low, the estimated number of those ﬁrms is actually
higher than of all registered ﬁrms together.52 Another possible source of undercoverage
occurs if one of the IDBR data source classiﬁes a reporting unit as dead and removes
it from the Register, even though it is still trading. A reporting unit holds the mailing
address for the business and is the unit for which businesses report their survey data to
the ONS (ONS, 2001, p. 17). Overcoverage, on the other hand, can appear if dead ﬁrms
are still in the sample and because of duplicates (ONS, 2001, p. 33). Duplicates can
arise if PAYE information cannot be matched with the VAT data. The main sources of
the IDBR are brieﬂy discussed below:53
VAT: All businesses with a turnover above ¿73,00054, with some exceptions in the health
and education industry, have to register at the Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
(HMRC)55, which provides data to the ONS. Turnover is gained from this source.
PAYE: Data of employers who are part of the PAYE scheme are recorded by the HMRC.
PAYE is deﬁned by the HMRC as . . . the system that HM Revenue & Customs
(HMRC) uses to collect Income Tax and National Insurance contributions (NICs)
51See ONS (2001), pages 15f.
52Out of 4.3m UK in a year around two million ﬁrms are part of the register. Still 99 percent of UK
economic activity is captured by the IDBR (ONS, 2006, p. 9).
53Table 3.2 reveals which information of the BSD comes from which source.
54See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/start/register/when-to-register.htm, access on 24/08/11.
55When ONS (2001) was published two separated institutions, the Her Majesty's Customs and Excise
(HMCE) and the Inland Revenue (IR), existed. They merged in 2005 to the HMRC. Therefore
throughout the thesis it will always be referred to the HMRC.
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from employees' pay as they earn it.56 Employers have to deduct the tax and NICs
from employees pay each pay period. Not every employer has to register. If any of
following conditions applies, registration is necessary:57
 the employee already has another job
 employees are receiving a state or occupational pension
 employees are paid at or above the PAYE threshold (¿7,475 per year)
 employees are paid at or above the National Insurance Lower Earnings Limit
(¿5,304 per year)
 employees are receiving employee beneﬁts
The data available is similar to the VAT data, so if a company does not surpass
the VAT threshold, then data might be used from PAYE instead.
CH: All companies which want to have limited liability have to register at CH ﬁrst (see
ONS, 2006, page 5). The main aim of the CH data is to connect VAT and PAYE
information with each other by using the legal names of the companies.
ARI: This survey data is mainly used to check and update the IDBR and to provide
information about employment at the local unit level for the Annual Business
Inquiry (ABI), which on its own is used as source for the IDBR. The ARI is the
successor of the Annual Employment Survey (AES) and was introduced in July
1999. Large companies are covered every year (employment > 100) and medium
sized companies every four years (employment 20  99). Around 68,000 enterprises
were part of the survey at the beginning, and around 400,000 local units were
covered.58
56See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/paye/intro/basics.htm, access on 04/01/12.
57See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/paye/intro/register.htm, access on 04/01/12.
58See Jones (2000), page 51.
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D&B: Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) is a private business information supplier and used
by the ONS to create and update information at the enterprise group level. Addi-
tionally, it is the main source to identify foreign ownership of ﬁrms.
3.2. Local Units, Enterprises and Enterprise Groups
Two separate databases exist, one including information on enterprises and another one
consisting of basic information of local units. Local units and enterprises can be linked
to an enterprise group. The ONS uses the EU Regulation on Statistical Units (EEC
696/93) for its categorisation:59
Local Unit: The local unit is an enterprise or part thereof (for example a workshop,
factory, warehouse, oﬃce, mine or depot) situated in a geographically identiﬁed
place. At or from this place economic activity is carried out for which  save for
certain exceptions  one or more persons work (even if only part-time) for one and
the same enterprise.
Enterprise: The enterprise is the smallest combination of legal units that is an organi-
sational unit producing goods or services, which beneﬁts from a certain degree of
autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of its current resources.
An enterprise carries out one or more activities at one or more locations. An
enterprise may be a sole legal unit.
Enterprise Group: An enterprise group is an association of enterprises bound together
by legal and/or ﬁnancial links. A group of enterprises can have more than one
decision-making centre, especially for policy on production, sales and proﬁts. It
may centralise certain aspects of ﬁnancial management and taxation. It constitutes
an economic entity which is empowered to make choices, particularly concerning
the units which it comprises.
59This description was taken from ONS (2006), page 7.
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In other words, local units are the actual physical premises of a company (for example
factories, outlets, etc.). In this thesis, in common with much of the literature, we will also
refer to them as establishments or plants. An enterprise can consist of one or more
local units, if it is the former case I will refer to them as single-plant, and if the latter is the
case, as multi-plant ﬁrms. The enterprise and local unit database can be merged easily
because every local unit can be connected to a company by using an enterprise reference
number. Additionally, an enterprise group reference number can be used to combine
ﬁrms of the same group. The raw data for local units and enterprises is presented in
table 3.1. Note that the number of business units increased massively from 2.2m ﬁrms
and 2.8m local units in 1997 to 3.9m ﬁrms and 5.1m local units in 2008. However, this
large increase is mainly caused by inactive ﬁrms. Active ﬁrms are identiﬁed as enterprises
with at least one local unit for which live data is available. Live data can be unavailable
if a ﬁrm stops trading or falls below the VAT threshold (Evans and Welpton, 2009). In
table 3.13 we can see that the number of inactive local units increased from around 200k
to 1.5m. After a ﬁrst, cleaning the actual number of ﬁrms just increased from 1.8m to
2.2m ﬁrms and not from 2.2m to 3.9m.
Enterprises Local Units
1997 2,179,819 2,800,732
1998 2,305,178 3,203,902
1999 2,498,186 3,181,018
2000 2,514,592 3,196,472
2001 2,545,284 3,293,706
2002 2,587,018 3,388,364
2003 2,843,291 3,809,199
2004 2,931,311 3,868,864
2005 2,974,762 3,866,165
2006 3,302,135 4,266,324
2007 3,574,241 4,711,449
2008 3,868,126 5,119,814
Total 34,123,943 44,706,009
Table 3.1: Raw data for number of enterprises and local units
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3.3. Available Information
The BSD reports information at the local unit and at the enterprise level. The data
available at the enterprise level is a little bit more comprehensive. Table 3.2 summarises
the variables included followed by a detailed description.
Variable Description Enterprise Local Unit Source1
Entref Enterprise Reference Number X X
Luref Local Unit Reference Number X
WOWref Enterprise Group Reference Number X X
Employment  X X PAYE
Employees  X X PAYE
Turnover  X VAT
SIC - Industry 5 digit, SIC 03 and SIC 07 2 X X VAT
Postcode 8 digit Postcode X X VAT
Gor Government Oﬃce Region X X
Inactive Dummy X CH
Birth Year X X
Death Year X X
Death Code Reason for death X
Status Legal Status X X VAT
Imm_foc Immediate Foreign Ownership X X D&B4
Ult_foc Ultimate Foreign Ownership X X D&B4
Live_LU Number of live local units X
Live_RU Number of reporting units X
live_paye live PAYE indicator X
live_vat live VAT indicator X X
Demvar Demographic event identiﬁer3 X X
Demvarred Dem. event ident. for Local Unit X
DTIref DTI reference number scheme X X
Notes:
1 Main sources for IDBR, can by updated and extended by other sources, see ONS (2001).
2 SIC 07 is only available for 2008.
3 Missing for enterprise data in 1997.
4 Dun and Bradstreet.
Table 3.2: Variables in BSD, based on ONS (2006), page 23, altered by author
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Reference numbers
According to ONS (2006) an important feature of the database is that local unit reference
numbers are consistent over time, meaning that it is unaﬀected by mergers or acquisitions.
Even if a local unit shuts down, it still will be kept in the sample as inactive local unit. In
contrast to that statement, ONS (2006), on pages 18ﬀ, states that the main focus of the
database is put on accuracy of a business activity at a single point of time rather than
continuity over time, therefore there is a possibility that the local unit reference numbers
are not always consistent over time. To check those statements an independent local unit
ID will be created, by using certain local unit characteristics. This ID number is based
on a local unit postcode, local unit industry classiﬁcation and the year of birth. Even if
two local units have the same postcode, by using the industry classiﬁcation and the year
of birth, allocating a unique ID number will be possible. A dummy is then created which
shows when a local unit appears and disappears from the data. Finally, if a local unit
(reference number) within a ﬁrm disappears in period t and a new local unit (reference
number) appears in the same ﬁrm in t + 1, but the local unit ID of the new local unit
is the same of the exited local unit, then the local unit reference number can be seen
as inconsistent. Table 3.3 illustrates this procedure with an example. Enterprise A has
three local units in 1997 and 1998. Retail shop 02 disappears from the data, but a new
retail shop appears a year later. The local unit ID calculated by some characteristics
would reveal that local unit 04 is in reality local unit 02.
Year Entref Luref Poco SIC 03 Birth Lurefid Entering Exiting
1997 A 01 NG9 17 1969 1 0 0
1997 A 02 M1 52 1990 2 0 1
1997 A 03 DE7 70 2000 3 0 0
1998 A 01 NG9 32 1969 1 0 0
1998 A 04 M1 52 1990 2 1 0
1998 A 03 DE7 70 2000 3 0 0
Table 3.3: Local unit reference number reliability check: an example
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The reliability check has been conducted for ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector. One
problem is that even though full postcodes, 5 digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation
(SIC) codes and the year of birth have been employed, the local unit ID is not unique,
see table 3.4. This occurs because a ﬁrm can have multiple observations with the same
postcode and date of birth. Around 93,600 observations have a local unit ID appearing
more than once. Before the reliability check can be conducted, it has to be taken care
of those suspicious units ﬁrst. We can only keep those duplicates, where the number of
appearances is two and if they have the same exiting and entering pattern. If they have
not we cannot allocate the appearance and disappearance pattern to the local unit ID.
Appearance Frequency
1 1,731,685
2 72,806
≥3 20,832
Total 1,825,323
Table 3.4: Number of local units with the same local unit ID
The results from the procedure explained are presented in table 3.5. The number of ob-
servations diﬀers from table 3.1 because we only consider the manufacturing sector. The
number of unreliable local unit reference numbers is quite low until 1999 but increasing
from 2000 onward, for example the number of local units which changed their local unit
reference number within a ﬁrm was 177 in 1997 but 1,761 in 2004. In total only 0.7 per-
cent of observations in manufacturing are potential data errors. So the change of local
unit reference number for a speciﬁc local unit within a ﬁrm over time is very unlikely,
but do the observations where it does happen aﬀect the analysis of fragmentation of UK
ﬁrms? The answer is no. Static analysis of this thesis is not aﬀected by it. It is also
not a problem for the dynamic analysis because even if the local unit reference number
changes, it will not change the characteristics of an enterprise.60
60For example, the main focus of the dynamic analysis is on the ﬁrm level. To be classiﬁed as a vertically
integrated ﬁrm, it is only important that vertically integrated local units exist. If the local units are
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Year Reliability Total
0 1
1997 175,216 177 175,393
1998 175,932 107 176,039
1999 170,069 790 170,859
2000 158,970 1,350 160,320
2001 155,782 1,480 157,262
2002 151,727 1,341 153,068
2003 144,388 1,606 145,994
2004 140,516 1,761 142,277
2005 136,804 1,482 138,286
2006 133,442 1,431 134,873
2007 132,571 1,372 133,943
Total 1,675,417 12,897 1,688,314
Table 3.5: Reliability of Local Unit Reference Numbers
Every local unit can be allocated to an enterprise through reference numbers. The
majority of ﬁrms only consist of one local unit. Theoretically all enterprises can be
connected to enterprise group reference numbers, which represents the ultimate stage of
aggregation. There are some issues with the enterprise group reference number, especially
its inconsistency over time. There was a change of the enterprise group reference number
in 1997 which aﬀects the years 1997 and 1998 in the BSD sample, because those changes
have not been updated. As suggested by Criscuolo and Martin (2007) two look-up tables
oﬀered by the ONS can be used to update those numbers, but unfortunately these look-
up tables are not complete. In contrast to the local unit or enterprise reference numbers,
the enterprise group is not suitable for panel data analysis. After 2005 the number of
missing enterprise group reference numbers is so severe that the last three years (2006 
2008) cannot be used for analysis anymore.
called A or B does not aﬀect the classiﬁcation. The characteristics and not reference number of the
local units are important.
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Employment, employees and turnover
The ONS deﬁnes those three variables as follows:
 Turnover is deﬁned as Total sales and work done. This is calculated by adding
to the value of Sales of goods produced, Goods purchased and resold without further
processing, Work done and industrial services rendered and Non industrial services
rendered  (ONS, 2010, page 5).
 Employment is deﬁned as . . . full and part time employees on the payroll plus the
number of working proprietors employed  (ONS, 2010, page 6).
 Employees are deﬁned as employment minus the number of working proprietors
employed (ONS, 2001, page 80).
The amount of employment, employees and turnover are available at the enterprise level
and employment and employee ﬁgures also at the local unit level. The enterprise level is
generated by adding up the local unit ﬁgures. Turnover data is delivered by the HMRC.
Turnover data for new businesses is estimated in advance by the companies concerned and
is a potential source of inaccuracy.61 Another problem is that many ﬁrms with a turnover
of zero exist, but which are still active. Some of these ﬁrms report zero turnovers for
the whole observation period, even though a ﬁrm, once it is in the data, should provide
information about its turnover. A further concern is that for some companies the turnover
rate ﬂuctuates massively over time, and unrealistic increases or decreases are reported.
For example, some ﬁrms have a turnover of a couple of millions in one period, followed by
a period where turnover increases to a couple of billions, before it returns to a reasonable
level. This can have a signiﬁcant impact on descriptive statistics. These problems mainly
arise in the ﬁnancial sector. To deal with the problems we cleaned the samples and
dropped all four digit SIC industries with extremely volatile aggregate turnover ﬁgures,
because there are too many ﬁrms with suspicious turnover ﬁgures. Furthermore, the
61See ONS (2001), page 41 and pages 43f.
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selection of the suspected outlier ﬁrms would be rather arbitrary. A detailed description
of the cleaning process can be found in section 3.4. The summary statistics for turnover
of the cleaned samples are reported in table 3.6 and all values are presented at current
prices.
All statistics about employment and turnover are presented separately for the manufac-
turing and the tradable service sector. The latter comprises all service which do not
require proximity to their customers, for example a call centre. Both the level and time-
series development of employment and turnover are very diﬀerent for these sectors, and
grouping them would disguise some important developments. On pages 88ﬀ this classi-
ﬁcation will be discussed in more detail. The manufacturing sample is presented on the
left side of the table. The right side shows the tradable service sample. For each sample
we present descriptive statistics for all ﬁrms, for multi-plant ﬁrms and for single-plant
ﬁrms. A ﬁrst look reveals that the majority of ﬁrms are single-plant ﬁrms. Nevertheless,
total turnover is mainly generated by multi-plant ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector. The
massive increase in the number of single-plant ﬁrms in the tradable service sector leads
to the situation where 68 percent of turnover comes from single-plant ﬁrms in 2008.
The cleaned and the full sample are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the tradable service sec-
tor. According to the data, total turnover of tradable services sample before cleaning
decreased from ¿2,800bn to ¿1,500bn between 1997  2008, even though the number
of ﬁrms is increasing massively. The ﬁnancial sectors are causing that problem. After
dropping those sectors the sample is reduced by about 50,000 observations. The total
turnover decreased to ¿105bn in 1997 and to ¿247bn in 2008. To check how reasonable
the sample with the ﬁnancial sector is, the turnover data of the BSD will be compared
with the production data of the OECD Structure Analysis Database (STAN). Table 3.7
shows that the BSD sample overstates actual turnover massively. In 1997 the turnover is
more than twelve times higher than in the STAN, but decreases to more than two and a
half times in 2008. Dropping the problematic ﬁnancial sectors will create more sensible
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Turnover
Manufacturing Tradable Services
Year Mean1 S.D.1 Freq. Total1 Mean1 S.D.1 Freq. Total1
A
ll
ﬁ
rm
s
1997 2.18 43.08 159,401 348,225 0.35 8.09 299,299 104,683
1998 2.20 41.47 161,701 356,047 0.33 4.68 339,754 113,510
1999 2.37 44.83 157,013 372,320 0.37 8.63 363,462 134,325
2000 2.50 47.17 147,548 369,445 0.38 8.41 378,593 144,529
2001 2.55 57.49 145,479 371,079 0.40 8.62 391,474 157,385
2002 2.55 42.36 142,141 361,827 0.46 12.69 397,179 183,301
2003 2.52 41.58 137,365 346,774 0.47 11.57 402,219 187,773
2004 2.58 42.47 133,220 343,651 0.43 8.01 429,603 184,424
2005 2.62 45.42 129,106 338,554 0.41 7.39 458,257 187,268
2006 2.80 52.07 125,763 352,148 0.41 7.37 489,681 201,458
2007 2.88 54.15 124,679 358,872 0.43 8.87 520,929 221,778
2008 2.92 52.81 123,555 361,089 0.45 9.39 547,899 246,937
M
u
lt
i-
p
la
n
t
ﬁ
rm
s
1997 22.07 172.21 9,484 209,353 3.87 23.40 8,483 32,869
1998 25.59 178.07 8,364 214,003 4.23 24.29 7,916 33,491
1999 28.06 192.89 8,046 225,781 5.78 55.77 7,617 43,998
2000 31.30 207.45 7,243 226,740 6.48 56.61 7,134 46,241
2001 32.46 249.95 7,159 232,350 6.77 52.87 7,501 50,785
2002 31.75 182.97 7,107 225,674 7.93 69.67 7,675 60,863
2003 30.91 178.43 6,701 207,143 7.94 50.22 7,569 60,071
2004 32.88 184.28 6,434 211,545 8.41 53.21 7,543 63,442
2005 35.11 202.22 5,905 207,310 9.20 52.67 6,785 62,456
2006 39.91 240.17 5,446 217,363 10.05 55.19 6,498 65,332
2007 42.50 251.57 5,240 222,704 11.73 71.64 6,485 76,068
2008 45.11 255.22 4,912 221,578 12.49 68.87 6,346 79,285
S
in
gl
e-
p
la
n
t
ﬁ
rm
s
1997 0.93 8.43 149,917 138,872 0.25 7.14 290,816 71,815
1998 0.93 7.27 153,337 142,044 0.24 2.83 331,838 80,020
1999 0.98 8.44 148,967 146,539 0.25 2.98 355,845 90,328
2000 1.02 8.59 140,305 142,705 0.26 3.14 371,459 98,288
2001 1.00 13.93 138,320 138,729 0.28 4.51 383,973 106,601
2002 1.01 8.94 135,034 136,153 0.31 8.22 389,504 122,438
2003 1.07 11.90 130,664 139,631 0.32 9.33 394,650 127,703
2004 1.04 11.11 126,786 132,107 0.29 3.68 422,060 120,982
2005 1.07 12.22 123,201 131,244 0.28 3.55 451,472 124,812
2006 1.12 12.59 120,317 134,784 0.28 3.58 483,183 136,126
2007 1.14 14.60 119,439 136,168 0.28 3.66 514,444 145,709
2008 1.18 11.48 118,643 139,510 0.31 5.65 541,553 167,653
Notes:
1 . . . ﬁgures in millions of ¿
Table 3.6: Detailed statistics of BSD turnover
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results for the remaining tradable service sector.
Table 3.9 compares the cleaned BSD sample with other databases to see how much of
the total UK sales and employment is covered by the sample. The other sources are the
ABI of the ONS and the STAN of the OECD. The ABI uses a stratiﬁed random sample
of about 67,000 businesses (2008) to calculate the whole population of UK ﬁrms. For the
manufacturing and the tradable service sector the cleaned BSD sample covers more than
70 percent of the respective total UK turnover. This is reasonable because, as mentioned
before, not the whole population is included in the BSD and some sample selection rules
had to be applied before using the BSD.62
The second comparison is with the STAN. The production data for manufacturing and
tradable services is in accordance with the turnover data in ABI.63
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
STAN 228 252 282 299 328 349 371 383 407 440 472
BSDfull 2,808 2,256 2,127 2,142 1,673 1,514 1,114 1,553 1,552 1,318 1,295
Notes:
All values are in bn ¿. In contrast to BSD's UK SIC 2003 classiﬁcation, ISIC Rev3 is used for classiﬁcation
of OECD's STAN database. While BSD data contains turnover, data presented in STAN column is
production data.
Table 3.7: Comparison of the tradable service sector in BSD including ﬁnancial sectors and
STAN
Employment ﬁgures are collected by the HMRC through the PAYE system. The cal-
culation of local unit employment data requires the ARI, which is part of the ABI. For
companies, for which only information from VAT is available, employment data is esti-
mated through turnover data and can be a source of misleading data.64 Because there is
62Below the sample selection rules will be explained in detail. For example, in that sample only ﬁrms
are included which have always been part of manufacturing. All non-private businesses have been
excluded.
63Production and turnover is not exactly the same, because production represents the value of goods
and/or services produced in a year, whether sold or stocked. Turnover represents only the value
of goods and/or services sold. See http://oecd-stats.ingenta.com/OECD/TableViewer/summary.
aspx, access on 04/05/2010. Because many services cannot be stocked, the diﬀerence between
turnover and production should not be too big.
64See ONS (2001), page 33.
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hardly any diﬀerence in the values of employment and employee data only the statistics
for the ﬁrst one will be presented.65 While employment in the manufacturing sector is
decreasing massively from 3.8m to 2.5m, it is increasing for the tradable service sector
from 1.93m to 2.96m. See table 3.8. The comparison of the BSD and ABI data shows
that the BSD underestimates the whole population of employment.
Table 3.9 compares again the cleaned BSD data with the ABI and STAN. On average
more than 80 percent of people employed are covered by the BSD, regardless the sector.
STAN employment data is only available for the manufacturing sector and overstates
actual employment slightly.
Locational variables
To every enterprise or local unit an eight digit postcode is allocated. Unfortunately a
large number of local units have a missing postcode in 2003, and we therefore impute
this information.66 67
According to the ONS the postcode of an enterprise does not necessarily represent the
postcode of its headquarters, because the postcode provided in the BSD indicates the
location of the reporting unit. A enterprise can have also several reporting units for dif-
ferent areas and diﬀerent divisions. To check if it can be assumed that the location of the
reporting unit is a good approximation for the location of the headquarters, the Finan-
cial Analysis Made Easy Database (FAME) is used. This database allows us to identify
the headquarters and its location in the BSD. Through a look-up table FAME's Com-
pany Reference Number (CRN) and BSD's enterprise reference number can be matched.
Ritchie and Evans (2009) could only match half of the data for the year 2007. This was
65The number of employee is slightly lower than the number of employment.
66Imputation rules are explained in section 3.4.
67Original postcode data is only available if the BSD is used in the Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML).
If the online access via Secure Data Service (SDS) is used, all postcodes are encrypted. The main
characteristics of the new postcodes are similar to the original ones, so analysis using geographical
data can still be conducted without any loss of information.
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Employment
Manufacturing Tradable Services
Year Mean S.D. Freq. Total Mean S.D. Freq. Total
A
ll
ﬁ
rm
s
1997 23.90 245.03 159,401 3,809,987 6.45 125.38 299,299 1,929,300
1998 22.76 226.36 161,701 3,680,178 5.78 99.83 339,754 1,965,039
1999 22.99 228.48 157,013 3,610,501 5.56 98.30 363,462 2,020,690
2000 23.79 222.73 147,548 3,510,103 5.62 95.18 378,593 2,126,975
2001 23.15 220.33 145,479 3,368,290 5.66 89.13 391,474 2,216,757
2002 23.29 204.06 142,141 3,310,937 5.95 86.63 397,179 2,361,977
2003 22.49 192.59 137,365 3,088,922 5.93 97.59 402,219 2,385,589
2004 22.11 192.84 133,220 2,944,967 5.61 98.80 429,603 2,408,468
2005 21.35 190.56 129,106 2,757,034 5.52 101.77 458,257 2,528,491
2006 21.05 186.38 125,763 2,646,871 5.62 116.59 489,681 2,751,943
2007 20.36 184.87 124,679 2,537,966 5.38 110.33 520,929 2,800,292
2008 20.01 183.84 123,555 2,472,859 5.41 122.95 547,899 2,964,204
M
u
lt
i-
p
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n
t
ﬁ
rm
s
1997 206.86 940.99 9,484 1,961,845 83.25 516.74 8,483 706,197
1998 222.85 954.38 8,364 1,863,946 92.02 626.05 7,916 728,439
1999 228.32 967.57 8,046 1,837,058 98.27 658.31 7,617 748,505
2000 244.05 955.63 7,243 1,767,655 107.09 667.72 7,134 763,948
2001 237.83 909.34 7,159 1,702,598 108.64 614.07 7,501 814,902
2002 234.68 857.06 7,107 1,667,871 109.01 591.80 7,675 836,619
2003 227.88 804.32 6,701 1,527,006 116.45 687.83 7,569 881,405
2004 229.45 827.95 6,434 1,476,254 117.51 722.75 7,543 886,349
2005 231.44 840.25 5,905 1,366,678 139.66 809.24 6,785 947,584
2006 238.36 841.69 5,446 1,298,124 159.89 979.58 6,498 1,038,981
2007 239.48 852.61 5,240 1,254,869 160.59 956.63 6,485 1,041,429
2008 247.23 870.93 4,912 1,214,380 171.50 1,040.54 6,346 1,088,363
S
in
gl
e-
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s
1997 12.33 74.68 149,917 1,848,142 4.21 90.63 290,816 1,223,103
1998 11.84 45.33 153,337 1,816,232 3.73 25.95 331,838 1,236,600
1999 11.90 45.44 148,967 1,773,443 3.58 20.15 355,845 1,272,185
2000 12.42 48.95 140,305 1,742,448 3.67 21.68 371,459 1,363,027
2001 12.04 75.88 138,320 1,665,692 3.65 22.86 383,973 1,401,855
2002 12.17 51.97 135,034 1,643,066 3.92 23.20 389,504 1,525,358
2003 11.95 59.54 130,664 1,561,916 3.81 19.86 394,650 1,504,184
2004 11.58 44.73 126,786 1,468,713 3.61 19.34 422,060 1,522,119
2005 11.29 44.76 123,201 1,390,356 3.50 19.95 451,472 1,580,907
2006 11.21 44.88 120,317 1,348,747 3.55 23.44 483,183 1,712,962
2007 10.74 39.90 119,439 1,283,097 3.42 22.02 514,444 1,758,863
2008 10.61 39.67 118,643 1,258,479 3.46 47.76 541,553 1,875,841
Table 3.8: Detailed statistics of BSD employment
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Manufacturing
Number of enterprises1 Total turnover2 Total employment3
Year BSD4 ABI STAN5 BSD4 ABI STAN5 BSD4 ABI STAN5
1997 159 170  348 470 409 3.81  4.52
1998 162 169  356 461 408 3.68 4.42 4.54
1999 157 170  372 462 405 3.61 4.27 4.37
2000 148 167  369 469 415 3.51 4.14 4.23
2001 145 165  371 462 412 3.37 3.97 4.06
2002 142 162  362 450 406 3.31 3.76 3.86
2003 137 158  347 448 404 3.09 3.53 3.68
2004 133 155  344 460 413 2.94 3.41 3.51
2005 129 153  339 472 429 2.76 3.25 3.36
2006 126 151  352 483 448 2.65 3.15 3.25
2007 125 149  359 504  2.54 3.07 3.20
Tradable Services
1997 299 319  105 136 117 1.93  
1998 340 347  114 158 141 1.97 2.58 
1999 363 397  134 174 157 2.02 2.75 
2000 379 415  145 189 176 2.13 2.93 
2001 391 425  157 199 191 2.22 3.11 
2002 397 432  183 204 204 2.36 3.14 
2003 402 429  188 216 218 2.39 3.12 
2004 430 444  184 228 229 2.41 3.20 
2005 458 476  187 252 241 2.53 3.40 
2006 490 499  201 271 253 2.75 3.37 
2007 521 534  222 307  2.8 3.57 
Notes:
1 in thousands, 2 in billions of ¿ and 3 in millions.
4 cleaned BSD sample is presented
5 Includes SIC 72.5, 74.15, 74.6, 74.7. STAN uses ISIC Rev3 while BSD is based on
UK SIC 2003. BSD shows turnover data, STAN production data. As in the BSD,
current prices are presented.
Table 3.9: Comparison of BSD sample with ABI and STAN
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mainly caused by diﬀerences in timing and diﬀerent inclusion criteria. The cleaned BSD
manufacturing sample contains only private companies, therefore a higher matching rate
is expected. Diﬀerent timing of recording should cause no problems, because the interest
does not lie on ﬁnancial information for which the recording time could be crucial.
16,947 observations of the manufacturing sector are available from FAME in 2009. The
VML oﬀers two look-up tables which match the CRN with enterprise reference numbers.
The updated look-up table from 2007 will be used. 98 percent of companies within
FAME can be linked to a BSD enterprise reference number from the look-up table.
Because headquarters can move over time we only merge FAME with the BSD sample
for the period 2005  2008.68 Only between 7,700 to 7,900 out of 16,947 of observations
can be matched between 2005 and 2008. Table 3.10 shows the result. Because only
multi-plant ﬁrms are of interest, the remaining observations are largely reduced. Out of
a total of 9,300 ﬁrms from 2005  2008 about 5,800 can be matched with a postcode of
the BSD. For 4,850 ﬁrms the postcode of the reporting unit equals the postcode of the
headquarters, which is about 84 percent. Even though this number seems to be high,
it has to be interpreted carefully. We can only match a rather small sample of ﬁrms of
the BSD and FAME. The obtained matches may favour small ﬁrms with few plants, and
therefore show little in terms of reporting units and headquarters of large ﬁrms.
Year All ﬁrms Multi-plant HQ Firms where
ﬁrms found RU = HQ
2005 7,722 2,331 1,376 1,161
2006 7,816 2,300 1,414 1,179
2007 7,917 2,349 1,494 1,247
2008 7,910 2,297 1,500 1,263
Total 31,365 9,277 5,784 4,850
Table 3.10: Reliability check of headquarters location using FAME
68The number of ﬁrms in the BSD of 1997 which can be merged to FAME 2009 is only about a half of
the number of ﬁrms which can be merged in 2008.
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Industry classiﬁcation
The BSD includes a ﬁve digit UK Standard Industry Classiﬁcation of 2003 (SIC 03) for
every enterprise and local unit.69 If an enterprise consists of one local unit, the industry
classiﬁcation will represent the activity, which involves the highest share of employees of
the company. However, if a company with one local unit is running several activities,
and all of them are about the same size, then important activities of that company
may be camouﬂaged by the data (Hellebrandt and Davies, 2008). The classiﬁcation of
multi-plant ﬁrms works diﬀerently and is illustrated by a table 3.11. The enterprise
industry classiﬁcation will be similar to the code of the dominant local unit. Dominance
is identiﬁed by looking at the number of people employed in local units of a speciﬁc
industry. After identifying the one digit industry with the highest number of employees,
the same procedure will be conducted again within this industry at the two digit SIC
level, followed by the three digit industry level, etc.
Enterprise Local Unit SIC Code Employment
A 01 33500 45
A 02 52111 20
A 03 52112 10
A 04 52210 25
B 05 33500 40
B 06 29410 15
B 07 52111 25
B 08 52210 20
Table 3.11: The determination of an enterprise activity based on Hellebrandt and Davies
(2008)
Enterprise A consists of four local units, where local unit 01 is an establishment in the
manufacturing sector and 02  04 in the service sector. Even though 01 is the biggest
local unit it is not the dominant local unit. The majority of workers are part of the
service sector 5 and within this sector of industry 52 followed by industry 521. Finally
69For the year 2008 also SIC 07 is available.
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in sector 521 the largest local unit is 02, therefore the company will be categorised as a
company in sector 52112. Enterprise B has local unit 07 as dominant establishment and
is classiﬁed as enterprise of the service sector, even though the majority of employees
is located within the manufacturing sector. The problem is that the manufacturing
activities are within two diﬀerent one digit industries. Local unit 05 of industry 33 has
40 employees, but local units active in industry 52 have in total 45. Because 07 is larger
than 08, local unit 08 is the dominant local unit. Therefore the industry classiﬁcation
at the enterprise level can sometimes be rather imprecise. It can even be the case that
ﬁrms with more people employed in manufacturing plants than in service local units are
still classiﬁed as service ﬁrms.
Birth, death and activity
The BSD does not contain only trading companies but also companies which have ceased
trading already. Through an active/inactive dummy it is possible to identify those en-
terprises. In 2008 1.5m (38%) enterprises out of 3.9m of the full sample were inactive.
Additional information exists about the date of birth or death of an enterprise or local
unit. The date of birth and the date of death represents the actual year of appearance
and the year of closure. Mergers, take-overs, break-ups and split-oﬀs do not aﬀect the
year of birth or death of a company.
The birth data for enterprises is censored at 1973. According to the ONS, the reason for
that is that the VAT system was introduced in 1973, since IDBR is based on VAT records,
the BSD presents the year of birth of 1973 even if they ﬁrms are older. At the local unit
level the date of birth and death and, instead of the active/inactive dummy, a deathcode
exist. Thirteen diﬀerent ways of dying can be identiﬁed70, but the ONS recommends to
use the year of death for the identiﬁcation of dead local units. In contrast to the ﬁrm
70See ONS, 2006, page 21.
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level the year of birth at the local unit level is not censored.
Legal status and foreign ownership
The BSD classiﬁes the legal status of an enterprise or local unit into seven diﬀerent
categories: company, sole proprietor, partnership, public corporation, central government
body, local authority and non-proﬁt making body.
Information about immediate and ultimate foreign ownership is available from D&B.
Both variables include a country code and reveal the location of the parent company.
Unfortunately the country classiﬁcation changes over time, for example from a three
digit country code to a two letter code. Figure 3.1 and table 3.12 show how many
ﬁrms in the UK are foreign owned using the two cleaned samples for manufacturing and
tradable services sector. The value 0 stands for domestic and 1 for foreign ownership. It
seems that in both sectors the degree of foreign ownership is increasing but this might
be caused by missing values, which completely disappear in 2008. Still, it can be seen
that in manufacturing the highest degree of foreign ownership is prevailing with 1  2.7
percent in comparison to 0.2  1 percent in the tradable service sector.
Other variables
The variables Live_Lu or Live_Ru show the number of live local units or reporting
units per enterprise. Comparing the Live_Lu variables with the number of local units
in the BSD shows that the numbers are nearly identical. Less than one percent of all
local units are part of a company for which the Live number is diﬀerent to the actual
number of local units which appear in the BSD. The variables live_paye and live_var
are markers revealing the source of information for every company. The most reliable
information is gained when information comes from VAT and PAYE. The Demvar and
Demvarred variables are demographic event identiﬁers, for example for merges and
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Figure 3.1: Share of foreign to total number of UK ﬁrms
Manufacturing Tradable Services
Year 0 1 missing 0 1 missing
E
n
te
rp
ri
se
s
1997 148,544 1,847 9,010 288,939 835 9,525
1998 153,022 1,734 6,945 330,783 839 8,132
1999 148,775 2,331 5,907 354,327 1,487 7,648
2000 140,000 2,413 5,135 370,120 1,677 6,796
2001 137,984 2,604 4,891 382,395 2,024 7,055
2002 134,860 3,101 4,180 387,600 3,201 6,378
2003 133,855 3,188 322 398,427 3,567 225
2004 129,507 2,922 791 425,487 3,078 1,038
2005 125,876 3,077 153 454,209 3,892 156
2006 122,523 3,093 147 485,560 3,965 156
2007 121,342 3,324 13 516,092 4,829 8
2008 120,166 3,389 0 542,484 5,415 0
L
oc
a
l
U
n
it
s
1997 158,818 4,836 17,949 292,689 2,225 24,948
1998 162,482 4,774 15,062 334,837 2,194 23,872
1999 159,843 4,873 12,478 360,681 2,575 21,211
2000 150,729 5,089 10,883 376,191 2,721 20,109
2001 147,916 5,652 10,423 389,031 3,319 19,364
2002 143,801 6,977 9,210 394,314 5,015 17,485
2003 146,195 6,919 720 421,938 5,735 464
2004 140,936 6,448 1,688 447,380 5,327 2,639
2005 137,327 6,664 318 476,638 6,294 325
2006 132,704 7,501 304 515,908 6,608 302
2007 131,426 7,745 69 549,011 7,674 43
2008 129,675 8,073 0 556,693 8,525 0
Table 3.12: Foreign ownership statistics
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break-ups. Finally DTIref is used for the linkage of internal data.
3.4. Cleaning of the Data
This section deals with the data cleaning process and its eﬀects on the sample size,
how inconsistent variables can be made consistent and how missing information can be
imputed.
3.4.1. Sample size
The BSD covers a major part of the population of UK ﬁrms. The raw data consists of
over 34m observations for the period 1997  2008. Before this raw data is ready for being
used for empirical research the data has to be cleaned. Sample selection is complicated
by the fact that we have a large 12-year panel. Restricting the sample based on the value
of industry in each year can lead to spurious gaps in the data. The only satisfactory
way of selecting the sample is to either use characteristics of ﬁrms which are constant
over time, or select on characteristics which are based on the whole panel. For example,
we select only those ﬁrms which are always in the manufacturing or service sector. The
selection will be conducted in two steps, where only the following ﬁrms are kept:
 ﬁrms which are not duplicates,
 ﬁrms which are active,71
 ﬁrms which remain in the private sector for the entire period,
 ﬁrms which have the legal status of being a company, sole proprietor or partner-
ship,72
 ﬁrms which have no gaps (for example disappear and reappear later).
71The ONS (2006), page 10, deﬁnes active enterprises as enterprises with turnover and/or persons
employed greater than zero and at least one administrative unit linked to the enterprise.
72Public corporation, central government body, local authority or non-proﬁt making body were dropped.
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Those selection rules decrease the number of observations drastically. Duplicates, which
are ﬁrms which appear twice in the data, are only a problem in 2006. Dropping ﬁrms
which are inactive reduces the sample by more than 8.3m, which is about 24 percent.
Non-Private ﬁrms account for about 1m (2.8 percent) observations, and ﬁrms with gaps
about the same. The sample after the ﬁrst cleaning is reduced by about 10m to 24m
ﬁrms. The selection of local units was easier, because only those are kept which are not
dead and can be linked to an enterprise.
Year Full sample Duplicates Inactive Non-Private Gaps Red. Sample
1997 2,179,819 0 203,821 69,380 77,286 1,829,332
1998 2,305,178 1 258,155 70,779 75,454 1,900,789
1999 2,498,186 0 424,772 72,297 76,733 1,924,384
2000 2,514,592 1 450,183 75,088 81,229 1,908,091
2001 2,545,284 0 449,818 76,611 88,457 1,930,398
2002 2,587,018 0 479,666 78,552 88,377 1,940,423
2003 2,843,291 0 733,749 80,351 84,208 1,944,983
2004 2,931,311 0 775,355 82,584 80,837 1,992,535
2005 2,974,762 0 773,405 84,376 79,608 2,037,373
2006 3,302,135 45,490 1,009,481 86,270 78,846 2,082,048
2007 3,574,241 0 1,243,880 88,977 85,335 2,156,049
2008 3,868,126 0 1,516,153 89,184 95,052 2,167,737
Total 34,123,943 45,492 8,318,438 954,449 991,422 23,814,142
Table 3.13: Sample size after ﬁrst cleaning process
A ﬁrst rudimentary analysis shows that the service sector accounts for about 20m and
the agricultural and manufacturing for about 2m ﬁrms. Because of its size working with
the whole dataset would still be diﬃcult. Therefore the sample will be divided into two
subsamples: manufacturing and tradable services. The service sector categorisation is
based on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) mode of transportation
classiﬁcation. Four categories exist where Mode 1 is of purpose for this chapter.73
Those services are referred to as tradable services. Tradable services are characterised
by their independence of the proximity to the ﬁnal customers, for example a call centre
73See GATS section at the WTO homepage available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_
e/serv_e.htm, access on 04/01/2010.
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can be located all around the world and can still serve the domestic market. There are
several reasons for splitting the sample, besides the reduction of the sample size. In the
theoretical and empirical literature of trade, in general, the manufacturing sector is in
focus of attention, but this sector is declining in importance, with regards to turnover,
employment and number of enterprises and local units. Common theories may not be
able to explain observable patterns in both sectors. For example, transport costs should
be more important for manufacturing, but agglomeration eﬀects could be more important
for tradable services. Furthermore, by splitting the sample, some empirical issues can be
mitigated like omitted variable bias.74 We focus on the following SIC sectors:75
 Manufacturing: SIC 15  37
 Tradable services:
 SIC 72: Data processing and software consultancy
* excl. SIC 72.5: Maintenance and repair of oﬃce, accounting and com-
puting machinery
 SIC 73: Research and development services
 SIC 74: Business Services
* excl. SIC 74.15: Management activities of holding companies
* excl. SIC 74.6: Investigation and security activities
* excl. SIC 74.7: Industrial cleaning
74For example, it is assumed that both sectors are estimated together, less skilled workers work on
average in manufacturing than in the tradable service sector and no data is available on the skill
levels of workers. The equation might look like yit = β0 + β1Xit + β2D
s
it + εit where yit is the degree
of vertical integration, Xit a matrix of diﬀerent determinants of integration and D
s
it is a service sector
dummy. Because we cannot observe the skill level of workers β2 can be biased. If we just keep the
service sector this problem can be mitigated.
75Jensen and Kletzer (2005) use a Gini-coeﬃcient for geographical concentration to measure how tradable
a service is. The higher the concentration the higher is the degree of tradability. They create
three groups from highly concentrated to least concentrated. Unfortunately their categorisation of
industries is based on 2-digit North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS), which is not
comparable to the UK SIC and therefore cannot be used for the BSD.
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This selection is conducted at the ﬁrm level. Therefore we only keep ﬁrms which are
part of one of the industries from the list above. The selection of local units is not af-
fected, therefore a manufacturing ﬁrm can still have a local unit in the wholesale sector.
Why was only the tradable service sector for ﬁrms chosen, which is only a small part
of the total service sector? The common deﬁnition of services is based on 1993 System
of National Accounting (SNA) and is as follows: Services are not separate entities over
which ownership rights can be established. They cannot be traded separately from their
production. Services are heterogeneous outputs produced to order and typically consist of
changes in the condition of the consuming units realised by the activities of the producers
at the demand of the customers. By the time their production is completed they must
have been provided to the consumers.76 This deﬁnition ﬁts to the theoretical concept of
non-tradable service sector. The Manual on Statistics on International Trade in Services
points out that there are industries regarded as service industries, where the border be-
tween goods and services is blurring, which leads to the concept of tradable services. For
example, the storage of information (R&D), consultancy reports (software consultancy)
etc., enables services being kept in physical assets, which qualiﬁes the deﬁnition just
mentioned.77 This storage possibility also increases the complexity of services provided.
This complexity is required to provide fragmentation opportunities. For example, a ﬁrm
in the R&D sector (tradable) will require computers and machinery for experiments,
specialists from the IT sector, etc. IT services can maybe sourced internally and com-
puters and machinery from an outside supplier. A ﬁrm in the industrial cleaning sector
(non-tradable) will be simplistic with a rather short production chain. It will be unlikely
that this ﬁrm will own a detergent producing plant. Data proves that we hardly ﬁnd any
vertical linkages in the non-tradable service sector. Therefore we will focus only on the
76See UN et al. (2002), pages 7f.
77Even though the concept of tradable and non-tradable services is intuitive, the application of this
classiﬁcation for industries is less clear. Harris and Li (2006) show that even non-tradable service
ﬁrms can be exporters. For example, in 2004 4.8 percent of ﬁrms of the Hotels & Catering sector
and 8.3 percent of the Retail Trade sector are exporter.
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more interesting case of the tradable service sector.
Another category we will not analyse consists of industries which cannot be uniquely
allocated to tradable or non-tradable services. For example, wholesale trade has char-
acteristics of both classiﬁcations. A wholesale business does not have to be located next
to its customers and is preferably located where there is enough space for storage. But
if it is too remotely located customers have to face additional costs, therefore transport
costs are still signiﬁcant. Another unclassiﬁed industry is transportation. Again there is
not a clear line and the theoretical models may not apply for these ﬁrms.
These subsamples need further cleaning because of the massive outliers in the tradable
service sector mentioned on page 75. The turnover ﬁgures are driven by some extreme
outliers, where an unrealistic increase in turnover is followed by a decrease back to the
level previous periods. This can be caused by errors in entering those turnover ﬁgures in
the BSD. The consequence is an unstable and unreasonable picture of the UK corporate
landscape. Several cleaning methods have been tried, but the best result was achieved
by dropping the extremely volatile sectors with unreasonable turnover changes. So the
analysis will still be representative for the remaining industries. All ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion sectors (SIC 65 and SIC 67), insurance services (SIC 66) and management activities
of holding ﬁrms (SIC 74.15) are excluded from analysis. Another solution was to drop all
the ﬁrms of the top 0.5 percent with regards to their turnover. Even though many ﬁrms
are still kept in the sample the total number of people employed per industry and total
industry turnover was reduced signiﬁcantly.78 Because the BSD enables a representative
analysis for the UK, dropping all big ﬁrms would be not desirable.79
78Results for this sample is provided in the appendix on pages 275ﬀ.
79Another selection method was tried where the sample was ﬁrst divided into regular ﬁrms and large
ﬁrms which belonged to the biggest ten percent of ﬁrms. If an enterprise switches from a regular to
a large ﬁrm and the change was caused by an increase or decrease by a factor equal or greater than
ten, then that company was dropped. Unfortunately this method could not clear the erratic results,
because of two reasons: On the one hand, some companies have been confronted by large changes,
but have always been part of the large sample and therefore could not been dropped. On the other
hand, it is less likely for a large company to double or triple its turnover temporarily for a year than
for a small company. So a doubling of a large company's turnover for one period could be already a
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In the manufacturing sector one outlier was dropped. The omitted ﬁrm experienced an
unrealistic increase in local units. Some companies report zero turnovers for the whole
observation period and are therefore regarded as dead companies. We drop those ﬁrms.
Table 3.14 shows the diﬀerences between the number of local units and enterprises for
each sector before and after cleaning the data from outlier industries and ﬁrm outliers.
Manufacturing Tradable Services
Year full clean full clean
E
n
te
rp
ri
se
s
1997 162,357 159,401 356,896 299,299
1998 162,437 161,701 391,801 339,754
1999 157,562 157,013 414,666 363,462
2000 148,055 147,548 429,245 378,593
2001 145,977 145,479 442,996 391,474
2002 142,729 142,141 450,316 397,179
2003 137,903 137,365 454,537 402,219
2004 133,619 133,220 483,750 429,603
2005 129,427 129,106 514,104 458,257
2006 126,099 125,763 547,045 489,681
2007 125,035 124,679 580,362 520,929
2008 123,916 123,555 609,120 547,899
Total 1,695,049 1,686,971 5,674,838 5,018,349
L
o
ca
l
U
n
it
s
1997 184,613 181,603 412,660 319,862
1998 183,059 182,318 448,264 360,903
1999 177,755 177,194 471,860 384,467
2000 167,214 166,701 485,430 399,021
2001 164,496 163,991 502,567 411,714
2002 160,582 159,988 507,196 416,814
2003 154,333 153,834 516,272 428,137
2004 149,475 149,072 542,718 455,346
2005 144,634 144,309 574,606 483,257
2006 141,332 140,509 615,874 522,818
2007 140,089 139,240 653,939 556,728
2008 138,568 137,748 665,586 565,218
Total 1,906,150 1,896,507 6,396,972 5,304,285
Table 3.14: Sample size before and after cleaning per sector
The careful reader will realise that only 12m out of 24m ﬁrms of the sample after the
ﬁrst cleaning are left. The diﬀerence is explained by unclassiﬁed service sector ﬁrms,
potential outlier but would not be recognised by the selection rule.
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ﬁrms in the agricultural sector, dropped outliers and companies which are changing their
industry.
3.4.2. Inconsistent variables
To make the BSD consistent over time some amendments are needed.
Industry Classiﬁcation: The format of the SIC is changing over time. Sometimes the
variable is saved as a number and sometimes as a string. Furthermore some indus-
tries are miscoded as 4-digit code in 1997 and 2008. Industries aﬀected are 01, 02
and 05, because for those two years the leading 0 is missing.
Reference Numbers: Usually reference enterprise and enterprise group reference num-
bers are stored as a number. In 1999 those reference numbers are stored as a string
and have to be transformed into a number.
Postcode: The presentation of the local unit and reporting unit postcode varies. To
create a consistent postcode the separation of the postcode into two parts has to
be removed. For example, instead of NG7 2RD NG72RD is created.80 This
cleaning is only required if analysis is conducted at the VML.
Foreign Ownership: The foreign ownership variable contains a country code, which
changes three times over time. For example, in 2008 the numeric code was swapped
for a two letter code abbreviation. Therefore I created a new variable which only
shows if the owner is foreign or domestic.
Death Code: The way the death code is stored changes between being a number and
being a string.
80This postcode is just an example and has not been selected from the BSD.
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3.4.3. Missing local unit information
As brieﬂy mentioned above, information is missing for local units between 1998  2004,
especially in 2003. Table 3.15 shows how severe the problem is. To mitigate this problem
data has to be imputed for the local unit industry classiﬁcation, the local unit postcode
and the enterprise reference number of a local unit. The imputation rule was that if data
is missing in period t, it will be identical to those from the period t − 1 but only if the
observations of t− 1 and t+1 are available and identical. Table 3.15 illustrates how this
intervention improves the situation.
entref lu sic lu poco
raw cleaned raw cleaned raw cleaned
1998 62,006 14,606 62,042 19,495 62,006 17,134
1999 42,888 31,888 42,928 33,660 42,888 34,268
2000 57,597 47,497 58,158 49,415 57,605 50,115
2001 75,406 63,685 75,830 65,864 75,409 66,378
2002 84,032 69,495 84,347 74,011 84,032 72,695
2003 199,607 54,670 200,036 70,706 199,607 64,328
2004 34,135 21,431 34,395 24,153 34,135 25,025
Table 3.15: Missing variables of local units, before and after cleaning
3.5. Notable Changes Over Time
Signiﬁcant changes have happened over the twelve year time period from 1997  2008 in
the UK. In total, the number of ﬁrms increased by 19 percent, but a diﬀerent development
can be observed in diﬀerent sectors. The manufacturing sector is shrinking, with regards
to number of ﬁrms, local units and employment. Only nominal turnover is increasing,
which indicates that labour productivity has increased signiﬁcantly over time. A diﬀerent
pattern can be observed in the tradable service sector, where the number of ﬁrms, local
units, employment and turnover is increasing massively. A common pattern is that the
share of single-plant ﬁrms to total ﬁrms is increasing. While multi-plant ﬁrms are getting
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bigger in terms of employment and turnover, the percentage increase of nominal turnover
is much lower for single-plant ﬁrms. Furthermore single-plant ﬁrms employ fewer workers
over time.
As chapter 4 will reveal, vertically integrated companies seem to allocate their local units
in 2008 further away than in 1997. We ﬁnd also an increase in the degree of fragmentation
in the manufacturing and tradable service sector, which is driven by the large increase
of single-plant ﬁrms.
3.6. Diﬀerences Between BSD and ARD
Besides the BSD, the second large enterprise database of the ONS is the Annual Re-
spondents Database (ARD). While the former contains a major part of UK enterprises
and local units, the latter one contains detailed information for a selected sample of UK
ﬁrms.
They are similar in that respect that both databases are based on the IDBR, which
has already been explained above. While the IDBR is directly used for the BSD, it has
two purposes for the ARD. Firstly, it is needed for sample selection in the ARD (ONS,
2002a). The ﬁrms are not selected from a representative sample. While all large ﬁrms
are part of the sampling fraction, it is only 25 percent of the small ﬁrms.81 As part of the
Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) questionnaires are sent to selected ﬁrms which have the
mandatory duty to answer them. The information of the ABI is the main source of the
ARD.82 Figure 3.2 summarises the diﬀerences. Secondly, it provides basic information
on non-selected or non-responding ﬁrms, which will be discussed below.
The ARD contains only data from the production sector until 1992. From 1993 onwards
81Large ﬁrms are ﬁrms with an employment of more than 250 and small ﬁrms with less than 10. There
are diﬀerent sample fractions for ﬁrms between this range, depending on the industries. See ONS
(2002a), page 22.
82Before 1998 the Annual Census of Production (ACOP) from 1970  1997 and the Annual Census of
Construction (ACOC) from 1992  1997 was used instead of the ABI. See ONS (2002a), pages 16ﬀ.
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IDBR
BSD
ABI ARD
used for sample
selection
1997 – 2008
1973 – 2008
1998 –
ACOP: 1970 – 1997
ACOC: 1992 – 1997
1994 –
CSO: 1984 – 1993
var.: – 1984
Notes:
ACOC: Annual Census of Construction
ACOP: Annual Census of Production
ABI: Annual Business Inquiry
ARD: Annual Respondents Database
BSD: Business Structure Database
CSO: Central Statistic Office Business Register
IDBR: Inter-Departmental Business Register
Figure 3.2: Diﬀerences between ARD and BSD
the construction sector was added. The sample size of selected ﬁrms is between 13,000
and 23,000 until 1996. From 1997 onwards the service sectors have been added, which
more than doubled the sample size to around 50,000 (Robjohns, 2006). From 2000 also
parts of the primary sector (SIC 02 and SIC 05) have been added (ONS, 2002a, p. 20).
In comparison to that the BSD contains a couple of million more observation, but only
from 1997 onwards and only basic information about employment, turnover, industry and
location. Note that merging the selected and non-selected sample of ﬁrms of the ARD
gives almost all the information available in the BSD, except turnover for companies
not selected for the ABI, and who provide this data to the HMRC. For the selected
sample the ARD provides 700 variables (Robjohns, 2006, p. 47). This allows us to
create complex variables like capital stocks for industries, which requires diﬀerent types
of capital expenditures and which should be weighted using the full ARD population.
Another diﬀerence is that the main level of analysis in the BSD is the local unit and
the enterprise level, and in the ARD it is the reporting unit level. Also the date of
recording is diﬀerent. While the BSD data is from March, the ARD provides data from
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the calendar year, but ﬁrms may report on any other 12 month period up to the end of
the ﬁnancial year (ONS, 2002a, p. 18). The observation period of the BSD is from 1997
 2008 and for the ARD 1973  2008.
Concluding, for our analysis on fragmentation based input-output measures, the BSD
provides all the necessary information. For using other measures, like value added to
sales ratios, the Annual Respondents Database (ARD) should be used.
3.7. Conclusion: Use of the Data for Research on Fragmentation
The most important advantage of the BSD is that it covers the population of UK ﬁrms
which have employees or whose turnover exceeds the VAT threshold. This provides
us with suﬃcient observations for analysis of certain events which may be relatively
uncommon (such as selling oﬀ vertically integrated local units). Enterprises can be
easily linked to local units and to other databases which is, as it will be shown in chapter
5, very useful for the analysis of fragmentation. The BSD contains precise information
about the activity of a ﬁrm and local units, the exact location through an eight digit
postcode, and is therefore a useful instrument for the analysis of fragmentation. The
possibility of merging with the Oﬃce for National Statistics Postcode Directory enables
the researcher to measure the distance between headquarters and local units. The merger
with ONS input-output tables reveals vertically linkages between local units of a company.
Besides static analysis about the degree of vertical integration and the distance between
headquarters and vertically integrated local units, the panel structure of the BSD enables
a dynamic analysis, so existing companies can be followed over time.
A drawback is the inconsistency of the enterprise group reference number. For fragmen-
tation decision other ﬁrms of the same enterprise group can aﬀect the fragmentation
decision of a company. The comparison of the enterprise and enterprise group level could
have been of interest but only a minor sample can be used. Furthermore, because of its
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inconsistency, it is impossible to follow enterprise groups over time.
Another issue is that no information exists on foreign aﬃliates. It can be the case that
a company is vertically integrated, but, because the plant is located in another country,
this company will not be recognised as vertically integrated. Because the number of
ﬁrms, which actually set up a plant abroad, is relatively low, not too many ﬁrms should
be wrongly classiﬁed.83
Even though there are some drawbacks with the data, the detailed information, accuracy
and the possibility to merge the information with other databases of the ONS will give
interesting insights into fragmentation decisions of companies.
83See page 101 for a quick review about how many ﬁrms are actually involved in foreign activities.
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4. Are UK Firms Becoming More Fragmented?
As early as 1937 Coase's celebrated article asked the question: where are the borders
of a ﬁrm? When is it better for a ﬁrm to buy inputs from the market and when is
it better to create a contractual relationship to produce the intermediates internally?
If parts of the required intermediate inputs are sourced from the market, we will refer
to this ﬁrm to be organisationally fragmented.84 If production stages are spread over
diﬀerent locations it will be referred to as spatial fragmentation. Currently we live in
a world of outsourcing85 but some commentators argue that increased fragmentation is
not inevitable. For example, Santander returned call centres from India to the UK (The
Independent, 2011) because of customers who were unhappy with the service provided.
In this chapter we want to show how important fragmentation has become for UK ﬁrms
and if we can observe a trend reversal recently or not. A comprehensive theoretical
literature exists to describe why ﬁrms are out- or insourcing and is discussed in chapter
2. The empirical literature is focused on international fragmentation, because moving
production parts abroad is a source of concern for the domestic population.
The evidence of international fragmentation is straight forward. Campa and Goldberg
(1997) and Feenstra (1998) ﬁnd evidence for an increase in international fragmentation
of ﬁrms. But as Brainard (1997) points out, the data to measure international activity
is often limited. For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) use the share of intermediate
inputs to total intermediate inputs. No diﬀerentiation between outsourcing and FDI can
be made. This can be crucial because moving a production stage abroad, but keeping
the ownership aﬀects the organisational structure of a ﬁrm diﬀerently than buying inter-
mediates from a foreign market. Even if FDI ﬂows can be identiﬁed there is still a lack
of information. The distinction between vertical FDI, which is related to fragmentation,
and horizontal FDI is important, because the theoretical foundation of each type is dif-
84See page 9 for the precise deﬁnition of fragmentation.
85This is often critically viewed by the public, see for example The Telegraph (2002, 2005).
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ferent. Another problem is the lack of detailed information about the location of foreign
aﬃliates. In general, only the country of residence is known. This can create misleading
results, because two domestically linked ﬁrms might be further away from each other
than domestic headquarters to its foreign aﬃliate.86 All those concerns are crucial for
the analysis of fragmentation of the production chain.
A clearer picture about the degree of vertical integration is provided by ﬁrm level studies
looking at fragmentation of domestic ﬁrms. Maddigan (1981) ﬁnds an increase in the
degree of vertical integration between 1947  1972, but the small sample size of less than
100 ﬁrms might not be representative. Kim (1999) shows that the share of multi-plant
local units in the US manufacturing sector increased from 7.4 percent in 1919 to 21.9
percent in 1987. This implies that US ﬁrms became geographically more dispersed and, if
the multi-plant local units are producing intermediate inputs, more vertically integrated.
In contrast to this, Abraham and Taylor (1996) report an increase in outsourced services
for US manufacturing ﬁrms between 1979  1986/87. Girma and Görg (2004) get similar
results for the UK. The outsourcing intensity is increasing for the electronics and me-
chanical engineering sectors between 1980  1992 and for the chemical industry between
1989  1992. Holl (2008) reports an increase in subcontracting by Spanish ﬁrms between
1990 and 1999. Those studies use rather small samples of the manufacturing sector or
focus on only certain industries. For example, Abraham and Taylor (1996) use mainly
ﬁrms with more than 100 employees, but the great majority of ﬁrms are much smaller
than this. Therefore those results may not be representative.
A way to create a more accurate picture of the change in the organisation structures
of ﬁrms is by using the Business Structure Database (BSD) of the Oﬃce for National
Statistics (ONS). It will be possible to see if the average UK ﬁrm is sourcing more or
less intermediate inputs internally and if they source from more dispersed regions or
86It is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence if a German aﬃliate of an Austrian company is located in Munich or in
Hamburg.
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not. The BSD contains a ﬁve digit SIC code for companies and local units to enable
the identiﬁcation of horizontally and vertically linked aﬃliates. Furthermore, eight digit
postcodes make an exact localisation of local units possible.
The drawback of this database is that it only allows us to identify domestic organisational
structures. However, the International Sourcing Statistics (ISS) database of Eurostat and
a dataset presented by Tomiura (2009) provide evidence that the majority of ﬁrms do
not source internationally. The former is a representative sample of big ﬁrms with more
than 100 employees of any sector. Even of large UK ﬁrms 63 percent are not sourcing
internationally and are not planning to do so.87 According to Eurostat the results for
the UK are overstating the real amount of international sourcing.88 Those ﬁgures do
not diﬀerentiate between foreign sourcing through foreign aﬃliates or foreign market
transaction. Tomiura (2009) shows, for the Japanese manufacturing sector, that 0.2
percent of ﬁrms are outsourcing only abroad, 2.5 percent abroad and domestically and
46.5 percent only domestically in 1998.89 Those results ﬁt to the theoretical models
of heterogeneous ﬁrms like Melitz (2003), where only a small number of companies will
engage in international fragmentation. Even though only few ﬁrms source internationally,
it does not imply that imported intermediate inputs are negligible. UK input-output
tables from 2005 show that 16.6 percent of intermediate inputs used have been imported.
Because our analysis is focused on the ﬁrm level,it is expected that important facts about
fragmentation can be gained, even though transport costs or cultural diﬀerences may only
have a little impact on domestic fragmentation.
87The data was collected by National Statistical Institutes over the period 2001  2006. A survey was
sent to companies with more than 100 employees. No clear information has been given if all ﬁrms
have replied or not in the UK. Firms from the ﬁnancial intermediation sectors were excluded. The
sample size was 7,174 enterprises.
88See Euro-SDMX Metadata Structure, available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_
SDDS/EN/iss_esms.htm, access on 09/02/11.
89The sample size consists of 118,300 ﬁrms. Tomiura (2009) uses a diﬀerent deﬁnition of outsourcing,
so not every market transaction is regarded necessarily as outsourcing. The Japanese ﬁrm structure
is diﬀerent to British enterprise groups. Many huge enterprise agglomerates exist in Japan, called
Keiretsu, which makes the results comparatively lower to the UK. However, not all Japanese ﬁrms
are included, which might lead to an upward sample selection bias.
101
The research question of this chapter is:
How fragmented are UK ﬁrms, and has the degree of fragmentation changed over time?
At the time of writing, this chapter represents the most detailed and comprehensive
study of the organisational structure of UK ﬁrms, and the ﬁrst to analyse changes in
organisational structure over time. The BSD allows us to extend the focus from the
manufacturing sector to the service sector. The main results are that not only the
importance of the sectors, but also that the average size of ﬁrms has changed signiﬁcantly.
The degree of vertical integration was rather low and decreased over time in every sector.
A decomposition of the change reveals that the decrease is mainly caused by new ﬁrms
rather than by continuing ﬁrms. With regards to spatial fragmentation, UK ﬁrms, which
are vertically integrated, became more dispersed. We conclude that intermediate inputs
are sourced from more distant locations. Newly vertically integrated ﬁrms are the reason
for the increase in the dispersion of ﬁrms.
The chapter will be structured as followed: First, the sample used will be described.
Second, a general picture of the UK company landscape will be drawn to see how the
importance of diﬀerent industries has changed over time. Third, a baseline measure
of fragmentation will be presented. Are more ﬁrms becoming multi-plant ﬁrms? In
how many diﬀerent regions are those multi-plant ﬁrms located? In the fourth part the
static analysis of fragmentation is discussed. Here the measures of organisational and
geographical fragmentation will be explained. Finally, in the last section, the dynamic
analysis will be conducted.
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4.1. The Sample
In chapter 3 a comprehensive description of the BSD is provided.90 The majority of
fragmentation studies focus on the manufacturing sector, but, as it will be shown be-
low, the service sector has become more and more important. Therefore the sample is
divided into two sub-samples, namely the manufacturing and the tradable service sector.
This classiﬁcation is based on GATS mode of transportation classiﬁcation, where for the
tradable service sector the proximity to the ﬁnal customer is negligible (for example a
call centre). The classiﬁcation is as follows:
 Manufacturing: SIC 15  37
 Tradable services:
 SIC 72: Data processing and software consultancy (excl. SIC 72.5)
 SIC 73: Research and development services
 SIC 74: Business Services (excl. SIC 74.15, SIC 74.6 and SIC 74.7)
There are several reasons for expanding the analysis by the service sector. Manufacturing
ﬁrms and service ﬁrms diﬀer signiﬁcantly from each other (see section 4.2). It is assumed
that the decision about fragmentation is based on diﬀerent determinants aﬀecting service
and manufacturing ﬁrms diﬀerently. The reason why only the tradable service sector
is considered is that the non-tradable service sector is not suitable for the analysis of
fragmentation. Non-tradable services have in general a rather short production chain
leaving fewer possibilities for fragmentation. This is illustrated by the fact that there
are only few massive ﬁrms (such as large retail ﬁrms) which are vertically integrated,
but in general, most multi-plant ﬁrms are not integrated. In addition, the geographical
distribution is driven by proximity to the market rather than the drivers of fragmentation
90Besides the BSD also other datasets like the Financial Analysis Made Easy Database (FAME), the
National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) and input-output tables are employed. A brief de-
scription of those sources can be found in the appendix on page 266.
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discussed in Chapter 2. A precise description of the sample is provided in section 3.4.1.
Table 4.1 reveals the sample which will be used in this chapter.
Manufacturing Tradable Services
Year Firms Local Units Firms Local Units
1997 158,092 173,239 340,416 367,210
1998 160,425 174,096 381,831 409,505
1999 155,726 168,991 405,140 431,471
2000 146,282 158,355 419,640 444,970
2001 144,234 155,728 433,398 457,499
2002 140,924 152,217 440,389 462,827
2003 136,249 146,544 446,379 467,119
2004 132,100 141,992 475,504 495,422
2005 128,055 137,273 505,674 524,271
2006 124,758 133,476 538,439 557,031
2007 123,710 132,337 571,958 591,717
2008 122,612 130,878 599,964 619,933
Total 1,673,167 1,805,126 5,558,732 5,828,975
Table 4.1: Sample size after second cleaning process
4.2. The UK Manufacturing and the Tradable Service Sector
One unique feature of the BSD is that it oﬀers information about the manufacturing
and the service sector. The importance of the service sector has signiﬁcantly increased,
especially if employment and turnover ﬁgures are considered. We will focus only on
the tradable service sector.91 In the following we illustrate how those two sectors have
developed over time and evidence is given for the increasing importance of the service
sector.92
As a ﬁrst measure the total number of ﬁrms and local units will be considered and
91See page 88 for a further discussion why this classiﬁcation has been chosen.
92One problem with the Industry classiﬁcation is that it is often diﬃcult to ﬁnd the border line between
manufacturing and services. The classical diﬀerentiation between manufacturing as a process where
raw materials are transformed into ﬁnished products is not appropriate anymore. Livesey (2006)
mentions IBM as a company producing computers turning into a service manufacturer. After
selling the PC production to Lenovo, the main source of income is through services. A problem can
arise if the share of manufacturing and service activities is about the same size, then the classiﬁcation
just into manufacturing and services can be too crude.
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Figure 4.1: Size of sectors according to number of ﬁrms and local units
graphically illustrated in ﬁgure 4.1. The development over time looks rather similar for
ﬁrm and local unit ﬁgures. A massive change has happened over the time period from
1997  2008. The number of manufacturing ﬁrms shrank by 27 percent but the number
of tradable service ﬁrms increased by 83 percent.
Those developments can also be observed with other size measures, like total employment
and total turnover per sector. Figure 4.2 captures those variables. Employment and
turnover ﬁgures are increasing in the service sector. Real total turnover93 in the tradable
service sector nearly doubled and employment rose from about 2m to 3m. The opposite
is happening in the manufacturing sector. Employment in manufacturing decreased
massively, from 3.8m down to 2.5m.94 Total turnover decreases until the end of the
1990s until 2005 and remains approximately constant afterwards.95
93We use the OECD GDP deﬂator with base year 2000.
94According to ONS (2008) the employment ﬁgure for manufacturing industries was about 2.9m in 2008.
95In the appendix on page 268 the same graph is included with the sample including all outlier industries.
This picture supports the decision, why ﬁnancial services have been dropped from analysis.
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Figure 4.2: Size of sample sectors according to employment and turnover
The development of both sectors is diﬀerent. How did the average ﬁrm change over time?
As shown in ﬁgure 4.3, manufacturing and service ﬁrms diﬀer massively from each other.
Manufacturing ﬁrms are characterised by higher turnover and employment rates. The
mean manufacturing ﬁrm had 24 people employed in 1997 but only 20 in 2008. In the
tradable service sector it decreased from 6.4 down to 5.5. There is less variation in the
median size of ﬁrms. The median manufacturing ﬁrm had 4 employees in 1997 and 3
in 2008. The median tradable service ﬁrm had 2 employees in 1997 but only 1 in 2008,
which is extremely low. We can speculate that this fall in employment could be the ﬁrst
evidence for organisational fragmentation. The mean turnover did not change much in
manufacturing and in the tradable service sector. The median turnover is much smaller.
While we ﬁnd a small increase in the median real turnover in the service sector (from
¿63.5k to ¿67.5k) it decreased in manufacturing (from ¿183k to ¿153k). The massive
decrease in average ﬁrm employment and an approximately constant mean turnover rate
implies that labour productivity increased signiﬁcantly. This would be the result we
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Figure 4.3: Changes in the size of ﬁrms according to mean employment and mean turnover
expect, because fragmentation means that ﬁrms specialise in their core activities and
productivity has therefore to increase. Even though a total factor productivity (TFP)
measure would be more suitable, we can only use labour productivity measures for this
thesis, because of the available information in the BSD. Empirical evidence shows that
capital deepening was responsible for a large share of labour productivity growth in the
late 1990s (Nordhaus, 2002, p. 236). That means the actual specialisation eﬀect may be
overestimated. We will conduct further investigations below to see if our ﬁrst impression
of increased fragmentation can be conﬁrmed.
Foreign ownership became more important in every industry, but especially in the manu-
facturing sector. At the beginning of the observation period until 2004, foreign ownership
information is missing for some observations, so it might be the case that the increase
in foreign ownership is less/more dramatic. See graph 3.1 on page 85 for more detailed
explanations.
A huge change has happened in the last twelve years. The tradable service sector
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now dominates the manufacturing sector in terms of number of ﬁrms, employment and
turnover. Firms have become smaller in terms of employment, while at the same time
having constant or increasing turnover.
4.3. A Baseline Measure of Fragmentation
In this section we provide two baseline measures of fragmentation. The ﬁrst organisa-
tional fragmentation measure looks at how many intermediate inputs are sourced from
outside suppliers and the second geographical fragmentation measure looks at how dis-
persed UK ﬁrms are.96
A necessary condition for a ﬁrm to be vertically integrated is that it produces diﬀerent
products. Figure 4.4 captures how many plants a ﬁrms has, which are part of a diﬀerent
SIC sector.97 The main activity of a local unit is recorded and categorised according to
SIC 03. We cannot observe if a local unit is also performing other minor activities.98 In
our sample only multi-plant ﬁrms can be multi-product ﬁrms. Because of conﬁdentiality
rules of the ONS, companies with more than ten local units have to be grouped together.
The presented SIC codes are at the 1-digit, 2-digit and 4-digit level. The more local units
a company has, the higher the amount of activities will be.
Figure 4.4 reveals an important fact: In general, manufacturing ﬁrms are active in more
industries than service ﬁrms, regardless of the SIC aggregation.99 Firms of the service
sector are, even if they are active in diﬀerent four digit industries, mainly based in the
same one digit industry, with the exception of ﬁrms with more than 20 local units. The
explanation for this pattern is that the production of services is fundamentally diﬀerent
96A more detailed explanation is provided on page 9.
97The median values are similar, therefore we present only the mean values.
98See page 83 for a detailed description of how activities of ﬁrms and local units are identiﬁed.
99We use SIC 03 for classifying each ﬁrm. However, using SIC 03 could be a potential source of un-
derestimating the degree of heterogeneity. The change from SIC 03 to SIC 07 introduced a ﬁner
classiﬁcation of services revealing that tradable services are not as homogeneous as used to be pre-
sumed. Still, the total number of 4 or 5 digit SIC industries is lower for tradable service sector in
comparison to the manufacturing sector. See ONS (2009b).
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Figure 4.4: Mean number of industries per ﬁrm pooled over period 1997  2008
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from the production of manufacturing goods. While the production of a manufacturing
good requires other goods and services, the production of services requires mainly other
services. This has the following consequences: On the one hand, we expect more ﬁrms to
be vertically integrated because of more possibilities to integrate production stages. On
the other hand, the location decision of manufacturing and tradable service ﬁrms will be
diﬀerent.
How geographically dispersed are these ﬁrms? This question is answered by ﬁgure 4.5.
The postcode information of the BSD identiﬁes the location, where four diﬀerent levels of
regional aggregation have been used. The full postcode is, for example, NG7 2RD100,
the postcode district is NG7 and the postcode area is NG. The highest level of ge-
ographical fragmentation is captured by government oﬃce regions, for example, East
Midlands.
Because the largest ﬁrms with more than twenty local units are signiﬁcantly more dis-
persed, the bars have been censored at twenty locations. Using median values does not
change the picture, therefore we stick to the mean values. At the full postcode level,
not many diﬀerences exist between manufacturing and the service sector with the ex-
ception of the largest companies. The location data shows that the biggest tradable
service ﬁrms are much more dispersed (98) than manufacturing ﬁrms (42). Those num-
bers include horizontally and vertically linked local units. The higher the aggregation
level, the smaller are the diﬀerences between manufacturing and service sector ﬁrms. If
only government oﬃce regions are considered then the diﬀerences of the largest ﬁrms
disappear completely  all large ﬁrms are acting nationwide. Surprisingly, the spatial
distribution of manufacturing and tradable service ﬁrms is quite similar. We would have
expected manufacturing ﬁrms to be more dispersed. Because the location of local units
can be driven by the input factor prices, plants of manufacturing ﬁrms might be located
in areas with a relatively low property price and headquarters are located in areas where
100This postcode is random and has not been identiﬁed from the BSD.
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suﬃcient services are supplied, for example, in cities. At a ﬁrst glance the tradable ser-
vice sector looks diﬀerent to what was expected: the nature of tradable services should
support concentration and not dispersion to enjoy economies of scales. One reason is
that in graph 4.5 only multi-plant ﬁrms are included. But as shown in ﬁgure 4.6 the
number of multi-plant ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly lower in the tradable service sector than in
manufacturing. It is less likely for tradable service ﬁrms to become a multi-plant ﬁrm
but if they become one, they have local units in diﬀerent regions. Another interesting
fact is that the number of multi-plant ﬁrms is decreasing in every sector, which is a ﬁrst
indicator of ﬁrms becoming more organisationally fragmented over time.
A more precise measure of geographical fragmentation can be created by measuring
the actual distance between all local units and their headquarters. We assume that
the postcode of the reporting unit is similar to the postcode of the headquarters or at
least to the largest local unit of the ﬁrm. Even if local units and headquarters are in
the same region, it is possible that the distance between those is greater than if they
were located in diﬀerent regions (for example the distance between two local units in
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire can be closer than the distance between two local units
within Nottinghamshire). Figure 4.7 shows the median distance for diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes.
We can see that in general the median manufacturing ﬁrm is more dispersed than a
tradable service ﬁrm. This is what was expected, because service should be located in
more agglomerated areas.101
101The diﬀerences are less severe if we look at the mean values, but still remain. A similar graph with
mean values is located in the appendix on page 268.
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Figure 4.5: Number of locations per ﬁrm pooled over period 1997  2008
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Figure 4.6: Share of multi-plant to total number of ﬁrms
4.4. A Static Analysis of Fragmentation
The baseline analysis is not suﬃcient for the analysis of the fragmentation of ﬁrms. On
the one hand, no diﬀerentiation between vertically and horizontally linked local units
was made. For fragmentation the vertical link is crucial. On the other hand, the number
of industries a company is in does not say much about regarding the degree a company
is vertically integrated. This section will take account of those aspects. A static analysis
is conducted to create a comprehensive picture of how fragmented UK ﬁrms are. This
section does not deal with the mechanics behind changes. Those will be part of the
dynamic analysis.
4.4.1. Organisational fragmentation
The baseline measure purely looked at how many diﬀerent products a company is produc-
ing. This does not imply that all products are intermediate inputs for other production
stages. Furthermore it does not give information about the importance of a product
in the production chain. In this section a measure of vertical integration, which is the
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Figure 4.7: Median distance between headquarters and local units
opposite of organisational fragmentation, will be created and analysed. This section is
heavily based on the approaches of Davies and Morris (1995) and Acemo§lu et al. (2010).
A measure of vertical integration
Many studies have been published with an empirical measure of vertical integration
(see section 2.1.4) but most of those measures are rather problematic. One of the main
problems is that the derivation of the measures requires additional company and industry
information, which is often unavailable. Many of the studies mentioned in section 2.1.4
using a classical vertical integration measure suﬀer from a relatively small sample, because
precise data about turnover, market shares and value added are often only available for
large companies. In contrast, the information needed for the calculation of the vertical
integration measure employed here is rather modest. The intermediate input structure
from input-output tables, the number of plants per ﬁrms and the SIC code of all local
units are suﬃcient. Furthermore, the measure features the distinction between forward
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and backward vertical integration and is always between zero and one. The focus of our
measure lies on the local unit and the ﬁrm level.
A plant is backward vertically integrated when another plant belonging to the same ﬁrm
exists which is producing intermediate inputs required by the ﬁrst plant. For example, a
ﬁrm possesses a plant producing cars and another plant producing steel. The car plant
requires steel as intermediate inputs, which is supplied ﬁrm internally. Therefore the car
producer is backward vertically integrated. A plant is forward vertically integrated when
another plant belonging to the same ﬁrm exists which requires the intermediate inputs
produced by the ﬁrst plant. In the example just mentioned the steel producing plant
would be forward vertically integrated.
Before we can derive and interpret the measure we have to state the following assump-
tions:
1. All companies in the same industry have the same intermediate input structure.
2. The output of a local unit is suﬃcient to satisfy the demand of the upstream local
unit, so, for example, bi-sourcing cannot exist.
3. If a local unit is producing intermediate inputs for another local unit, then all of
its output is traded internally.
Assumption 1 is similar to Maddigan (1981), who assumes that the same technology is
prevailing for all companies within the same industry. This is a good approximation for
companies oﬀering homogeneous goods. For companies in a diﬀerentiated goods sector
the input structure can be quite diﬀerent, for example, a car producer can decide to use
mainly steel for safety reasons for the production of a car and another one might prefer
plastic parts to reduce the production costs. Because of assumption 2 all intermediate
inputs produced internally are enough to satisfy the demand of the company. Acemo§lu
et al. (2010) show that this assumption may not be far-fetched. Their calculations suggest
that if a ﬁrm has an intermediate input supplying plant it will be enough to satisfy
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the demand for this speciﬁc intermediate input of the downstream ﬁrm. On average,
if a vertical linkage between local units of diﬀerent industries belonging to the same
company exists, 93 percent of the demand for intermediate inputs is satisﬁed by internal
production.102 Finally, according to assumption 3 all goods are traded internally, for
example bi-sourcing cannot arise. Because of this all forward vertically integrated units
are by deﬁnition fully integrated. Therefore only a vertical integration dummy for forward
integration can be generated.103
Our measure of backward vertical integration is calculated for a local unit as shown in
equation 4.1:
vibli =
R∑
j=1
akj × Iij (4.1)
where l is a local unit, i is the company that local unit l is part of, akj indicates the
proportion of inputs demanded by a local unit of industry k from a supplying industries
j (technology coeﬃcient), and Iij is a dummy vector which is 1 if company i has another
local unit in a sector j or 0 otherwise. vibli is therefore the share of total intermediate
inputs used by local unit l of company i which are provided by other local units of
company i. If akj > 0, where j = k, observations will only be kept in the sample if
there are other local units of the same company with a diﬀerent 4 digit SIC code. For
example, a solicitor oﬃce is part of 4-digit SIC code 7411. If there are several oﬃces with
the same owner and the same SIC code, but at diﬀerent locations, those observations will
be treated as not vertically integrated. If it has another oﬃce which is responsible for
bookkeeping activities, the 2-digit SIC code would be the same (74), but they will diﬀer
at the 4-digit level (7412). This company has a positive degree of vertical integration if
a74,74 > 0.
104
102Acemo§lu et al. (2010) highlight that this does not imply that all demanded intermediate inputs can
be provided internally. See page 50 equation 2.9 for how Acemo§lu et al. (2010) calculate this value.
103With the input-output tables it is possible to calculate the share of outputs of a local unit a of
industry j delivered to another local unit b of industry k. Because of assumption 3 the degree of
forward vertical integration will always be one for a.
104Note that input-output tables are relatively aggregated, therefore a identiﬁcation of how many goods
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The measure of backward vertical integration at the enterprise level is the average value
of the degree of vertical integration of all local units l of company i.
vibi =
∑n
l=1 vibli
ni
(4.2)
where ni is the number of local units within company i and vibli the degree of vertical
integration of the local unit. vibi is the average share of backward vertical integration of
local units within company i.
Because of assumption 3, another approach has to be taken to calculate the forward
vertical integration measure at the local unit level. Only a forward vertical integration
dummy can be created.
vifli =


0 . . . if ﬁrm i does not own a plant in ind. j supplying its plant in ind. k
1 . . . if ﬁrm i owns at least one plant in ind. j supplying its plant in ind. k
(4.3)
The enterprise level measure will also be a dummy as shown in equation 4.4:
vifi =


0 . . . if
∑n
l=1 vifli = 0
1 . . . if
∑n
l=1 vifli ≥ 0
(4.4)
If ﬁrm i has at least one plant which is vertically integrated the whole ﬁrm will be
regarded as vertically integrated. We use a similar method for the derivation of the
backward vertically integration dummy.
The following example illustrates the logic behind the measure. On the left hand side
of table 4.2 a made-up Use input-output table can be found. The demand of diﬀerent
industries for certain goods is listed in the columns and goods produced, which are
from sector 7412 are actually used in 7411 is not possible. We only have information about how many
goods from sector 74 are demanded by sector 74. Therefore if the ﬁrm owns those two aﬃliates, then
a7411,7412 = a74,74.
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comparable to supplying industries, are listed in the rows. In this example only ten
diﬀerent goods are produced in the economy. Cell (1,1) shows that 30 percent of all
intermediate inputs demanded by industry 1 are supplied by industry 1, 10 percent by
industry 2, 20 percent by industry 3, etc.
IO-table BSD
goods | ind. 1 . . . 3 . . . entref luref ind vib
1 0.3 . . . 0 . . . A 01 1 0.35
2 0.1 . . . 0 . . . A 02 3 0.7
3 0.2 . . . 0.5 . . . A 03 3 0.7
4 0 . . . 0 . . . A 04 7 . . .
5 0.1 . . . 0 . . . A 05 10 . . .
6 0.1 . . . 0 . . . ...
...
...
...7 0 . . . 0.1 . . .
8 0 . . . 0 . . .
9 0.05 . . . 0.3 . . .
10 0.15 . . . 0.1 . . .
Sum 1 . . . 1 . . .
Table 4.2: The calculation of a vertical integration measure using input-output tables
On the right hand side of the table is a synthetic example of the BSD. entref is an
abbreviation for enterprise reference number, luref is for a local unit reference number
and ind indicates the industry that each local unit is part of. Enterprise A owns ﬁve
plants, which are part of four diﬀerent industries, 1, 3, 7 and 10.
We compute105 if any of the plants of enterprise A are supplying intermediate inputs
demanded by the plant concerned. For example, plant 01 is active in industry 1. In
the input-output table we have the information about the share of intermediate inputs
demanded by industry 1. 10 percent of the intermediate inputs demanded are supplied
by industry 2. Firm A does not have any plants active in industry 2, therefore we can
conclude that those 10 percent of intermediate inputs demanded by the local unit have
to be sourced from the market. The next industry in the input-output table is industry
105We provide the code in the appendix on pages 269ﬀ and explain the syntax.
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3, which supplies 20 percent of intermediate inputs for industry 1. This time ﬁrm A
owns local units (02 and 03) of industry 3, therefore we assume that at least 20 percent
of intermediate inputs are produced internally. This process continues for all industries.
Local unit 5 of ﬁrm A is active in industry 10, and is therefore another intermediate
input supplier for local unit 1. 15 percent of intermediate inputs demanded by industry
1 come from industry 10. Therefore local unit 01 will end up with a degree of vertical
integration of 35 percent.
The same procedure is applied for all other local units. A special case arises for local
units 02 and 03, which are of the same industry. According to the input-output table
half of the goods demanded are supplied by its own industry. Only if both plants are
of diﬀerent 4 digit SIC industries vertical integration is recorded. In the example both
plants are in diﬀerent 4-digit SIC industries and therefore have to be taken into account
for the degree of vertical integration (which is 70 percent for plants 02 and 03).
Our vertical integration measure is closely related to the Davies and Morris (1995) and
Acemo§lu et al. (2010) measures but diﬀers in certain aspects:
 Level of aggregation: Davies and Morris (1995) provide a ﬁrm measure and Ace-
mo§lu et al. (2010) is creating a within-ﬁrm measure, where the degree of vertical
integration is calculated for industry pairs of its local units. For one local unit
several vertical integration measures exist. For example, a steel producing plant
requires inputs from three industries: coal, iron ore and chemical sector. Therefore
three degrees of vertical integrations are derived. If the steel producer also owns a
plant in the chemicals sector, then the degree of vertical integration for the steel-
chemicals industry pair would be positive and for the steel-coal and steel-ore pairs
equal to zero. The measure of this work is based on the local unit level, through
which the ﬁrm level can be calculated.
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 Precision: Davies and Morris (1995) and Acemo§lu et al. (2010) use additional
information to improve the precision of their measure. Davies and Morris (1995)
include the market share of a company to separate the internal intermediate input
ﬂows from intermediate inputs delivered to outside ﬁrms. This measure is not
able to distinguish between backward and forward vertical integration. Besides the
market share also total sales of a company are needed for the calculation. A more
precise measure is used by Acemo§lu et al. (2010). By using information about the
value of intermediate inputs produced and needed for the production of the ﬁnal
product, Acemo§lu et al. (2010) can exactly tell what share of intermediate inputs
is supplied internally. The used measure in this work treats all ﬁrms equally, so the
actual amount of intermediate inputs supplied internally cannot be considered.
 Time Period: In contrast to Acemo§lu et al. (2010), who are using cross section
data, Davies and Morris (1995) and I look at time series data.
The measure faces certain limitations. One issue with all input-output table based mea-
sures is that outside factors exist which can inﬂuence the technology coeﬃcient even
though the actual technology has not changed. For example, regulations could alter
prices of intermediate inputs. This aﬀects the value of intermediates supplied by one in-
dustry to another industry and can change the relative composition of the intermediate
input structure, even though no actual change in the intermediate input structure has
happened. Nevertheless the degree of vertical integration may change.
Secondly, they often take account of only direct not indirect linkages between plants.
Assume a simpliﬁed diamond production chain illustrated in ﬁgure 4.8. Three production
stages exist, mining, manufacturing and retailing. Additionally there are three local units
called A, B and C, where A is in the mining business, B in manufacturing and C in
retailing. All of them are vertically linked with each other. A does not need any other
intermediate inputs, B only requires inputs of plant A and C sources all its input from
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Figure 4.8: Illustration of problems caused by indirect linkages for the vertical integration
measure
B. So the whole production process of C consists of three production blocks. If C does
not own any other company the vertical integration measure will be zero. If C buys B,
the manufacturing company, then C will have a degree of backward vertical integration
of 1, even though it does not own the ﬁrst production step. To pursue the problem
further, if C owns A, but not B then C would not be regarded as vertically integrated,
even though A is part of the production process. The measure may overvalue (scenario
1) or undervalue (scenario 2) the actual amount of vertical integration
Finally, our measure can only capture vertical integration, if a separate local unit exists
which produces intermediate inputs. A ﬁrm producing ﬁnal products and intermediate
inputs within one establishment will not be recognised by our measure.
Nevertheless, despite these drawbacks, our measure is suitable for our analysis. Other
measures often require detailed balance sheet information and therefore only a few ﬁrms
can be used for analysis. One aim of this chapter is to ﬁnd out how the average UK ﬁrm
has changed. Even though our measure is less precise than comparative measures, we can
calculate the degree of vertical integration for every ﬁrm in our sample. A straight forward
interpretation, a distinction between forward and backward vertical integration106 and
106This distinction can be important, for example in chapter 5 the backward measure is preferred, but
in chapter 6 we require the forward measure.
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the possibility of calculating a ﬁrm level measure support the choice of our measure.
Empirical evidence for vertical integration
After showing how important vertically integrated ﬁrms are for both sectors, the change in
the degree of vertical integration over time will be analysed for the backward integration
sample.
Firstly, we show in graph 4.9 how many ﬁrms are backward vertically integrated. We
do not present the graph capturing the forward sample, because the development of the
share of forward and backward integrated ﬁrms and local units is similar.107 The top
two panels show the share of vertically integrated local units to all local units if all ﬁrms
(top left) or only multi-plant ﬁrms (top right) are considered. In the bottom the share
of vertically integrated ﬁrms to all ﬁrms (bottom left) and vertically integrated ﬁrms to
multi-plant ﬁrms (bottom right) are captured.
The following discussion will be based on the backward sample. The share of vertically
integrated ﬁrms and local units is much lower in the tradable-service sector than in
manufacturing. The share of vertically integrated ﬁrms to all ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly lower
than the share of vertically integrated local units to all local units. In the manufacturing
sector, the share of vertically integrated local units decreased from 10 percent to 7.6
percent for the whole sample. The multi-plant sample shows a relatively constant share
that was always around 61 percent. This picture is supported by the ﬁrm measure. If all
ﬁrms are considered, then the share decreased from 3 percent to 2 percent. The share
of the ﬁrm multi-plant sample was always around 52 percent. There was a decline in
every share and every measure for the tradable service sector. The already low share
of vertically integrated local units decreased further from 2.9 percent to 1 percent (all
ﬁrms) and from 32.6 percent to 27.4 percent (multi-plant ﬁrms). At the ﬁrm level the
picture is similar, the share decreased from 0.6 to 0.2 percent (all ﬁrms) and from 21.4
107The share of forward and backward vertically integrated ﬁrms are even identical.
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Note: All four panels show the share of backward vertically business units based on diﬀerent
samples. The top left panel includes the share of backward vertically integrated local units to all
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Figure 4.9: Share of backward vertical integrated local units and ﬁrms according to type of
ﬁrm
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percent to 17.2 percent (multi-plant ﬁrms). Concluding, the share of vertically integrated
ﬁrms decreased, regardless of the sector. In the next paragraph we analyse how many
intermediate inputs are sourced internally.
The measure described in section 4.4.1 is used to ﬁnd a quantitative measure of ver-
tical integration. The measure points in the opposite direction of fragmentation, that
means that the lower the degree of vertical integration is, the higher is the degree of
organisational fragmentation. A ﬁrm with a degree of zero is completely fragmented
and with a degree of one it is completely vertically integrated. The main input for this
measure is the use of the input-output table from 2002. The ONS oﬀers annually up-
dated input-output tables, but because of the following reasons I only use one.108 On
the one hand, input-output tables should not change dramatically over years. On the
other hand, changes in the input-output tables can be caused by outside factors which
can inﬂuence the intermediate input structure even though the actual technology has not
changed. For example, regulations could alter prices of intermediates. This aﬀects the
value of intermediates supplied by one industry to another industry and can change the
relative composition of the intermediate input structure, even though no actual techno-
logical change in the intermediate input structure has happened. Nevertheless the degree
of vertical integration may change over time. If just the input-output table of 2002 is
kept, those problems can be avoided.
By keeping the limitations of the vertical integration measure in mind, ﬁgure 4.10 shows
how many of the intermediate inputs are sourced within the ﬁrm. Four diﬀerent graphs
are gathered. In the ﬁrst one in the top left panel the degree of vertical integration for the
average UK ﬁrm is calculated. In the top right graph the degree of vertical integration for
the average multi-plant ﬁrm, in the bottom left for ﬁrms with more than ten local units
and in the bottom right for all vertically integrated ﬁrms are presented. We only present
108It has been checked if the results will change if the input-output tables from 1997 are used. As it can
be seen on page 272 in the appendix, the results have not changed signiﬁcantly.
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the ﬁrm and not the local unit measure. The latter one is too erratic in the tradable
service sector. Therefore we move this measure to the appendix on page 274 with an
explanation, what is causing these ﬂuctuations. The average degree of integration of a
local unit within a ﬁrm is not confronted with his problem. The results are presented in
ﬁgure 4.10.
The measure of vertical integration is extremely skewed. The median ﬁrm was not
vertically integrated, regardless of the sector. In manufacturing, the average (mean)
degree of vertical integration of a ﬁrm decreased from 0.16 to 0.09 percent, but also if
only multi-plant ﬁrms are considered, the degree decreased from 2.8 to 2.4 percent. Only
the largest ﬁrms became more integrated (from 9.2 to 10.2 percent). The average degree
for vertically integrated ﬁrms declined too (from 5.2 to 4.6 percent).
The degree of vertical integration for all tradable service ﬁrms decreased from 0.04 to
0.016 percent. The degree for the multi-plant sample was with 1.4 percent rather constant
and decreased strongly from 1 to 0.57 percent in the sample with ﬁrms with more than
ten local units. It was less likely for local units in the tradable service sector to be
vertically integrated in comparison to the manufacturing sector, but if they are vertically
integrated they will be at a higher degree. The degree increased for vertically integrated
ﬁrms from 6.8 percent to 8.2 percent.
This section reveals that the majority of ﬁrms are not vertically integrated. Even if only
vertically integrated ﬁrms are considered, the degree of vertical integration is low. This is
in accordance with other studies using input-output measures for measuring the degree
vertical integration (see section 4.6 on page 140). The average vertically integrated
manufacturing ﬁrm does not produce more than 5 percent and the average vertically
integrated tradable service ﬁrm more than 8 percent of its intermediate inputs internally.
This implies that a very large share of supply for the average ﬁrm comes from outside.
The second new ﬁnding is that the average UK ﬁrm became more fragmented between
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Figure 4.10: Degree of vertical integration per ﬁrm according to type of ﬁrm
126
1997  2008. We will discuss possible explanations for these ﬁndings after conducting
the dynamic analysis.
4.4.2. Geographical fragmentation
A measure of spatial fragmentation
As for organisational fragmentation, a discrete and continuous measure will be presented.
The ﬁrst measure is a multi-location dummy. If a ﬁrm has at least one local unit in more
than one region, then the multi-location dummy will be one. The calculation is described
in equations 4.5 and 4.6 and based on Landier et al. (2009), with the diﬀerence that we
only look at vertically integrated local units.
MLviir =


1 . . . if (
∑nl
l=1 lulir) > 0 and vilir > 0
0 otherwise
(4.5)
MLvii =


1 . . . if (
∑nr
r=1ML
vi
ir) > 1
0 otherwise
(4.6)
where the index i represents the ﬁrm, l the local unit and r the region. lulir is a dummy
which is one if ﬁrm i has a local unit l in region r. Equation 4.5 identiﬁes if local units
in diﬀerent regions exist. Because we focus on fragmentation only vertically integrated
local units are considered. If ﬁrm i has at least one vertically integrated local unit in
region r, then the multi-location ﬁrm region dummy will be one. In the second stage
(equation 4.6) all those multi-location ﬁrm region dummies are added up and if there are
local units in more than one region, the multi-location ﬁrm dummy will be one.
Another way to calculate the spatial dimension of fragmentation is to measure the dis-
tance between the headquarters of a ﬁrm and its intermediate input supplier.109 Unfor-
109Alternatively, Audia et al. (2000) are measuring the average distance of all local units with each other.
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tunately, it is diﬃcult to gain information about the location of unaﬃliated intermediate
input suppliers. This data does not exist in the UK.110 We therefore focus on the dis-
persion of vertically integrated ﬁrms.
To measure the distance between the headquarters and its vertically integrated aﬃliates
we use the NSPD.111 This database links every postcode of ﬁrms or plants to unique
coordinates, called Eastings and Northings. The concept of Eastings and Northings
can be illustrated by putting a grid over the UK. One point of the grid regards as
starting point. All postcodes can be reached by an Eastings-Northings vector, which is
measured in meters. The earth curvature is ignored112, therefore the distance between
two postcodes can by derived by using Pythagoras' theorem, like in equation 4.7:
distil =
√
(Northi −Northil)2 + (Easti − Eastil)2 (4.7)
where the postcode of ﬁrm i equals the postcode of the headquarters of the ﬁrm, l is one
local unit of ﬁrm i and North represents Northings and East Eastings.113 In contrast to
the general indicator of fragmentation mentioned in section 4.3, not the distance between
all local units but only between vertically integrated local units and their headquarters
are considered. Equation 4.7 is the foundation for our ﬁrm dispersion measure presented
in equation 4.8.
av. disti =
∑ni
i=1
av. distance within ﬁrm︷ ︸︸ ︷(∑nil
l=1,l 6=i distil
nil
)
ni
(4.8)
110To illustrate it with table 2.1 on page 11, it is partly possible to diﬀerentiate between the cells in the
right column, but not for the two cells in the left column. Only the geographical distance between
the aﬃliates of the same company can be identiﬁed.
111The National Statistics Postcode Directory of 2009 is used.
112According to Duranton and Overman (2005) ignoring the earth curvature in the UK leads only to a
maximum possible error of one kilometre, which is negligible.
113Information about ﬁrms and local units in the BSD are provided by reporting units. A reporting unit
is a local unit, providing the information. As we show on page 79, our assumption that the location
of the reporting unit is equal to the location of the headquarters is valid.
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where i is the index for ﬁrms and l for local units. We calculate ﬁrst the average distance
between the headquarters and its local units within every ﬁrm and then create an average
distance over all ﬁrms of the sample. Graph 4.11 reveals the results for the multi-location
and mean distance share. We present here the results for the multi-location dummy and
distance by using forward vertically integrated local units. Even though the results hardly
change, it is from a conceptual point of view more appropriate to look at local units, which
are producing intermediate inputs than at local units which are receiving intermediate
inputs. The total share of multi-location ﬁrms is decreasing in both sectors. The share
of multi-location ﬁrms decreased from 1.4 to 1 percent in manufacturing and from 0.3 to
0.1 percent in the tradable service sector. If we consider the share of multi-location ﬁrms
to all multi-plant ﬁrms, the share is with 25 percent in manufacturing and 10 percent
in the service sector rather constant. The important result appears in the last graph of
the ﬁrst row. The share of multi-location units to all vertically integrated local units
is increasing strongly. While 49 percent of vertically integrated ﬁrms in manufacturing
and 52 percent in the service sector were multi-location ﬁrms in 1997, it increased to 55
percent and 62 percent respectively.
In the second row of ﬁgure 4.11 we show the distance measure. We can actually only
measure geographical fragmentation for vertically integrated ﬁrms. For example, we
cannot tell if single-plant ﬁrms are sourcing intermediate inputs from the same or from
another region. If we just look at vertically integrated local units, we can get an idea,
where the intermediate inputs producing plants are located. Therefore the graphs with
the all ﬁrm and multi-plant ﬁrm sample are driven by the reduced number of vertically
integrated ﬁrms.
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Note: The top row shows the share of multi-location (ML) ﬁrms (measured at the postcode-area level), to all ﬁrms, multi-plant ﬁrms and
vertically integrated ﬁrms. The bottom row shows the mean distance between forward vertically integrated local units and their headquarters
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Figure 4.11: Share of multi-location ﬁrms and mean distance of forward vertically integrated local units to their HQ within ﬁrms.
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To analyse the change in geographical fragmentation we will focus on the last graph in
the second row. The average distance is increasing from 63km to 75km in manufacturing
and from 60 to 80 km in the tradable service sector.
To check if the way of calculation is valid, the reliability of reporting unit post codes has
been analysed. By using the FAME database it is possible to identify if the postcode of
headquarters is similar to the reporting unit postcode. The result for a sub-sample of
the manufacturing sector was that for 84 percent the location was similar. See section
3.3 on page 79 for a precise description of this reliability check.
It can be concluded that vertically integrated ﬁrms are becoming signiﬁcantly more dis-
persed over time, regardless of their sector. The distance measure indicates an increase
in geographical fragmentation in manufacturing during the observation period of 1997 
2008 by around 19 percent and the tradable service sector by 33 percent. The increase
in geographical fragmentation can be based on several factors mentioned in section 2.1.2.
According to the factor proportion theory and the Knowledge Capital Model the disper-
sion can be caused by an increase in factor price diﬀerences between diﬀerent regions of
the UK. Furthermore, a decrease in the costs of service linkages can reduce the barriers
of fragmentation. It even can be an indicator that the costs of outsourcing decreased in
comparison to setting up a vertically integrated plant. Therefore ﬁrms may shut down
local units which are close to the headquarters, because factor-costs advantages are not
large enough anymore. If that is the case we would expect ﬁrms, which become vertically
integrated, to be more dispersed than old ﬁrms. To ﬁnd support for that idea, we have
to conduct a dynamic analysis.
4.5. A Dynamic Analysis of Fragmentation
While the static analysis is able to describe the current state of UK ﬁrms, it is not
able to answer the question what the mechanism behind the change in the degree of
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fragmentation are. The picture from the static analysis stated above suggests that the
average UK ﬁrm became organisationally more fragmented and the average vertically
integrated ﬁrm spatially more dispersed. This could be caused by
1. new ﬁrms entering the market which are more fragmented,
2. old ﬁrms exiting the market which are less fragmented, or
3. existing ﬁrms becoming more fragmented.
The dynamic analysis reveals how ﬁrms change over time. Transition tables and decom-
position methods are common tools to analyse the drivers behind changes. We will focus
on decomposition. State transition tables show how many observations are changing their
state over time, for example from the state of being vertically integrated to being frag-
mented. Firms hardly change their state from fragmented to integrated and vice versa,
which can be an indicator that cause 3 is not the driving force behind fragmentation.
Therefore the transition tables are only presented in the appendix on pages 278ﬀ.
Decomposition is a useful tool for identifying the source of changes. It is very common in
studies about wage diﬀerences to indicate the explainable and inexplicable part114 or in
papers about productivity growth to show what type of ﬁrms are causing it. The latter
one is used as framework for the analysis of the change in the structure of organisational
forms. Foster et al. (2006)115 oﬀer a method based on Baily et al. (1992), which is shown
in equation 4.9.
∆F ojt =
∑
i∈C
si,t−1∆F
o
i,t +
∑
i∈C
(F oi,t−1 − F
o
j,t−1)∆si,t +
∑
i∈C
∆F oi,t∆si,t+
+
∑
i∈N
si,t(F
o
i,t − F
o
j,t−1)−
∑
i∈X
si,t−1(F
o
i,t−1 − F
o
j,t−1) (4.9)
114See for example Hisarciklilar et al. (2010).
115A more comprehensive description of diﬀerent decomposition methods is available in Foster et al.
(1998).
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∆F ojt is the change in a the degree of organisational or geographical integration (o =
{org, geo}) of an industry j (manufacturing and tradable services) at time t. This change
is generated by ﬁrms which are entering or exiting during the observation period and
continuing ﬁrms, which have existed over the whole observation period.
The right hand side consists of variables at the industry (j) and ﬁrm (i) level. si is a
weight representing the share of economic activity in a sector. For example, Foster et al.
(2006) use man-hours at the local unit level, which was calculated by employment times
industry average hours from the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). We will use equal
weights for every ﬁrm calculated as 1/(Number of firms). si does not measure in our
case the share of economic activity but the ﬁrm concentration share. This can change
over time, if more ﬁrms exit or enter the sector. Equal weights are not a drawback for
the analysis because the focus of this research lies on how the average ﬁrm has changed
over time and not on how the average output was produced. For example, consider an
industry with few large integrated ﬁrms and many small fragmented ﬁrms. According to
the output it might be the case that the average output is highly integrated because of
the dominance of the few large ﬁrms. Still the average ﬁrms will be fragmented.
Continuing ﬁrms (C) can inﬂuence the degree of vertical integration in three ways: First,
the ﬁrms can become more or less vertically integrated keeping everything else constant.
It is ignored if the ﬁrm concentration has increased or not over time. This is measured by
the change in the degree of fragmentation over time times the ﬁrm concentration variable
in the starting period. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side captures this eﬀect, which
is also called the within eﬀect. The second term is called the between eﬀect. It indicates
how the change in the ﬁrm concentration aﬀects the total change in the degree of vertical
integration. If a ﬁrm with a higher degree of integration than the average ﬁrm experiences
an increase in its ﬁrm concentration share, because many ﬁrms are exiting the sector,
the overall change in F ojt will be positively aﬀected. The last eﬀect of continuing ﬁrms is
a cross eﬀect capturing how the change of the degree of integration aﬀects the activity
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of a company. It is expected that an increase in fragmentation will lead to a decrease in
the ﬁrm concentration share.
The ﬁrst term in the second line of equation 4.9 captures the eﬀect of entering ﬁrms (N).
If a company enters which is more integrated than the average ﬁrm at the beginning
of the observation period, then ∆F ojt will increase. The ﬁfth and last eﬀect comes from
exiting ﬁrms (X). This time if an exiting ﬁrm is more integrated than the average ﬁrm
then ∆F ojt will decrease.
4.5.1. Organisational fragmentation
The results for organisational fragmentation are presented in table 4.3 for the years 1997
and 2008. In the last column the absolute change of the degree of vertical integration is
captured. The change is exactly the diﬀerence illustrated in ﬁgure 4.10. The degree of
vertical integration decreased by 0.0007 in the manufacturing sector, which is a decrease
of 44 percent in comparison to the degree of vertical integration in 1998 and by 0.00025
(-62.5 percent) in the tradable service sector. The values of the eﬀects are all expressed
in percentages. The sign for exiting ﬁrms has been changed according to formula 4.9.
Continuing
Within Between Cross New Exit Total
Man 21.3 −7.2 6.1 104.9 −25.1 -0.0007
Ser 3.4 3.4 −1.5 102.2 −7.5 -0.00025
Notes:
This table is based on equation 4.9. The last column (Total) shows the absolute
change in the degree of vertical integration if all ﬁrms are considered. In all other
columns (Within to Exit) values are in expressed in percentage. The ﬁrst three
columns (Continuing) show how much of the absolute change has been caused be
continuing ﬁrms. The fourth column (New) indicates the inﬂuence of ﬁrms which
entered after 1997 and the ﬁfth column (Exit) the inﬂuence of ﬁrms which exited
before 2008. A positive sign implies causing a decrease in the degree of integration
and a positive sign an increase. We swapped the sign of the Exit column to be
consistent with equation 4.9.
Table 4.3: Decomposition of the change in organisational fragmentation of ﬁrms
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The degree of vertical integration is decreasing in the manufacturing sector, therefore
all positive percentage ﬁgures mean a decrease in the degree of vertical integration. The
main driver of the decrease in vertical integration is new ﬁrms (105 percent). The average
ﬁrm, which entered between 1997 and 2008, was on average more fragmented than the
average ﬁrm in 1997. Exiting ﬁrms were relatively more fragmented, but had a lower
impact (minus 25 percent) than new ﬁrms. This can be caused by many small single-plant
ﬁrms exiting the market. Around 20 percent of the change are explained by continuous
ﬁrms, where the majority of the eﬀect is caused by the within eﬀect (21 percent). The
average continuing ﬁrm became more fragmented (20 percent). The between eﬀect shows
in the opposite direction, leading to an increase in the degree of vertical integration.116
The smallest eﬀect is the cross eﬀect capturing the interaction between the change in the
market share and the change in the degree of vertical integration. Because continuing
ﬁrms became more fragmented and less ﬁrms were in the market, the cross eﬀect can
only explain a small part of the increase in fragmentation.
In the tradable service sector the decrease in the degree of vertical integration is mainly
caused by entering ﬁrms. 102 percent of the increase in fragmentation can be explained
by those ﬁrms. The rest of the eﬀects can only account for minor parts. Concluding, the
main share of the decrease in the number of vertically integrated ﬁrms is caused by new
ﬁrms, regardless the sector. We will discuss the implications of that result in the next
section. Concluding, the decrease in the degree of vertical integration is mainly caused
by new ﬁrms.
Implications of results
We can observe that the degree of vertical integration of the average ﬁrm and the aver-
age multi-plant ﬁrm is decreasing in manufacturing. This change is caused by new ﬁrms,
116This is exactly what was expected. The total number of ﬁrms is much lower in 2008. Therefore
the market share of continuing ﬁrms will increase. A continuing ﬁrm is on average more vertically
integrated than the average ﬁrm, therefore the increase in market share will have a negative eﬀect
on vertical integration.
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which are mainly single-plant ﬁrms. Factors inﬂuencing the change in the degree of verti-
cal integration will be discussed to a further extent in the next chapter. Some basic ideas
will be presented here. As mentioned on page 90 one explanation why manufacturing
ﬁrms are on average more vertically integrated is that the production chains are shorter
for services. What is the reason for the decrease in the degree of vertical integration in
all sectors and why is the decrease of diﬀerent extent?
The main driver of the decrease in fragmentation is new ﬁrms. New ﬁrms generally start
as single plant ﬁrms and are therefore regarded as fragmented according to our deﬁnition.
What we show here is a structural change in the UK business landscape where the single
plant structure seems to crowd out the vertically integrated multi-plant structure. But it
is not just the case that the industry structure shifted, also characteristics of single plants
have changed. We presented evidence that the average size of a UK ﬁrm is getting smaller
between 1997  2008. These are patterns which can also be observed in other countries
like Portugal, Denmark (Braguinsky et al., 2011) and the USA (Choi and Spletzer, 2011).
We concluded that fragmentation can be the reason for this observable development, but
there are other explanations as well. For example, in the case of Portugal, Braguinsky
et al. (2011) blame strict labour market regulation, which do not allow ﬁrms to reach
their optimal size, for ﬁrms getting smaller. Choi and Spletzer (2011) ﬁnd that plant
births are on average smaller and remain smaller in the following years than older ﬁrms.
They conclude that a technological change has happened shifting production from labour
intensive to more capital intensive production stages.
Even though new ﬁrms seem to be the main driver of fragmentation, the literature
allows us especially to look at the change of continuing ﬁrms. Also continuing ﬁrms got
more fragmented over time. Two kinds of eﬀects could have caused this development.
On the one hand, there could be country wide changes which aﬀect ﬁrms of diﬀerent
industries in a diﬀerent way. On the other hand, there could be industry speciﬁc changes.
According to the transaction costs theory by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1979) costs
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of re-writing contracts for market transaction have a positive eﬀect on integration, and
the incomplete contract theory as described by Grossman and Hart (1986), mentions the
problems of monitoring contracts and the diﬃculty to enforce them. By an improvement
of institutions, those costs could decrease and fragmentation could be more likely to
happen. This reason does not seem to be appropriate to explain the change in ﬁrm
structure because there were not many institutional changes within the UK between
1997  2008.
Another nationwide eﬀect could be the increase in competition through the enlargement
of the European Union. Grossman and Helpman (2002) show that if the cost disadvan-
tage of outsourcing through search costs and incomplete contracts are lower than the
costs arising through dis-economies of scales through vertical integration, then a higher
degree of competition leads to more ﬁrms engaging in fragmenting the production.117
As explained on page 20, another eﬀect will also appear. More competition diminishes
the specialisation advantages of component suppliers, therefore will reduce the number
of intermediate input suppliers. This makes it easier for that ﬁrm to break even and
increases the propensity of outsourcing ﬁrms. Those eﬀects can also point in opposite
directions, where the cost eﬀects dampens or may even outweigh the change in the num-
ber of component supplier eﬀect. Grossman and Helpman (2002) also oﬀer industry
speciﬁc explanations. In general, a reduction of search costs to ﬁnd a suitable specialised
ﬁrm, lower ﬁxed costs of ﬁrms which engage in outsourcing and a decrease in the pro-
duction costs of specialised in comparison to vertically integrated ﬁrms could lead to an
increase in fragmented ﬁrms. If the cost structure has developed diﬀerently over time
then companies of diﬀerent sectors will behave diﬀerently as well.
So far the foreign dimension has been neglected. It could be the case that outsourcing
or FDI into other countries inﬂuence the results. If outsourcing was dominating the
117If the dis-economies are lower than the search and incomplete contract costs, then a higher amount of
competition can lead to the exact opposite outcome. Higher competition leads to a higher propensity
of having vertically integrated ﬁrms.
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international interaction of ﬁrms, then the results above would not change at all. The
appearance of FDI would lead to an overestimation of organisational fragmentation. On
the other hand, inward FDI of companies, which already have an aﬃliate in the UK, will
increase the number of vertically integrated ﬁrms even though, they might have been
integrated before.
4.5.2. Geographical fragmentation
The analysis for geographical fragmentation will be conducted in the same manner like
above. Transition tables will only be presented in the appendix on pages 278ﬀ, because of
the small number of ﬁrms with a changing location structure. We will focus again on the
decomposition measure. We can only measure the geographical dispersion of vertically
integrated ﬁrms, therefore we consider only vertically integrated ﬁrms for this analysis.
We measure how geographically dispersed the internal production process of a ﬁrm is.
The change in the average distance will be decomposed again to see if the increase in
distance has been caused by continuing, entering or exiting ﬁrms. Exiting and entering
ﬁrms are now interpreted in a diﬀerent way than before. For the calculation of the spatial
measure the distance between the headquarters and the vertically integrated local units
are important. Therefore if a ﬁrm becomes vertically integrated it will appear in the
sample and is therefore an entering ﬁrm, even though it existed before. An exiting ﬁrm
is not necessarily a ﬁrm becoming inactive, but a ﬁrm which does not own any vertically
integrated plants anymore. The results are presented in table 4.4. In the last column the
absolute change in distance in meters is presented.
Similar to the organisational fragmentation newly vertically integrated ﬁrms are causing
the increase in the dispersion. In manufacturing it is around 79 percent, followed by 17
percent from continuing ﬁrms, where the main eﬀect of continuing ﬁrms is the within
eﬀect. This means that vertically integrated ﬁrms got more dispersed. Exiting ﬁrms are
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Continuous
Within Between Cross New Exit Total
Man 8.0 2.7 6.5 79.4 3.3 9,760
Ser 3.7 −1.8 1.7 100.5 −4.0 17,685
Notes:
This table is based on equation 4.9. The last column (Total) shows the absolute
change in the spatial distribution (in meters) of vertically integrated ﬁrms. In all
other columns (Within to Exit) values are in expressed in percentage. The ﬁrst
three columns (Continuing) show how much of the absolute change has been caused
be continuing ﬁrms. The fourth column (New) indicates the inﬂuence of ﬁrms which
entered after 1997 and the ﬁfth column (Exit) the inﬂuence of ﬁrms which exited
before 2008. We swapped the sign of the Exit column to be consistent with equation
4.9.
Table 4.4: Decomposition of the change in spatial fragmentation of local units
responsible for only 3 percent of the change, meaning that more concentrated ﬁrms have
left the market. In the tradable service sector the change of dispersion is only caused by
new ﬁrms.
To sum it up, the higher rate of dispersion of the average ﬁrm is mainly caused by ﬁrms
becoming vertically integrated, regardless of the industry.
Implications of results
As for organisational fragmentation, the determinants of spatial fragmentation will be
more closely discussed in the next chapter. We ﬁnd that the share of multi-location ﬁrms
and the average dispersion increased for vertically integrated ﬁrms. The change is driven
by new ﬁrms and partly by continuous ﬁrms which got more dispersed. Newly vertically
integrated ﬁrms set up their plants further away than the average vertically integrated
ﬁrm in 1997 continuing ﬁrms set up new vertically integrated local units further away
or shut down old vertically integrated local units closely located to the reporting unit.
This supports our explanation from the static analysis that outsourcing became relatively
cheaper than vertical investments. For example, search costs for ﬁrms to ﬁnd an outside
supplier decreased, or service linkages became cheaper. Therefore for a ﬁrm to disperse
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the internal production chain over diﬀerent regions only pays oﬀ, if factor price diﬀerences
are large enough. Another argument could be an increase in the importance of market
coverage. The dominance of `new' entrants can maybe explained with the costs related
with setting up a new vertically integrated local unit. Setting up a new plant is expensive,
therefore for ﬁrms which are already vertically integrated it will be less likely to move
an existing plant to a new location than for ﬁrms which set up a local unit in a distant
location to create a new vertical link.
4.6. Comparison to Other Studies
If the organisational fragmentation results are compared to other empirical studies for the
manufacturing sector, the size of the degree of vertical integration seems to be reasonable.
Studies by Maddigan (1981) or Davies and Morris (1995) oﬀer mean values of a higher
degree than in this chapter. The reason for that is that only big ﬁrms are considered
in their analysis. The comparison of the results of Acemo§lu et al. (2010) is a little bit
more diﬃcult because they are using an even less aggregated measure than the local unit
level. The results are extremely low, which is comparable to my ﬁndings. All the results
are presented in table 4.5.
4.7. Summary and Conclusion
The main purpose of this chapter was to measure how fragmented UK ﬁrms are. This
question was answered with the Business Structure Database which contains a sample
with a couple of million observations for the period 1997  2008. Two dimensions of
fragmentation, geographical and organisational, for two diﬀerent sectors, the manufac-
turing and the tradable service sector, were considered. Organisational fragmentation,
which can be divided into forward and backward vertical fragmentation, gave informa-
tion about how many intermediate inputs are sourced from the market. The degree of
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Organisational Fragmentation
Author Count. No of obs Period Info Results Value
Maddigan
(1981)
US 96 1947 Firm, VI direct Degree of vertical inte-
gration of ﬁrms is signif-
icantly increasing over
time
0.1047
96 1958 0.1369
96 1963 0.1751
96 1967 0.1935
96 1972 0.2257
Davies and
Morris (1995)
UK 306 1985 Firm, only for
vertically
integrated ﬁrms
Riegler gets a degree of
0.052 for vi ﬁrms in 1997
0.0138
Acemo§lu
et al. (2010)
UK 2,973,008 1996
2001
Local unit
industry pair of a
company
Degree of vertical
integration of an
industry pair of a
company is very low,
but a high deviation can
be observed.
0.0080
Riegler UK 158,113 1997 Firms Degree of vertical inte-
gration is low and de-
creasing
0.0016
160,244 1998 0.0014
155,547 1999 0.0013
146,030 2000 0.0013
143,943 2001 0.0012
140,688 2002 0.0012
136,098 2003 0.0012
132,191 2004 0.0012
128,315 2005 0.0012
125,012 2006 0.0010
123,963 2007 0.0009
122,879 2008 0.0009
Table 4.5: Comparison of empirical results
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organisational fragmentation was derived with input-output tables. Spatial fragmenta-
tion indicates how far away vertically integrated local units are from their headquarters.
This illustrated how geographically dispersed a production process of a company was.
To answer the research question we focused on a static and a dynamic analysis. The
former showed the trends in fragmentation and the latter which ﬁrms caused the ob-
served change. The analysis of the organisational dimension revealed that the degree
of vertical integration for the average local unit or ﬁrm was extremely low, even if only
vertically integrated ﬁrms were considered. This meant that the observation units are
highly fragmented.
In the manufacturing sector the picture was quite clear. The degree of vertical integration
decreased over time. Firms became more fragmented, regardless whether all or only
multi-plant ﬁrms were considered. The decomposition of the degree of vertical integration
revealed that the main part of the change in the degree of vertical integration was caused
by new ﬁrms.
In the tradable service sector the results were rather similar but at a signiﬁcantly lower
level. The degree of vertical integration decreased if all ﬁrms and remained rather con-
stant if only multi-plant ﬁrms were considered. The share of vertically integrated ﬁrms
was lower in the service sector than in manufacturing, but when a service ﬁrm was
vertically integrated, it was at a higher degree. Again, the change in the degree of frag-
mentation was caused mainly by new ﬁrms. The higher degree of fragmentation ﬁts into
the picture of shrinking UK ﬁrms.
We could only measure the spatial dispersion of vertically integrated local units, therefore
the analysis of spatial fragmentation considered only vertically integrated local units.
The average dispersion of vertically integrated local units increased for manufacturing
and the tradable service sector. This dispersion was mainly caused by newly vertically
integrated ﬁrms. Furthermore, also continuing ﬁrms got more dispersed. We concluded
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that outsourcing became more attractive for ﬁrms in comparison to setting up a plant
at a diﬀerent location. Only if factor-price diﬀerences are large enough, then it is still
worth to keep or set up a new plant in a diﬀerent location.
In summary, we ﬁnd evidence that UK ﬁrms became signiﬁcantly more fragmented be-
tween the period 1997  2008.
143
Important Note
In the ﬁrst chapters we used the sample period from 1997  2008. The whole analysis has
been conducted at the Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML) of the Oﬃce for National
Statistics (ONS) in London and Newport. To increase eﬃciency the ONS introduced the
Secure Data Service (SDS). Researchers are now allowed to access conﬁdential ONS data
from the researcher's oﬃce computers. However, the BSD observations for 1997 have
not been available until recently. Therefore in this and the following chapters we had to
reduce the observation period to 1998  2008. To keep conﬁdentiality of ﬁrms, the ONS
encrypted postcodes. The characteristics of the original postcodes remain. We still can
allocate the encrypted postcodes to local authority and measure the distance between
headquarters and local units. Originally, we cleaned some postcodes manually. We do
not know which cleaning procedures the ONS has used. The main results remain the
same, even though some results are not signiﬁcant anymore. This could be caused by
dropping year 1997 or a diﬀerent postcode cleaning procedure.
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5. Explanations for the Organisational Structure of Firms
5.1. Introduction
In the last chapter evidence has been presented which suggested that the way an average
ﬁrm is structured changed signiﬁcantly over the ten years from 1998  2008. The number
of single-plant ﬁrms has increased massively, and, if only multi-plant ﬁrms are considered,
the degree of vertical integration decreased in manufacturing, and the distance between
local units and their headquarters increased in manufacturing and in the tradable service
sector. In table 5.1 we summarise diﬀerent structures based on an organisational and
spatial dimension for the manufacturing and the tradable service sector. All in all ﬁve
diﬀerent organisational forms can be identiﬁed, where single-plant ﬁrms are not shown
in the table.118
Organisational dimension
S
p
a
ti
a
l
d
im
e
n
si
o
n
Market Vertical Int.
co
n
c. Manufacturing 20,077 (1.4%)
Tradable Ser. 7,506 (0.2%)
33,564 (2.3%)
d
is
p
.
58,808 (1.3%)
Manufacturing 14,872 (1.0%)
Tradable Ser. 5,866 (0.1%)
Notes:
This table is based on table 2.1 for period 1998  2008. The ﬁrst
value of each cell is the absolute number of ﬁrms in each category.
Values in parenthesis are the share of each category of the total
number of ﬁrms and do not add up to 100% because single-plant
ﬁrms (95.3% for man. and 98.4% for trad. ser.) are not presented.
No spatial distinction is possible for ﬁrms which source from the
market only.
Table 5.1: Classiﬁcation of fragmentation for all three sectors
Being vertically integrated is most important for the manufacturing sector (2.4 percent),
118According to the deﬁnition used single-plant ﬁrms are completely fragmented. See discussion on page
169 for the problems with the classiﬁcation of single-plant ﬁrms.
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but hardly plays any role in the tradable service sector (0.3 percent). In general, con-
centration is more popular for vertically integrated ﬁrms than dispersion. With only
0.1 percent of all ﬁrms, dispersed and vertically integrated local units hardly appear
in the tradable service sector. We do not have suﬃcient information to identify where
non-vertically integrated ﬁrms are sourcing their intermediate inputs. Therefore we can
present only how many multi-plant ﬁrms are sourcing solely from the market.
Many theories exist explaining which factors aﬀect the organisational structure of ﬁrms.
The purpose of this chapter is to test the predictions of many common theories about
the organisational structure of ﬁrms using new and more comprehensive data for the
UK which allows us to examine both the organisation and geographical structure of
multi-product ﬁrms. The key question we ask in this chapter is:
What common theories can explain the organisational structure of UK ﬁrms?
The reason why a ﬁrm would let an outside supplier conduct former vertically integrated
production stages (organisational fragmentation) is mainly based on two factors: incom-
plete contracts and knowledge capital.119 The reasons for moving production stages to
other areas (spatial fragmentation) is theoretically covered by Factor Proportion Models
(FPMs) and again by the Knowledge Capital Model (KCM).120 Additionally to those
theories, two papers by Acemo§lu et al. (2007) and Acemo§lu et al. (2010) will build
the foundation of the analysis. Acemo§lu et al. (2007) create a model of how a certain
organisational form can inﬂuence the implementation of the right technology. Acemo§lu
et al. (2010) provide the calculation of an empirical vertical integration measure by using
datasets of the ONS.
The empirical evidence is not always clear, which is partly caused by diﬀering deﬁnitions
of how to measure fragmentation. To test the incomplete contracts hypothesis and the
KCM, R&D expenditures and capital intensities are often used to capture how knowledge
119A precise description of both theories can be found in chapter 2, pages 15ﬀ and 17ﬀ.
120The theoretical description is provided on page 25 and 28.
146
and capital intensive the production of a good is. Acemo§lu et al. (2010) ﬁnd a positive
relationship between R&D intensity and integration for the downstream ﬁrm, but a neg-
ative relationship for the upstream ﬁrm using UK data. Tomiura (2005) gets a diﬀerent
result for Japanese ﬁrms. The higher the R&D intensity the more will be outsourced,
because outsourcing leaves more resources for conducting R&D. Also Díaz-Mora (2008)
ﬁnds evidence that, in high skilled industries, more outsourcing will appear. Tomiura
(2005) ﬁnds that physical capital is positively related to integration, but Taymaz and
Kiliçaslan (2005) ﬁnd the opposite sign for Turkey. Congruent empirical evidence shows
that cost-saving motives are also an important determinant for outsourcing, for exam-
ple, ﬁrms paying higher wages are more likely to outsource (Abraham and Taylor, 1996;
Girma and Görg, 2004; Díaz-Mora, 2008; Holl, 2008). Also agglomeration of economic
activities, for example in cities, has a positive inﬂuence on outsourcing (Abraham and
Taylor, 1996; Taymaz and Kiliçaslan, 2005; Holl, 2008).
International studies reveal that labour-cost diﬀerences can attract FDI, which implies
that ﬁrms are willing to set up aﬃliates and become spatially more dispersed (Bellak
and Leibrecht, 2009) but not necessarily (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005). Agglomerations
of economic activities, such as, for example, those seen in urban areas, have a positive
eﬀect on the dispersion of a ﬁrm. This is because the accumulation of services creates
positive externalities for management activities, like reduced search costs for service
providers, a larger pool of high skilled workers, etc. To maximise proﬁts, a multi-unit
ﬁrm will then be better oﬀ moving production stages to remote areas with lower labour
costs. Galliano et al. (2007) ﬁnd empirical evidence for this. All empirical results are
summarised in table 5.2.
This chapter will take advantage of many diﬀerent datasets of the ONS. Again, the
Business Structure Database (BSD) will be the main dataset, which has the advantage
of containing nearly the whole population of UK ﬁrms. The second database used is the
Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) database which provides the
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Organisational Structure (Integration)
Variables Authors Result Comments
Age Acemo§lu et al. (2007) + Results are for decision
power concentration
Holl (2008) −
Distance to tech.
Frontier
Acemo§lu et al. (2007) − Results are for decision
power concentration
Tech. Industry
Heterogeneity
Acemo§lu et al. (2007) − Results are for decision
power concentration
R&D intensity Acemo§lu et al. (2010) + Positive eﬀect on
downstream ﬁrms.
Tomiura (2005) −
Capital intensity Tomiura (2005) + For Japan
Taymaz and Kiliçaslan (2005) − For Turkey
Skill intensity Díaz-Mora (2008) −
Spatial Structure (Dispersion)
Unit Labour Costs Bellak and Leibrecht (2009) + International study
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) − International study
Agglomeration Galliano et al. (2007) +
Table 5.2: Eﬀects of variables on vertical integration and geographical dispersion
data for R&D expenditures. The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) is the
main source for industry and regional wage data. The Annual Respondents Database
(ARD) will be used for the calculation of industry capital stocks. Other data is sourced
from diﬀerent ONS sources freely available.121
By taking account of diﬀerent characteristics, namely if ﬁrms are multi-plant, vertically
integrated and geographically concentrated or the opposite, three diﬀerent estimation
stages will be conducted, to ﬁnd the determinants of those characteristics. Most studies
focus only on the manufacturing sector, as it is clear from results in earlier chapters, the
service sector now dwarfs the manufacturing sector in size. Therefore, additionally to
the manufacturing sector, we are going to analyse the tradable service sector.
One drawback of the data we use is that it only covers the organisational structure of
ﬁrms within the UK. That is, we have no information on how these ﬁrms are organised
121See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/default.asp, access on 03/08/11.
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in their overseas aﬃliates, if they have them. The ONS oﬀers a database called the
Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) which captures outward and in-
ward investments of UK ﬁrms. Unfortunately, it was not possible to use this information
for analysis. Data exists only for the observation period up to 2005.122 Additionally
the AFDI database is classiﬁed into enterprise groups and not enterprises. In theory,
enterprise groups reference numbers should be included in the BSD, but unfortunately
this reference number is inconsistent over time and sometimes missing. This problem is
so severe that information for years 2004 and 2005 could not been used. As a result,
this study will purely focus on the organisational structure of ﬁrms within the UK. Even
though the international dimension is missing, the analysis of changes in the organisa-
tional structure of ﬁrms within the UK will still provide important insight into strategic
decisions of ﬁrms. Only a small proportion of ﬁrms actually set up aﬃliates abroad. This
can theoretically be explained by models based on heterogeneous ﬁrms. For example,
according to Antràs and Helpman (2004) only the most productive ﬁrms will be able
to set up foreign aﬃliates. Many theories about international fragmentation are based
on factors which do not necessarily need an international dimension. For example, a
ﬁrm employing a high amount of knowledge capital will be expected to be integrated,
regardless if the company is domestic or international. Of course some variables, for
example variables of the gravity model123, should matter less, but with these caveats,
the analysis of domestic fragmentation will help to ﬁnd new insight in what inﬂuences
the organisational structure of ﬁrms.
Finally, the analysis can only be conducted at the enterprise and not at the enterprise
group level. Because of the inconsistency of the enterprise group reference numbers over
time, a panel data analysis over the period 1998  2008 is impossible.124 The eﬀect
on the results can be ambiguous. Large enterprise groups may produce a large variety
122The merger was tried at the beginning of 2010.
123See section 2.1.3 on page 33.
124See page 69 for the deﬁnitions of diﬀerent units.
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of products which have, according to the input-output table, a vertical connection, but
goods are actually not intermediate inputs for other enterprises. On the other hand, it
could be the case that some vertical linkages are ignored even though another company
of the same group is providing intermediate inputs.
The analysis is conducted in three parts. In the ﬁrst part a descriptive explanation
about the decision of being a multi-plant or single-plant ﬁrm will be presented. This
decision is important, because according to our deﬁnition only multi-plant ﬁrms can be
vertically integrated. In the second stage we will consider the decision of a ﬁrm to be
organisationally integrated or fragmented. The measure calculated in the last chapter
will be used.125 In the last stage the decision of a ﬁrm to be spatially concentrated or
dispersed will be analysed.
The main value added to the literature is that, in contrast to many other studies, the
analysis is spread over the manufacturing and the tradable service sector. As far as
the author knows no one before has conducted such a precise analysis about the organ-
isational structure of UK ﬁrms. Normally only a small number of ﬁrms are changing
their organisational structure, but the large sample of the BSD allows us to identify a
remarkable amount of ﬁrms changing their organisational structure. The detailed infor-
mation allows us further to identify vertical local units which is important for testing
theories about the spatial dispersion of ﬁrms. Detailed measures of R&D should reveal
the importance of R&D intensities of ﬁrms on their organisational structure.
This chapter analyses why some ﬁrms are more likely to be fragmented than others
by looking at ﬁrm, industry and regional characteristics. The main results are that
ﬁrm heterogeneity has a signiﬁcant impact. For organisational fragmentation we ﬁnd
robust and similar coeﬃcients for the technology variables in both sectors. The more
technological heterogeneous an industry is, the more likely it will be for fragmented
125See pages 114ﬀ.
150
ﬁrms to appear. The closer a ﬁrm is to the technological leader, the more likely it
will be vertically integrated. The results for R&D intensities are only signiﬁcant in
manufacturing, but a diﬀerent sign appears depending on what kind of R&D has been
conducted. Agglomeration has a signiﬁcant negative impact on integration in the tradable
service sector only. With regards to spatial fragmentation, we do not ﬁnd evidence that
regional wages have a positive eﬀect on geographical fragmentation. Instead we ﬁnd that
ﬁrms which are large, close to the technological frontier and in a concentrated market
are more likely to be dispersed. For ﬁrms of the tradable service sector agglomeration
has a positive impact on dispersion.
The results give some important insights into the diﬀerences and similarities of manu-
facturing and the service sector. The theoretical fragmentation literature often focuses
on a manufacturing ﬁrm, which conducts two kinds of activities, headquarters services
and production of intermediate and ﬁnal goods. In fact, the majority of ﬁrms are service
ﬁrms, where the production stage is missing. This chapter suggests that there is a core
part of ﬁrms which is similar independent of the sector. This part is aﬀected by certain
factors in the same way. For example relative technology diﬀerences between ﬁrms have
the same eﬀect in every sector. In contrast, other theories, like the knowledge capital
theory, seem to have an impact only in manufacturing. Because of the increasing impor-
tance of services it is required to create new theories which take more into account the
structure and characteristics of service ﬁrms.
In the next section 5.2 a short overview of the theoretical foundation will be given.
After that, the datasets used will be described and linked to the testable hypothesis in
section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the sample and the empirical strategy employed for
this chapter. All results are gathered in section 5.5. This chapter will be ended with a
brief summary and conclusions.
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5.2. Theoretical Foundation
In the typical neoclassical model a company always tries to maximise its proﬁts. Choos-
ing the right organisational structure should help to achieve this target. For example,
to beneﬁt from regional factor price diﬀerences, a company can decrease its production
costs. Factor prices can therefore aﬀect the spatial structure of the ﬁrm. If factor price
equalisation cannot be achieved between regions, it could be worthwhile for a company
to set up a plant in a region with diﬀerent relative factor prices, for example if land is
expensive like in London it can pay oﬀ to establish a new plant in the East Midlands
(Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Venables, 1999; Jones and Kierzkowski,
2001; Markusen, 2002; Van Long et al., 2005). There is evidence that factor price diﬀer-
ences are still prevailing in the UK (Bernard et al., 2002, 2008), so even within a country
we would expect those models to work. FPMs are discussed on pages 25ﬀ.
One main determinant of organisational structure is the headquarters service126 intensity
of an industry. If a ﬁrm is part of a headquarters service intensive industry, it is more
likely for the ﬁrm to have an integrated structure. Two popular theories can explain this.
The KCM by Markusen (2002) assumes that to reveal knowledge capital like technological
know-how to an outside manager could lead to moral hazard of that agent. For example,
the manager could, after the knowledge was transferred, use it for its own purposes and
turn into a competitor. Therefore knowledge intensive industries will tend to be vertically
integrated. The KCM is described on pages 15ﬀ.
Antràs and Helpman (2004) show how incomplete contracts aﬀect ﬁrms of diﬀerent head-
quarters service intensive sectors. In general, incomplete contracts lead to an ex-ante
underinvestment problem of an intermediate input supplier I and a ﬁnal good producer
F . F can own I or could leave it independent to an unrelated manager. Ownership is
crucial so the underinvestment is mitigated. According to the theory of property rights
126It is very broadly deﬁned and consists of R&D, marketing, advertisement, and is normally high skilled
labour and capital intensive.
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by Grossman and Hart (1986) the best outcome is achieved if the company owns the pro-
duction stage, whose ex-ante investment is more important in the production process.
Based on this result, Antràs and Helpman (2004) show that a ﬁrm in a headquarters
service intensive sector is more likely to be integrated and ﬁrms in more labour and
component intensive sectors will tend to outsource. Please refer to pages 17ﬀ for further
information.
Acemo§lu et al. (2010) establish a model to explain speciﬁcally the property rights ap-
proach of incomplete contracts and how the technological level of the ﬁnal good producer
or the intermediate input supplier aﬀect the organisational structure. They consider three
organisational forms: non-integration, backward vertical integration or forward vertical
integration. Their main result is that the more technology intensive a ﬁrm is, the more
likely it is to be vertically integrated, because ex-ante investments are becoming more
important. So if the downstream ﬁrm is R&D intensive, it has a higher incentive to be
vertically integrated, but if the supplier is the more advanced ﬁrm, the probability of
backward vertical integration will decrease. A more comprehensive explanation can be
found on pages 21ﬀ.
Another paper by Acemo§lu et al. (2007) focuses on how technological diﬀerences between
ﬁrms and their distances to the technological frontier aﬀect the decentralisation decisions
of ﬁrms. A manager has the advantage of knowing better how to implement a new
technology, but managers often have an incentive to follow diﬀerent motives than a
principal. This creates a trade-oﬀ. A principal can observe other ﬁrms or can learn from
her own experience. Therefore if a ﬁrm is in a market where already many other ﬁrms
have implemented a new technology (in other words, when a sector is homogeneous) a
principal does not need any manager to choose the right decision. Therefore the decision
power will be concentrated. If a ﬁrm is relatively more advanced than any other ﬁrm, for
example if it is the ﬁrm at the technological frontier, then the principal faces problems
again to choose the right way of implementing a new technology. Therefore delegation
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will be the preferred choice. A more detailed summary of that model can be found on
pages 23ﬀ. This model is based on ﬁrm internal decisions. Instead of thinking of internal
decisions I will treat the model in the same way as Acemo§lu et al. (2010) between
the option of having a production stage being conducted internally or externally. If
the industry is very homogeneous it will be easier for a ﬁrm to use the most eﬃcient
technology and therefore a higher degree of vertical integration is expected. In a very
heterogeneous environment it can be better to let a specialised supplier carry out parts
of the production process because of better information on the latest technology. With
regards to the distance to the technological frontier, the further away a ﬁrm is from the
industry leader, the likelihood of integration should increase. Following the argument
of the internal decision process, a ﬁrm producing at the technological frontier should be
fragmented and a ﬁrm distant to the frontier should be integrated. The argument is that
a technological leader requires a specialised input producer to be able to further increase
productivity and ﬁrms far away from the frontier can just copy the production process
of diﬀerent stages of the production chain from other ﬁrms. Those implications are not
as convincing as for the internal decision process. The reason is that, for the decision
of integration or fragmentation, a technological leader may not be able to ﬁnd outside
suppliers which are able to produce the required intermediate inputs, or a technological
leader does not want to reveal the technology used. This would lead to an opposite result
that technological leaders will be more likely vertically integrated.
All these theories mentioned require detailed data at the plant, ﬁrm or at least at a quite
disaggregated industry level which is often diﬃcult to ﬁnd. For example, to calculate
technological diﬀerences ﬁrm level data is required. The degree of spatial dispersion needs
information on the location of local units. Fortunately the ONS oﬀers plenty of sources
for the required information. The main diﬃculty is to tidy up the data and connect
it with each other. In the next section the databases used for testing the theories will
be introduced. The main explanations for the cleaning of the data can be found in the
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appendix on pages 283ﬀ.
5.3. Data Description
The majority of the databases comes from the VML of the ONS which oﬀers a large
variety of diﬀerent ﬁrm and individual level information of many diﬀerent areas.
BSD: The observation period is from 1998  2008. A comprehensive data cleaning has
been conducted, which is precisely explained in chapter 3. Acemo§lu et al. (2010) use
the ARD, which consists of more variables but the sample size is signiﬁcantly lower.
The reason why the sample size matters is that even for large ﬁrms a change in the
organisational structure is an unusual event. Therefore a huge sample is required to have
enough variation to calculate accurate coeﬃcients. Data about employment, turnover,
age and location are available at the ﬁrm level. This data is needed for the creation of
the dependent variables. This dataset enables us to identify vertically linked local units,
which is crucial for testing the hypothesis about spatial dispersion.
ARD: With the ARD the calculation of the average real capital stock and capital inten-
sities of a ﬁrm in a 4 digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) industry is possible.
Capital intensities are calculated by real capital stock divided by employment. Some
basic descriptions about the ARD are provided on pages 95. Martin (2002) and Gilhooly
(2009) explain in more detail how to create the capital stock. A summary of the proce-
dure can be found in the appendix in section C.2. Only ﬁrms have been employed for
which less than 50 percent of annual observations have been imputed. Capital stock data
can only be used from 1998  2006. This would lead to a loss of the years 2007 and 2008.
Therefore we will use capital stocks only as a robustness check. We hope to cover capital
intensity with R&D intensity, which are available for every year.
BERD: To measure knowledge intensity a database called BERD will be used. This
database is based on an annual questionnaire which is sent to all ﬁrms the ONS believes
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are engaged in R&D. The information on which ﬁrms to approach is gleaned from var-
ious sources, but most respondents are those from the last BERD survey. The data is
available for the whole observation period. According to Griﬃth and Hawkins (2003)127
85 percent of R&D ﬂows from the last year are captured by surveys and the rest is gener-
ated through a stratiﬁed sample. The BERD includes data on the R&D expenditure on
in-house R&D and R&D which was bought from an unrelated ﬁrm, the number of people
employed for R&D activities, a SIC code, reporting and enterprise reference numbers. A
link between the BERD R&D expenditures and industries in the BSD can be created.
Several problems arise to merge the BERD with the BSD. The procedure chosen to cir-
cumvent those problems can be found in the appendix in section C.1.1.128
ASHE: The ASHE is intended to be a one percent sample of all UK employees and
oﬀers detailed information about them. The observation period is 1998  2008 and every
year contains more than 200,000 observations. Besides information on wages and hours
worked, the ASHE contains information on where the employees are living and how skill
intensive their job is.129 To measure regional factor price diﬀerences, the average weekly
basic wage130 in a local authority was calculated. To measure the wage level in an indus-
try the average weekly basic wages for the 4 digit SIC level was calculated. The cleaning
procedure is explained precisely in appendix C.1.2 on page 288.131
Regional Data: Diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent characteristics, which are often used
to explain international fragmentation. Also diﬀerent regions within the same country
are diﬀerent. To capture those diﬀerences regional data was gathered. The variable for
127This publication seems to be only available at the VML.
128For example, observations in the BERD are reporting units, and many enterprise reference numbers
are missing. By using postcode and industry classiﬁcations, these problems were mitigated.
129The average wage for skilled and unskilled workers can have diﬀerent eﬀects on the fragmentation
decision of a ﬁrm. Unfortunately, the skill classiﬁcation is inconsistent over time. Therefore we can
use a skill intensity measure only for robustness checks. See appendix page 288 for more explanations
on the skill intensity measure.
130Weekly gross wages would be more appropriate. This variable is unfortunately inconsistent over time.
131The ASHE does not contain data for Northern Ireland and British tax havens like the Scilly Isles etc.
Table C.4 on page 289 shows and describes which industries could not be merged with the industries
included in the BSD.
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the identiﬁcation of the location of a ﬁrm is an eight digit postcode, which can be ag-
gregated up to postcode areas or postcode sectors. Because the postcode data depends
solely on the eﬃciency strategies of the Royal Mail, no statistical data exists for postcode
areas, districts, etc. For local authorities far more data is available. Local governments
inﬂuence the policy in their local regions, therefore allocating ﬁrms to its local authority
is more appropriate than to postcode areas. The National Statistics Postcode Directory
(NSPD) 2009132 was used to link every postcode to a local authority code. A look-up ta-
ble from the NSPD from 2008 helped to identify the local authority code. With the name
of the local unitary authority a broad range of data from diﬀerent ONS publications like
Region in Figures and Regional Trends can be used. The very disaggregated district
level was further aggregated to the county level and the regional level.
5.4. The Sample and Empirical Strategy
A similar sample to that of chapter 4, without year 1997, will be used. Generally, we
have UK data for the observation period 1998  2008, with 1.5m observations in the
manufacturing and 1.4m in the tradable service sector.133 Note that, because of the
large size of the tradable service sector, Stata reached its memory limits. Therefore we
had to select a 30 percent random sample of tradable service ﬁrms which leads to 1.4m
observations.134 Selected samples are presented in the Full-All columns of table 5.3. The
multi-plant sample is signiﬁcantly smaller than the sample including all ﬁrms. In the
BERD sample only ﬁrms of the BERD which could be merged with the BSD sample are
kept. Therefore the sample is even smaller than the multi-plant sample.
Fragmentation has two dimensions, a spatial and an organisational dimension.135 These
132It was 2007 on the SDS server.
133Both sectors are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, therefore the split into two sub-samples shall help to compare
the determinants of the organisational structure of ﬁrms between those sectors. See page 88 for a
more detailed explanation about deﬁning the two sub-samples.
134See footnote 162 on page 179 for a description of the random sample selection.
135See section 2.1.1 for a more detailed description.
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Manufacturing Tradable Services
Sample Full R&D Full R&D
Sub-sample All MP All All MP All
1998 153,680 11,397 1,820 99,047 11,455 624
1999 149,454 11,179 1,880 105,833 11,731 772
2000 141,043 10,941 2,209 110,380 11,884 953
2001 138,158 10,559 2,283 113,891 11,733 1,095
2002 134,945 10,159 2,792 115,464 11,304 1,437
2003 130,834 9,539 3,026 117,165 10,814 1,998
2004 127,113 9,022 3,347 125,751 10,205 2,689
2005 123,168 8,465 3,577 134,446 9,342 2,966
2006 119,771 8,125 4,243 143,843 8,970 3,746
2007 118,830 7,755 4,583 153,199 8,623 4,639
2008 117,697 7,365 4,064 161,455 8,251 4,394
Total 1,454,693 104,506 33,824 1,380,474 114,312 25,313
Notes:
This table presents the number of ﬁrms for three diﬀerent samples: All ﬁrms, multi-plant ﬁrms
(MP) and ﬁrms which only appear in the BERD sample. The BERD sample is signiﬁcantly
smaller because it keeps only ﬁrms from the BERD which can be merged with ﬁrms of the
BSD.
Table 5.3: Sample size for diﬀerent sub-samples
two dimensions identify four diﬀerent organisational structures which are presented in
table 5.1. These organisational structures range from completely vertically integrated
and concentrated to completely organisationally fragmented and spatially dispersed. A
special case are single-plant ﬁrms, which will be dealt with separately, because they could
be completely fragmented or completely integrated.136 This leads to the following ﬁve
organisational structures:
1. Single-plant ﬁrms,
2. multi-plant ﬁrms which are not vertically integrated and spatially concentrated,
3. multi-plant ﬁrms which are not vertically integrated and spatially separated,
4. multi-plant ﬁrms which are vertically integrated and spatially concentrated,
5. multi-plant ﬁrms which are vertically integrated and spatially separated.
136See page 169 for a further discussion.
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As table 5.1137 illustrates, the number of ﬁrms of a speciﬁc category diﬀers between
manufacturing and the tradable service sector. It is expected that diﬀerent theories aﬀect
the organisational structure diﬀerently. For example, the Factor Proportion Model and
the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ should be suitable to explain the spatial dimension.
If the decision is about sourcing the intermediate inputs from the market or from an
aﬃliate then it will depend on incomplete contracts, knowledge capital and technological
factors.
5.4.1. Empirical strategy
One possible way to estimate the determinants of structures 1  5 would be to use a
polychotomous dependent variable model with ﬁve diﬀerent, unordered states. However,
common estimation methods require strong assumptions (Maddala, 1983), which do not
hold in this case. The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) makes the Multi-
nomial Logit Model not feasible. IIA states that, for example, the probability of a ﬁrm
choosing a type 1 (single-plant ﬁrm) or type 2 (multi-plant, not vertically integrated
and geographically concentrated) structure should not be inﬂuenced by other organisa-
tional choices. If we add type 3 structures to the possible organisational forms, some
type 2 ﬁrms will consider this alternative. This will inﬂuence the probability of a ﬁrm
choosing a type 1 in comparison to a type 2 structure.138 A Multinomial Probit Model
relaxes the IIA, but because of its computational intensity applied research with more
than three states is not recommended.139 A computational feasible method is a Nested
Logit Model, but the structure would be rather arbitrary and furthermore no correlation
137In this graph the government oﬃce region was used as a measure of concentration. If a ﬁrm has
only local units within the same government oﬃce region, we regard to it as concentrated ﬁrm. In
the empirical analysis below I will use instead of the government oﬃce region the local authority
level which are signiﬁcantly smaller. Therefore I expect the numbers in table 5.1 to undervalue the
dispersed and overvalue the concentrated ﬁrms.
138The probability of choosing type 2 will go down, and if the probability of choosing type 1 remains the
same, the probability of choosing type 1 relative to type 2 will go up.
139See Maddala (1983); McFadden (1984); Greene (1997).
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of the disturbance terms of states in diﬀerent nests should arise.
Our empirical strategy will therefore follow a diﬀerent approach and focuses on the
two basic dimensions of fragmentation, space and organisation, separately. Instead of
having one estimation stage, three separate estimation stages will be conducted. This
has several advantages. Fixed eﬀects models can be used to control for ﬁxed ﬁrm speciﬁc
factors which are unobserved but which may be correlated with the determinants of
interest. Additionally to dependent binomial variables indicating if a ﬁrm is fragmented,
continuous measures can be used. The degree of vertical integration calculated in the
last chapter140 also takes account of changes in the degree of vertical integration within
vertically integrated ﬁrms. A dichotomous variable does not diﬀerentiate between ﬁrms
which are vertically integrated to 100 percent and ﬁrms which are to just 0.1 percent.
We also derived a continuous spatial measure. The basic estimating equation takes the
following form:
Org. Structure = (technology vars, Knowledge Capital, factor price diff.)+
+ (firm, industry and regional controls) + dummies+ ε (5.1)
The dependent variable, the organisational structure, and the inclusion and the eﬀect of
the explanatory variables are diﬀerent in every estimation stage. The variables within the
ﬁrst brackets are the variables of interest. How do technology variables, factor price dif-
ferences and knowledge capital inﬂuence organisational structure? Many other controls
will be employed, which consists of ﬁrm, industry and regional characteristics. Addi-
tionally, we will use ﬁrm and time dummies.141 Before the explanatory variables are
allocated to the diﬀerent stages, those variables will be discussed.
140See section 4.4.1 on page 114.
141For standard OLS regressions we will use regional and industry dummies instead of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
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5.4.2. Explanatory variables
Technology variables
Homogeneity/heterogeneity measure: According to Acemo§lu et al. (2007) a mea-
sure of technological heterogeneity or homogeneity inﬂuences the choice of a company to
concentrate or to decentralise its decision making power. We use this theory for the de-
cision to let an outside producer or a ﬁrm-internal plant produce the intermediate input.
An increase (decrease) in heterogeneity (homogeneity) will lead to an increase in the de-
gree of fragmentation within a ﬁrm. The more (less) homogeneous (heterogeneous) ﬁrms
of an industry are, information about the production technology can be gained easily
from other ﬁrms and using a new technology can be easily implemented within the ﬁrm.
Acemo§lu et al. (2007) use an industry measure for heterogeneity which is represented by
the dispersion of the ﬁrm productivity growth rate within an industry. The dispersion is
captured by the diﬀerence between the 90th and the 10th percentile in the productivity
growth distribution. If growth rates diﬀer a lot, then the heterogeneity measure will have
a large value. If they are identical, then the value will be zero.
Heterogeneityjt = (∆ ln yjt)
90 − (∆ ln yjt)
10 (5.2)
where j stands for the industry, i for the ﬁrm, and t for the time period.
Acemo§lu et al. (2007) use value added per hour as a productivity measure, which is
not available in the BSD. I use labour productivity, calculated as turnover per employee,
instead. In contrast to Acemo§lu et al. (2007), many small ﬁrms are included in the BSD
which could be problematic because growth rates of small ﬁrms are rather ﬂuctuating.
Given a constant number of employees, a change in sales can lead to signiﬁcant changes
in the productivity rate per worker of that ﬁrm which might create a picture of a hetero-
geneous sector even though the changes in the productivity growth rates are caused by
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small, economically insigniﬁcant ﬁrms. Like Acemo§lu et al. (2007) I will use only ﬁrms
with more than 20 employees. Of course, the majority of companies are rather small,
and using only ﬁrms with more than 20 employees bears the risk of underestimating the
technological heterogeneity of an industry. Therefore we employ another measure where
a three year average growth rate for robustness checks.
Distance to frontier: The distance to the technological frontier is another important
determinant in the model of Acemo§lu et al. (2007). As stated on page 153, contrary
to them we expect ﬁrms at the technological frontier to be more likely to be vertically
integrated because suppliers may not be able to supply the required intermediate inputs.
For ﬁrms far away from the frontier it will be easier to ﬁnd supplier for their products.
The only measure of productivity available in the BSD is turnover per worker. Acemo§lu
et al. (2007) calculate the distance as the diﬀerence of the ﬁrm's productivity to the
productivity of the 99th percentile of the ﬁrms in the same four digit sector:
Distance to Frontierijt = log (yijt)− log (yFjt) (5.3)
where F represents the frontier productivity.
Age: Acemo§lu et al. (2007) modify their model and by assuming that ﬁrms can learn
how to implement a new technology by their own experience instead of depending on other
ﬁrms. A young company does not have any experience, therefore relying on a manager
is more proﬁtable. Old ﬁrms, which have had enough successful implementations of
technologies, are better oﬀ by concentration. Holl (2008) expects the opposite eﬀect.
The older the ﬁrms are the more likely they are to subcontract non-core activities to
outside suppliers. This is because they can focus more on their own core-activities and
have also more time to ﬁnd suitable contractors. The BSD includes the date of birth for
all companies, where the date is censored in 1973.
162
Factor price diﬀerences
In theory, the main drivers of geographical fragmentation are factor price diﬀerences.
For example, labour intensive production stages should be moved to the regions where
labour is relatively abundant. We will control in our model for factor price diﬀerences by
using regional wages. The higher the wages within an area, where the headquarters are
located, are, the higher should be the probability of sourcing inputs from other places.
The wage data comes again from the ASHE, and the average wage was calculated at
the local unitary authority level. There are several limitations of capturing factor-price
diﬀerence with regional wages: There have been little relative changes in industry wages
across this short time period. Another limitation could be that higher regional wages
could be partly explained with higher regional labour productivity. Therefore the results
of factor-price diﬀerences could be downward biased.
Hold-up hypothesis and knowledge capital
The hold-up hypothesis suggests that if a sector is headquarters service intensive, then
integration will be the proﬁt maximising strategy, if it is a component-intensive sector,
then outsourcing is more likely.142 The KCM states that not all intermediate inputs are
sourced from the market because there are ownership advantages of a ﬁrm, which are
better used by being internalised then externalised to other ﬁrms. The more prevailing
ownership advantages are for a company the more likely it will be integrated. The
hold-up hypothesis and the knowledge capital theory show in the same direction, so a
higher degree of headquarters service intensity makes integration more likely. To measure
knowledge intensity we use R&D intensities, which is quite common in the empirical
literature (for example Acemo§lu et al., 2010). Tomiura (2005) uses a physical capital to
142Because of incomplete contracts hold-up problems arise (Grossman and Hart, 1986). The hold-up
problem leads to a potential underinvestment for a component supplier. This underinvestment can
be mitigated by oﬀering a higher share of the proﬁts to the intermediate input supplying plant. Out-
sourcing increases the proﬁt share for a subcontracting plant. The organisational structure depends
now on the characteristics of the industry.
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labour and a human capital to labour ratio. One way of capturing headquarters service
intensity is by using the R&D information from the BERD. A labour measure and a
R&D expenditure intensity measure will be created. For the calculation of the labour
measure we use the BERD information on scientiﬁc staﬀ, consisting of scientists and
engineers, technicians and other supporting staﬀ like secretarial or clerical staﬀ. The
reason why a scientist is treated equally to a secretary is, that those types of workers are
complements. Without supporting staﬀ the scientist would be less productive. We then
add up all the scientiﬁc staﬀ of an industry and divide it by total industry employment.
The superscripts indicate the data source.143
scientific employment ratioj =
research staffBERDj
total employmentBSDj
(5.4)
Second, a similar method is applied for the expenditure measures. The BERD oﬀers
an in-house R&D and a market sourced R&D variable. In-house R&D can also be
conducted for other ﬁrms. Therefore adding up external and internal R&D would include
double counting. Instead both measures will be included as explanatory variables in the
regressions.
in-house R&D ratioj =
in-house R&D expenditureBERDj
total turnoverBSDj
(5.5)
external R&D ratioj =
external R&D expenditureBERDj
total turnoverBSDj
(5.6)
Even though this proxy of R&D intensity is quite popular it might not capture knowledge
capital perfectly because it is a ﬂow and not a stock measure and therefore does not take
account of past investments. Acemo§lu et al. (2010) use also the BERD and highlight
that the distribution of R&D across industry is rather skewed. Additionally, it can
be the case that the R&D ﬁgures are better reported for industries with many large
143In appendix C.1.1 on pages 283ﬀ we describe precisely how we cleaned the BERD.
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ﬁrms, which are also more likely to be vertically integrated. This could create a spurious
correlation and bias the results. Therefore Acemo§lu et al. (2010), page 30, suggest to use
physical capital intensity as an additional measure. This measure is less skewed and more
accurately reported. The problem is that capital intensity might not be as accurate to
capture knowledge capital, and as mentioned before, capital stock data is only available
until 2006. A measure of the capital intensity of an industry can be calculated by using
the ARD. A perpetual inventory model was employed and a real ﬁrm capital stock was
created144, summed up by industry and then divided by number of employees of that
industry:
Capital Intensityjt =
∑n
i=1 real Capital Stock
ARD
ijt∑n
i=1Employment
ARD
ijt
(5.7)
Control variables
Firm size eﬀects: Firm size is used in empirical studies to take account of many
diﬀerent aspects. Tomiura (2005), for example, argues that the bigger the company the
larger is the market power and therefore the easier it is to ﬁnd contracting partners.
Abraham and Taylor (1996) focus on the specialised service argument. Small ﬁrms do
not have the possibility to produce all intermediate inputs required above the minimum
eﬃciency scale, therefore, to be competitive, they have to outsource those production
stages to specialised ﬁrms. The second argument is more in favour of the deﬁnition we
are using for identifying vertically integrated ﬁrms. Only larger ﬁrms, which can produce
intermediate inputs on their own in a suﬃcient amount, can be vertically integrated.
Therefore I expect that the larger the ﬁrm is the higher is the probability of being
vertically integrated. Employment as a ﬁrm size measure will be used. A non-linear
relationship between the size of a ﬁrm and its organisational structure is expected. The
bigger a company gets, the more likely it will be that the minimum eﬃciency scale can
144See section C.2 in the appendix for detailed explanations how the capital stock measure has been
calculated.
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be reached.
Foreign ownership: It is evident that aﬃliates of multinational enterprises are on
average larger and more productive than domestic ﬁrms.145 But higher productivity and
larger size might not be the only reason for foreign ﬁrms having another organisational
structure. Dunning and Lundan (2008) mention that the hierarchies of multinationals
can diﬀer from that of domestic ﬁrms because of diﬀerences in cross-border cultures,
political and economic systems, language and ideologies, and institutional structures.146
Girma and Görg (2004) add that foreign ﬁrms are often part of a vertical production
chain, therefore they will be specialised and by deﬁnition more inputs have to be sourced
from other plants of the same ﬁrm. Díaz-Mora (2008) uses the same argument but comes
to the conclusion that because of the focus on only one speciﬁc task fewer subcontractors
are needed. Girma and Görg (2004) and Díaz-Mora (2008) agree that the international
network of MNEs makes it easier to ﬁnd external and more eﬃcient providers of in-
termediate inputs. The BSD data contains an indicator for foreign ownership.147 No
information is contained about foreign aﬃliates of foreign owned ﬁrms. To follow the ar-
gument of Girma and Görg (2004), if there are other aﬃliates in the UK then they should
be more likely to be vertically integrated than domestic ﬁrms. If the company gets its
input from aﬃliates abroad they will not be recognised, so a company might be regarded
as a fragmented ﬁrm, even though it is vertically integrated. The culture from the home
country can aﬀect the organisational structure of a company in any direction, therefore
a foreign ownership dummy can have a positive or negative eﬀect on the probability of a
ﬁrm of becoming vertically integrated.
145See Navaretti and Venables, 2004 for an overview of empirical studies
146See Dunning and Lundan (2008), page 235.
147This country code enables to identify the location of the foreign owner, unfortunately this country
code is inconsistent over time.
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Competition: Grossman and Helpman (2002) mention that an increase in competition
can lead to an increase in fragmented or integrated ﬁrms, depending on diﬀerent market
characteristics like costs through incomplete contracts and costs of dis-economies through
vertical integration. Available measures for market concentration are the C4 index which
is a concentration index capturing the market share of the four biggest ﬁrms in an
industry (for example used by Pugel, 1981), the Lerner index, which is used by Acemo§lu
et al. (2007) and the Herﬁndahl index. The data available in the BSD allows us to
use the C4 measure and the Herﬁndahl index. The Herﬁndahl index is calculated as
Herfindahlj =
∑N
i=1 s
2
ij , where si represents the market share of company i in industry
j. The concentration index shows the market share of the biggest companies, for example
C4j = s1j + s2j + s3j + s4j , where the sij represents the market share of the four biggest
companies in a speciﬁc industry j. Total sales (turnover) data of all ﬁrms can be used
for the calculation.
Cost eﬃciency measures: One important argument for fragmenting the production
process is to decrease costs. It is assumed that companies which pay higher wages, after
controlling for skills, in comparison to other ﬁrms have a higher incentive to outsource.
Abraham and Taylor (1996) argue that ﬁrms pay above-market wages to increase the
workers work spirit and also to attract higher quality workers. Firms will consider this
strategy especially for core workers. High wage ﬁrms will also pay higher wages to non-
core activities like janitorial services, regardless if they are highly unionised or not. This
is because of workers equality preferences, that if some workers earn a high income,
all workers should receive an above the average income. Their theory is supported, by
empirical evidence of Blau (1977). Costs can be reduced by outsourcing those overpaid
non-core activities. To capture this eﬀect the average industry wages are calculated. We
derive the average basic weekly payments in a four digit SIC industry from the ASHE
167
database.148 149 Ideally, ﬁrm level wages should be used, but the required data does
not exist. We can only check if industries paying higher wages will be more likely to
outsource.
The degree of unionisation can aﬀect the probability of outsourcing. On the one hand,
unionised ﬁrms are characterised by higher wages, but, on the other hand, there could be
special agreements which impede fragmentation of production (see Abraham and Taylor,
1996 and Girma and Görg, 2004). The Union membership status comes from the ASHE
database and was calculated by taking the share of employees in a speciﬁc four digit
SIC industry, which wages were set with reference to a collective agreement (see ASHE
Dataset User Documentation).
Agglomeration: Agglomeration eﬀects can inﬂuence the organisational structure de-
cisions of a company. A company which is located within an urban area is more likely
to have a fragmented production chain. The reason is that in metropolitan areas ser-
vice providers are gathered, therefore it is more likely to ﬁnd a subcontracting partner
at lower search costs. Furthermore, the more diverse the amount of specialised services
oﬀered in a speciﬁc region are, the greater is the decreasing eﬀect on production costs
which makes it even more likely for a company to organisationally fragment its produc-
tion (Van Long et al., 2005). Abraham and Taylor (1996) use a dummy variable for
indicating companies which are located in centralised urban areas, for example with at
least 100,000 people. Holl (2008) points out that it is not the population on its own
that is important, but the density of economic activity. Therefore she uses as a measure
148More suitable would be using the average gross weekly payments, unfortunately this measure is not
consistent over time. In the period 1998  2003, 2004 and the period after 2004 the gross payments
consist of diﬀerent income types. For example, additionally to the basic wages and premium wages
in the current deﬁnition a payment type called other pay was added capturing wages received in
the pay period for other reasons. For a detailed comparison please refer to the ASHE Dataset User
Documentation.
149For robustness checks we add, like Girma and Görg (2004), two variables containing information on
the average wage of highly skilled and unskilled workers. Unfortunately, because of an inconsistent
job classiﬁcation the analysis is rather limited. See section C.1.2 in the appendix on page 288 for
further details.
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regional industrial employment density for a speciﬁc year. The size of local unitary loca-
tion is gained from various Region in Figures publications. The population was gained
from the Population Estimates database of the ONS.150
5.4.3. The three analysis stages
We now discuss the three estimation stages and will allocate the variables to the right
stage. The ﬁrst stage is about being a multi-plant or single-plant ﬁrm. Therefore the
dependent variable is a binomial discrete variable. The full sample will be used. If a
single-plant ﬁrm structure was chosen, then, according to our deﬁnition mentioned in
chapter 4.4.1, these ﬁrms are producing only one kind of product, are organisationally
completely fragmented and spatially concentrated. Of course, it can be the case that
single-plant ﬁrms exist which produce certain intermediate inputs, however if the average
company size is taken into account, it seems rather unlikely that the average single-
plant manufacturing company with 12 employees is able to produce its own intermediate
inputs. In the service sector the picture is less clear. If a small web-page producer in
London is considered, then it can be the case that all the required intermediate inputs
like accounting, R&D and programming are done within the company. This company
would be vertically integrated to 100 percent. A look at the data reveals that single-plant
ﬁrms seem to be quite diﬀerent from multi-plant ﬁrms.151 What actually determines that
ﬁrms become multi-plant ﬁrms? Very few papers have been published about multi-unit
ﬁrms, where one part is focusing on determinants (Chandler, 1990; Kim, 1999; Galliano
et al., 2007) and the other part on the performance of multi-plant ﬁrms (Chandler, 1990;
Audia et al., 2000). Chandler (1990) points out that new technologies, economies of scale
and scope can only be fully realised in a multi-unit structure. Kim (1999) highlights that
150The whole population was used to calculate the population intensity measure.
151Single-plant ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly smaller than their multi-plant counterpart, had in 2008 on average
10.6 employees in manufacturing and 3.5 in the tradable service sector in comparison to an average
multi-plant ﬁrm employment of 247 and 171 respectively. Turnover for the average single-plant ﬁrm
was ¿1,200k and ¿310k in comparison to the average multi-plant ﬁrm of ¿45,100k and ¿12,500k.
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the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) literature is actually a special case of the multi-unit
literature. First location advantages must exist to have a plant abroad. Also factors like
proximity to the ﬁnal market and transport costs have to be considered. Only if some
internalisation advantages exist, those local units abroad will be owned by the company.
Therefore both organisational and spatial fragmentation factors are of importance. Kim
shows that most ﬁrms in the US manufacturing sector started to integrate forward into
distribution and not backward into raw materials. Therefore he argues that economies in
marketing are even more important for becoming a multi-unit ﬁrm. Factors like a brand
name and reputation are of better use when used within the ﬁrm than licensed to outside
ﬁrms. Galliano et al. (2007) mention the search for market power as a determinant
of a multi-plant structure. Audia et al. (2000) add that a multi-unit structure gives
opportunities to ﬁrms to cooperate. For example, instead of competing with a ﬁrm in
the same markets it is possible to agree that both ﬁrms will act in diﬀerent regions to
make use of their market power.
The size of a ﬁrm matters (Galliano et al., 2007). Concentration of production in one
plant creates a trade-oﬀ between having economies of scale at the plant level and informa-
tional disorder. Dividing a ﬁrm into smaller, more manageable proﬁt centres will ensure
a better performance of a ﬁrm. Concluding, we expect all factors causing geographical
and organisational fragmentation also to inﬂuence the decision of becoming a multi-plant
ﬁrm. Size and competition is expected to matter signiﬁcantly. Therefore in this stage all
available explanatory variables will be included. The extremely large sample precludes
estimation of the ﬁrst stage on the entire population of ﬁrms in the same sector. We
therefore select a random 30 percent sub-sample for the tradable service sector.152
In the second stage the question of being vertically integrated or not will be discussed.
Two vertical integration measures are available. On the one hand, a discrete choice
variable indicating if a ﬁrm is integrated or not and, on the other hand, a continuous
152This restriction was necessary because of memory limitation at the VML.
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measure indicating the degree of vertical integration are available. The measures are
based on Acemo§lu et al. (2007) and Abramovsky and Griﬃth (2007), who use input-
output tables to create a link of vertically integrated local units of a company.153 The
vertical integration dummy is one for a ﬁrm if at least one vertically integrated local
unit exists. The continuous measure is calculated as the average of the degree of vertical
integration of the local units of a ﬁrm. In this stage it will be analysed if technology
matters for vertical integration and what inﬂuence R&D and capital intensity will have
on the decision of a ﬁrm to be vertically integrated. Having a ﬁrm level measure of R&D
intensities would be ideal because the theoretical foundation is based on the knowledge
intensity at the ﬁrm and not at the industry level. The BERD oﬀers ﬁrm level data. The
drawback of using the BERD sample is that the sample size will be dramatically reduced.
To see if results are similar, regardless of using industry or ﬁrm level R&D expenditures,
the analysis will be conducted with both samples.
In the third stage the spatial structure of ﬁrm will be analysed. The sample used will be
the multi-plant sample. Two kinds of dependent variables will be employed. The discrete
measure is a multi-location dummy and indicating if a company has vertically integrated
local units in more than one local unitary authority. The continuous measure measures
how far away are on average vertically integrated local units from their headquarters. We
will employ a within-ﬁrm measure, which calculates the average distance of all vertically
integrated local units within a ﬁrm.154 The main variable of interest is factor proportion
diﬀerences. The number of observations for each sample are included in table 5.3.
153The vertical integration measure is explained in section 4.4.1.
154A more detailed description can be found in section 4.4.2 on pages 127ﬀ.
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Variable Level Based on Comments Expected sign
MP VI MLv
Technology Variables:
Heterogeneity Industry Acemo§lu et al. (2007) ? − −
Dist. to tech. Frontier Firm Acemo§lu et al. (2007) ? − −
Age Firm Acemo§lu et al. (2007) + ? +
Holl (2008)
Factor Price Diﬀerence Variables
Factor prices Location Helpman (1984) Wagelua + +
Incomplete Contracts and Knowledge Capital Variables:
Hold-up hypothesis Industry Antràs and Helpman (2004) In-house R&D Int. ? + +
Tomiura (2005) External R&D Int. ? + +
Helpman (2006) Sci. Staﬀ Int. ? + +
Real Cap. Stock ? + +
Knowledge Capital Industry Markusen (2002) Like hold-up ? + +
Control Variables:
Firm Size Firm Abraham and Taylor (1996) Employment + + +
Tomiura (2005)
Foreign Ownership Firm Girma and Görg (2004) + ? ?
Dunning and Lundan (2008)
Díaz-Mora (2008)
Competition Industry Grossman and Helpman (2002) Herﬁndahl ? ? ?
Acemo§lu et al. (2007) C4 ? ? ?
Cost cutting measures Industry Abraham and Taylor (1996) Wageind ? − −
Industry Girma and Görg (2004) Coll.Agreement Int. ? ? ?
Agglomeration Location Abraham and Taylor (1996) − − −
Holl (2008)
Notes:
MP . . .multi-plant ﬁrms, VI . . . vertically integrated ﬁrms and MLv . . .multi-location ﬁrms
+ increase of probability of being status mentioned in header
Table 5.4: Overview of explanatory variables in the empirical literature for chapter 5
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5.4.4. Estimation procedure
Ideally, estimated coeﬃcients of a model are interpreted as causal eﬀects. This interpre-
tation is only possible if there are no endogeneity issues caused by ﬁrm heterogeneity
(omitted variables), simultaneity and measurement errors (Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 4).
The ﬁrst two will be discussed in more detail.155 All three eﬀects lead to biased and
inconsistent results. Equation 5.8 shows the estimated model.
Oorg, geoit = β0 + β1Xi,t−1 + β2Xj,t−1 + β3Xr,t−1 + γ1Ci,t−1 + γ2Cj,t−1 + γ3Cr,t−1+
+Dt + ai + εit (5.8)
where indices i represents the ﬁrm, j the 4 digit SIC industry, r the local unitary authority
region and t time. X are the variables of interest at the ﬁrm, industry and regional level
and C the control variables at the same three levels. Additionally, dummies are added. ε
is the idiosyncratic error-term. Crucial for analysis is the term ai. This term is called ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀect and captures unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity meaning all ﬁrm characteristics
which are speciﬁc to a ﬁrm and do not change over time. If unobserved eﬀects are not
considered in the regression then the estimated coeﬃcients can be biased. For example,
the following equation could be estimated:
Fragmentationit = β0 + β1frontierit + β2corporate culturei + εit (5.9)
where frontier measures the proximity to the technological leader. Corporate culture
may measure the attitude of the company towards its employees. For example, how many
fringe beneﬁts are oﬀered, how much inﬂuence have employees on company's decisions,
etc. We cannot observe the latter, but we expect that the more employee friendly the
155Wooldridge (2002) states that endogenous variables are very broadly deﬁned in econometrics. If a
variable is correlated with the error term, the variable is endogenous, if the error term and the
variable are uncorrelated, then it is a exogenous variable. All those three situations lead to having
endogenous variables on the right hand side of the equation.
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corporate culture is, the higher will be the labour productivity (through motivation and
commitment), which increases the proximity to the technological frontier. It can also
be the case that a stronger inﬂuence of employees will make it less likely to outsource
production stages. The corporate culture variable will be captured by the error term,
which is correlated with the frontier variable. This leads to a biased estimation of β1.
An employee friendly corporate culture will have a negative impact on fragmenting,
leading to a downward bias of β1.
A way to solve this problem of omitted variable bias is by employing ﬁxed eﬀects estima-
tion methods. By demeaning all explanatory variables the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect will disappear
and the error term will not be correlated with the explanatory variables anymore, for
example, if the corporate culture was time invariant it would not bias the results of the
frontier variable anymore.156 Of course this method is not suitable if unobservable time
varying ﬁrm speciﬁc factors are correlated with the right hand side variables, for example
the quality of a management. This would require an Instrument-Variable strategy. Un-
fortunately it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd appropriate instruments at the ﬁrm level. To take
care of other unobservable factors, time dummies are added. Those capture all eﬀects
which change over time but are similar for all ﬁrms, for example boom and bust periods
of an economy.
The second main concern of the analysis are simultaneity issues. We cannot be sure
that all explanatory variables are exogenous so a causal interpretation is impossible. For
example, the estimation of average industry wages on fragmentation decisions of ﬁrms
may look like:
Fragmentationit = β0 + β1average wagesjt + · · ·+ εijt (5.10)
average wagesjt = γ0 + γ1Fragmentationit + · · ·+ uijt (5.11)
156This implies that also all other observable time constant factors will disappear.
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According to the theory, industries with high average wages pay also higher wages for non-
core activities. Therefore the incentive is higher to outsource those non-core activities
and we expect β1 in equation 5.10 to be positive. Equation 5.11 shows that this is not a
one way relationship. If a ﬁrm outsources its non-core activities, the average wage in the
industry can increase.157 The crucial ceteris paribus assumption will not hold, and the
results will lead to biased and inconsistent estimators (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998, pp.
339). Even though the concept of simultaneity and omitted heterogeneity is diﬀerent,
simultaneity leads to the same consequences as the correlation between the explanatory
variables and the error term (Deaton, 1995, p. 1825).
The best approach to deal with endogeneity issues is by using proxies for unobservables,
or instruments which are highly correlated with the variable of concern but uncorrelated
with the error term. Unfortunately it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd appropriate instruments.
For example, in equation 5.10 the instrument has to be highly correlated with wages but
should not be aﬀected by the fragmentation decision of a ﬁrm. Acemo§lu et al. (2007)
use UK industry variables as instrument for French industry data. In our case, instead
of using the average industry wage of the UK, we could use the industry wage of another
European country or the US. In theory, actions of UK ﬁrms should not aﬀect the average
wage of diﬀerent US industries. Still, some problems remain. On the one hand, we cannot
ﬁnd instruments at the ﬁrm level. Second, there could still be a correlation between the
average US industry wage and the error term. A global recession can aﬀect both the US
and the UK industry wages and inﬂuence the organisational structure of a UK ﬁrm.
With ﬁxed eﬀects mentioned above at least some unobserved eﬀects can be captured.
A way to mitigate the endogeneity problem is by using lagged independent variables,
like in equation 5.8. It is very tempting to treat those lagged variables as instruments,
which are highly correlated with the explanatory variables, but uncorrelated with the
157We have to assume that this company is big in size, otherwise one fragmenting ﬁrm might not inﬂuence
the average wage in an industry.
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current error term. Unfortunately it only mitigates and does not solve the problem. Firm
heterogeneity will aﬀect the current but also lagged variables. For example, the corporate
culture, which cannot be observed in the data, will aﬀect the current organisational form
but the labour productivity of the last period too. Therefore the lagged frontier variable,
which is based on relative labour productivities of ﬁrms, is not exogenous anymore.158
Still equation 5.8 is estimated with ﬁxed eﬀects and lagged independent variables. We
cannot control for time-variant ﬁrm speciﬁc unobserved eﬀects which leaves the error
term being correlated with some right hand side variables. Because of this we will still
interpret the coeﬃcients as correlations and not as causal eﬀects.
We are using continuous and discrete variables as dependent variables and even when the
binomial dependent variables are employed, a linear ﬁxed eﬀects model will be estimated
instead of non-linear estimation methods like Probit and Tobit. This is justiﬁed by the
results showing that ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are having a signiﬁcant impact on the results.159
Using a linear probability model is confronted with several problems too, for example the
estimated coeﬃcient can be outside the zero-one interval and provides a poor model for
individual probabilities (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p. 471). Nevertheless it is a useful
measure for the marginal eﬀect of the mean ﬁrm. The straight and quick way of compu-
tation and the importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity seem to outweigh the disadvantages.160
158Deaton (1995), page 1825, explains it with an example of a production function of a farmer in a
developing country: The combination of genuine simultaneity and heterogeneity has the further eﬀect
of ruling out the use of lags to remove the former; while it is true that the seeds have to be planted
before the crop is harvested, heterogeneity across farmers will mean that seeds are not exogenous for
the harvest, . . . .
159The importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity is captured by an example of the American car industry by
Chandler (1990). Firms in the same industry and in the same country and during the same time period
were following diﬀerent vertical integration strategies: Ford remained fully vertically integrated,
General Motors had a policy of controlling one-quarter of its suppliers, and Chrysler obtained nearly
all of its supplies from independent producers. (Chandler, 1990, p. 38).
160See Angrist and Pischke (2009).
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5.4.5. Descriptive statistics
The dependent variables were already discussed extensively in chapter 4. In table 5.5 the
basic descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and covariates are summarised.
We show the results for the sample including all ﬁrms and the sample including ﬁrms
which have had multiple plants at least once. It is possible that in the multi-plant sample
also single-plant ﬁrms are included, therefore the average probability of being a multi-
plant ﬁrm in the multi-plant sample is not equal to one. In general, manufacturing ﬁrms
are more likely to be vertically integrated than service ﬁrms and more likely to have a
dispersed production chain. The technology variables show that the average distance to
the technological frontier is similar in all sectors. The heterogeneity index looks similar
in the total and the multi-plant sample. This is caused by using only ﬁrms with more
than twenty employees. Service industries are more heterogeneous than manufacturing
ﬁrms. The industry characteristics reveal that the manufacturing industries are more
concentrated than the service sectors. Average weekly wages and the R&D intensity are
higher, and the degree of unionisation is lower in the tradable service sector. Regional
characteristics reveal that tradable service ﬁrms are located in more agglomerated regions
where the average wage is higher.
5.5. Results
All variables employed have been described above. The ﬁrm size is captured by employ-
ment and competition by the Herﬁndahl index. The heterogeneity measure only takes
account of ﬁrms with more than 20 employees. Because of ﬁxed eﬀects regression age2
instead of age will be used.161 This section is divided into three parts, where in every
stage the main results and the main robustness checks are presented.
161The demeaning through the within estimator leads to the same increase of age for every company
in every year. Therefore it is not possible to distinguish this eﬀect from the time ﬁxed eﬀects
(Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 818). By using the square of age, the increase will be diﬀerent for every ﬁrm
in every year.
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Manufacturing Tradable Services
All MP All MP
Dependent variables
Proportion of ﬁrms with multiple plants (MP = 1 ) 0.0467 0.6494 0.0159 0.6378
Proportion of ﬁrms with vertically integrated plants
(VID = 1 )
0.0236 0.3283 0.0029 0.1148
Degree of vertical integration (vi) 0.0012 0.0169 0.0002 0.0088
Standard Deviation 0.0161 0.0578 0.0064 0.0399
Proportion of ﬁrms with vi plants in multiple
locations (ML_v = 1 )
0.0127 0.1774 0.0018 0.0712
Average distance in meters between vi plants within
ﬁrm (dist_v)
1,835 25,675 222.5 8,946
Standard Deviation 20,768 73,624 7,348 45,751
Explanatory variables
Technology variables
Age (age) 12.35 19.45 6.83 16.56
Standard Deviation 9.599 8.989 6.801 9.817
Heterogeneity Index (het_ind_g20 ) 0.6886 0.6693 1.1989 1.0735
Standard Deviation 0.3115 0.2672 0.5361 0.6123
Distance to the technological frontier (frontier) -2.1783 -2.0052 -2.0892 -2.1251
Standard Deviation 0.9532 0.9075 0.9399 1.1410
Firm characteristics
Number of employment (employment) 21.11 166.73 5.47 93.14
Standard Deviation 190.73 683.92 100.32 613.31
Turnover in thousands of GBP (turnover) 2,361 22,405 407.33 6,627
Standard Deviation 41,030 149,793 8,557 47,357
Labour Productivity, turnover over employment
(prod)
80.45 103.36 77.39 109.07
Standard Deviation 439.02 373.45 1,454.04 1,536.88
Number of plants per ﬁrm (J ) 1.1124 2.5651 1.0540 3.1684
Standard Deviation 1.3834 4.9362 10.0552 63.7012
Proportion of foreign owned ﬁrms (foreign) 0.0206 0.1341 0.0072 0.0590
Industry characteristics
Herﬁndahl index for industry concentration
(herﬁndahl)
0.0386 0.0512 0.0112 0.0143
Standard Deviation 0.0764 0.0865 0.0232 0.0273
Average weekly net industry wages (av_bpay_ind) 343.68 345.28 491.62 456.23
Standard Deviation 84.96 81.83 110.48 110.24
Degree of unionisation (colag_ratio) 0.3829 0.4133 0.2178 0.2152
Standard Deviation 0.1500 0.1494 0.0937 0.0967
In-house R&D intensity (rad_ih_ratio) 0.0099 0.0120 0.0150 0.0237
Standard Deviation 0.0502 0.0501 0.0926 0.1418
External R&D intensity (rad_ex_ratio) 0.0013 0.0014 0.0026 0.0050
Standard Deviation 0.0273 0.0255 0.0283 0.0411
Capital intensity, av. real capital stock per worker in
SIC4 (cap_int)
24.86 28.92 90.01 110.29
Standard Deviation 71.72 90.10 72.46 77.36
Regional characteristics
Population density in local authority (agglom) 1.8652 1.6872 2.4404 2.5317
Standard Deviation 2.4718 2.1893 3.1665 3.1134
Average weekly net wages in local authority
(av_bpay_lua)
321.81 316.09 363.95 356.46
Standard Deviation 78.94 74.20 109.50 115.99
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables across 1998  2008
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Stage 1: Multi-plant ﬁrms
To see which ﬁrms in which industries are more likely to have a multi-plant structure,
we use the total ﬁrm sample. According to Kim (1999) becoming a multi-plant ﬁrm
depends on locational and organisational factors, therefore I will include all explanatory
variables. The analysis focuses on the degree of market power. The higher the degree of
market concentration, the more likely it is to have multi-unit ﬁrms. Besides market power
horizontal motives are important. According to the Proximity-Concentration trade-oﬀ
the higher the capital intensity of an industry the higher is the probability of having big,
concentrated ﬁrms. On the other hand, if a sector is not capital intensive, it is easier to
set up a new business, because technical barriers to enter the market are low. Therefore
many single-plant ﬁrms can appear. Finally, we expect that ﬁrm size and ﬁrm age is
positively correlated with being a multi-plant ﬁrm. If a ﬁrm gets too big dis-economies
of scale can arise because of, for example, increasing communication costs. Older ﬁrms
may have better market knowledge, less restrictive budgetary constraints and a better
known product which makes setting up a new plant easier.
MPijrt = β0 + β1age
2
ijrt−1 + β2 log (employmentijrt−1) + β3 log (employment
2
ijrt−1)+
+ β4foreignijrt−1 + β5frontierijrt−1 + β6heterojt−1 + β7 log (wagejt−1)+
+ β8concentjt−1 + β9R&Djt−1 + β10 log (cap. intjt−1) + β11 log (wagert−1)+
+ β12unionjt−1 + β13agglomrt−1 +Dt + aijr + εijrt (5.12)
The main problem of this stage is the large sample size, which is pushing Stata to its
memory limits. While the analysis can be conducted with the full manufacturing sample
we have chosen a random 30 percent sample from the tradable service sector.162
The base results are presented in the base columns of table 5.6. The coeﬃcients look
162 The last digit of the enterprise reference number is random. Therefore we chose three numbers and
keep all ﬁrms, which end with the chosen number.
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Manufacturing Tradable Services
Variables Base Cap. Intensity Base Cap. Intesity
Dep. Var. MP MP MP MP
Hetero. -0.0012 ** -0.0010 * 0.0009 ** 0.0016 ***
Frontier 0.0021 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0019 ***
Age2 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Employment -0.0216 *** -0.0205 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0056 ***
Employment2 0.0138 *** 0.0131 *** 0.0085 *** 0.0077 ***
Foreign 0.0028 * 0.0037 ** 0.0092 *** 0.0078 ***
Herﬁndahl 0.0090 ** 0.0096 ** 0.0183 ** 0.0483 ***
Ind. Wage 0.0031 * 0.0031 * 0.0029 ** -0.0022
Reg. Wage 0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0003
Agglomeration 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
Cap. Intensity 0.0003 * 0.0003
Ex. R&D 0.0147 0.0108 0.0325 ** 0.0519 **
Ih. R&D -0.0037 0.0018 -0.0083 * -0.0084
Unionisation -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0123 *** -0.0158 ***
Constant -0.0113 0.0041 -0.0056 0.0207
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,009,570 894,503 933,263 587,203
R-Square .0255 .0233 .0235 .0205
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 5.6: Base and capital intensity results for stage 1
rather small, but in general the number of multi-plant ﬁrms is rather low. Only 4.7
percent in manufacturing and 1.6 percent in tradable services are multi-plant ﬁrms.
Market power seems to be an important determinant. In both sectors a higher market
concentration is positively correlated with having a multi-unit structure. If the market
concentration is increased by a standard deviation, then a ﬁrm will be 0.07 percentage
points more likely in manufacturing and 0.04 percentage points in tradable service sector
to be a multi-plant ﬁrm.163 This is an increase by 1.5 percent in manufacturing and
2.5 percent in the tradable service sector in comparison to the average probability of
becoming a multi-plant ﬁrm.164
The external R&D intensity of an industry has a positive impact on the probability
of becoming a multi-plant ﬁrm, but the opposite sign is found for the in-house R&D
intensity. Only the coeﬃcients for the tradable service R&D intensities are statistically
163This values are calculated as 0.0764×0.00898 in manufacturing and 0.0232×0.0183 in tradable services.
164Manufacturing: 0.0007/0.0467. Tradable services: 0.0004/0.016.
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signiﬁcant. Those two variables could comprise of diﬀerent types of knowledge capital.
External R&D intensities could cover investments into marketing, which follows Kim's
argument. In-house R&D intensity could be a proxy for capital intensity, which would
capture economies of scale at the plant level and favour a single-plant structure. An
increase of external R&D intensity by a standard deviation in the tradable service sector
leads to an increase in the probability of becoming a multi-plant ﬁrm in comparison to
the average probability by 5.7 percent ((0.0283 × 0.0325)/0.016) and for in-house R&D
a decrease of 4.6 percent ((0.0926 × −0.008)/0.016)). As a robustness check we also
add capital intensities to the regression results in table 5.6. The in-house R&D results
are sensitive to the inclusion of a capital intensity variable. While it remains negative
and turned into insigniﬁcant in the service sector, the sign changed in manufacturing.
Capital intensity is positive and signiﬁcant in manufacturing. Contrary to the proximity-
concentration theory we ﬁnd that lower capital intensities lead to more single-plant ﬁrms,
even though the eﬀect is extremely small.
As expected, larger ﬁrms and foreign ﬁrms are more likely to be multi-unit ﬁrms. In-
creasing the average employment size of a manufacturing ﬁrm by 10 percent will lead
to an increase in the probability of getting a multi-plant ﬁrm of 0.6 percentage points.
For a ﬁrm of the tradable service sector the probability will increase by 0.4 percentage
points.165 Age is statistically but not economically signiﬁcant. In more technologically
heterogeneous sectors it is less likely for multi-unit ﬁrms to appear in the manufacturing
but more likely in the tradable service sector. If the technological industry heterogene-
ity increases by one standard deviation, it will lead to a 0.04 percentage point decrease
in the probability of becoming a multi-unit ﬁrm in manufacturing and a 0.05 percent-
age point increase in tradable services.166 If we consider the average probability this
165The calculation was the following: 0.01× (−0.0216 + 2× 0.0138× log (21))× 10 (manufacturing) and
0.01 × (0.0085 + 2 × 0.0092 × log (5.5)) × 100 (service sector). See footnote 171 on page 187 for a
detailed explanation of how to calculate non-linear eﬀects.
166These values are calculated as 0.3115×−0.0012 in manufacturing and 0.5361× 0.0009.
181
would lead to an 0.9 percent decrease in manufacturing and a 3.1 percent increase in
the service sector.167 The closer a ﬁrm is to the technological frontier, the more likely
it will be a multi-unit ﬁrm. A doubling of the proximity to the technological leader
leads to a 3 percent ((0.0021 × log (2)/0.047) increase in manufacturing and a 7 per-
cent ((0.0016 × log (2))/0.016) increase in tradable services. We do not ﬁnd evidence
that if headquarters are located in populated areas that ﬁrms will be more likely to be
multi-plant ﬁrms. Also no statistical proof exists that higher regional wages will promote
multi-unit ﬁrms.
We check the robustness of three variables. First, we use an alternative measure for
technological heterogeneity. This measure uses a three year average of the productivity
growth of a ﬁrm. In manufacturing, the results remain robust, but in the tradable
service sector the eﬀect of industry heterogeneity becomes insigniﬁcant. We use the C4
concentration measure instead of the Herﬁndahl index. The ﬁrm concentration eﬀects
remain positive and signiﬁcant. Finally, to capture knowledge capital we substitute
in-house R&D intensity with a scientiﬁc staﬀ ratio. In manufacturing the variables
remain insigniﬁcant. In the tradable service sector the sign remains negative but becomes
signiﬁcant. The results for the robustness checks are gathered in table C.7 on page 295
in the appendix.
Concluding, market concentration has a positive eﬀect in both sectors, but seems to
matter more in the tradable service sector. We also ﬁnd a positive correlation for the
external R&D intensity, however the results are only statistically signiﬁcant for ﬁrms of
the tradable service sector. Technology matters too, especially the relative distance to
the technological frontier. We ﬁnd that size and foreign ownership have a positive impact
in being a multi-plant ﬁrm.
167Manufacturing: −0.0004/0.0467. Tradable services: 0.0005/0.016.
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Stage 2: Vertically integrated ﬁrms
The sample size can be reduced massively by keeping those ﬁrms, which have been a
multi-plant ﬁrm at least once. According to our deﬁnition only multi-plant ﬁrms can
be vertically integrated. Therefore the interpretation will be based on ﬁrms, which have
the opportunity to be vertically integrated, for example, that they can aﬀord to set up
another local unit. A discrete and a continuous measure of vertical integration are used.
We will focus on the discrete measure and compare the results then with the continuous
measure. The estimated model is shown in equation 5.13.
V IDit = β0 + β1age
2
it−1 + β2 log (employmentit−1) + β3 log (employment
2
it−1)+
+ β4foreignit−1 + β5frontierit−1 + β6heterojt−1 + β7 log (wagejt−1)+
+ β8concentjt−1 + β9R&Djt−1 + β10unionjt−1 + β11agglomrt−1+
+Dt + ai + εit (5.13)
This stage will focus on how technology diﬀerences, knowledge capital and incomplete
contracts aﬀect the decision of a ﬁrm to be vertically integrated. The three variables
capturing the ﬁrst are ﬁrm age, the distance of a ﬁrm to the technological frontier and
the heterogeneity of technology used in every industry. The KCM will be tested by using
external and internal R&D intensities of industries. Also capital intensities of industries
will show if, like Antràs and Helpman (2004) predict, a higher intensity leads to inte-
gration being more likely to happen. For taking account of the cost-savings advantages
we add average industry wages and degree of unionisation. Agglomeration captures the
population density in a region and is expected to have a negative impact on the prob-
ability of being integrated. In contrast to before, I exclude the average wage of a local
authority from the equation, because regional wage diﬀerences should only aﬀect spatial
and not organisational fragmentation.
First results show that ﬁrm heterogeneity has a strong inﬂuence on the results. See table
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Manufacturing Tradable Services
Variables Discrete Cont. Discrete Cont.
Dep. Var. VID VI VID VI
Hetero. -0.0111 -0.0004 -0.0162 *** -0.0015 **
Frontier 0.0070 ** 0.0002 0.0046 ** 0.0006 **
Age2 -0.0000 * -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ***
Employment 0.0466 *** -0.0028 ** 0.0385 *** 0.0019 ***
Employment2 0.0108 *** 0.0015 *** -0.0005 0.0003 ***
Foreign 0.0013 0.0009 0.0007 0.0016
Herﬁndahl 0.0534 0.0019 0.3407 *** 0.0459 ***
Ind. Wage 0.0102 0.0008 -0.0981 *** -0.0126 ***
Agglomeration -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0026 * -0.0005 ***
Ex. R&D 0.3236 * 0.0035 0.1117 0.0212
Ih. R&D -0.2390 * -0.0138 0.0684 * 0.0066
Unionisation -0.0304 * -0.0031 0.0425 0.0052
Constant -0.0578 -0.0017 0.6362 *** 0.0782 ***
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65,446 65,446 66,470 66,470
R-Square .037 .0122 .0263 .0135
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 5.7: Discrete and continuous vertical integration results for stage 2
C.8 on page 296 of the appendix for a comparison of the OLS, Probit and ﬁxed eﬀects
estimation results.
Table 5.7 reveals the results of the analysis. The technology variables lead to the same
result in both sectors. We want to highlight here again that the interpretation of the
coeﬃcients is not causal, because we cannot control for time-variant unobservable factors.
The age coeﬃcient is economically insigniﬁcant. This can be caused by ﬁxed eﬀect
capturing most of the variety.
Highly signiﬁcant and negative results are found for the heterogeneity measure in the
tradable service sector. In manufacturing the coeﬃcients are negative but only signiﬁ-
cant at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level. A higher degree of technological heterogeneity
in an industry is a better environment for fragmented ﬁrms. The magnitude of the
change is diﬀerent in each sector. The standard deviation of heterogeneity was 0.267 in
manufacturing and 0.612 in tradable services (see table 5.5). A manufacturing ﬁrm fac-
ing a standard deviation higher industry heterogeneity level has a 0.3 percentage points
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(−0.011× 0.267) lower probability of being vertically integrated. For a tradable service
ﬁrm it is a 1 percentage point (−0.0162 × 0.612) lower probability of being vertically
integrated. To calculate an approximation for an elasticity measure, we compare the co-
eﬃcients with the average probability of being vertically integrated. According to table
5.5 the mean value in manufacturing is 0.33 and in the tradable service sector 0.115.
In manufacturing we observe a 0.9 percent (0.001/0.33) lower probability relative to the
average industry, which is a small diﬀerence. In tradable services it is around 9 percent
(0.01/0.11).168
The technological frontier variable is highly signiﬁcant and positive in both sectors. A
ﬁrm being a technological leader in a sector is more likely to be vertically integrated  a
result opposite to what we have expected. Internal decision power delegation cannot be
compared with external decentralisation decisions. A technological leader may require
intermediate inputs which can be produced internally and not sourced by unrelated
aﬃliates, because they do not possess the technology to produce those intermediaries.
This result is highly signiﬁcant even after controlling for knowledge capital. Doubling
the proximity to the technological frontier leads to an increase in the probability of being
integrated by 1.5 percent (0.007 × log (2)/0.33) in manufacturing and by 1.8 percent
(0.0046× log (2)/0.115) in the tradable service sector.169
The result of the external R&D is what we have expected. Firms in R&D intensive
sectors are more likely to be vertically integrated. This result is signiﬁcant for manu-
facturing but insigniﬁcant for the services sector. Descriptive statistics from table 5.5
show that the mean R&D intensity is rather low (0.0014 in manufacturing and 0.005
168Acemo§lu et al. (2006) calculate the eﬀect by multiplying the coeﬃcient with the heterogeneity mean
value instead of standard deviation. Their `elasticity' was 23 percent for the manufacturing sector.
Their estimated coeﬃcient was 0.251, the mean industry heterogeneity was 0.275 and the base 0.3.
If we follow Acemo§lu's calculation we get a value of 2.4 percent for manufacturing and 19 percent
for tradable service ﬁrms. Our elasticities are much smaller, but, in contrast to our data, Acemo§lu
et al. look only at power decentralisation within a ﬁrm. Therefore we observe a weaker eﬀect of an
increase in industry heterogeneity on organisational fragmentation.
169Acemo§lu et al. (2006) calculated an eﬀect of 37 percent, but again, this percentage is related with
ﬁrm internal delegation decisions.
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in tradable services) and confronted with relatively high standard deviations (0.026 in
manufacturing and 0.041 in tradable services). Therefore a manufacturing ﬁrm in an
industry with a standard deviation higher R&D intensity will experience a 0.8 percent-
age point (0.324 × 0.026) higher probability of becoming vertically integrated. In the
tradable service sector an increase of a standard deviation will lead to a 0.5 percentage
points (0.112 × 0.041) higher probability of being vertically integrated. The latter rela-
tionship is not statistically signiﬁcant. An unexpected result appears for in-house R&D
expenditures for manufacturing ﬁrms. Firms in a more in-house R&D intensive sector
are more likely to be fragmented, which oﬀers a diﬀerent result than theory would sug-
gest. The result in the tradable service sector is positive and signiﬁcant. The in-house
R&D intensities are higher than the external R&D intensities. A ﬁrm in an indus-
try with a standard deviation higher in-house R&D intensity has 1.2 percentage points
(−0.24 × 0.05) lower probability of being vertically integrated in manufacturing and 1
percentage point (0.068× 0.14) higher probability in the tradable service sector.
How is it possible that R&D expenditures may lead to a decrease in the probability of
becoming vertically integrated? A theoretical explanation can be by Antràs and Helpman
(2004) which conclude that headquarters service intensive sectors would prefer integration
of intermediate input production to outsourcing. This argument is based on the theory of
incomplete contracts. However Grossman and Hart (1986) argue, in a more general way,
that the best outcome for a ﬁrm is gained if the ownership is allocated to the company,
for which the ex-ante investments are more crucial.170 An increase in R&D expenditures
might change the input mix of production. Therefore there could be a change of priority
170For example, if the component input is crucial for a ﬁnal product it is better to give the component
supplier the residual rights. We can link this statement to the results of Acemo§lu et al. (2009). If
backward vertical integration is considered, and the downstream plant is R&D intensive, a ﬁrm is
better oﬀ by having another intermediate inputs supplying plant. But it could be the case that the
intermediate input suppliers are part of the R&D intensive production stages. Then there is a higher
probability of an upstream local unit being forward vertically integrated but not backward. Because
our ﬁrm measure is based on local units, a ﬁrm which has a backward integrated local unit has by
deﬁnition also a forward integrated local unit. Therefore this explanation cannot be used to explain
the observed pattern.
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for ex-ante investments, leading to a higher propensity of fragmentation than integration.
Another possible explanation is that R&D might not be able to capture the headquarters
service intensity as suggested by Antràs and Helpman (2004). For example, while external
R&D captures headquarters services and knowledge capital, like blue-prints, marketing
strategies, etc., we are thinking of, in-house R&D may capture the capital intensity of a
ﬁrm. Capital intensity can be higher in those sectors, which have already outsourced the
labour intensive production stages, which pushed the capital-labour ratio up. To analyse
these considerations we will conduct two robustness checks by adding actual capital
intensity and looking at a ﬁrm speciﬁc R&D intensity. Another explanation could be
that the high correlation between external and internal R&D leads to a collinearity-
problem.
Agglomeration has a negative impact on the probability of being vertically integrated.
This eﬀect is only signiﬁcant in the service sector.171 Size matters in all sectors. There is
a positive eﬀect in the service sector and a positive non-linear eﬀect in manufacturing.172
171 To illustrate the eﬀect of population density, consider Nottingham with a 3.62 people per square
meter and Inner London with 8.98 people per square meter in 2002 (ONS, 2004a,b). The population
density diﬀerence is 5.36. Therefore a tradable service ﬁrm in Nottingham with London's population
density would be expected to have a 1.4 percentage points (−0.0026× 5.36) lower probability to be
vertically integrated than a ﬁrm in actual Nottingham. If the base probability of vertical integration
is considered, it would mean that the probability will decrease by 12 percent (0.014/0.115) percent.
172The interpretation of the coeﬃcients has to be done carefully, because, while the dependent variable is a
dummy, the independent variables are measured in Log. Starting with the tradable service sector, the
coeﬃcient 0.0385 means that a one percent higher employment is correlated with a 0.0385 percentage
points (0.0385/100) higher probability of being vertically integrated. The mean employment in the
tradable service sector is around 93. A ten percent, or 9 workers, larger ﬁrm will experience a
0.39 percentage points increase in becoming vertically integrated. Because of the non-linearity the
eﬀect is larger in the manufacturing sector. The mean employment size in manufacturing is 167.
A one percentage increase at this size is correlated with an increase in the probability of becoming
vertically integrated of 0.16 percentage points (0.01×(0.0466+2×0.0108× log (167)) This calculation
requires further explanation. The standard equation is V I = β0 + β1 log (emp) + β2[log (emp)]
2 + u,
ignoring now all other covariates and indices, which will not inﬂuence the results. To calculate
the marginal eﬀect this equation has to be diﬀerentiated with regards to log (emp). This leads to
∆V I/∆ log (emp) = β1 + 2 × β2 log (emp). Because the estimated model is a lin-log model, the
interpretation of a percentage change of employment aﬀecting a percentage point change in the
probability of being vertically integrated requires a division by 100. The marginal of a speciﬁc
employment size is then calculated as ∆V I = 0.01× [β1+2×β2× log (emp)]×%∆emp. For example,
we would expect a ﬁrm, which is ten percent, or 17 workers, larger than the mean ﬁrm, to have a 1.6
percent higher probability of being vertically integrated.
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Foreign ownership is positively but not signiﬁcantly correlated with being vertically in-
tegrated. Girma and Görg (2004) may be right by assuming that foreign owned local
units are by deﬁnition more specialised and source additional intermediate inputs from
other local units of the same ﬁrm. Market concentration has only a signiﬁcant impact
for tradable services. A higher degree of competition is positively correlated with out-
sourcing.
Finally, cost-savings motives seem to matter in tradable services. A higher average wage
in an industry leads to a higher probability of becoming fragmented.173 Unionisation
shows that a higher degree has a signiﬁcant negative impact in the manufacturing and a
positive insigniﬁcant impact in the tradable service sector. As Girma and Görg (2004)
point out, even though wages might not be diﬀerent if a sector is highly unionised or
not, other costs can arise for a company, therefore fragmentation seems to be more likely.
Examples are regulated working hours, diﬃculties to make employees redundant, etc.
This seems to be the case in the manufacturing sector. The negative sign of the tradable
service sector can be explained that stronger trade unions can also prevent ﬁrms to
outsource to diﬀerent countries which could cause a higher probability of being vertically
integrated.
Concluding this section, technology matters. With the exception of age, the technological
variables are important. The calculations above show that the coeﬃcients are rather
similar, but the eﬀect on the base probability seems to be stronger in the service sector.
The results for the R&D intensities are ambiguous. To check the robustness of those
results, we will use a continuous vertical integration measure, a model with physical
capital intensities and estimations using the BERD sample.
173For example, a ﬁrm in an industry with an average wage of ten percent (¿46) higher than in the mean
industry (¿456) will be a 1 percentage point less likely to be vertically integrated (0.01× (−0.0981)×
10).
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Continuous measure
We substitute the discrete integration measure with a continuous measure. The average
degree of vertical integration in manufacturing is 1.7 percent and 0.88 in the tradable
service sector. The distribution is extremely skewed, with many ﬁrms having a low degree
of vertical integration and only a few with higher degrees. As shown in table 5.7 this will
lead to relatively small absolute eﬀects. The signs are nearly identical to the discrete
case, but in the manufacturing sector less signiﬁcant coeﬃcients appear. Only the size
coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcant. With the exception of the in-house R&D coeﬃcient the
signiﬁcance of the results remains in the tradable service sector.174
Capital stock and the BERD sample
As a robustness check for headquarters service intensity we use the capital intensity
of an industry. The ARD allows us to calculate the real capital stock of an industry.
Capital intensity is measured as real capital stock per worker. Data is only available for
the period 1998  2006 and results are presented in table 5.8. Even though the panel
is two years shorter, the results change only marginally from the baseline results. The
capital stock variable has a negative but insigniﬁcant sign in manufacturing. The R&D
variables are also not aﬀected. In the service sector, the capital stock variable is positive
but insigniﬁcant. The R&D variables are sensitive to the inclusion. Both external and
internal R&D coeﬃcients remain positive, but while the in-house R&D coeﬃcient turns
insigniﬁcant and smaller, the external R&D coeﬃcient becomes signiﬁcant and larger.
One main problem of R&D expenditures is that only few ﬁrms actually engage in R&D,
therefore the R&D coeﬃcients are mostly insigniﬁcant or may cause unexpected results.
A smaller sample will be employed with ﬁrms for which ﬁrm level R&D data from the
174To illustrate the small absolute changes, the distance to the technological frontier will be considered for
the tradable service sector. The coeﬃcient is 0.0006. If a ﬁrm is twice as close to the technological
frontier, then we would expect a 0.04 percentage point (0.0006 × log (2)) lower degree of vertical
integration. That means 0.04 percent more of intermediate inputs will be sourced from the market.
This seems to be very little, but if the change is compared with the average degree of vertical
integration, this would represent a 4.5 percent change (0.0004/0.0088).
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Manufacturing Tradable Services
Variables Cap. Stock BERD Cap. Stock BERD
Dep. Var. VID VID VID VID
Hetero. -0.0139 * -0.0003 -0.0173 *** -0.0025
Frontier 0.0065 * 0.0015 0.0046 ** 0.0012
Age2 -0.0000 * 0.0001 *** -0.0000 -0.0000
Employment 0.0367 *** -0.0264 * 0.0304 *** -0.0086 *
Employment2 0.0112 *** 0.0129 *** 0.0000 0.0047 ***
Foreign -0.0007 0.0128 -0.0027 -0.0155 *
Herﬁndahl 0.0671 * 0.0562 0.4356 *** -0.0246
Ind. Wage 0.0000 0.0096 -0.0911 *** -0.0020
Agglomeration 0.0003 0.0027 -0.0038 ** -0.0017
Cap. Intensity -0.0008 0.0040
Ex. R&D 0.3968 * -0.0010 0.3062 * -0.0000
Ih. R&D -0.2460 * 0.0003 0.0259 0.0000
Unionisation -0.0358 * 0.0088 0.0260 0.0291
Constant 0.0345 -0.0838 0.5190 *** 0.0382
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57,521 24,770 49,831 17,820
R-Square .0352 .016 .0225 .00513
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 5.8: Capital stock and BERD sample results for stage 2
BERD is available. The description of how the sample was selected can be found on page
155. The same estimation methods will be used. The results are presented in table 5.8.
The signs of the technology variables are identical to the analysis above, even though
they are not signiﬁcant anymore. The signiﬁcance of the R&D expenditures disappeared.
There is no evidence that R&D expenditure are aﬀecting the decision of a ﬁrm to become
vertically integrated or not. One explanation is sample selection bias. In the BERD
sample only ﬁrms spending money on R&D are included. By neglecting other ﬁrms
without R&D expenditures the eﬀect of R&D on the probability of being vertically
integrated may be understated. Another explanation is that knowledge capital factors
like advertisement and reputation are not included in purely R&D measures. Also R&D
expenditures are ﬂow variables, but to be more precise, the knowledge capital stock
should be considered for the decision of being vertically integrated or not.
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Further robustness checks
We also conduct a variety of robustness checks, which are all presented in the appendix
on pages 298 and 299. In general the results are robust independent of the covariates
used. Here we will only discuss the sensitive cases. Instead of using the heterogeneity
measure based on ﬁrms with more than 20 employees a heterogeneity measure with a
three year average growth rate was employed. The results do not change in the manu-
facturing sector. In the service sector, additionally to the disappearing signiﬁcance, also
the sign has changed. Therefore this result is sensitive to which measure has been used.
However, as explained above in section 5.4.2 using all ﬁrms creates a very noisy measure
of heterogeneity and therefore we stick to the restricted measure.
Instead of in-house R&D intensity a scientiﬁc worker ratio was used. We still ﬁnd a
negative, but this time insigniﬁcant, coeﬃcient in manufacturing. We get the same
result in the tradable service sector. External R&D are sensitive to that change. In the
tradable service sector the coeﬃcients become signiﬁcant and more than twice as large
as in the baseline regression.
Stage 3: Multi-location ﬁrms
In this stage the distance between local units which produce intermediate inputs and
headquarters are analysed. We consider only local units which are vertically linked to
the headquarters. The multi-plant sample is the foundation of the estimation. On the
one hand, a discrete multi-location dummy and, on the other hand, a continuous measure
with average distance between headquarters and local units are available. The continuous
measure will be used as the main indicator for the geographical distribution of a company,
mainly because it can be the case that the dummy is rather imprecise.
Which vertically integrated ﬁrms will be spatially concentrated or dispersed? Because we
use the multi-plant sample we expect all technology and knowledge capital variables to
have a positive eﬀect on ﬁrms being geographically dispersed. Additionally, an average
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wage per region variable was added to capture factor price diﬀerences. We expect ﬁrms
having headquarters in areas with high average wages and in agglomerated regions to be
more likely to be dispersed. Equation 5.14 shows the estimated model.
DIvijrt = β0 + β1ageijrt−1 + β2 log (employmentijrt−1) + β3size
2
ijrt−1 + β4foreignijrt−1+
+ β5frontierijrt−1 + β6heterojt−1 + β7 log (wagejt−1) + β8concentjt−1+
+ β9R&Djt−1 + β10 log (wagert−1) + β11unionjt−1 + β12agglomrt−1+
+Dt + aijr + εijrt (5.14)
As in stage 2, a comparison between OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects regression reveals that ﬁrm
heterogeneity matters (see table C.11 on page 300 in the appendix). Table 5.9 compares
the results of a ﬁxed eﬀects regression with lagged covariates for the manufacturing and
the tradable service sector. Because we have also non-vertically integrated ﬁrms in the
sample, the continuous distance measure will be left censored at zero. Censoring can
lead to biased and inconsistent estimators.175
The FPM is based on manufacturing ﬁrms which produce heterogeneous goods requiring
headquarters services and labour intensive intermediate goods. We expect a UK company
with its headquarters in an area with high factor prices to shift labour and capital
intensive production stages into cheaper areas. As a proxy for factor prices the average
weekly net wages are used. We do not have data for capital costs, so we hope to capture
capital price diﬀerences with this variable. We do not ﬁnd evidence that factor price
diﬀerences matter within the UK. The coeﬃcients have even a negative sign.176
175A way to deal with this problem is by using a Tobit model. This has not been conducted yet but is
planned to be done for future modiﬁcations of this chapter.
176A ﬁrm in a region with a 10 percent higher wage will have ﬁrms which are on average 0.37km
(−3.702/100) × 10) less dispersed. A similar eﬀect remains in the tradable service sector. High
wages can be an indicator for a higher number of skilled people, which are necessary for tradable
services. Therefore local units might be concentrated in those regions.
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Manufacturing Tradable Services
Variables Cont. Level Discrete Cont. LOG Cont. Level Discrete Cont. LOG
Dep. Var. DIv MLv log(DIv) DIv MLv log(DIv)
Hetero. -335.2 -0.0039 -0.0262 -1,993 ** -0.0121 *** -0.0246
Frontier 1,048 ** 0.0063 ** -0.0026 1,153 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0095
Age2 8.92 *** -0.0000 0.0001 2.0 0.0000 0.0000
Employment -4,659 *** -0.0132 * -0.0759 2,659 *** 0.0199 *** -0.0133
Employment2 2,302 *** 0.0130 *** 0.0140 ** 178 0.0013 ** 0.0104
Foreign -1,026 0.0127 * -0.0267 -275.4 0.0051 -0.0417
Herﬁndahl 1,992 0.0724 ** 0.0098 37,311 ** 0.2370 *** -0.5309
Ind. Wage -422 -0.0081 0.0255 -6,385 ** -0.0636 *** -0.1584
Reg. Wage -3,702 -0.0075 0.0906 -3,394 -0.0163 -0.1779
Agglomeration 339.3 -0.0006 -0.0200 * -459.2 ** -0.0027 ** -0.0263 *
Ex. R&D -18,999 0.0274 0.0360 -1,822 0.0748 -1.4344 *
Ih. R&D 4,490 -0.0276 0.0201 15,325 ** 0.0434 0.4759 *
Unionisation -4,066 -0.0058 -0.0403 15,468 *** 0.0282 0.2381
Constant 26,858 0.1163 9.6827 *** 63,374 *** 0.5128 *** 12.0999 ***
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65,446 65,446 17,065 66,470 66,470 6,360
R-Square .0146 .0228 .00509 .0124 .0192 .0232
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 5.9: Discrete and continuous vertical integration results for stage 3
193
The second regional factor, agglomeration, has a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient in the
service sector. In more agglomerated areas ﬁrms are more likely to be concentrated.
If the population density of Nottingham is increased by 5.36 to reach the population
density of London, then ﬁrms will be 2.5km (−0.459×5.36) less dispersed in the tradable
service sector. The mean dispersion is 8.9km in tradable services. An increase by 2.5km
represents a 28 percent increase.
Industry heterogeneity and the distance to the technological frontier have the opposite
sign in both sectors. This was expected because only ﬁrms which are vertically integrated
can have a positive rate of dispersion. To double the proximity to the technological
frontier leads to ﬁrms to be less dispersed by 0.73km (1.05 × log (2)) in manufacturing
and by 0.8km (1.153 × log (2)) in the tradable service sector. The R&D variables have
large but insigniﬁcant eﬀects.
Size matters again. There is a non-quadratic employment coeﬃcient in the manufac-
turing.177 A positive size eﬀect is also found in the tradable service sector. Market
concentration has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the tradable service sector178 and we
ﬁnd also an insigniﬁcant positive eﬀect in manufacturing. Average industry wages have
a signiﬁcant negative sign in the service sector. This variable aﬀects the dispersion via
the vertical integration channel. The higher the industry wages, the more likely it will
be for a ﬁrm to fragment the production chain leading to a more spatially concentrated
ﬁrm. A ﬁrm within a sector with ten percent higher average wages will be 0.6km less
dispersed in the tradable service sector. Finally the degree of unionisation matters for
the tradable service sector. An increase by one standard deviation, which is around ten
177The minimum is already reached after 2.75 employees (exp [4.659/(2× 2.302)]). If the average ﬁrm
with 167 employees in manufacturing is compared with a ten percent larger ﬁrm, then the latter ﬁrm
will be 1.9km (0.01× [−4.659 + 2× 2.302× log (167)]× 10 = 1.9) more dispersed.
178A ﬁrm in a standard deviation more concentrated industry, will be on average 1km more dispersed.
Competition is a good example to illustrate the causality problem. On the one hand, it is assumed
that in industries with a higher market concentration ﬁrms have economic proﬁts so they can easier
access other markets. On the other hand, also the higher dispersion and crowding out of smaller
competitors causes higher market concentration.
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percentage points, will be correlated with a 1.5km higher degree of dispersion. As a ﬁrst
robustness check we use a multi-location dummy as dependent variable.
Discrete measure
The dependent variable is a multi-location dummy, indicating if a ﬁrm is active in mul-
tiple local authorities. We ﬁnd support for the results of the continuous measure. The
coeﬃcient of regional wages remains insigniﬁcant and negative. Even if a manufacturing
ﬁrm is active in a location with twice as high regional wages, the probability of being a
multi-location ﬁrm will decrease by 0.005 percentage points, which is, calculated at the
base probability of being a integrated multi-location ﬁrm of 0.18, around 2.8 percent.
The importance of technology is supported by this robustness check. The closer a com-
pany is to the technological frontier the likelier it is to be located in multiple locations.
For more productive ﬁrms it is easier to overcome the ﬁxed costs of setting up a new
intermediate input supplying ﬁrm. The technological heterogeneity of a sector has always
a negative eﬀect on the probability of being a multi-location ﬁrm and distance, but is
only signiﬁcant for the tradable service sector. The channel for this result is the same
like in stage two of our analysis. The bigger a company is, the higher is the marginal
probability of being a multi-location ﬁrm. Competition leads to a lower probability of
having vertically integrated local units in diﬀerent regions. This eﬀect is much larger in
the tradable service sector.
Log-model
In our sample a ﬁrm can only be spatially fragmented if it has vertically integrated local
units. To identify the factors, which are inﬂuencing the spatial distribution of vertically
integrated ﬁrms and not the probability of becoming vertically integrated, we keep in this
sample only vertically integrated local units. By taking the Log of distance only vertically
integrated ﬁrms are kept and the results can be interpreted as elasticities. The cost of this
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approach is that many observations will be dropped. Also those results are presented
in table 5.9. The factor price diﬀerences remain insigniﬁcant but are now positive in
the manufacturing sector. A ten percent higher average wage in a local authority is
related with a 0.9 percent higher degree of spatial fragmentation. There is no statistical
signiﬁcance.
The technological variables have small and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. They do not matter
for spatial fragmentation. R&D expenditures have relatively large coeﬃcients, but are
only signiﬁcant in the tradable service sector. According to Brainard (1997) economies
of scale at the ﬁrm level are based on R&D activities. The higher those economies of
scale at the ﬁrm level are, the lower will be the costs to produce in the local units and
therefore the more likely it will be for a ﬁrm to set up other plants. This can explain
the positive impact of R&D. A negative eﬀect can happen if R&D intensity is correlated
with capital intensity. Setting up a new plant can be very expensive, which can reduce
the probability to establish another plant. Both eﬀects arise, but to ﬁnd out why the
external and in-house R&D have diﬀerent signs which are exactly the opposite in the
manufacturing sector requires more information about what kind of R&D investments
are actually included in each category. Size matters again in the manufacturing sector.
In the tradable service sector a signiﬁcant correlation cannot be observed.
Additional robustness checks include the C4 concentration measure, scientiﬁc employ-
ment ration, the technological distance to the most productive ﬁrm and a 3 year average
growth heterogeneity measure. The results are presented in the appendix on page 301.
In the tradable service sector the eﬀect of technological heterogeneity depends on the
measure chosen. While we have a negative eﬀect if we use the measure based on ﬁrms
with more than 20 employees, a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect appears if the 3 year average
measure has been chosen. In manufacturing the R&D intensities are sensitive to the
chosen in-house R&D measure. The results remain insigniﬁcant but have opposite signs.
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To summarise this section, for manufacturing it seems that the main driver for having a
more dispersed production chain are relative productivity, ﬁrm size and market power.
Only if a ﬁrm is large enough it can aﬀord setting up local units in multiple locations.
Even though we just look at the spatial distribution within the UK, relatively more
productive ﬁrms (ﬁrms which are closer to the technological frontier) can aﬀord setting
up vertically integrated plants in more dispersed regions. Additionally, we ﬁnd for the
tradable service sector that agglomeration matters. A ﬁrm which has its headquarters in
an agglomerated region does not have to source intermediate inputs from other locations.
5.6. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to test the predictions of many common theories about
the organisational structure of ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally we tested the eﬀect of technology
based on the model by Acemo§lu et al. (2007) and the eﬀect of knowledge capital on
the organisational fragmentation of ﬁrms. The eﬀect of factor price diﬀerences on spatial
fragmentation was tested as well. The analysis was conducted for two diﬀerent samples,
the manufacturing and the tradable service sector using a large sample of UK ﬁrms. Firm
ﬁxed eﬀects estimation methods were used which had a signiﬁcant impact on the results.
Many signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of the Probit and the Linear Probability model turned out
to have a diﬀerent sign or to be signiﬁcant/insigniﬁcant after applying ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Therefore ignoring ﬁrm heterogeneity can produce misleading results. However, ﬁxed
eﬀect models face certain limitations. The key problem is that identiﬁcation is driven only
by within-ﬁrm changes of y and x. These changes can be very small and measurement
error may lead to downwardly biased coeﬃcients.
In the ﬁrst stage of the analysis we looked at what factors can inﬂuence the probability
of a ﬁrm to become a multi-unit ﬁrm. Market concentration has a positive eﬀect in both
sectors, but seems to matter more in the tradable service sector. While we ﬁnd a small and
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signiﬁcant impact of capital intensity in manufacturing, external R&D intensity, which
captures partly economies of scale at the ﬁrm level, has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect in
the tradable service sector. Technology matters. While ﬁrms closer to the technological
frontier are more likely to become a multi-plant ﬁrm, independent of the sector, we
ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬀects for the technological industry heterogeneity. In more heterogeneous
manufacturing industries we will ﬁnd less multi-plant ﬁrms. The opposite is true for the
tradable service sector.
In the second stage we analysed the impact of technological variables, knowledge capital
and incomplete contracts on the decision of a ﬁrm to vertically integrate. Technology has
a signiﬁcant eﬀect in every sector. The closer ﬁrms are to the technological frontier of a
sector, the higher is the probability of being vertically integrated. External intermediate
input suppliers may not be able to supply the demanded inputs, because they do not
possess the suitable technology yet. This result is diﬀerent to the delegation idea of
Acemo§lu et al. (2007). The more technologically heterogeneous an industry is, the less
likely it will be integrated. This result is in accordance to Acemo§lu et al. (2007). It is
diﬃcult to copy other ﬁrms, because not many ﬁrms have used the right way to implement
the correct technology. It might be better to source from a specialised outside supplier
to enjoy a more eﬃcient technology. R&D intensities, to capture knowledge capital,
is positively correlated with being vertically integrated in the tradable service sector,
even though we do not ﬁnd many signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. One explanation could be that
a higher degree of knowledge capital could lead to moral hazard of outside suppliers,
therefore ﬁrms will prefer to keep production stages internally. An unexpected result
was revealed by R&D intensities in the manufacturing sector. External R&D intensity
is positively correlated with being vertically integrated, in-house R&D negatively. One
explanation could be that the latter aﬀects the possibility of being forward vertically
integrated, but, because our measure is focused on backward integration, this type of
integration is not captured.
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In the third stage we focused on the geographical distribution of the internal production
chain of a ﬁrm. Our check for factor price diﬀerences, the average wage in the region of the
headquarters, did not ﬁnd an impact on the dispersion of UK ﬁrms. Knowledge capital
cannot explain the spatial distribution. Few signiﬁcant results appear for ﬁrms of the
manufacturing sector. This can be caused by not being able to capture the international
dimension of ﬁrms. Even without the international dimension, we still can identify which
ﬁrms are more likely to be dispersed: Large ﬁrms, which are close to the technological
frontier and are in a concentrated market. Only large ﬁrms can aﬀord sourcing from
diﬀerent regions, and, as being a technological leader implies that ﬁrms have better
managers, those ﬁrms will be more suitable to coordinate a more dispersed production.
We also ﬁnd that agglomeration has a positive impact in the tradable service sector.
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6. The Eﬀects of Fragmentation on Employment and
Productivity
6.1. Introduction
The closing down of a plant attracts a lot of attention in the media. For example: 400
jobs to go at zinc works (BBC, 18/02/03)179, Cadbury's Bristol plant to close by 2011 
(BBC, 09/02/10)180, 302 jobs lost as factory closes (BBC, 04/06/09)181, Chocolate
plant closure is grim news, says local MP (The Telegraph, 11/12/10)182 and Pﬁzer to
close Viagra research site, putting 2,400 UK jobs at risk  (The Telegraph, 01/02/11)183.
The main worry is that all the jobs of a closed plant will be lost. Is that necessarily
the case? The answer is no. For example, the chocolate plant of Nestle in Castleford,
West Yorkshire, employed 210 people. The production will be moved to other plants in
Halifax and Newcastle, which can create up to 120 new posts. The total employment
eﬀect (−90) can be less than the direct employment eﬀect (−210). This eﬀect may vary if
a horizontal or vertical local unit has been closed. Here we have an example of a closure
of a horizontal local unit.
What can be expected from closing a vertically integrated plant? Examples can be
the shutting down of the zinc producing plant, or closing parts of the R&D site of
Pﬁzer. We expect that some jobs might move to other plants of the ﬁrm, which should
increase employment in the remaining plants. In contrast to before we also expect a
specialisation eﬀect to appear. By fragmenting the production, ﬁrms will focus more on
their core activities and will oﬀer new jobs in that area. This should lead to an increase
179Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2775051.stm, access on 11/10/11.
180Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8507066.stm, access on 11/10/11.
181Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/north_east/8081186.stm, access on 11/10/11.
182Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jobs/8196068/Chocolate-plant-closure-is-
grim-news-says-local-MP.html, access on 11/10/11.
183Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/pharmaceuticalsandchemicals/
8296725/Pfizer-to-close-Viagra-research-site-putting-2400-UK-jobs-at-risk.html, access
on 11/10/11.
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in productivity and mitigate or even outweigh the employment losses through the closure
of the plant.
We will put our focus on fragmentation, or, to put it diﬀerently, on the closure or selling
of vertically integrated local units. As we will see below the vast majority of exiting
plants is actually shutting down. The employment eﬀects of selling a local unit or to
close it can be diﬀerent. If the plant is sold there will be less pressure on the ﬁrm to shift
workers to other plants of the same ﬁrm, because the workers of the sold-oﬀ plant will
not necessarily be made redundant. The vast majority of exiting local units is shutting
down. Possible explanations for this can be that ﬁrms do not want to leave parts of their
knowledge capital to other ﬁrms. Another explanation can be that the least eﬃcient
plants are closed, therefore the demand for this plant might be very low. If the least
productive local units are exiting the ﬁrm, then we expect the productivity of the ﬁrm
to increase.
We assume that, if a plant producing intermediate inputs is exiting the ﬁrm, the in-
termediate inputs will be sourced from the market, which we refer to as organisational
fragmentation. The eﬀect on ﬁrm level employment can be ambiguous. For example,
factor-proportion models predict, in an international framework, that those production
stages which require an input factor which is relatively abundant in the other region will
be moved abroad. While the labour intensive parts might be oﬀ-shored to India, the
ﬁrm will start specialising in the capital and headquarters services intensive part of the
production process. The specialisation will create new jobs, which could outweigh the
previous job losses. To see if this eﬀect actually appears, a diﬀerentiation between short-
and long-run eﬀects is necessary. This chapter will analyse if closing a vertically inte-
grated plant actually leads to a reduction of ﬁrm employment in the short- and long-run.
The ﬁrst research question of this chapter will be:
What are the ﬁrm level employment eﬀects of fragmentation?
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Furthermore we assume that this specialisation should lead to an increase in the labour
productivity of a ﬁrm. For example, a manufacturing ﬁrm is providing in-house IT
services. By focusing on what the company is good at (producing goods) and letting
a specialised outside supplier taking care of the IT services, the productivity of the
manufacturing ﬁrm should increase. Of course, a positive eﬀect is also expected if the
least eﬃcient plant has been closed. This leads to the second research question:
Does fragmentation lead to an increase in labour productivity?
Fragmentation in this chapter is deﬁned as a ﬁrm which owns a forward vertically inte-
grated plant closing that plant. A plant is forward vertically integrated if another plant
of the same ﬁrm exists, which is demanding the former plant's output. We ﬁnd those
production linkages by using UK input-output tables. We describe the derivation of this
measure precisely on pages 114ﬀ of in chapter 4.
The idea behind the employment eﬀects is summarised in ﬁgure 6.1. The Business
Structure Database (BSD) contains information at the ﬁrm and at the local unit level,
where the total ﬁrm employment is calculated by adding up the employment of all local
units. Let us assume that company A consists of four local units: local unit 1 represents
the headquarters, local unit 2 a vertically integrated plant, local unit 3 another bigger
vertically integrated local unit and, ﬁnally, local unit 4 a non vertically integrated aﬃliate.
In period 1 the total employment of the company will be 95. At the end of period 1, local
unit 2 is shut down. The total change in employment will be decomposed in a direct and
indirect employment eﬀect.
Total Eﬀect = Direct Eﬀect+ Indirect Eﬀect (6.1)
Direct Eﬀect = ∆L2 = −L2 (6.2)
Indirect Eﬀect = ∆L1 +∆L3 +∆L4 (6.3)
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The direct employment eﬀect consists of the loss of jobs in the exiting plant. In our
example the direct eﬀect would be ∆L2 = −10. The indirect eﬀects are captured by the
change in employment in all other plants, which would be ∆L1+∆L3+∆L4. The direct
eﬀect is always negative, but the indirect eﬀects can be positive or negative. There are
several reasons for expecting a positive indirect eﬀect. For example, if a ﬁrm is specialising
it will increase its employment needed for the core activities. If a ﬁrm is part of a sector
with strong labour unions, jobs of the exiting plants may be transferred to other local
units. A company might also be afraid of losing important human capital and therefore
keep the experienced workers of the closing plant within the ﬁrm. However, the indirect
eﬀect might also be negative. For example, a ﬁrm having several local units producing
complementary intermediate inputs is closing down one if its plants. Outsourcing to an
outside supplier implies that intermediate inputs are now sourced from a more eﬃcient
source. This can decrease the demand for the complementary inputs, which will lead to a
negative indirect employment eﬀect. The size of the indirect eﬀect is expected to change
over time. Two possible short-run scenarios are:
Scenario 1: After closing local unit 2 all ten jobs are lost (direct eﬀect). If there is no
or just a small indirect eﬀect, the total employment eﬀect will be negative and
approximately equal to the direct eﬀect.
Scenario 2: New jobs might be created or workers can be transferred from the exiting
plants to the remaining local units. This can lead to large positive indirect eﬀects,
which can mitigate the loss from the direct eﬀect.184
It can be the case that the long-run indirect eﬀects are diﬀerent from the short-run eﬀects.
We will build on the two short-run examples.
Scenario 1a: After scenario 1 had happened, enterprise A started to specialise and the
184It would be very interesting to see if new workers are hired or old workers are just moved to the
remaining local units. Unfortunately we cannot diﬀerentiate in our data if the new jobs are taken by
existing employees or new employees to the ﬁrm.
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Enterprise A
HQ
LU 1
L1 = 50
VI Plant
LU 2
L2 = 10
VI Plant
LU 3
L3 = 15
HO Branch
LU 4
L4 = 20
Period 1:
(before fragmentation)
Total Employment:
L1 + L2 + L3 + L4 = 95
Period 2:
Direct Effect: ∆L = −L2 = −10
Indirect Effect: ∆L1 +∆L3 +∆L4 = ?
HQ
LU 1
L1
VI Plant
LU 3
L3
HO Branch
LU 4
L4
Plant is shut down at
the end of period 1
Figure 6.1: Stylised example of employment eﬀects of fragmentation
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labour demand of the other local units started to increase. Through the special-
isation, the ﬁrm gets more competitive and therefore will increase its production
further. This will push employment even further up. In theory, the indirect eﬀect
can outweigh the direct eﬀect and a positive total employment eﬀect may arise.
Scenario 2a: Scenario 2 happened in the short-run. This could be caused by trade unions
or legal diﬃculties to make employees redundant immediately. After a while a ﬁrm
can ﬁnd other ways to reduce employment, for example by not hiring new workers
for retired workers. Therefore the indirect eﬀect gets smaller over time and might
disappear completely.
Those scenarios show that several possibilities exist how ﬁrm level employment will de-
velop over time. All of those scenarios are capturing internal ﬁrm eﬀects. What are the
external eﬀects on the whole economy? First, N2 can be transferred to other ﬁrms. The
eﬀect of the transfer can be ambiguous. If jobs are transferred to ﬁrms abroad, then
a negative external eﬀect can arise. Second, fragmentation can lead to an increase in
eﬃciency and result in a higher output of the ﬁrm. The higher output requires more
intermediate inputs from the outsourced industries. This can lead to an increase in the
employment in the outsourced industries and create a positive external eﬀect on domes-
tic employment. However, in this thesis we consider only the eﬀects of fragmentation on
employment and productivity within the ﬁrm, and ignore spillover eﬀects on other ﬁrms
in the industry or linked industries.
The productivity measure that we use requires a more detailed discussion. In order to
calculate productivity, we require a measure of output. Unfortunately, sales are only
measured at the ﬁrm level (not at the plant level) so the only measure of productivity
we can use is a sales per employee measure at the ﬁrm level. The diﬀerentiation between
direct and indirect eﬀects is not possible, because only the total eﬀect can be captured.
Ideally we should use a total factor productivity measure, but, because we only have
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a measure of one input (labour), we cannot derive it. Labour productivity is the best
proxy for productivity we can derive from the data available. We expect that closing a
plant will decrease sales in the short-run, but through higher eﬃciency we expect sales
to recover and to increase over time. The change in sales and employment can be used to
identify the change in labour productivity. We expect fragmentation to cause an increase
in labour productivity.
The main database employed is the BSD in connection with the Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings (ASHE), Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) database
and the National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD). The BSD only includes data for
plants and ﬁrms located in the United Kingdom, but this is not necessarily a restriction
for the analysis of this topic. We do not look at the employment eﬀects at the country
level, only at the ﬁrm level. Therefore if jobs are moved abroad or just to another
domestic company will not aﬀect our results.
The closest related literature is about oﬀshoring and outsourcing, which oﬀer ambiguous
results on the eﬀect of fragmentation on ﬁrm level employment. Biscourp and Kramarz
(2007) ﬁnd a negative impact of outsourcing on ﬁrm level employment. In contrast Hijzen
et al. (2011), Ando and Kimura (2007) and Hijzen et al. (2009) cannot ﬁnd evidence for
a negative eﬀect and even ﬁnd evidence that fragmenting ﬁrms are experiencing a larger
employment growth in comparison to non-fragmenting ﬁrms.
Few papers discuss the eﬀects of fragmentation on productivity. In general, outsourcing
of services will have a positive eﬀect on productivity of manufacturing ﬁrms (Fixler and
Siegel, 1999; ten Raa and Wolﬀ, 2001; Girma and Görg, 2004), even though Görzig and
Stephan (2002) ﬁnd only a positive impact in the long-run, Girma and Görg (2004)
ﬁnd no eﬀect in the electronics sector and Görg et al. (2008) only for exporting plants.
Outsourcing of materials can have a positive (Görzig and Stephan, 2002) or insigniﬁcant
impact Görg et al. (2008).
206
Our analysis diﬀers from the studies above in so far that we look at how the closure of a
vertically integrated plant (and not the increase in imports of intermediate inputs) aﬀects
the ﬁrm level employment. The literature on the eﬀects of plant closures on ﬁrm level
employment is rather restricted and as far as the author knows, this is the ﬁrst analysis
of the impact of vertically integrated plant closure on employment and productivity.
Additionally, our data allows us to decompose the total employment eﬀect into a direct
and indirect eﬀect. We can also infer how the closure will aﬀect the ﬁrm level labour
productivity.
Our main results are that we ﬁnd a strong negative impact of fragmentation on em-
ployment, where the medium-run (3  5 years) impact is much larger for manufacturing
than for tradable service ﬁrms. The ﬁrst year after fragmentation employment decreases
by 17% in manufacturing and 16% in the tradable service sector. Employment losses
increase to 23% after ﬁve years in manufacturing, but reduce to 13% after 3 years in
the tradable service sector. While we ﬁnd a negative indirect employment eﬀect for
manufacturing ﬁrms in the medium-run, we ﬁnd positive, increasing indirect eﬀects in
the service sector. The impact on productivity is large in manufacturing. There is an
immediate productivity increase by 27%, which decreases to 15% after 5 years. There
are no immediate productivity eﬀects in the service sector. After three years we ﬁnd an
increase by 6%, but as regression analysis reveals, this value is not robust.
This chapter will be structured as follows: First, a summary of the literature about
outsourcing and its eﬀects on employment and productivity will be presented. We then
describe how the data was prepared and which ﬁrms were allocated to a treatment or
control group. The next section explains the empirical strategy employed and which
dependent and independent variables were chosen. In section 6.5 we show our main
results. This chapter ﬁnishes with a conclusion.
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6.2. Literature
We look at the ﬁrm employment and productivity eﬀects caused by an exiting vertically
integrated plant, which we will call fragmentation. We focus on plant closures, because
only the minority of exiting plants are sold.185 As far as the author knows no theoretical
or empirical paper exists to describe or follow this approach.186
Some papers exist using a speciﬁc example to describe the consequences of a plant closure
for the region and for the workers. For example, Rowthorn and Ward (1979) conduct
a cost-beneﬁt analysis on the closing down of the steel making plant in Corby. They
show that the closing down would not only aﬀect workers working at the plant, but also
auxiliary sectors in this region. Hinde (1994) looks at eﬀects of the closing down the
British Shipbuilding (BS) Yards on workers in Sunderland.
The literature most related is the international oﬀshoring and outsourcing literature. The
main similarity between those and this chapter is that a link between fragmentation and
employment is set up. We expect to ﬁnd a similar theoretical foundation and empirical
framework. The main diﬀerences are that this chapter does not look at international
linkages and the way fragmentation is measured. In general, fragmentation is measured
by looking at how many goods a ﬁrm imports from abroad, where sometimes intermediate
and ﬁnal goods can be distinguished. In our model, fragmentation can only arise if a
whole plant is closed. In general, total ﬁrm employment eﬀects are considered, while we
diﬀerentiate between direct and indirect eﬀects.
The theoretical literature comes to ambiguous results about the eﬀects of fragmentation
on employment (Bottini et al., 2007). If foreign workers are substitutes for domestic
185Note that Harris and Moﬀat (2011) ﬁnd, contrary to our ﬁndings, that brownﬁeld plants are more
likely to be in operation in manufacturing and service sectors. One reason could be that if ﬁrm A
takes over another ﬁrm B, the plants will be regarded as brownﬁeld plants of company B. However,
we look at the case where a ﬁrm has an exiting plant, but continues to exist. In case of ﬁrm A, we
would not regard this scenario as a plant exit.
186A more detailed literature review including studies at the economy, industry and plant level can be
found in section 2.3 on page 57.
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workers, oﬀshoring can increase the domestic unemployment rate. A positive eﬀect can
arise from eﬃciency gains, which then reduces unemployment rates.
Several studies about the eﬀects of fragmentation at the ﬁrm level have been published
recently. Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) use French manufacturing data for 1986  1992
and compare the employment growth rates of ﬁrms which started to oﬀ-shore abroad
and ﬁrms which did not. They ﬁnd evidence that oﬀshoring ﬁrms suﬀered heavier jobs
losses than non-oﬀshoring ﬁrms. Hijzen et al. (2011) use a similar approach but come to
diﬀerent conclusions. The authors focus on the eﬀect of oﬀshoring of producer services
on the labour employed in UK ﬁrms of the manufacturing and ﬁnancial and business
services sector for the period 1996  2004. Firms which start oﬀshoring are experiencing
an even higher employment growth than ﬁrms which have never imported services. Ando
and Kimura (2007) conduct a similar analysis for Japanese ﬁrms for the Period 1998 
2003. They found evidence that oﬀshoring does have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
a company's decision not to reduce employment. If a ﬁrm is increasing the amount of
oﬀshoring abroad it leads to growth rates of employment of 3  8 percentage points higher
than of other manufacturing ﬁrms. This cannot be observed for non-manufacturing ﬁrms.
Hijzen et al. (2009) explain the positive employment eﬀect by arguing that vertical FDI
leads to eﬃciency gains to withstand competitive pressures and Ando and Kimura (2007)
with that, at least for manufacturing, domestic and foreign production processes are
complements rather than substitutes. Another reason could be that the increased demand
for outsourced inputs coincides with a positive (unobserved) demand shock, which would
question the causality of the results above.
Besides using a rather descriptive approach, a quasi-experimental technique, like Diﬀerence-
in-Diﬀerences (DiD) (Hijzen et al., 2010) and propensity score matching (Hijzen et al.,
2009, 2011) can be used for analysis. Hijzen et al. (2010) look at how mass lay-oﬀs or
plant closures aﬀect the earnings of displaced workers. Even though this paper does not
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directly touch the question of the ﬁrm employment eﬀects after the closure of a plant, the
empirical strategy used in this paper will be one of the main foundations of this chapter
and will be discussed in section 6.4. Besides implementing a DiD estimator they also
use propensity score techniques. Hijzen et al. (2009) follow this approach and analyse
the eﬀects of internationalisation of a ﬁrm on the performance of the ﬁrm for the pe-
riod 1984  2002. The authors diﬀerentiate between manufacturing and service sector
and horizontal and vertical Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). They ﬁnd that FDI of the
service sector and horizontal FDI of manufacturing ﬁrms into high income countries and
industries, where the ﬁrm has a comparative advantage in, have a signiﬁcant positive
impact on domestic employment in comparison to ﬁrms which did not internationalise.
Even for vertical FDI of manufacturing ﬁrms no evidence for job losses for the parent
ﬁrms was found.
The theory about productivity is quite clear. Fragmentation and focusing on the core
activities of a ﬁrm should increase productivity. The empirical evidence is not as straight
forward (Olsen, 2006). Görzig and Stephan (2002) show that return per employee of Ger-
man manufacturing ﬁrms is positively aﬀected by material outsourcing, subcontracting
and service outsourcing in the long-run. In the short-run, service outsourcing has a nega-
tive impact. Girma and Görg (2004) examine the eﬀect of an increase in the outsourcing
intensity on labour productivity and TFP for UK ﬁrms of the chemical, the electronics
and the engineering sector. Only in the chemical and the engineering sector a positive
eﬀect of outsourcing can be found. Hijzen et al. (2009) study the productivity eﬀects
of French ﬁrms through oﬀ-shoring. For the manufacturing sector they ﬁnd large but
imprecise positive productivity gains through vertical FDI, but no productivity gains
through horizontal FDI. Oﬀshoring does not have a positive productivity eﬀect for the
service sector. Görg et al. (2008) focus on Irish plant level data. They ﬁnd that only
for exporting plants, independent of being foreign owned or not, outsourcing of services
has a positive impact on TFP. No signiﬁcant impact is found of outsourcing of material
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inputs. Recently anecdotal evidence can be found about ﬁrms revaluating their out-
sourcing decisions (for example BBC, 2009 and The Telegraph, 2010). Outsourcing may
reduce labour costs, but quality standards cannot be met anymore, leading to reduced
sales. For example, relocating UK contact centres to Mumbai reduces the labour costs by
90 percent. The cost of customer lost was ¿12m a year, therefore the expected increase
in proﬁtability did not happen (UKTI, 2010).
To conclude, we ﬁnd mixed empirical evidence on the eﬀects of fragmentation on em-
ployment and productivity.
6.3. Data, Treatment and Control Groups
The main database used is the BSD for the period 1998  2008, which is described in detail
in chapter 3. The NSPD is used for classifying the postcodes into local authorities, the
BERD for industry in-house R&D intensities and the ASHE for the degree of unionisation.
Again the manufacturing and the tradable service sector are considered. Before we can
start with the analysis the data will be modiﬁed. Our treatment is fragmentation,
the sourcing of former internally produced intermediate inputs from the market. This
is measured by a ﬁrm selling or closing down one of its vertically integrated local units
in any year between 1998  2007.187 188 Because those events are quite rare, we follow
the data manipulation of Hijzen et al. (2009) and Hijzen et al. (2010). First every year
is considered separately. For example, ﬁrms which close a plant in 2000 will be in the
treatment group of year 2000, and ﬁrms which did not close a plant will be part of the
control group 2000. We follow this approach for every year. Then a relative time measure
t∗ will be introduced, which is 0 when the treatment happens, −1 one year before and 1
one year after the treatment, etc. We will end up with −9 ≤ t∗ ≤ 10. We will then stack
187We deﬁne the year of closure as the year when the local unit appeared the last time in the dataset.
The reason is that the BSD is a record of ﬁrms in March. Therefore if a plant disappears for example
in the BSD in 2001, it means that it exited between March 2000 and March 2001.
188We discuss the treatment group in the next section.
211
up all the cohorts, so that ﬁrms of the control group can appear more than once.189 This
modiﬁcation will create a correlation in the error structure, therefore clustered standard
errors have to be used. The clusters used are the original ﬁrm identiﬁers. So if a ﬁrm
appears several times the cluster includes several observations from the same ﬁrm.
We create diﬀerent treatment and control groups depending on diﬀerent selection rules.
This has been conducted to show that the results are robust. All selection rules have
in common that in the pre-treatment period no plant has exited or entered a ﬁrm. The
diﬀerences arise after the treatment appeared. Our main sample will only consider ﬁrms
which, after the treatment happened, do not close or open any other local unit. The
second selection rule is far less restrictive. After the treatment all ﬁrms, regardless if
they open or close any plant, will be kept. We will discuss the treatment and the control
groups in far more detail now.
Treatment group
The treatment group consists of those ﬁrms which are shutting down or selling one
vertically integrated plant within in the observation period. More speciﬁcally, forward
vertically integrated plants matter. If a forward vertically integrated plant exits the ﬁrm,
then those intermediate inputs have to be sourced from the market. Table 6.1 illustrates
what kind of event is of interest. It shows a simpliﬁed version of the BSD with made-up
data, sorted by ﬁrms and year. Scenario I shows the straight forward case. Firm A owns
two local units of diﬀerent industries, 1 and 2, where both plants provide intermediate
inputs for the other ﬁrm. In 2001 local unit 2 is sold, therefore all intermediate inputs
have to be sourced externally. The treatment dummy for the ﬁrm will be one. Scenario
II shows ﬁrm B, which owns only horizontally linked local units. Even though local
189Hijzen et al. (2010) explain that a treated ﬁrm can also appear more often in the treatment group if
a treatment happens more than once over time. In contrast to that I have included only ﬁrms which
experience a treatment once. Additionally, ﬁrms of the treatment group do not appear in the control
group later.
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unit 4 exits, it will not change the treatment dummy. Scenario III is trickier. One
assumption has been so far that, if a ﬁrm has a company producing intermediate inputs,
it was suﬃcient to satisfy the ﬁrm's internal demand for this intermediary.190 If a local
unit exits, but there is still another local unit of the same industry, then the plants left
are suﬃcient to produce the required intermediate inputs or, to put it diﬀerently, the
fragmentation motive will only come into existence if no plants of the same industry
within a ﬁrm exist anymore.191 On the other hand, if an intermediate input supplying
plant is closing, then the ﬁrm has to source them from the market and we still can refer to
it as fragmentation. For example, enterprise C has three local units, where 5 and 6 are of
the same and 7 is of another industry. In 2000 plant 6 shuts down. We will allocate that
ﬁrm to the treatment group, even though it has another plant left in the same industry,
since it seems reasonable to assume that such an event is a type of fragmentation because
it represents a shift from internal provision of intermediates to external supply.
Firms will be only part of the treatment group if they close one vertically integrated plant
at t∗ = 0. If they close more than one vertically integrated plant or any other horizontally
linked plant, then they will not be considered for the treatment group. The restricted
treatment group will only include ﬁrms which, after the treatment happened, do no close
any other plant. The less restrictive treatment group contains also ﬁrms which close and
open other local units in the post-treatment period. The implication is that, because of
fragmentation, a ﬁrm may specialise or changes its organisational structure further and
set-up or close down another local unit. For example, a ﬁrm fragments it production
and, because of specialisation, it open another plant in its core activity. It is expected
that this can have a positive (if new plants appear) or negative (if additional plants are
exiting) eﬀects on total employment.
Regardless of whether or not ﬁrms are kept in the post-treatment period which keep their
190See page 115 for a description of required assumptions for the vertical integration measure.
191For example, to save costs it might be possible to concentrate production in one location, so this plant
closure is not related to fragmentation.
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local unit structure or close and open other local units, we only consider fragmentation
for ﬁrms which close one plant only at t∗ = 0.
I. Ent. Ref. LU Ref. SIC viflu vifﬁrm frag
1999 A 1 15 1 1 1
1999 A 2 20 1 1 1
2000 A 1 15 0 0 1
2000 A     
II.
1999 B 3 15 0 0 0
1999 B 4 15 0 0 0
2000 B 3 15 0 0 0
2000 B     
III.
1999 C 5 15 1 1 1
1999 C 6 15 1 1 1
1999 C 7 20 1 1 1
2000 C 5 15 1 1 1
2000 C     
2000 C 7 20 1 1 0
Table 6.1: Derivation of the treatment dummy
Control group
The choice of the control group is crucial for a DiD analysis. Firstly, the control group
should contain those ﬁrms which might have closed down a vertically integrated plant,
but which did not. We have excluded single plant ﬁrms, because they cannot fragment
according to our deﬁnition. As mentioned on page 169, they are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to
multi-plant ﬁrms.
Secondly, the characteristics of the treatment and the control groups can be very diﬀer-
ent from each other. However, a key assumption is that the trends of the control and
treatment group are the same in the absence of treatment, for example, the control group
is not growing faster or slower. Another assumption is that the control groups are not
aﬀected by the treatment. This can happen, for example, if there are spillovers. Besley
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and Case (2000) give an example about how the choice of the control group can aﬀect
the results.192 193 Results are very sensitive to which control group (counterfactuals)
have been chosen (Hijzen et al., 2010). To have ﬁrms following rather similar trends we
will keep only those ﬁrms which are not signiﬁcantly larger according to turnover and
employment and did not close and open any plants before t∗ = 0. We use only manu-
facturing ﬁrms as a control for the treated manufacturing ﬁrms, and for tradable service
ﬁrms only ﬁrms of the tradable service sector. Based on this our control group consists of
ﬁrms which are vertically integrated. This ﬁts to our ﬁrst requirement that we only keep
ﬁrms which could potentially close a vertically integrated plant. I will also create another
comparison group which includes also non-vertically integrated multi-plant ﬁrms. This
group is only kept to see how the average ﬁrm which did not fragment at t∗ = 0 behaved
in comparison to the treatment group. Note that this group is not suitable as control
group because it violates the assumption that only ﬁrms can be in the control group
which could potentially fragment.
6.4. Empirical Strategy
Common problems in empirical research are caused by the correlation between the error
term and the covariates. We already discussed the omitted variable bias and endogeneity
problems in the last chapter and how they can be mitigated in certain circumstances by
using ﬁxed eﬀects estimation methods. For example, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects can take care of
unobserved or omitted ﬁrm speciﬁc factors, which are time invariant. Time ﬁxed eﬀects
can take care of factors, which are time variant, but are the same for all ﬁrms.
192Besley and Case (2000) show how an increase in workers' compensation beneﬁts aﬀects average earn-
ings. The treatment groups are US states which experienced an increase in beneﬁts, and control
groups are the other states experiencing no change. Some control states seem to be inappropri-
ate, because of signiﬁcantly diﬀering unemployment growth rates, which may aﬀect average earnings
diﬀerently.
193An example of a nearly identical treatment and control is provided by Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994)
mentioned in Cameron and Trivedi (2009). They are using data of twins to ﬁnd the eﬀect of schooling
and wages. This should take care of the diﬀerences in unobservable ability.
215
Still two problems remain. Firstly, if unobserved factors, or factors, for which no data
is available, are time variant and diﬀerent for every ﬁrm, then ﬁxed eﬀect estimations
will not solve the problem and the biased results will remain. We will illustrate it with
equation 6.4.
Employmentit = β0 + β1fragi + β2Xit + ait + εit (6.4)
where fragi indicates if ﬁrms are fragmenting or not, X contains other ﬁrm related
covariates and the unobserved eﬀect is captured by ait. If ai was time invariant, by
taking a within-group estimator, ai would disappear. Because ait is changing over time,
this bias will still remain. ait is any unobserved ﬁrm speciﬁc shock to labour demand. If
that shock is correlated with fragi, results will be biased, and it seems likely that they
are correlated. For example, a ﬁrm loses a big customer and as a result needs to lay-oﬀ
workers. The ﬁrm may choose then to shut down its least eﬃcient plant. If this ﬁrm had
not shut down that plant, maybe it would have done even worse. In other words, the
demand shock caused both the employment loss and the decision to sell-oﬀ the plant.
Another problem is selection bias which can create misleading results. To test the eﬀects
of fragmentation we could compare the number of people employed in ﬁrms which closed
a vertically integrated plant and ﬁrms which did not close a plant. Following the notation
of Angrist and Pischke (2009) the observed diﬀerence in average ﬁrm employment is on
the left hand side of equation 6.5.
E[empi|fragi = 1]− E[empi|fragi = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Observed diﬀerence in av. employment
= E[emp1i|fragi = 1]− E[emp0i|fragi = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Av. treatment eﬀect on the treated
+
+ E[emp0i|fragi = 1]− E[emp0i|fragi = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection Bias
(6.5)
where emp0i captures the employment of a ﬁrm which did not fragment and emp1i the
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employment if a ﬁrm fragmented. Those two expressions do not imply if a ﬁrm actually
fragments or not. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side shows the average treatment
eﬀect on employment. This is what we want to measure. What is the diﬀerence between
the employment level of a fragmented ﬁrm and the employment level of a fragmented
ﬁrm, if it had not fragmented? We cannot observe E[emp0i|fragi = 1]. What problems
it can cause is illustrated by the second term in equation 6.5. This term captures the
selection bias and illustrates diﬀerences between treated and non-treated ﬁrms, even if
the actual treatment would not have happened. This selection bias can outweigh the
actual treatment eﬀect. Even if a ﬁrm closes a vertically integrated plant and reduces
the number of people employed non-treated ﬁrm can be genuinely smaller, and therefore
the average employment eﬀect would appear to be positive. If the fragmenting and the
non-fragmenting ﬁrms are similar, then the selection bias would diﬀerence itself away.
Unfortunately the comparison group is normally diﬀerent. A numerical example shall
illustrate this case:
We can observe that fragmenting ﬁrms have on average 100 employees, non-fragmenting
ﬁrms 50. The observed diﬀerence in average employment would be 50. We cannot
conclude that fragmentation leads to ﬁrms being on average bigger by 50 employees.
The right hand side of the equation will show why. If the ﬁrm had not fragmented, it
would have had 120 employees, therefore the treatment eﬀect we have been looking for
is minus 20 employees. The selection bias in our example is 70 (120 − 50), resulting in
misleading results.
A method to solve the second problem is by using a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences estimator
(see Wooldridge, 2002, Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, and Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
The basic set-up consists of at least two time periods, a pre- and post-treatment period
and two diﬀerent groups, one group receiving a treatment and another group which did
not. To calculate the net eﬀect of the treatment, one could ﬁrst run a regression on the
second time period only. The coeﬃcient of the treatment dummy would then indicate
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how much the treatment aﬀected the treated group in comparison to the non-treated
group. In the example above, it would be the diﬀerence in employment of fragmenting
and non-fragmenting illustrated in equation 6.5, which was 50. It could be the case that
fragmenting ﬁrms are already bigger than non-fragmenting ﬁrms. By running a similar
regression for the ﬁrst period the coeﬃcient of the treatment dummy gives information
about how much the two groups were diﬀerent even before there was a treatment. By
diﬀerencing now the size diﬀerences of both periods a more reliable statement can be
made about the eﬀects of the treatment. Using the example from above again, if the
fragmented ﬁrms have already been bigger in the ﬁrst periods by 70 employees, then we
would get the treatment eﬀect of −20 (50− 70).
We present a basic DiD model in equation 6.6.
empi = β0 + β1fragi + β2T2 + β3T2 × fragi + β4Xi + εi (6.6)
where T2 is a time dummy for the post-treatment era, fragi is a fragmentation dummy,
and Xi captures all other factors. The coeﬃcient of interest is β3, the treatment eﬀect.
We want to analyse how the treatment aﬀects the employment of the ﬁrm over more
than one period. Equation 6.6 can be easily modiﬁed to take account of this:
empit = β0 + β1fragi +
t∗max∑
k=t∗min
βk2T
k
it +
t∗max∑
k=t∗min
βk3T
k
it × fragi + β5X + εit (6.7)
β3 captures the treatment eﬀect, which can be followed now over several observation
periods.194 Covariates can be added to capture more time variant ﬁrm speciﬁc factors.
194Autor (2003) conducts a similar model. His paper deals with the employment changes of temporary
help services (THS) in the US through law changes. To observe dynamic eﬀects, he estimated to
following model:
yist = γ1ds + γ2dt +
m∑
τ=0
δ−τDs,t−τ +
q∑
τ=1
δ+τDs,t+τ +X
′
istβ + εist
where Ds,t±τ represent the interaction term of the time and state dummies. This model enables to
see the dynamic changes over time. The ﬁrst sum term captures all periods before the treatment
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We ﬁx the value of the covariates to two periods before the treatment. We will use this
estimation method for our balanced sample.
A generalisation of DiD is possible if instead of group ﬁxed eﬀects fragi individual ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects are considered by using a within-group estimator. If a balanced panel is
used, both DiD and ﬁxed eﬀects estimators will lead to identical results. However for
unbalanced panels estimates will be diﬀerent. Hijzen et al. (2010) suggest using FE
estimates for unbalanced panels.
In general DiD can take care of unobserved heterogeneity if the shocks are aﬀecting
the treatment and control group similarly. Also diﬀerences between ﬁrms before the
treatment can be controlled for. If E(ai|fragi) = 0, we are able to interpret our results
in a causal way. However, we cannot be sure that we capture the causal link between
fragmentation and employment. On the one hand, the problem of unobserved time
varying factors remains leading to biased results. On the other hand, the sample selection
bias still remains. We cannot be conﬁdent about that our control groups are capturing the
appropriate counterfactuals. In the most extreme case E(emp0i|fragi = 1) can be zero.
This means that the ﬁrm would have gone bankrupt without fragmenting, and therefore
we are underestimating the true impact of fragmentation on ﬁrm level employment.
Concluding, DiD requires the strong assumption that the outcome eﬀect for fragmenting
ﬁrms would have been the same in the post-treatment period, if they had not been frag-
menting, as for non-fragmenting ﬁrms. This might be unlikely because of self-selection.
For example, fragmenting ﬁrms would have reduced the number of people employed, rel-
atively to non-fragmenting ﬁrms, anyways, otherwise they might have to shut down the
whole enterprise.
and the second sum term all the after treatment periods. More precisely Autor (2003) creates two
variables for capturing two pre-treatment periods, four variables to capture the post-treatment period
τ = 0, 1, 2, 3 and a seventh variable to identify all post-treatment periods for τ > 3.
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6.4.1. Dependent variables
Three dependent variables will be used. First, the total amount of labour employed
within a ﬁrm to capture the total employment eﬀects. Second, the employment of the
ﬁrm net of the employment of the exiting plant to capture indirect employment eﬀects
and ﬁnally total sales to be able to ﬁnd the eﬀect of fragmentation on labour productivity.
We are going to compare the employment and turnover ﬁgures after treatment with the
employment and turnover ﬁgures at t∗ = −2. It can be the case that in the year of
the treatment the ﬁrm is already anticipating the closure of the plant by moving jobs to
other plants or reducing already the workforce.195
6.4.2. Independent variables
The choice of independent variables is crucial, so we can control for speciﬁc diﬀer-
ences between the control and treatment groups. We will use covariates from the pre-
fragmentation periods only to see how the pre-treatment factors are aﬀecting post-
treatment turnover and employment.
Firm related factors
Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) and Hijzen et al. (2011) use the change of sales to indicate
technological and ﬁrm size changes, which are unrelated to fragmentation. For example, a
temporary boom period might lead to higher employment within a ﬁrm, but is unrelated
to fragmentation. Turnover ﬁgures are available for most ﬁrms in the BSD. We use the
sales change one period before fragmentation instead of two periods before, like for other
covariates. The reason is that we would lose many observations if we used the change of
sales for period t∗ = −2.
195This anticipation is also called Ashenfelter dip after Ashenfelter (1978). Note that anticipation is
not the only reason for the Ashenfelter dip to appear. It may be an indication of an unobserved
shock which initially causes a change in the dependent variable and then the entry into treatment.
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Total employment, age and foreign ownership will also be used. The larger the ﬁrm is,
the likelier it is to decrease a larger number of employees. The eﬀect of the age variable
can be ambiguous. Foreign ownership is expected to amplify the employment reduction,
because the further away the headquarters are the less do managers care about the
regional consequences (Landier et al., 2009). It can also be the case that foreign-owned
ﬁrms are more likely to outsource or oﬀshore.
Industry factors
Unionisation is an important factor for employment changes of ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm is in
a highly unionised sector it is assumed that the employment ﬂuctuations will be sig-
niﬁcantly smaller than in unprotected industries. Especially the short-run eﬀects are
assumed to diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Ando and Kimura (2007) also add an independent vari-
able for in-house R&D of an industry. Unfortunately they do not mention any underlying
theory behind this variable.
6.5. Empirical Results
6.5.1. Stylized facts
How often are local units closed? Table 6.2 gives the answer. We consider only ﬁrms
which have been a multi-plant ﬁrm at least once and exiting local units if the parent
ﬁrm continues to exist. In the second column cont we can see the number of local units
which remained part of a ﬁrm and in the ex tot column the total number of local units
which exited a ﬁrm.196 Columns 4 (ex ho) and 5(ex vi) contain a distinction between
the number of horizontally linked and exiting vertically integrated local units. More
vertically integrated local units have been closed in manufacturing and more horizontal
196Exiting is identiﬁed by the disappearance of a local unit id number in the data. Therefore changes in
id numbers might cause spurious closures. As shown on page 72, the reference numbers are rather
reliable in the BSD.
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local units in the tradable service sector. Only four percent of exiting local units have
been sold in manufacturing and three percent in the tradable service sector.197 In our
sample fragmentation is mainly driven by plant closures.
On the right hand side of the table we show how many ﬁrms are closing at least one
(ﬁrm ex ) and in the last column (ﬁrm cont) how many ﬁrms did not close any vertically
integrated plant. The number of ﬁrms closing a plant is ﬁve times larger in the man-
ufacturing sector than in the tradable service sector. In general the majority of ﬁrms
does not fragment.198 Not all ﬁrms which close a vertically integrated local unit will be
considered for the treatment group. In the next section we are going to discuss in detail
the treatment and control groups.
6.5.2. Sample
We create a balanced and an unbalanced data set. The unbalanced data set has the
advantage of having a bigger sample size, but suﬀers from an under-represented sample
in later post-treatment years. Results can be biased if the cause of missing observations
is endogenous (Dougherty, 2007). In table 6.3 we show the size of the used samples. On
the left side of the table the restricted sample and on the right hand side the unrestricted
sample are presented. This is further divided into a balanced and unbalanced sample
and those are then separated into a control and a treatment group.
We focus our analysis on the balanced samples and use the unbalanced samples for
robustness checks. In manufacturing the number of ﬁrms in the balanced treatment
sample is 165 and in the tradable service sector it is 64. The observation period chosen
is from t∗ = −2 to t∗ = 5. That means that fragmentation must have happened between
197Because of conﬁdentiality requirements we are not allowed to show in detail how many local units
have been sold or closed down.
198In the appendix on pages 303f in tables D.1  D.2 we provide some more statistics, showing in which
regions and industries the majority of local units has been closed.
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Manufacturing
Local units Firms
year cont ex tot ex ho ex vi ﬁrm ex ﬁrm cont
1998 29,161 760 330 430 235 11,529
1999 27,097 2,151 1,035 1,116 656 10,891
2000 25,941 1,860 804 1,056 466 10,778
2001 24,532 1,846 853 993 524 10,365
2002 23,890 1,667 843 824 478 10,002
2003 21,709 1,738 954 784 442 9,400
2004 20,781 1,739 818 921 501 8,803
2005 19,498 1,705 847 858 585 8,170
2006 19,021 1,286 607 679 415 8,008
2007 18,519 1,267 621 646 418 7,630
Tradable Services
1998 30,915 448 362 86 61 11,792
1999 28,276 3,334 2,400 934 274 11,888
2000 27,972 3,036 1,470 1,566 178 12,035
2001 27,125 3,331 1,631 1,700 188 11,932
2002 26,294 3,020 1,552 1,468 197 11,470
2003 25,452 2,348 1,678 670 175 10,981
2004 24,957 2,424 1,614 810 239 10,308
2005 23,131 2,486 1,664 822 266 9,409
2006 23,275 1,815 1,097 718 191 9,121
2007 23,147 1,882 1,119 763 217 8,733
Table 6.2: Number of closing local units
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Manufacturing
Restricted Sample Unrestr. Sample
Balanced Unbalanced Balanced Unbalanced
t∗ Control Treat. Control Treat. Control Treat. Control Treat.
-3 5,211 367 9,493 549
-2 2,591 165 6,284 423 5,840 310 11,668 680
-1 2,591 165 6,284 423 5,840 310 11,668 680
0 2,591 165 6,284 423 5,840 310 11,668 680
1 2,591 165 6,284 423 5,840 310 11,668 680
2 2,591 165 5,211 366 5,840 310 10,117 595
3 2,591 165 4,245 319 5,840 310 8,601 525
4 2,591 165 3,382 221 5,840 310 7,136 385
5 2,591 165 2,591 165 5,840 310 5,691 296
6 1,871 105 4,236 205
Tradable Services
-3 2,160 82 4,099 153
-2 1,737 64 2,637 94 3,897 134 5,127 174
-1 1,737 64 2,637 94 3,897 134 5,127 174
0 1,737 64 2,637 94 3,897 134 5,127 174
1 1,737 64 2,637 94 3,897 134 5,127 174
2 1,737 64 2,160 81 3,897 134 4,411 147
3 1,737 64 1,737 64 3,897 134 3,722 117
4 1,376 40 3,065 77
5 1,051 24 2,419 50
6 755 16 1,793 35
Table 6.3: Sizes of diﬀerent treatment and control group samples
2000 and 2003.199 This seems to restrictive for the service sector, because we would
be left with only 24 ﬁrms. Therefore the post-treatment period range was reduced to
t∗ = 3. Firms which fragmented between 2000 and 2005 will be included. We will have a
treatment sample of 64 ﬁrms. We relax this assumption for the unbalanced sample. The
restriction left is that we only keep ﬁrms which have appeared in period t∗ = −2 and
t∗ = 1. Because at the beginning and the end of the t∗-period only few ﬁrms appear we
focus on the period −3 ≤ t∗ ≤ 6.
6.5.3. Descriptive analysis
Before we can conduct the DiD analysis, we have to compare the characteristics of the
control and the treatment group with each other. It is important that the development
199If the fragmentation happened before 2000, then we could not observe t∗ = −2 and if it is after 2003
we could not follow the company over the next ﬁve years after fragmentation.
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of the characteristics of both groups is not too diﬀerent from each other. The following
graphs in ﬁgure 6.2 will compare the development of the dependent variables before and
after the treatment.
In the top part of the ﬁgure we can see the diﬀerences of the treatment and control
groups in employment, net employment and real ﬁrm labour productivity for the manu-
facturing and in the bottom for the tradable service sector. The timing of the treatment
is illustrated by the vertical line. First, the performance of the control groups looks quite
similar in terms of trends, but are just at a diﬀerent level. We can observe a strong
eﬀect of fragmentation on the total employment in manufacturing. Two periods after the
treatment the performance seems to be similar between the treatment and the control
groups. Note that we also add a group which includes also non-vertically integrated local
units. Keeping non-vertically integrated local units does not change the performance of
non-treated ﬁrms. Only the level of employment and productivity seems to diﬀer.
For the tradable service sector we observe a decrease of total employment in period
one after the treatment, but then employment stabilises and increases again slightly. A
small and positive indirect eﬀect can be observed in manufacturing a period after the
treatment, which turns into signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect after 5 periods. In the service
sector the employment in all other plants is increasing slightly. Finally the development
of real labour productivity looks more erratic then the employment ﬁgures, which can
be caused by more ﬂuctuating sales ﬁgures. We can still observe an increase in labour
productivity after the treatment, which was highest immediately after the treatment.
The picture in the service sector is less clear. Three years after the ﬁrm fragmented, we
can observe a higher productivity, but a period before we would have observed a lower
productivity.
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Figure 6.2: Development of dependent variables before and after treatment for control and treatment groups
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We will discuss the characteristics of each group in more detail now by using tables 6.4 
6.5. We have already seen that employment and turnover is larger in the treatment group
than in the control group. In manufacturing the average ﬁrm level labour productivity
is about the same for the treatment and the control group in the pre-treatment period.
The share of foreign owned plants, the degree of unionisation, the number of plants and
the market concentration are similar in both groups. More ﬁrms in the control group are
in R&D intensive industries. We can already conduct a ﬁrst DiD analysis.
In period t∗ = 1 employment drops sharply. The total employment eﬀect is −14.11
workers. We can calculate a direct and indirect eﬀect. The indirect eﬀect in t∗ = 1 is
with +0.57 (66.93 − 66.36) rather small and turns to −6.8 in t∗ = 5. The direct eﬀect
is −14.68 (81.04 − 66.36). The employment change in the vertically integrated control
group is −0.35 in t∗ = 1 and −3.22 in t∗ = 5. The result of the DiD is that the treatment
causes treated ﬁrms to experience a decrease in total employment by −13.76 (17%) in
t∗ = 1 and −18.26 (23%) in t∗ = 5 in comparison to the control group. The indirect
eﬀects let total employment gradually decrease further over time.
For labour productivity we can only calculate a direct eﬀect. Real labour productivity
increased in t∗ = 1 by ¿17.96k and in t∗ = 5 it is still ¿11.97k higher than in t∗ = 0.
In the vertically integrated control group we can only ﬁnd a small change of -¿0.28k in
t∗ = 1 and ¿2.08k in t∗ = 5. DiD shows that labour productivity for the treatment group
increased by ¿18.24k (27%) in t∗ = 1 and ¿9.89k (15%) in t∗ = 5 in comparison to the
treatment group. We ﬁnd a large positive eﬀect of fragmentation on labour productivity,
even though the eﬀect gets smaller over time. While labour productivity was about the
same in the treatment and in the control group, it is much higher now in the treatment
group.
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Manufacturing
t* Obs. Employment Net Emp. R. Turn. R. Firm Prod. No. of Plants Foreign Concent. Unionisation Ih R&D
Treatment Group
-2 165 83.86 66.44 6,879 68.21 2.26 0.18 0.21 0.46 0.19
-1 165 82.41 65.20 6,764 69.31 2.26 0.19 0.22 0.44 0.20
0 165 81.04 66.36 6,331 66.99 2.26 0.11 0.22 0.43 0.25
1 165 66.93 66.93 6,050 84.95 1.26 0.09 0.25 0.42 0.26
2 165 63.22 63.22 5,954 80.90 1.26 0.09 0.25 0.40 0.28
3 165 62.27 62.27 5,612 82.10 1.26 0.10 0.28 0.39 0.25
4 165 61.33 61.33 5,530 76.21 1.26 0.09 0.25 0.38 0.33
5 165 59.56 59.56 5,636 78.96 1.26 0.12 0.26 0.38 0.37
VI Control Group
-2 2,591 53.20 53.20 4,829 64.74 2.23 0.19 0.22 0.45 0.29
-1 2,591 53.47 53.47 4,872 64.67 2.23 0.19 0.22 0.44 0.34
0 2,591 53.38 53.38 4,870 64.01 2.23 0.12 0.23 0.42 0.40
1 2,591 53.03 53.03 4,871 63.73 2.23 0.09 0.23 0.41 0.47
2 2,591 52.41 52.41 4,883 63.78 2.23 0.07 0.23 0.39 0.52
3 2,591 51.60 51.60 4,888 64.09 2.23 0.06 0.24 0.37 0.54
4 2,591 50.90 50.90 4,961 65.05 2.23 0.06 0.25 0.35 0.56
5 2,591 50.16 50.16 5,040 66.09 2.23 0.06 0.26 0.33 0.55
ALL Comparison Group
-2 5,073 46.79 46.79 4,390 68.45 2.16 0.18 0.21 0.45 0.25
-1 5,073 46.94 46.94 4,416 68.59 2.16 0.18 0.22 0.44 0.31
0 5,073 46.73 46.73 4,364 68.14 2.16 0.11 0.23 0.42 0.39
1 5,073 46.33 46.33 4,319 68.44 2.16 0.08 0.23 0.41 0.46
2 5,073 45.64 45.64 4,286 68.02 2.16 0.06 0.23 0.39 0.52
3 5,073 44.87 44.87 4,276 68.38 2.16 0.05 0.24 0.37 0.56
4 5,073 44.24 44.24 4,296 68.86 2.16 0.06 0.25 0.35 0.57
5 5,073 43.56 43.56 4,343 69.44 2.16 0.06 0.26 0.34 0.56
Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics for control and treatment groups in the manufacturing sector
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We will discuss now the tradable service sector. The size of ﬁrms with regards to employ-
ment and turnover in the treatment group is much larger than in the control group. The
average ﬁrm of the treatment group is more productive than in the control group. Total
employment is rather constant and real turnover is decreasing in the control group, the
average employment size and the real turnover are increasing. The employment ﬁgures
are rather ﬂuctuating in the treatment group. This is caused by one large ﬁrm with
volatile employment ﬁgures. The regression results are not aﬀected by this large ﬁrm,
but, because we are using levels for the descriptive part, we will exclude that outlier.
The descriptive statistics with the outlier can be found in the appendix on page 305.
The total employment eﬀect is −5.05 (25.57−30.62) in t∗ = 1 and −4.24 in t∗ = 3. This
is again driven by the direct eﬀect −5.76 (30.62 − 24.86) and slightly mitigated by the
indirect eﬀect with the value 0.71 (25.57− 24.86) in t∗ = 1 and 1.52 in t∗ = 3. Employ-
ment in the control group changes by only −0.13 in t∗ = 1 and −0.17 in t∗ = 3. The
basic DiD analysis therefore reveals that total employment decreased by 4.92 in t∗ = 1
(16%) and was reduced by 4.07 (13%) in t∗ = 3
The immediate labour productivity eﬀect is with ¿0.84k rather small in t∗ = 1 but
increases to ¿7.22k in t∗ = 3 in the treatment group. In the control group the diﬀerences
are ¿1.52k in t∗ = 1 and ¿2.03k in t∗ = 3. DiD shows that labour productivity decreases
slightly by -¿0.68k (-0.8%) in t∗ = 1 but increases to ¿5.19k (5.8%) in t∗ = 3. Contrary
to the manufacturing sector we cannot observe an immediate productivity eﬀect, but
3 years after the treatment a positive productivity eﬀect appears. This value is still
not very robust, because of a rather erratic behaviour of the labour productivity value.
However, it seems that the productivity eﬀect is much smaller in the service than in the
manufacturing sector.
So far we just looked at the raw employment and turnover changes. We did not control
for other factors, and cannot say anything about signiﬁcance of those results. Therefore
we will conduct a DiD analysis in the next section.
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Tradable Services
t* Obs. Employment Net Emp. R. Turn. R. Firm Prod. No. of Plants Foreign Concent. Unionisation Ih R&D
Treatment Group
-2 63 29.67 24.22 2,811 86.92 2.32 0.12 0.07 0.25 5.66
-1 63 30.94 25.05 2,947 80.45 2.32 0.09 0.06 0.24 5.76
0 63 30.62 24.86 2,693 89.20 2.32 0.06 0.06 0.20 5.78
1 63 25.57 25.57 2,579 90.04 1.32 0.07 0.07 0.19 4.25
2 63 25.81 25.81 2,559 82.38 1.32 0.06 0.07 0.17 6.37
3 63 26.38 26.38 2,684 96.42 1.32 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.56
VI Control Group
-2 1,737 12.44 12.44 840 67.43 2.16 0.08 0.10 0.29 1.45
-1 1,737 12.40 12.40 840 66.73 2.16 0.07 0.10 0.28 2.56
0 1,737 12.30 12.30 833 67.37 2.16 0.05 0.10 0.25 3.97
1 1,737 12.17 12.17 824 68.89 2.16 0.05 0.10 0.22 5.21
2 1,737 12.11 12.11 814 69.88 2.16 0.04 0.10 0.21 6.74
3 1,737 12.13 12.13 822 69.40 2.16 0.04 0.10 0.19 7.56
ALL Comparison Group
-2 10,181 18.52 18.52 911 58.42 2.18 0.04 0.06 0.25 0.64
-1 10,181 18.72 18.72 938 59.54 2.18 0.03 0.06 0.23 1.07
0 10,181 18.95 18.95 956 59.51 2.18 0.02 0.06 0.21 1.65
1 10,181 19.14 19.14 968 58.95 2.18 0.02 0.06 0.19 2.12
2 10,181 19.29 19.29 970 58.25 2.18 0.01 0.05 0.17 2.73
3 10,181 19.46 19.46 981 58.01 2.18 0.01 0.06 0.15 3.09
Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics for control and treatment groups in the tradable service sector
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6.5.4. Regression results
We provide three tables for each sector. In all tables we present the results for the
balanced sample. In the ﬁrst two coeﬃcients columns we have the restricted and in
the third and fourth column the unrestricted sample. In column one and three we use
the vertical integration control group and in column two and four the comparison group
containing also not vertically integrated Firms. The description of the results is focused
on the former control group if not stated otherwise. In tables 6.6 and 6.9 the dependent
variable is log employment, in tables 6.7 and 6.10 log employment without employment
of exiting plant (net employment) and in tables 6.8 and 6.11 log of labour productivity.
We start with the analysis of the manufacturing sector.
The main interest lies on the interaction terms of the fragmentation and the time dum-
mies, because it captures the treatment eﬀect. After the treatment happened the eﬀects
on total employment are rather similar, independent of using the balanced, the unbal-
anced sample, the vertically integrated ﬁrms- or all multi-plant comparison groups. Be-
fore the treatment happened there were rather small and mainly insigniﬁcant diﬀerences
between the treatment group and the control group in the restricted sample. In the ﬁrst
period the reduction of total employment is around 28 percent200 larger in treated ﬁrms
than in ﬁrms of the control group. These values are increasing over time. Five years after
fragmentation the treated ﬁrms have a 30 percent higher reduction in employment than
the control group. We cannot ﬁnd evidence that after ﬁve years the negative total em-
ployment eﬀects are mitigated. Those results are supported by the unrestricted samples.
The eﬀects are even larger. While in the ﬁrst post-treatment period the total employ-
ment decreases by around 30 percent, it is 40 percent after ﬁve years. One diﬀerence
of the unrestricted sample is, that already one period before the treatment a large and
signiﬁcant relative employment decrease of around eight percent can be observed. Also
200This was calculated as follows: exp (−0.33)− 1 .
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Variables Restricted VI Restricted All Unrestr. VI Unrestr. All
fragi 0.013 ** 0.016 *** 0.074 *** 0.084 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009)
t*-1 0.000 0.000 0.030 *** 0.032 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
t*0 -0.003 -0.002 0.062 *** 0.065 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
t*1 -0.007 -0.009 * 0.108 *** 0.112 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
t*2 -0.015 * -0.018 *** 0.140 *** 0.139 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
t*3 -0.025 ** -0.028 *** 0.153 *** 0.144 ***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008)
t*4 -0.036 *** -0.038 *** 0.169 *** 0.147 ***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.009)
t*5 -0.045 *** -0.047 *** 0.184 *** 0.149 ***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010)
fragi×t
*
-1 -0.012 -0.012 * -0.035 *** -0.038 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
fragi×t
*
0 -0.016 -0.016 -0.079 *** -0.082 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
fragi×t
*
1 -0.328 *** -0.327 *** -0.346 *** -0.351 ***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.029) (0.028)
fragi×t
*
2 -0.325 *** -0.322 *** -0.370 *** -0.369 ***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.031) (0.030)
fragi×t
*
3 -0.343 *** -0.339 *** -0.431 *** -0.421 ***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.035) (0.033)
fragi×t
*
4 -0.338 *** -0.335 *** -0.444 *** -0.421 ***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.037) (0.036)
fragi×t
*
5 -0.363 *** -0.361 *** -0.513 *** -0.477 ***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038)
Log Empi, -2 0.985 *** 0.983 *** 0.930 *** 0.926 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Agei, -2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.009 *** -0.008 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Turnoveri, -1 0.005 0.007 -0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Unionisationj, -2 0.081 0.063 0.080 0.046
(0.048) (0.032) (0.055) (0.038)
Foreigni, -2 0.017 -0.000 0.026 0.036
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.019)
R&Dj, -2 0.002 0.002 0.084 0.019
(0.003) (0.003) (0.089) (0.014)
Constant 0.015 0.037 0.386 *** 0.388 ***
(0.042) (0.028) (0.057) (0.037)
Observations 22,048 41,904 49,200 115,989
R-Square .97 .973 .894 .883
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 6.6: Regression results for total employment eﬀects in manufacturing using balanced
restricted and unrestricted samples
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the unbalanced panel analysis provides similar results with equally sized coeﬃcients. See
table D.10 on page 312 in the appendix.
The results for the indirect eﬀect are less clear. The balanced samples do not show
any signiﬁcant impact of fragmentation on net employment immediately after the ﬁrm
has fragmented. The indirect eﬀect gets also smaller in size after ﬁve years, and remains
insigniﬁcant in the restricted samples. In the unrestricted sample the indirect eﬀect turns
negative and highly signiﬁcant. After ﬁve years net employment is 19 percent lower than
in the control group. In the unbalanced samples we ﬁnd similar results, with the only
diﬀerence that in the short-run we have a positive employment eﬀect in the restricted
unbalanced sample. But this eﬀect disappears completely after ﬁve years. See table D.11
on page 313 in the appendix.
Table 6.8 shows the results for sales per worker. After the treatment the labour pro-
ductivity increases by about 23.9 percent and increases further. After ﬁve years labour
productivity increases by about 26.4  29.8 percent. Again, the unbalanced samples
support the results, however the restricted unbalanced sample has got negative but in-
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. See table D.12 on page 314 in the appendix.
Similar employment results appear in the service sector. The total employment eﬀect is
between -16  -24 percent, where the absolute eﬀect is larger in the unrestricted sample.
Three years after the treatment employment is absolutely increasing further. In the
restricted sample it reaches -18 percent and even -36 percent in the unrestricted sample.
The unbalanced samples provide similar results. See table D.13 on page 315 in the
appendix.
There is a large, but mostly insigniﬁcant, positive indirect employment eﬀect. The
employment in all other plant will immediately increase by 12  20 percent. This value
gets smaller over time. The indirect employment eﬀect seems to matter much more in
the service sector. These results are supported again by the unbalanced sample. See
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Variables Restricted VI Restricted All Unrestr. VI Unrestr. All
fragi -0.357 *** -0.353 *** -0.229 *** -0.218 ***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.027)
t*-1 0.000 0.000 0.030 *** 0.032 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
t*0 -0.003 -0.002 0.062 *** 0.065 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
t*1 -0.007 -0.009 * 0.108 *** 0.112 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
t*2 -0.015 * -0.018 *** 0.140 *** 0.139 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
t*3 -0.025 ** -0.028 *** 0.153 *** 0.144 ***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008)
t*4 -0.036 *** -0.038 *** 0.169 *** 0.147 ***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.009)
t*5 -0.045 *** -0.046 *** 0.185 *** 0.149 ***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010)
fragi×t
*
-1 -0.012 -0.012 -0.031 *** -0.033 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
fragi×t
*
0 -0.030 -0.030 -0.077 *** -0.080 ***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.014)
fragi×t
*
1 0.040 0.041 -0.044 -0.049
(0.044) (0.044) (0.033) (0.032)
fragi×t
*
2 0.043 0.046 -0.068 -0.068
(0.047) (0.046) (0.037) (0.036)
fragi×t
*
3 0.025 0.029 -0.129 ** -0.119 **
(0.048) (0.048) (0.039) (0.038)
fragi×t
*
4 0.030 0.033 -0.142 *** -0.119 **
(0.051) (0.050) (0.041) (0.040)
fragi×t
*
5 0.005 0.007 -0.211 *** -0.175 ***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.044) (0.042)
Log Empi, -2 0.987 *** 0.984 *** 0.931 *** 0.927 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Agei, -2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.009 *** -0.008 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Turnoveri, -1 0.004 0.006 -0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Unionisationj, -2 0.092 0.069 * 0.086 0.049
(0.049) (0.033) (0.055) (0.039)
Foreigni, -2 0.018 0.001 0.029 0.038 *
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.019)
R&Dj, -2 0.002 0.002 0.087 0.019
(0.003) (0.003) (0.089) (0.014)
Constant -0.009 0.024 0.377 *** 0.384 ***
(0.043) (0.029) (0.057) (0.037)
Observations 22,046 41,902 49,198 115,987
R-Square .967 .972 .892 .882
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 6.7: Regression results for indirect employment eﬀects in manufacturing using bal-
anced restricted and unrestricted samples
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Variables Balanced VI Balanced All Unbalan. VI Unbalan. All
fragi 0.021 * 0.009 -0.016 -0.030 *
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
t*-1 0.022 *** 0.017 *** 0.019 *** 0.017 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
t*0 0.028 *** 0.023 *** 0.022 ** 0.018 ***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
t*1 0.036 ** 0.036 *** 0.016 0.008
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
t*2 0.048 *** 0.049 *** 0.019 0.016 *
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007)
t*3 0.064 *** 0.064 *** 0.042 *** 0.041 ***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008)
t*4 0.066 *** 0.071 *** 0.049 *** 0.058 ***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009)
t*5 0.070 ** 0.079 *** 0.055 *** 0.075 ***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.009)
fragi×t
*
-1 -0.020 -0.016 0.021 0.022
(0.020) (0.019) (0.040) (0.040)
fragi×t
*
0 -0.031 -0.027 0.046 0.049
(0.028) (0.027) (0.039) (0.038)
fragi×t
*
1 0.214 *** 0.212 *** 0.243 *** 0.251 ***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041)
fragi×t
*
2 0.165 *** 0.163 *** 0.206 *** 0.209 ***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.044) (0.044)
fragi×t
*
3 0.219 *** 0.217 *** 0.243 *** 0.244 ***
(0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
fragi×t
*
4 0.192 *** 0.185 *** 0.197 *** 0.188 ***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043)
fragi×t
*
5 0.234 *** 0.222 *** 0.261 *** 0.241 ***
(0.052) (0.050) (0.049) (0.047)
Log Prodi, -2 0.870 *** 0.857 *** 0.714 *** 0.707 ***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.014)
Agei, -2 -0.004 ** -0.003 ** -0.004 *** -0.003 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unionisationj, -2 -0.224 * -0.140 -0.230 ** -0.109 *
(0.095) (0.074) (0.072) (0.046)
Foreigni, -2 0.212 *** 0.224 *** 0.221 *** 0.202 ***
(0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.018)
R&Dj, -2 0.013 ** 0.011 * 0.124 0.013
(0.005) (0.004) (0.120) (0.027)
Constant 0.741 *** 0.739 *** 1.336 *** 1.340 ***
(0.109) (0.096) (0.114) (0.072)
Observations 22,039 41,834 49,135 115,815
R-Square .69 .67 .577 .561
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 6.8: Regression results for ﬁrm average labour productivity eﬀects in manufacturing
using balanced restricted and unrestricted samples
235
Variables Restricted VI Restricted All Unrestr. VI Unrestr. All
fragi 0.009 0.001 0.091 *** 0.041 ***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.017) (0.011)
t*-1 -0.003 0.004 ** 0.059 *** 0.051 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
t*0 -0.007 0.007 *** 0.124 *** 0.105 ***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004)
t*1 -0.011 * 0.010 *** 0.210 *** 0.180 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.015) (0.005)
t*2 -0.016 * 0.012 *** 0.293 *** 0.234 ***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.020) (0.007)
t*3 -0.020 ** 0.014 ** 0.339 *** 0.255 ***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.023) (0.008)
fragi×t
*
-1 0.034 0.028 -0.038 ** -0.030 *
(0.024) (0.023) (0.013) (0.012)
fragi×t
*
0 0.038 0.024 -0.054 -0.035
(0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028)
fragi×t
*
1 -0.179 * -0.201 ** -0.277 *** -0.246 ***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.064)
fragi×t
*
2 -0.203 * -0.231 ** -0.390 *** -0.329 ***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.077) (0.075)
fragi×t
*
3 -0.204 * -0.239 ** -0.440 *** -0.353 ***
(0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.080)
Log Empi, -2 0.986 *** 1.001 *** 0.941 *** 0.943 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004)
Agei, -2 0.000 0.001 -0.011 *** -0.011 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
∆ Turnoveri, -1 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Unionisationj, -2 -0.055 -0.078 * -0.039 -0.130 *
(0.046) (0.034) (0.162) (0.055)
Foreigni, -2 0.041 -0.011 0.039 0.053
(0.032) (0.024) (0.058) (0.034)
R&Dj, -2 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.045 0.010 0.376 *** 0.382 ***
(0.025) (0.013) (0.063) (0.027)
Observations 10,806 61,470 24,183 163,568
R-Square .972 .973 .815 .827
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 6.9: Regression results for total employment eﬀects in tradable service sector using
balanced restricted and unrestricted samples
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Variables Restricted VI Restricted All Unrestr. VI Unrestr. All
fragi -0.351 *** -0.357 *** -0.300 *** -0.349 ***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045)
t*-1 -0.003 0.004 ** 0.059 *** 0.051 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
t*0 -0.007 0.007 *** 0.124 *** 0.105 ***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004)
t*1 -0.012 * 0.010 *** 0.210 *** 0.180 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.015) (0.005)
t*2 -0.016 * 0.012 *** 0.293 *** 0.234 ***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.020) (0.007)
t*3 -0.020 ** 0.014 ** 0.339 *** 0.255 ***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.023) (0.008)
fragi×t
*
-1 0.061 0.054 -0.018 -0.010
(0.047) (0.047) (0.025) (0.024)
fragi×t
*
0 0.069 0.056 -0.027 -0.008
(0.048) (0.048) (0.038) (0.037)
fragi×t
*
1 0.179 * 0.157 0.113 0.144
(0.091) (0.091) (0.080) (0.078)
fragi×t
*
2 0.155 0.127 0.000 0.061
(0.100) (0.099) (0.090) (0.088)
fragi×t
*
3 0.154 0.119 -0.050 0.037
(0.104) (0.103) (0.095) (0.093)
Log Empi, -2 0.988 *** 1.001 *** 0.942 *** 0.943 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004)
Agei, -2 0.000 0.001 -0.011 *** -0.011 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
∆ Turnoveri, -1 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Unionisationj, -2 -0.059 -0.078 * -0.040 -0.130 *
(0.046) (0.034) (0.162) (0.055)
Foreigni, -2 0.040 -0.012 0.029 0.050
(0.029) (0.023) (0.058) (0.034)
R&Dj, -2 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.040 0.009 0.373 *** 0.381 ***
(0.024) (0.013) (0.063) (0.027)
Observations 10,806 61,470 24,183 163,568
R-Square .971 .973 .813 .826
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 6.10: Regression results for indirect employment eﬀects in tradable service sector using
balanced restricted and unrestricted samples
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table D.14 on page 316 in the appendix.
Table 6.11 gathers the results for labour productivity. The size and sign of the treatment
coeﬃcients depend on the sample and control group chosen. The only common factor
of all results is that they are insigniﬁcant. The immediate eﬀect is between 4.1  14.5
percent. Three years later the impact remains with 7.5  16.2 percent dispersed. The
unbalanced samples show an immediate, signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect, even though the
signiﬁcance disappears over time and the coeﬃcients can even turn negative. See table
D.15 on page 317 in the appendix.
6.6. Conclusions
The main aim of this chapter was to illustrate how fragmentation may aﬀect the per-
formance of a ﬁrm. To be more speciﬁc, we examined the impact of plant closure on
total employment, employment in the remaining plants, and labour productivity. Plant
closure is taken to be a measure of fragmentation because we consider plants which were
vertically linked to production in other plants within the ﬁrm. Productivity is measured
as sales per worker. We use a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences approach, where we compare the
performance of ﬁrms which closed a vertically integrated plant with ﬁrms which did not
close one.
Fragmentation leads in the short- (one year) and in the medium-run (3  5 years) to
a large decrease in total employment and the eﬀects absolutely increase over time. In
manufacturing, immediately after a ﬁrm closes a plant it will reduce total employment
on average by 14 (-17%). After ﬁve years the value increases up to 18 workers (-23%).
There is no evidence of a rebound eﬀect. Similar results are found in the tradable service
sector. One year after the ﬁrm fragments it will reduce total employment by 5 workers
(-16%), but 3 years later it will decrease to 4 workers (-13%).
If we consider net employment, the total employment minus employment of the exiting
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Variables Restricted VI Restricted All Unrestr. VI Unrestr. All
fragi 0.067 * 0.083 ** 0.032 0.071 **
(0.032) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
t*-1 0.008 0.027 *** 0.019 * 0.028 ***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
t*0 -0.000 0.043 *** 0.017 0.042 ***
(0.016) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004)
t*1 0.002 0.057 *** -0.007 0.033 ***
(0.023) (0.008) (0.017) (0.006)
t*2 -0.013 0.066 *** -0.047 * 0.031 ***
(0.029) (0.011) (0.021) (0.007)
t*3 -0.017 0.076 *** -0.053 * 0.045 ***
(0.032) (0.013) (0.023) (0.008)
fragi×t
*
-1 -0.072 -0.087 -0.021 -0.030
(0.050) (0.049) (0.040) (0.039)
fragi×t
*
0 -0.059 -0.099 -0.113 * -0.138 **
(0.063) (0.061) (0.048) (0.046)
fragi×t
*
1 0.135 0.083 0.040 -0.000
(0.071) (0.068) (0.065) (0.063)
fragi×t
*
2 0.125 0.049 0.014 -0.064
(0.083) (0.078) (0.079) (0.076)
fragi×t
*
3 0.150 0.058 0.072 -0.029
(0.099) (0.094) (0.081) (0.077)
Log Prodi, -2 0.792 *** 0.799 *** 0.735 *** 0.723 ***
(0.033) (0.017) (0.020) (0.009)
Agei, -2 -0.003 -0.003 ** -0.005 *** -0.002 **
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Unionisationj, -2 -0.005 -0.145 -0.156 0.050
(0.196) (0.085) (0.146) (0.058)
Foreigni, -2 -0.009 0.020 0.195 *** 0.210 ***
(0.067) (0.059) (0.053) (0.035)
R&Dj, -2 0.001 0.000 0.027 0.026
(0.001) (0.000) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant 0.898 *** 0.732 *** 1.219 *** 1.073 ***
(0.156) (0.078) (0.107) (0.046)
Observations 10,764 61,266 24,062 163,133
R-Square .622 .598 .589 .562
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 6.11: Regression results for ﬁrm average labour productivity eﬀects in tradable service
sector using balanced restricted and unrestricted samples
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local unit, then the results reveal that one year after the treatment there is no signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect appearing but is getting absolutely larger over time. After a manufacturing
ﬁrm fragmented, it will reduce employment in all other plants by 4.5 more workers in
the medium-run. Regression results support partly the signiﬁcant negative eﬀect, if we
consider the unrestricted sample. We ﬁnd a positive eﬀect in the tradable service sector.
Employment will increase by 0.85 workers because of the change in the indirect eﬀect
between the ﬁrst and the third period after the treatment. Regression results ﬁnd a
positive, but statistically not signiﬁcant result.
Fragmentation is correlated with large productivity gains for manufacturing ﬁrms. Pro-
ductivity increase immediately by 27 percent and remains 15 percent higher after 5 years.
Regression results suggest that productivity may even increase further over time. We do
not ﬁnd a clear picture for the tradable services.
Concluding, we could not ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms start specialising and increase the
employment ﬁve years after the treatment. In contrast, the negative employment eﬀects
are increasing in size over time. We ﬁnd strong evidence that fragmentation aﬀects the
productivity of manufacturing ﬁrms positively, but the results for the tradable service
sector are ambiguous. Fragmentation seems to aﬀect manufacturing and tradable-service
ﬁrms diﬀerently.
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7. Conclusion
In this thesis we have attempted to provide a comprehensive and detailed analysis of
the organisational structure of UK ﬁrms over the period 1997  2008. We focused in
particular on three key questions:
1. How fragmented are UK ﬁrms and has the degree of fragmentation changed over
time?
2. What common theories can explain the organisational structure of UK ﬁrms?
3. What are the eﬀects of fragmentation on the employment and labour productivity
of UK ﬁrms?
We focused on organisational and spatial fragmentation. The former concept captures
the extent to which intermediate inputs are sourced from the market, and the latter
concept captures the extent to which the internal production process of a company is
geographically dispersed across the UK. To calculate a degree of vertical integration and
to identify the linkages between headquarters and vertically integrated local units we
used input-output tables. The main foundation of this work was the Business Structure
Database (BSD) provided by the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS). This large scale
dataset includes the great majority of UK companies for the period 1997  2008. It
includes ﬁrm level as well as plant (local unit) level information, which is required to
calculate our fragmentation measure. It further allows us to analyse both the manufac-
turing and the tradable service sector. In terms of employment and output, the latter is
an increasingly important part of the UK economy.
Because of its importance we provided a detailed description of the BSD and its virtues
and limitations in chapter 3. The BSD is regularly and quickly updated. For example,
at the end of 2011, data for 2010 was already online. This will enable researchers in
the future, for example, to look at the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis on the organisational
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structure of ﬁrms.
In chapter 4 we examined whether UK ﬁrms had become more fragmented or integrated
over the last decade. Although this is a relatively short period, we found evidence of strik-
ing changes in the organisation of UK ﬁrms. The analysis of the organisational dimension
revealed that the degree of vertical integration for the average ﬁrm was extremely low,
even if only vertically integrated ﬁrms were considered. In short, this means that UK
ﬁrms tend to source the great majority of their intermediate inputs from separate ﬁrms,
and not from within their own organisation. In the manufacturing sector the picture was
quite clear. The proportion of vertically integrated ﬁrms decreased from 3 percent in
1997 to 2 percent in 2008 and the degree of vertical integration from 0.16 percent to 0.09
percent. This means that the average ﬁrm only sourced 0.09 percent of its demanded
intermediate inputs internally. Manufacturing ﬁrms became more fragmented, regardless
whether all or only multi-plant ﬁrms were considered. In the tradable service sector the
results were rather similar but at a signiﬁcant lower level. The proportion of vertically
integrated ﬁrms decreased from 0.6 to 0.2 percent and the degree of vertical integration
decreased from 0.04 to 0.016 percent if all ﬁrms were considered. The share of vertically
integrated ﬁrms was lower in the service sector than in manufacturing, but if a service
ﬁrm was vertically integrated, it tends to be at a higher degree.
We could only measure the spatial dispersion of vertically integrated local units, therefore
the analysis of spatial fragmentation considered only vertically integrated local units.
The average dispersion of vertically integrated local units increased over the last decade
for manufacturing (from 63km to 75km) and the tradable service sector (from 60km to
80km).
A decomposition of the change in the degree of vertical integration and the spatial dis-
persion showed that the entry of new ﬁrms caused almost the entire decline in the degree
of vertical integration and newly vertically integrated ﬁrms caused the increase in spatial
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dispersion.
We concluded therefore that UK ﬁrms had become more fragmented. This statement
is supported by the observation that ﬁrms became signiﬁcantly smaller, the number of
manufacturing ﬁrms fell signiﬁcantly, the number of service ﬁrms skyrocketed and the
productivity of manufacturing ﬁrms increased. These observations ﬁt into the speciali-
sation discussion. For example, manufacturing ﬁrms outsource non-core activities, like
services, which leads to smaller manufacturing ﬁrms and a larger service sector. Through
specialisation, productivity will increase too. Still, we cannot exclude other explanations
for ﬁrms becoming smaller. First of all, technological improvements and new production
methods could have reduced the average size of a ﬁrm. The change in the mode of pro-
duction is the main explanation of Choi and Spletzer (2011) for US ﬁrms and local units
becoming smaller. Braguinsky et al. (2011) connect the shrinking size of ﬁrms in Por-
tugal with strict labour market protection laws. What policies could aﬀect the average
ﬁrm size in the UK? An important determinant of the UK ﬁrm composition could be the
VAT threshold. VAT was introduced in the UK in 1973 and ﬁrms above a turnover of
¿5,000 had to register, but this values had already doubled to ¿10,000 by 1978.201 The
VAT threshold increased above the inﬂation rate a second time in 1991 from ¿25,400 to
¿35,000. Since then, the threshold was only inﬂation adjusted. Recently, the threshold
reached ¿73,000 in 2011. What are the consequences of a real VAT threshold increase, as
in the 1970s and 1991? At a ﬁrst glance, a larger amount of small ﬁrms will appreciate
a decrease in costs and might increase the number of smaller ﬁrms. This should lead
to a reduction of the average ﬁrm size. However, in our data only ﬁrms above the VAT
threshold are recorded. Therefore the average size of a ﬁrm will increase, if we assume
that sales and employment are positively related. On the other hand, if labour produc-
tivity increases faster than the increase in the VAT threshold, smaller ﬁrms will pass the
threshold and average size over the threshold will fall.
201See Seely (2011) for a comprehensive description of the UK VAT threshold.
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Concluding, many factors can actually cause the shrinking UK ﬁrm size. Further research
is required to identify the extent to which fragmentation, other technological develop-
ments or data issues are the key determinants of the observed fall in average ﬁrm size.
In chapter 5 we examined whether existing economic theories could explain why ﬁrms
choose a particular organisational structure, and which determinants were most impor-
tant. The organisational structures of concern were single-plant vs. multi-plant ﬁrm
(ﬁrst stage), fragmented vs. integrated multi-plant ﬁrm (second stage) and spatially
concentrated vs. dispersed multi-plant ﬁrm (third stage). For the ﬁrst stage we found
that market concentration had a positive eﬀect on becoming a multi-plant ﬁrm in the
manufacturing and tradable service sector, but it seemed to matter more in the latter.
We found only a small signiﬁcant impact of capital intensity in manufacturing. External
R&D intensity had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect in the tradable service sector. Technology
mattered in both sectors. In general, ﬁrms closer to the technological frontier were more
likely to become multi-plant ﬁrms. While technological industry heterogeneity had a
negative eﬀect on manufacturing ﬁrms it was the opposite for the tradable service sector.
For the second stage we found that technology had the same eﬀect in every sector.
Proximity to the technological frontier led to a higher probability of being vertically in-
tegrated. The more technologically heterogeneous an industry was, the less likely would
be ﬁrms within that industry vertically integrated. R&D intensities, to capture knowl-
edge capital, were positively correlated with being vertically integrated in the tradable
service sector, even though we did not ﬁnd many signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. In manufactur-
ing, external R&D intensity was positively correlated with being vertically integrated,
in-house R&D negatively.
In the third stage we could not ﬁnd evidence that factor price diﬀerences aﬀected the
spatial distribution of UK ﬁrms. Knowledge capital could also not explain the spatial
distribution. We found that, in general, independent of the sector, large ﬁrms, which
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were close to the technological frontier and in a concentrated market, were more dis-
persed. Additionally, being located in a populated area had a positive impact on being
concentrated for tradable service ﬁrms.
The main problem of this chapter is the fact that many of the determinants of organisa-
tional structure are endogenous because they are chosen by the ﬁrm itself. We tried to
mitigate this problem by using ﬁxed eﬀects estimators and lagged independent variables.
Still, we could not capture time-variant unobservable factors. In the future, industry
variables like R&D expenditures and industry heterogeneity from other countries could
be used as an instrument, even though the variables may still be correlated with UK
unobservables. Another problem was that, by using a within-group estimator, only small
changes could be captured and measurement errors may led to downwardly biased coef-
ﬁcients. Further investigations are required in the second stage of analysis with regards
to the R&D measures. Even though in-house and external R&D intensities were highly
correlated, they had opposite signs. In stage 3, further research is required, because
our main explanations for geographical dispersion, factor price diﬀerences and agglom-
eration, do not seem to be able to explain a spatially dispersed production process of
manufacturing ﬁrms within the UK. Other theoretical models may be needed.
In chapter 6 we examined the consequences of fragmentation. Speciﬁcally, we looked at
how the closure of a vertically integrated local unit will aﬀect total employment, indirect
employment (that is employment in the remaining parts of the ﬁrm) and labour produc-
tivity of a ﬁrm. The total employment eﬀect was straight forward. In manufacturing,
immediately after a ﬁrm closes a plant, it reduces total employment on average by 14
workers (-17%). After ﬁve years the value increases to 18 workers (-23%). Similar results
were found in the tradable service sector. One year after the ﬁrm fragments it reduces
total employment by 5 workers (-16%), but 3 years later by 4 workers (-13%).
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The key ﬁnding of the chapter was that the employment losses were not compensated
elsewhere in the ﬁrm. One year after the treatment, there was no signiﬁcant indirect
employment eﬀect appearing, regardless the sector. After ﬁve years, the indirect em-
ployment for manufacturing ﬁrms led to a further reduction of employment in all other
plants by 4.5 workers. Regression results supported partly the signiﬁcant negative eﬀect,
when we considered the unrestricted sample. We found a positive eﬀect in the tradable
service sector after three years. Employment increased by 0.85 workers, because of the
change in the indirect eﬀect between the ﬁrst and the third period after the treatment.
Regression results were positive, but statistically not signiﬁcant.
Fragmentation was correlated with large productivity gains for manufacturing ﬁrms.
Productivity increased immediately by 27 percent and remained 15 percent higher after
5 years. Regression results suggested that productivity may even increase further over
time. One explanation could be that through fragmentation ﬁrms started to specialise
and became therefore more productive by focusing on their core activities. A more
mundane explanation could be that ﬁrms were just closing the least productive local
units. We did not ﬁnd a clear picture about productivity changes for the tradable service
sector.
We used a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DiD) estimator for our analysis. However, an im-
portant caveat is the extent to which the estimates can be interpreted as the causal eﬀect
of fragmentation. Although the control group are observably similar to the treatment
group, fragmentation is a choice which may well be correlated with other unobserved
shocks. Thus the counterfactual  what would have happened in the absence of frag-
mentation  may not be revealed by the control group. For future research we want
to add propensity score matching, a method, which compares treated ﬁrms with the
most similar ﬁrms from the control group. However, also this method will not be able
to identify the real counterfactual. We also want to compare the results with the clo-
sure of horizontally linked local units. This will shed light on the topic if the ﬁrm level
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productivity and employment depends on the type of closed local unit.
The organisational structure of ﬁrms is continuously changing. The ICT revolution, new
and more (human) capital intensive products and the death of distance have created an
environment in which fragmentation could evolve easily. Our analysis showed that the
time of fragmentation is not over yet. The number of large ﬁrms producing large parts
of their intermediate inputs internally is decreasing, instead thousands of small single-
plant ﬁrms arise every year. These structural changes can have signiﬁcant consequences
for the welfare of the UK. Specialisation can lead to a positive eﬀect on the aggregate
productivity level. The United Kingdom may become more competitive in a globalised
world and can secure, or even improve, its trading position. If the production chain
fragmented domestically, then new jobs can be created. If production stages are oﬀshored
or outsourced abroad, then the employment loss can be greater than the gain of jobs
through specialisation. Newly created jobs will not be distributed equally over all jobs
with diﬀerent skill level. The UK has a comparative advantage in skill-intensive jobs,
therefore specialisation will have positive eﬀects on employment and wages for highly
skilled people. However, outsourced low-skilled jobs will have a negative impact for
unskilled UK workers. Wages will become lower because of a lower demand for UK low
skilled workers.
Ignoring the international dimension, the trend towards small single-plant ﬁrms can
have an impact on market structure. Many small ﬁrms can be an indicator for increased
competition, which leads to lower prices and increasing welfare for consumers. However,
smaller ﬁrms might not be able to provide services for employees like larger companies.
For example, fringe beneﬁts, like training programmes, career advancement or even child
care, will only be relevant after a certain ﬁrm size has been surpassed. Also, smaller ﬁrms
pay lower wages on average than larger companies (Oi and Idson, 1999). Furthermore,
Mayo and Murray (1991) show that ﬁrm size is negatively correlated with ﬁrm failure.
Therefore smaller ﬁrms in general will oﬀer less stable jobs.
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Concluding, the structure of UK ﬁrms has changed, which leads to smaller ﬁrms, which
are more productive. The eﬀect of this change on the welfare of the UK can be ambiguous
and requires further research.
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Appendices
A. Literature Review
A.1. The Maddigan (1981) Measure: A Numerical Example
A numerical example is provided which should help to understand the mechanics behind
the vertical integration measure by Maddigan (1981). To keep it as simple as possible
three industries called 1, 2 and 3 and one ﬁrm are assumed. Further factors like value
added, private consumption etc. are assumed to be zero.
Matrix X shows the value of goods from industry i delivered to industry j and Z the
total output of an industry i. For example, industry 2 demands goods of value 5 from
industry 1. The total output of industry 2 is 17.
X =


2 5 4
6 2 9
7 3 3

 , Z = (11, 17, 13)
In the second step two matrices containing relative net inputs (matrix A) and relative net
output shares (matrix B) are created.202 Negative values represent inputs and positive
values outputs.
A =


1 −0.42 −0.44
−1.2 1 −2.25
−1.75 −0.21 1

 , B =


−1 0.56 0.44
0.4 −1 0.6
0.7 0.3 −1


In the third step matrices C and D are calculated. Those are calculated for every ﬁrm
202The exact formula used is A = I − [xij/(zj − xij)] + [yij ] and B = [xij/(zi − xii)]− [yij ]− I, where I
is the identity matrix and yij exists to oﬀset the ﬁrst term in brackets if i = j.
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separately and keeps only those rows and columns (industries) in which the ﬁrm is active.
Firm 1 is at the beginning only active in industry 1, therefore C1 = 1 and D1 = −1.
Equation 2.3 in chapter 2 leads to vimadd1 = 1− 1/((1)(1)) = 0.
Firm 2 is active in industry 1 and industry 2.
C2 =

 1 −0.44
−1.75 1

 , D2 =

 −1 0.44
0.7 −1


Therefore vimadd2 = 1−
1
(1 + 0.442)(1 + 1.752)(1 + 0.442)(1 + 0.72)
= 0.47
Finally the last ﬁrm has got a plant in every industry, so C3 = A and D3 = B. This
results in vimadd3 = 0.99, meaning that this company is completely vertically integrated.
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B. Are UK Firms Becoming More Fragmented?
Additional information for chapter 4 is provided here. In some graphs, additionally to
the manufacturing and the tradable-service sector, the non-tradable sector is included.
At the beginning of writing the thesis analysis included this sector as well, but, because
vertical integrated ﬁrms hardly appear, we dropped it later.
B.1. Description of Databases Used Besides BSD and ARD
FAME
We want to take a closer look at the distance between local units and their headquarters.
The Business Structure Database (BSD) does not include information on whether the
location of the enterprise refers to the headquarters or just to the reporting unit. The Fi-
nancial Analysis Made Easy Database (FAME) can be used to identify the headquarters.
This database of Bureau van Dijk (BvD) oﬀers ﬁnancial information about all British
ﬁrms (corporations) which are registered at the Companies House. Additionally to ﬁnan-
cial information, it also includes a company registration number (CRN) and a postcode
for the location of the headquarters. All in all, 7m companies are included. However,
4m are already inactive.203 In this thesis FAME data from 2009 is used. Because it is a
live database it cannot be controlled for changes in the headquarters location over time.
This database is available at BvD's homepage at http://www.bvdinfo.com, access on
17/05/2010.
National Statistics Postcode Directory
The National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) of February 2009 includes Eastings
and Northings identiﬁers, which are used to measure the distance between local units.
203See http://www.bvdep.com/pdf/brochure/Fame.pdf, access on 12/11/09.
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2.47m postcodes are included. This database is available at Edina's UKBORDES site at
http://edina.ac.uk/ukborders/, access on 17/05/2010.
Input-Output Tables
We use input-output tables for the UK to calculate the degree of vertical integration
of UK plants. The Use-matrix shows how many goods are transferred between the
industries. To be more precise, the Use matrix is a product × industry matrix, where
the product can be diﬀerent from the industry classiﬁcation. It is not always the case
that only companies from an industry j produce goods from sector j, for example a
company can produce goods of diﬀerent industries, but it is still regarded as company
of its main business. To get a measure of vertical integration we nevertheless assume
that the product side of the matrix represents the supplying and the industry side the
demanding industry.
Input-output tables are annually generated for the UK. They are constructed through
data source supplied by the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS), other government de-
partments (for example the Bank of England) and non-governmental sources (for example
the association of British insurers), whereby the main ONS source is the Annual Busi-
ness Inquiry (ABI) (Mahajan, 2006). About 13,000 ﬁrms received in 2005/06 an industry
speciﬁc statutory survey about intermediate input consumption. Input-output tables are
available at ONS homepage at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/methodology_
by_theme/inputoutput/default.asp, access on 17/05/2010.
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B.2. Descriptive Statistics of the UK Economy Without Dropping
Outliers
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Figure B.1: Size of sample sectors according to employment and turnover, including outliers
B.3. Basic Mean Distance Measure
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B.4. Calculation of the Measure of Vertical Integration Using Stata
How to measure vertical integration was already mentioned in section 4.4.1. To sum-
marise, the idea is to use input-output tables to ﬁnd the intermediate input structure of
a plant. If a ﬁrm consists of multiple local units we can identify those local units, which
produce outputs, which are used as intermediate inputs for other local units within the
same company. Input-output tables enable us further to calculate a measure for the
degree of vertical integration. To put it diﬀerently, to generate the degree of backward
vertical integration of a plant A, it is checked how many other plants of the same enter-
prise, to which plant A belongs to, are producing goods which are intermediate inputs for
plant A. The intermediate input shares of all intermediate inputs supplying local units
are added up. To apply those ideas empirically, the following description explains how to
implement the calculation of backward vertical integration in Stata. The Stata version
used in the Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML) is 9.2. Two datasets are needed: the
Business Structure database (BSD) and UK input-output tables. The following steps
were conducted:
1. Because input-output tables are categorised into industries diﬀerent to the SIC
2003 which is used in the BSD, the BSD has to be made consistent ﬁrst. The
industry classiﬁcation of the input-output table can be easily matched with the
SIC 03.204
2. In the next step relative input values are calculated in the input-output tables.
Because input-output tables have supplying industries in rows and demanding in-
dustries in columns the whole input-output table has to be transposed.
3. Finally, the input-output matrix has to be reshaped into long format, so a list is
gained showing the intermediate inputs supplying industries for each SIC sector
204Look-up tables can be found at the ONS homepage. See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/
methodology_by_theme/inputoutput/, access: 10/02/10.
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After that, the input-output table and the BSD are ready to be merged. The following
Stata code was used for the calculation of the vertical integration measure:
To avoid confusion with the notation, the three diﬀerent SIC variables are lu_sic_4
for the four digit SIC code of local units of the BSD, lu_sic_io the input-output table
consistent SIC code of local units of the BSD and ﬁnally supply_sic for the intermediate
input supplying companies gained from the input-output tables.
A loop is used for the whole observation period:
forvalues i = 1997(1)2008{
The BSD data with consistent SIC codes for each year is loaded:
use if year == `i' using "io_bsd"
Because of the massive size of the data and the resource intensive way of calculation the
sample has to be reduced. First of all, single plant ﬁrms are by deﬁnition not vertically
integrated and can be dropped.
bysort entref: keep if _N > 1
Another assumption is that, if a company has multiple local units which are in the same
2-digit industry but in a diﬀerent 4-digit industry, those local units will be classiﬁed
as vertically integrated. To achieve that, only one local unit per 4-digit SIC sector per
company is kept.
bysort entref lu_sic_4: keep if _n == 1
A variable is created to indicate how many plants with diﬀerent 4-digit SIC codes exist
within the same 2-digit SIC sector. Then the BSD is merged with the input-output tables.
Because all industries of the input-output tables have to be connected to one local unit
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of the BSD, the command joinby has to be used. After the merge all intermediate input
supplying sectors of local units are available.
bysort entref lu_sic_io: gen plants_in_sic = _N
bysort entref lu_sic_io: gen plants_in_sic_num = _n
sort lu_sic_io
joinby lu_sic_io using "io_long_rel_back", unmatched(master)
Now the ﬁnal selection can be conducted. If there is only one kind of plants of a spe-
ciﬁc 4-digit sector within a ﬁrm all of those observations can be dropped. Only one
representative local unit with the relative share of intermediate inputs has to be kept.
drop if supply_sic == lu_sic_io & plants_in_sic == 1
drop if plants_in_sic > 1 & plants_in_sic_num > 1
The following code is the crucial part of the do ﬁle. The supply_sic shows the SIC code
of intermediate input supplying industries. The code checks for every supply_sic of a
local unit if any other local units within a ﬁrm exist which have a similar SIC code. If
that is the case the relative share of intermediate inputs used by local unit is allocated
to a vertical integration variable. The ﬁrst command lines are needed to calculate the
maximum amount of iteration for every year.
egen maxrows = count(year), by(entref)
su maxrows
local J = r(max)
sort entref luref supply_sic
gen vi_b=.
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forvalues j = 1(1)`J'{
di "." _c
quietly by entref: replace vi_b = use if supply_sic == lu_sic_io[`j']
}
replace vi_b = 0 if vi_b == .
save "iot_vi_b_matched_`i'", replace
The last command lines generate the share of in-house intermediate inputs used by local
units. Finally, the share can be merged with the BSD and the vertical integration measure
is added to the BSD sample.
egen sum_vi_b = sum(vi_b), by(entref lu_sic_io)
bysort entref lu_sic_io: keep if _n==1
keep entref lu_sic_io sum_vi_b
save "io_bsd_vi_b_`i'", replace
use if year==`i' using "io_bsd"
sort entref lu_sic_io
merge entref lu_sic_io using io_bsd_vi_b_`i'
replace sum_vi_b=0 if missing(sum_vi_b)
save "bsd_vi_b_`i'", replace
}
B.5. Check of the IO Measures
We checked if the usage of a diﬀerent input-output table would change the result sig-
niﬁcantly. The input-output table of 1997 was used to calculate the degree of vertical
integration for the year 1997 and was then compared with the results of 1997 obtained
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by using the input-output table of 2002. This analysis was only conducted for the man-
ufacturing sector using the sample dropping the largest 0.5 percent of ﬁrms. Table B.1
reveals that the diﬀerences between the input-output table 1997 and input-output tables
2002 calculations are negligible, for the local unit as for the ﬁrm level.
IOT 2002 IOT 1997
L
o
ca
l
u
n
it
s vib of all local units 0.0042 0.0042
vib of mp local units 0.031 0.0313
vib of vi local units 0.0574 0.0603
share of vi local units to total 0.0728 0.0704
share of vi local units to mp 0.5408 0.52
F
ir
m
s vib of all ﬁrms 0.0247 0.0248
vib of vi ﬁrms of mp 0.0479 0.0479
share of vi local units to total 0.0277 0.0275
share of vi local units to mp 0.5155 0.51
vib . . . degree of backward vertical integration
mp . . .multi-plant
vi . . . vertical integrated
Table B.1: Comparison of backward vertical integration using input-output tables 1997 and
2002
B.6. The Local Unit Vertical Integration Measure
In ﬁgure B.3 we capture the degree of vertical integration of the average local unit. In
general, because of the high share of single-plant ﬁrms, the average degree of vertical
integration is rather low if all ﬁrms are considered. The degree is ﬂuctuating, especially
for the service sector. The more local units per ﬁrm are considered the more ﬂuctuating
the picture gets. In the manufacturing sector the picture is quite clear. If all ﬁrms are
considered, the degree of vertical integration is decreasing, while in 1997 the average
plant sourced around 0.8 percent of intermediate inputs internally, it was only around
0.6 percent in 2008. Multi-plant ﬁrms are keeping the same degree of vertical integra-
tion. Approximately 4.8 percent of intermediates have been produced in-house. For the
vertically integrated ﬁrm sample the degree is around 8 percent.
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Figure B.3: Degree of vertical integration per local unit according to type of ﬁrm
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In the tradable service sector the degree of vertical integration for the average local unit
is lowest and decreasing over time from 0.37 percent down to 0.15 percent. The multi-
plant samples show two signiﬁcant drops in 1998 and in 2006  2007. The large fall in
1998 is a data issue. The measure of vertical integration treats local units of a ﬁrm with
the same 2-digit but a diﬀerent 4-digit SIC code as potentially vertically integrated. In
1998 many observations of ﬁrms which owned those local units with identical 2-digit,
but diﬀerent 4-digit SIC codes, were confronted with a homogenisation of the activity
classiﬁcation. The former heterogeneous local units are now allocated to the same 4-digit
SIC code, therefore former vertically integrated local units are not recognised as those
anymore. This problem gets even more severe because some sectors like, for example,
the business service sector comprises of plenty of diﬀerent services which account for the
majority of intermediate inputs demanded. If a ﬁrm closes one of its service local units,
a large absolute drop of the degree of vertical integration can happen. Another fact is
that it is very unlikely for a tradable service local unit to be vertically integrated but if
they are integrated, then they will be to a higher degree than manufacturing local units.
B.7. The Degree of Vertical Integration Using the Sample Without
Top 0.5 Firms
This sample drops the top 0.5 percent of largest ﬁrms according to their turnover. If a
ﬁrm has been once part of the top 0.5 percent it will be dropped for all other years too.
This time, the tradable service sector includes also the ﬁnancial intermediation sector.
Figure B.4 shows the average degree of vertical integration for a local unit and ﬁgure B.5
for a ﬁrm.
The observation of the local unit sample of the year 1998 had to be dropped in the
tradable service sector, because of a massive drop in the vertical integration values which
was caused by data problems. This can be partly explained with the discussion in section
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4.4.1, that some large ﬁrms were confronted with a homogenisation of their 4-digit SIC
codes of local units. So even dropping the largest ﬁrms of the sample does not mitigate
the problem in the tradable service sector.
B.8. Transition Tables
We consider three organisational states:
1. single plant ﬁrms,
2. multi-plant ﬁrms, not vertically integrated and
3. multi-plant ﬁrms, vertically integrated.
It can be the case that some transitions are caused by data inaccuracies. For example,
because of a wrong SIC code in one period a ﬁrm may appear to change its state from
integrated to fragmented, but, after the correct SIC code appears again, changes back
to be vertically integrated. To avoid the problem of temporary status changes we will
ignore only one period lasting state changes. The cleaned results, calculated using the
backward sample, are presented in table B.2. The rows indicate the state of a ﬁrm in
period t and the columns in period t+1. There are two numbers in every cell, the upper
one is the absolute number of ﬁrms keeping or changing their states and the lower one
shows the probability of a ﬁrm of a certain state to keep or change to another state. For
example, consider the top left panel. We can see that 1,818 single-plant manufacturing
ﬁrms became vertically integrated. The probability that this event can happen is only
0.14 percent. The tables show the result for the whole twelve year observation period.
Firms which appear only once are not included.
The vast majority of ﬁrms are keeping its organisational structure. The biggest group
is the group of single plant ﬁrms staying a single plant ﬁrm (more than 99 percent). A
similar pattern for both sectors is that it is always more likely for a single-plant ﬁrm to
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BACKWARD INTEGRATION
Manufacturing Sector Tradable Service Sector
Type 1 2 3 Total Type 1 2 3 Total
1 1,288,541 2,248 1,818 1,292,607 1 3,710,618 3,802 1,090 3,715,510
99.69 0.17 0.14 100.00 99.87 0.10 0.03 100.00
2 2,496 26,531 1,177 30,204 2 2,782 52,049 666 55,497
8.26 87.84 3.90 100.00 5.01 93.79 1.20 100.00
3 2,006 1,395 28,542 31,943 3 734 773 10,598 12,105
6.28 4.37 89.35 100.00 6.06 6.39 87.55 100.00
Total 1,293,043 30,174 31,537 1,354,754 Total 3,714,134 56,624 12,354 3,783,112
95.44 2.23 2.33 100.00 98.18 1.50 0.33 100.00
Table B.2: Change of organisational structure over time for clean sample
become a not vertically integrated multi-plant ﬁrm than a vertically integrated one.
The main interest lies on how many vertically integrated ﬁrms have become fragmented
and how many fragmented ﬁrms have become vertically integrated. Transition tables
cannot show if the degree of vertical integration has increased or decreased but they can
give an idea about how many ﬁrms changed from one state to another. The discussion will
start with the manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector is the sector for which the
number of integrated and not integrated multi-plant ﬁrms is quite similar. 1,818 single-
plant and 1,177 non vertically integrated multi-plant ﬁrms became vertically integrated
ﬁrms. In contrast to that, 2,006 integrated ﬁrms became single-plant or 1,395 non-
integrated multi-plant ﬁrms. To ﬁnd out if more ﬁrms became fragmented or integrated
over time the number of ﬁrms becoming integrated (ﬁrms turning from a single plant or
a not vertically integrated multi-plant ﬁrm into an integrated ﬁrm) are compared with
the number of ﬁrms changing their vertically integrated status to a fragmented status.
53.2 percent of all changes are related with backward vertically integrated ﬁrms turning
into a fragmented state.
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In contrast to the manufacturing sector, non-integrated multi-plant ﬁrms are far more
common in the service sector and the probability of becoming a vertically integrated
ﬁrm is much lower. Even though the sample is much larger the absolute number of
ﬁrms changing their status is lower. In the tradable service sector 1,756 (1,090 plus
666) fragmented ﬁrms became integrated and 1,507 (734 plus 773) became fragmented.
53.8 percent of all changes are of ﬁrms which turned from a fragmented into a backward
integrated. To sum it up, in the manufacturing sector more existing ﬁrms became frag-
mented than integrated. This is diﬀerent to the service sector, where more ﬁrms became
integrated. Still the absolute number of ﬁrms changing the status is extremely low.
The analysis for geographical fragmentation will be conducted in the same manner as
above. Again three categories of spatial concentration of ﬁrms are used:
1. Concentrated, regional ﬁrms, located only in one government oﬃce region,
2. spread, bi-regional ﬁrms,
3. national ﬁrms, located in more than two government oﬃce regions.
One criterion for spatial fragmentation is the vertical linkage between the local units of
a ﬁrm. Therefore only the dispersion of the vertically integrated local units of a ﬁrm will
be considered, or, to put it diﬀerently, how geographically dispersed is the production
process of a ﬁrm. Therefore I will only keep ﬁrms with vertically integrated local units.
Horizontally connected local units are ignored. Furthermore, to avoid that a ﬁrm exits
and re-appears in the sample, because it is temporarily not vertically integrated, I will
only keep the ﬁrms which do not re-appear. Finally, to get rid of data errors, ﬁrms which
change their locational status just for one period and switch back to their old one in the
next period, are also dropped. We use data based on forward vertically integrated local
units to derive the transition tables. Table B.3 reveals the results. The state of the ﬁrms
in period t are shown in rows and in period t + 1 in columns. For example, the value
of 118 in the table for manufacturing ﬁrms states that 118 concentrated ﬁrms became
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bi-regional ﬁrms in t+ 1.
In general, the biggest group for all industries is the group of ﬁrms with vertically in-
tegrated local units in the same region, followed by bi-regional and then national ﬁrms.
Most ﬁrms keep their state. Because only vertically integrated ﬁrms are considered, the
total number of observation is rather small in comparison to the total ﬁrm sample used
for organisational fragmentation.
FORWARD INTEGRATION
Manufacturing Sector Tradable Service Sector
Type 1 2 3 Total Type 1 2 3 Total
1 13,812 118 29 13,959 1 5,774 47 14 5,835
98.95 0.85 0.21 100.00
2 116 4,555 129 4,800 2 44 2,270 58 2,372
2.42 94.90 2.69 100.00
3 16 163 3,175 3,354 3 - 34 1,461 -
0.48 4.86 94.66 100.00
Total 13,944 4,836 3,333 22,113 Total - 2,351 1,533 -
63.06 21.87 15.07 100.00
Table B.3: Change of geographical dispersion over time for clean sample
In the manufacturing sector the number of concentrated ﬁrms turning into bi-regional
ﬁrms and vice versa is rather similar. Bi-regional ﬁrms become slightly more dispersed
then concentrated. The signiﬁcant change appears because more national ﬁrms get less
dispersed than ﬁrms turning into national acting ﬁrms. This causes that the overall
number of ﬁrms turning into a more concentrated state (295) is higher than of ﬁrms
becoming more dispersed (276).
The tables for the tradable service sector looks quite basic in comparison to the other
sectors. Because less than ten observations appeared in some cells, those values had to be
suppressed.205 The amount of ﬁrms with vertically integrated local units is much lower
205To be able to publish results the Oﬃce for National Statistics demands that statistics with less than
ten observations not to be made public, so the identity of a ﬁrm cannot be revealed.
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in the tradable service sector. In contrast to the manufacturing sector, ﬁrms are more
likely to become dispersed than concentrated. Slightly more concentrated ﬁrms turn into
bi-regional ﬁrms than vice versa and more bi-regional ﬁrms turn into national ﬁrms than
the other way around.
To sum it up, there are only few ﬁrms changing their status between concentrated, bi-
regional and national ﬁrms. In manufacturing more ﬁrms became more concentrated
while in the service sector the opposite has happened. Even though the distance between
local units and their headquarters increased it seems that it is caused by a higher dis-
persion of local units within a region or by large ﬁrms becoming active in more than 3
regions, which is not captured by the dynamic analysis presented.
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C. Explanations for the Organisational Structure of Firms
C.1. Cleaning and Creating Data
C.1.1. BERD
Jones (2007) writes the following about the deﬁnition of R&D: R&D is deﬁned as `cre-
ative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge,
including the knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowl-
edge to devise new applications'. This deﬁnition is provided by the OECD Frascati Man-
ual . . . . Guidance notes . . . state that `the guiding line to distinguish R&D activity from
non-research activity is the presence or absence of an appreciable element of novelty or
innovation. If activity departs from routine and breaks new ground it should be included:
if it follows an established pattern it should be excluded'.
The extent of the companies included increased from 4,800 in 1995 up to 13,900 in 2005.
The peak was reached in 2007 with approximately 20,000 and decreased in 2008 back
to the 2006 level of 17,000. Survey data is not available for every year for every ﬁrm,
therefore those missing observations are imputed by the ONS. As mentioned in the main
part of the thesis, some obstacles have to be overcome to be able to merge the BERD
with the BSD. Here the procedure will be explained.
In the BERDmultiple entries per reporting unit exist and are caused by diﬀerent locations
where R&D is conducted, by civil or defence purposes or by diﬀerent product groups.
I do not diﬀerentiate between civil or defence purposes. The BERD applies the UK
SIC 92 classiﬁcation and the BSD UK SIC 03. According to ONS (2002b), page V, the
changes between the 1992 and the 2003 version are minor. The adjustments of concern
are presented in table C.1. SIC 29.4 was split into three new 4 digit industries and two
new industries were added to 74.8 and 72.2.
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SIC 92 Agg. Level SIC 03 New Sectors
29.4 Manufacture of machine
tools
29.41 Man. of portable hand held
power tools
29.42 Man. of other metalworking
machine tools
29.43 Man. of other machine tools
not elsewhere classiﬁed
74.8 Miscellaneous business
activities not elsewhere
classiﬁed
74.86 Call centre activities
72.2 Software consultancy and
supply
72.21 Publishing of software
Table C.1: Diﬀerences between UK SIC 92 and UK SIC 03
To create a consistent appearance of a ﬁrm over time I have aggregated the industries of
concern to a more aggregated level. Therefore in manufacturing all new 29.4x are added
up to 29.4 again and in the tradable service sector 72.2x to 72.2 and all 74.8x to 74.8.
According to the BERD Quick Guide206 the data was cleaned by the ONS, but still
some adjustments have to be conducted. Besides the data collected through the survey,
employment and turnover data is sourced from the Inter Departmental Business Register
(IDBR). Some employment and many turnover ﬁgures are missing. The data for em-
ployment comes from the IDBR and should therefore match with the employment data
from the BSD. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. Many observations are in-
cluded as a lagged variable in the BERD, resulting that the employment/turnover ﬁgure
of period t is used for t − 1. The reason might be that the IDBR data is a snapshot of
companies in March. In contrast, the BERD is based on a 12 month observation period.
Many turnover ﬁgures are missing, even though they exist within the BSD and the BSD
gets its turnover data from the IDBR again. I will rely on the BSD sample values for
employment and turnover to calculate the R&D intensity for speciﬁc industries.
206Available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/about/who-we-are/our-services/vml/about-the-vml/
datasets-available/dataset-downloads/berd-guides.zip, accessed on 18/12/10.
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The main reference number is the reporting unit reference number, but also enterprise
reference numbers (entref) should be provided. The enterprise reference number is crucial
for a more detailed analysis of R&D intensity at the ﬁrm level. Only from 2003 onwards
the ONS started to provide enterprise reference number on a comprehensive scale. Before,
only ﬁrms which ﬁlled in the survey had an enterprise reference number. Being able to
link the reporting unit R&D information to enterprises of the BSD allows us to look at the
eﬀect of R&D on organisational structure decisions precisely. To merge the BERD with
the BSD some prerequisites have to be conducted. Because many enterprise reference
numbers are missing I have to impute them, when possible.
Before the imputation can start, a control variable will be created. The reporting unit
postcode will be crucial for the imputation process. If a postcode gap arose for a reporting
unit, then the missing value will be ﬁlled in, if the preceding t− 1 and the following t+1
postcode are identical and the industry classiﬁcation of period t is similar to them of
t− 1 and t+ 1.
The ﬁrst imputation rule for missing enterprise reference numbers is quite similar to
above. If an reporting unit r has a missing enterprise reference number at time t, but
an earlier (t − x) and later (t + y, where x, y ∈ {1, 10}) observation exists, where the
entref rt−x = entref
r
t+y, all those missing between enterprise reference numbers will be
imputed with entref rt−x. One requirement is that the postcode of t has not changed.
This is illustrated with case I. on the top left hand side of table C.2. Note that all the
following tables are made up tables and are not taken from the BERD or BSD. Reporting
unit 11 is part of enterprise A in 2003 and 2006, its location is constant, therefore it is
assumed that 11 is also part of A in 2004 and 2005. The upper right corner, case II., of
the table illustrates the case, when no imputation will happen. The enterprise number
is diﬀerent in 2003 and 2006.
The method seems to work for most missing enterprise reference numbers after 2002 but
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Case I. II.
Before ruref year entref poco berd ruref year entref poco berd
Imputation 11 2003 A NG9 11 2003 B NG9
11 2004 . NG9 11 2004 . NG9
11 2005 . NG9 11 2005 . NG9
11 2006 A NG9 11 2006 A NG9
After ruref year entref poco berd ruref year entref poco berd
Imputation 11 2003 A NG9 11 2003 B NG9
11 2004 A NG9 11 2004 . NG9
11 2005 A NG9 11 2005 . NG9
11 2006 A NG9 11 2006 A NG9
Case III. IV.
Before ruref year entref poco berd ruref year entref poco berd
Imputation 11 2000 . NG9 11 2003 . S1
11 2001 . NG9 11 2004 . S1
11 2002 . NG9 11 2005 . S1
11 2003 A NG9 11 2006 A NG9
After ruref year entref poco berd ruref year entref poco berd
Imputation 11 2000 A NG9 11 2000 . S1
11 2001 A NG9 11 2001 . S1
11 2002 A NG9 11 2002 . S1
11 2003 A NG9 11 2003 A NG9
Table C.2: BERD enterprise reference number imputation rules I
is rather poor for earlier years. For earlier missing observations I will impute entref rt =
entref rt+1, but only if the reporting unit has not experienced any ownership change and
the postcode is still the same. This is illustrated at the bottom part of table C.2, case III.
All missing enterprise reference number for reporting unit 11 will be imputed. Taking
account of the ownership change is important, otherwise it could be the case that the
missing values of case B will be imputed. It is impossible to evaluate if enterprise reference
number A or B is the correct one. How can we make sure that the imputed enterprise
reference numbers are correct? The postcodes of the BSD can help. A reporting unit
can be any local unit of an enterprise. The BSD contains exactly that information, if the
reporting unit postcode is identical to the local unit postcode from the BSD, it is very
likely that the reporting unit is part of the enterprise.
Again, certain rules have to be applied. The ﬁrst rule drops all BERD reporting units if
a speciﬁc enterprise reference number of a certain year does not exist in the BSD. This
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is illustrated with reporting unit 11 in table C.3.
Sometimes a BERD enterprise reference number and year combination does exist, but
the postcodes are diﬀerent. If it has ever been the case, that a reporting unit had at
least once a postcode in the BERD, which is identical to a postcode in the BSD, then
all observations will be kept. Reporting unit 12 has a misspeciﬁed postcode in 2000 and
2001. Because it has the right postcode in 2003, I will keep all observations. Reasons
for this misspeciﬁcation are that the BERD data is partly gained from diﬀerent sources
than the BSD. Therefore the postcode can diﬀer slightly. It is worth noting that after
merging with the BSD no reporting unit exists, which changes its enterprise reference
number over time any more.
If the reporting unit has never had a postcode identical to the enterprise it was assumed
to be belonged to, then the reporting unit will be dropped. This is shown by reporting
unit 13 in table C.3.
Before ruref year entref berd entref bsd poco berd poco bsd
Cleaning 11 2000 A  NG9 
11 2001 A A NG9 NG9
11 2002 A A NG9 NG9
12 2000 A A XX S1
12 2001 A A XX S1
12 2002 A A S1 S1
13 2000 A A D3 ST7
13 2001 A A D3 ST7
13 2002 A A D3 ST7
After ruref year entref berd entref bsd poco berd poco bsd
Cleaning 11 2001 A A NG9 NG9
11 2002 A A NG9 NG9
12 2000 A A XX S1
12 2001 A A XX S1
12 2002 A A S1 S1
Table C.3: BERD enterprise reference number imputation rules II
Finally, an enterprise can have more than one reporting unit. If that is the case all values
are added up and collapsed to one observation.
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C.1.2. ASHE
Skill intensity information of ASHE
The information on the skill level of employees needs further explanations. The classiﬁ-
cation between highly skilled and unskilled workers is based on Her Majesty's Stationery
Oﬃce (2000), whereby the Standard Occupational Classiﬁcation (SOC) is used to allo-
cate Jobs to four diﬀerent skill levels. Level one indicates the lowest skilled workers, like
elementary trade occupations and level four high skilled workers, like research profes-
sionals.207 The exact job allocation is captured in table C.5 on page 290. Until 2001
SOC 1990 was employed, from 2002 onwards it was changed to SOC 2000. SOC 1990
and SOC 2000 are not comparable.208 The diﬀerentiation between low and high skilled
wages requires splitting the sample into two halves, one for the period 1998  2001 and
the other one from 2002  2008.
Cleaning the ASHE
Two cleaning strategies were employed: Firstly, many duplicates exist in ASHE, espe-
cially in the years 2004 and 2006, where it seems that every observation was included
twice. Duplicates were dropped. If it was just a miscoding, for example the same ID
number was entered for two diﬀerent observations, then they were still kept, because the
interest does not lie on following an individuals over time. Observations with missing
ID numbers were only dropped when an identical entry exists, unique ones were kept.
Secondly, the postcodes in 1997 are miscoded. Out of 150,000 observations, 90,000 post-
codes could not be found in the National Statistics Postcode Directory of 2009. This was
caused by wrong data input. For approximately 80,000 observation a 0 was added to the
207According to the ONS skill levels . . . are approximated by the length of time deemed necessary for
a person to become fully competent in the performance of the tasks associated with a job. (Her
Majesty's Stationery Oﬃce, 2000, p. 5). For example, for the ﬁrst skill level only compulsory
eduction is required. For the fourth skill level a degree and work experience are necessary.
208The VML oﬀers some look-up tables to connect SOC 1990 with SOC 2000, but as explained in ONS
(2009a), it is not recommended to use SOC 2000 before 2002. An Excel ﬁle on the VML server
reveals the complexity of allocating SOC 1990 to SOC 2000 and vice versa.
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end of the postcode. Deleting this wrong number reduces the non-matchable observa-
tions to 18,000. This remainder was caused by a non-systematically wrong data input.
Table C.5 shows the skill level of diﬀerent occupations.
SIC Description
15.41 Manufacture of crude oils and fats
15.43 Manufacture of margarine and similar edible fats
15.62 Manufacture of starches and starch products
15.88 Manufacture of homogenised food preparations and dietetic food
15.92 Production of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials
15.93 Manufacture of wines
15.95 Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages
17.14 Preparation and spinning of ﬂax-type ﬁbres
17.15 Throwing and preparation of silk including from noils and throwing
and texturing of synthetic or artiﬁcial ﬁlament yarns
17.16 Manufacture of sewing threads
17.17 Preparation and spinning of other textile ﬁbres
17.25 Other textile weaving
18.10 Manufacture of leather clothes
18.30 Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur
20.52 Manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials
21.11 Manufacture of pulp
23.10 Manufacture of coke oven products
24.11 Manufacture of industrial gases
25.12 Retreading and rebuilding of rubber tyres
26.25 Manufacture of other ceramic products
26.53 Manufacture of plaster
26.65 Manufacture of ﬁbre cement
27.31 Cold drawing
27.32 Cold rolling of narrow strip
27.35 This code is no longer in use
52.73 Repair of watches, clocks and jewellery
55.11 ?
55.12 ?
71.23 Renting of air transport equipment
Table C.4: List and description of BSD SIC which cannot be matched with ASHE
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SOC2000 SOC1990
Level 4 11 Corporate managers 1a Corporate managers and
administrators
21 Science and technology
professionals
2a Science and engineering
professionals
22 Health professionals 2b Health professionals
23 Teaching and research
professionals
2c Teaching professionals
24 Business and public service
professional
2d Other professional occupations
Level 3 12 Managers and proprietors in
agriculture and services
1b Managers/proprietors in
agriculture and services
31 Science and technology associate
professionals
3a Science and engineering associate
professionals
32 Health and social welfare associate
professionals
3b Health associate professionals
33 Protective service occupations 6a Protective service occupations
34 Culture, media and sports
occupations
3c Other associate professional
occupations
35 Business and public service
associate professionals
7a Buyers, brokers and sales
representatives
51 Skilled agricultural trades 9a Other occupations in agriculture,
forestry and ﬁshing
52 Skilled metal and electrical trades 5b Skilled engineering trades
53 Skilled construction and building
trades
5a Skilled construction trades
54 Textiles, printing and other skilled
trade
5c Other skilled trades
Level 2 41 Administrative occupations 4a Clerical occupations
42 Secretarial and related occupations 4b Secretarial occupations
61 Caring personal service
occupations
6b Personal service occupations
62 Leisure and other personal service
occupation
71 Sales occupations 7b Other sales occupations
72 Customer service occupations
81 Process, plant and machine
operatives
8a Industrial plant and machine
operators, assemblers
82 Transport and mobile machine
drivers and operatives
8b Drivers and mobile machine
operators
Level 1 91 Elementary trades, plant and
storage related occupations
9b Other elementary occupations
92 Elementary administration and
service occupations
Table C.5: Categorisation of job skill levels according to SOC 1990 and SOC 2000, based on
Her Majesty's Stationery Oﬃce (2000).
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C.2. The Creation of the Capital Stock Measures
Because the ARD does not select the same ﬁrms every year, gaps appear. Employment
and capital expenditure data is crucial for the calculation of the capital stock and there-
fore those gaps will be ﬁlled in. The second challenge is the calculation of the capital
stock in the ﬁrst year of a ﬁrm appearing in the data set. Appearing the ﬁrst time in
the ARD does not imply that it has not existed before. The ﬁrst year capital stock is
calculated by using the Volume in Capital Services (VICS).
The structure is as follows:
1. Preparing the data sets, including data imputations.
2. Finding capital stock for the ﬁrst year of appearance in the ARD.
3. Using a Perpetual Inventory Model (PIM).
Preparing the data: Data is available for nearly the whole necessary observation
period from 1997  2006.209 The dat ﬁles of the ARD are used including ﬁrms which have
been selected and returned the survey sheets. Firms are not always selected or return the
sheets every year, therefore gaps can appear. To ﬁll this gaps another data set called the
ARD Register Panel is used. Firms which have never been selected are dropped and then
the ARD and the ARD Register Panel are merged. The merge leads to many missing
values which have to be imputed. Gilhooly (2009) describes the imputation methods in
detail, so here is only a brief summary. First, employment ﬁgures have to be imputed,
because they will be needed for further imputations. If there is a gap in the employment
data, then just the average of the leading and the following employment will be derived. If
the missing employment data is at the beginning (end) of the appearance of the ﬁrm, then
the three year average of the following (preceding) years will be taken. The calculation of
209Data for 2007 and 2008 are also available, but unfortunately there are some serious issues with those
years and only 2,000 out of 47,000 observations can be used.
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the capital stock requires the capital expenditure of ﬁrms. Therefore all missing values
have to be imputed again. Because of the volatile behaviour of capital expenditure,
Gilhooly (2009) recommends to calculate an average capital stock per employee and then
to impute the missing capital expenditure values by multiplying the averages with the
actual number of employees.
Finding ﬁrst year capital stocks: A problem of the calculation of the capital stock
is to ﬁnd the capital stock for the ﬁrst year of appearance of a ﬁrm. Just because a
ﬁrm appears the ﬁrst time in the ARD does not necessarily imply that it is actually the
ﬁrst year of existence. The main idea is to use aggregate investment capital from the
Volume in Capital Services (VICS) and allocate those capital stocks to the ARD ﬁrms.
The number of ﬁrms included is much smaller than the population size, therefore we
have to ﬁnd ﬁrst the share of the industry capital which we can allocate to the ARD
ﬁrms. Because we do not have capital stock data for the ARD ﬁrms, we approximate the
share by using the share of investment of ARD ﬁrms in comparison to total investment
(equation C.1). Then we multiply the share with the aggregated capital stock data from
the VICS (equation C.2) and get the capital we can allocate to the ARD ﬁrms.
Firm Investment Share(asset) =
ARD︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
(rncapex)year, sic, asset
Industry Investmentyear, sic, asset︸ ︷︷ ︸
VICS
(C.1)
Alloc. F irm Capital(asset) = Industry Capitalasset︸ ︷︷ ︸
V ICS
×Firm Inv. Share(asset) (C.2)
Now the capital has to be allocated to the ARD ﬁrms. A variable is needed which is
highly correlated with the capital stock of a ﬁrm and which has been collected for most of
the periods. This variable is total purchases. As presented in equation C.3 a mixture of
total purchases and employment has been used to calculate the share of the aggregated
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capital stock which has to be allocated as precise as possible.210
m_Share =
(
totpurch∑
totpurchsic3d year
)
×
( ∑
employmentsic3d year∑
employmentsiclett year
)
(C.3)
Perpetual Inventory Model: The PIM adds the capital expenditures of the ﬁrm
to the existing capital stock annually, taking account of depreciations rates. Those are
twenty percent for vehicles, six percent for plant & machinery and two percent for build-
ing. The ﬁrst year capital stock is calculated as the allocated capital from the VICS plus
the real capital expenditures of the ﬁrm in the ﬁrst year:
FirmCap. Stockasset t=1 = (Alloc. F irmCapitalasset ×m_Share) + rncapext=1 (C.4)
In the following year the new capital expenditures are added and the depreciation is
deducted:
FirmCap. Stockasset t+1 = (Alloc. F irmCap.asset t × (1− δ)asset) + rncapext+1 (C.5)
where δ stands for the depreciations rate. Finally to get the total capital stock of a ﬁrm
in year t, all three kind of assets are aggregated:
Firm Total Cap. Stockyear =
∑
Firm Cap. Stockasset (C.6)
It can be the case that the allocated capital stock in the ﬁrst year is too low, therefore
negative capital stocks of a ﬁrm arise during the observation period. This problem
is solved by adding exactly the absolute of the negative value to all observations of a
reporting unit. This procedure has been conducted several times to minimise the amount
of negative capital stocks.
210The VICS contains information at the industry letter level, therefore by using employment we can
distribute the capital to a more disaggregated level.
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C.3. Empirical Results
C.3.1. Stage 1: Robustness checks
Manufacturing
Variables OLS lag PRO lag OLS curr PRO curr FIX curr
Hetero. -0.0002 -0.0103 0.0003 -0.0053 -0.0008 *
Frontier 0.0004 * 0.0005 -0.0007 *** -0.0432 *** 0.0007 ***
Age2 0.0001 ***
Employment -0.0384 *** 0.3834 *** -0.0392 *** 0.3914 *** -0.0315 ***
Employment2 0.0206 *** 0.0292 *** 0.0206 *** 0.0294 *** 0.0190 ***
Foreign 0.0153 *** 0.0161 0.0174 *** 0.0447 *** 0.0117 ***
Herﬁndahl -0.0108 * -0.1266 -0.0040 -0.1033 0.0009
Ind. Wage -0.0008 -0.0235 -0.0007 -0.0157 0.0046 ***
Reg. Wage 0.0052 ** 0.0986 ** 0.0045 ** 0.1116 *** 0.0002
Agglomeration 0.0004 0.0094 ** 0.0002 0.0104 ** -0.0000
Ex. R&D 0.0354 0.4284 0.0041 -0.1040 -0.0226
Ih. R&D -0.0194 -0.2021 -0.0021 0.0692 0.0139
Unionisation 0.0027 -0.1503 *** 0.0041 * -0.1578 *** 0.0005
Constant 0.0025 -3.3470 *** -0.0058 -3.7959 *** -0.0269 *
Observations 1,009,570 1,008,547 1,263,414 1,263,078 1,263,414
R-Square .262 .264 .0489
Tradable Services
Hetero. 0.0064 *** 0.2045 *** 0.0075 *** 0.1918 *** 0.0004
Frontier 0.0018 *** 0.0488 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0010 ***
Age2 0.0000 ***
Employment -0.0160 *** 0.5944 *** -0.0161 *** 0.6185 *** -0.0081 ***
Employment2 0.0179 *** -0.0033 0.0168 *** -0.0093 *** 0.0086 ***
Foreign 0.0047 *** 0.1335 *** 0.0066 *** 0.1842 *** 0.0103 ***
Herﬁndahl -0.0422 *** -2.5247 *** -0.0690 *** -3.7631 *** 0.0158 **
Ind. Wage 0.0138 *** 0.5416 *** 0.0147 *** 1.0542 *** 0.0026 ***
Reg. Wage -0.0106 *** -0.1118 ** -0.0096 *** -0.0385 0.0010
Agglomeration 0.0005 *** 0.0053 0.0007 *** 0.0115 ** -0.0000
Ex. R&D -0.0228 -1.9355 ** -0.0171 -2.0485 *** 0.0259 ***
Ih. R&D 0.0008 0.5062 * -0.0070 0.5200 -0.0082 **
Unionisation -0.0008 0.2233 -0.0082 *** -0.0919 -0.0103 ***
Constant -0.0383 *** -6.2139 *** -0.0421 *** -10.1161 *** -0.0174 **
Observations 933,263 933,153 1,259,273 1,259,045 1,259,273
R-Square .201 .194 .0259
Firm FE No No No No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table C.6: Current and lagged OLS, Probit and FE estimation results for stage 1
294
Manufacturing Tradable Services
Variables Hetero. 3 C4 Sci. Emp. Hetero. 3 C4 Sci. Emp.
Hetero. -0.0011 ** -0.0012 ** 0.0009 ** 0.0009 **
Hetero. 3 -0.0123 *** -0.0013
Frontier 0.0018 *** 0.0021 *** 0.0021 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0015 ***
Age2 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Employment -0.0195 *** -0.0216 *** -0.0216 *** -0.0067 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0073 ***
Employment2 0.0127 *** 0.0138 *** 0.0138 *** 0.0079 *** 0.0085 *** 0.0085 ***
Foreign 0.0012 0.0027 * 0.0028 * 0.0059 *** 0.0092 *** 0.0092 ***
Herﬁndahl 0.0107 *** 0.0091 ** 0.0099 0.0199 **
C4 0.0033 0.0054 **
Ind. Wage 0.0022 0.0030 * 0.0031 * 0.0036 ** 0.0027 ** 0.0030 **
Reg. Wage 0.0012 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007
Agglomeration 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
Ex. R&D 0.0133 0.0174 0.0079 0.0370 ** 0.0306 ** 0.0397 ***
Ih. R&D -0.0025 -0.0054 -0.0117 ** -0.0083 *
Sci. Emp. 0.0009 -0.0131 **
Unionisation -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0087 *** -0.0118 *** -0.0121 ***
Constant 0.0018 -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.0081 -0.0051 -0.0066
Observations 890,156 1,009,570 1,009,570 844,888 933,263 933,263
R-Square .0207 .0255 .0255 .02 .0235 .0235
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table C.7: Robustness checks for stage 1
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C.3.2. Stage 2: Robustness checks
While in the manufacturing sector the signiﬁcance and sometimes even the signs diﬀer
from each other, the coeﬃcients in the tradable service sector are completely diﬀerent
for competition and industry wage variables.
Manufacturing
Variables OLS lag PRO lag OLS curr PRO curr FIX curr
Hetero. -0.0085 -0.0379 0.0047 0.0028 0.0039
Frontier -0.0237 *** -0.0807 *** -0.0346 *** -0.1216 *** -0.0034
age 0.0030 *** 0.0098 *** 0.0041 *** 0.0134 ***
Age2 0.0001 ***
Employment -0.0281 *** -0.0266 -0.0256 *** -0.0026 0.0406 ***
Employment2 0.0129 *** 0.0323 *** 0.0131 *** 0.0316 *** 0.0181 ***
Foreign -0.0103 -0.0344 * -0.0067 -0.0220 0.0060
Herﬁndahl 0.0267 0.1030 0.0055 0.0213 0.0236
Ind. Wage -0.0069 -0.0359 0.0102 0.0208 0.0216
Agglomeration 0.0046 * 0.0144 * 0.0039 0.0123 -0.0023
Ex. R&D 0.3071 0.9023 0.0050 0.0369 0.0082
Ih. R&D -0.1910 -0.5585 -0.0323 -0.0991 -0.0767
Unionisation -0.0579 ** -0.2186 ** -0.0447 * -0.1880 ** -0.0017
Constant 0.1666 -0.8329 0.0282 -1.5238 *** -0.3629 ***
Observations 65,446 65,323 76,766 76,692 76,766
R-Square .121 .131 .0684
Tradable Services
Hetero. -0.0316 *** -0.0871 ** -0.0270 *** -0.0985 ** -0.0144 ***
Frontier 0.0050 *** 0.0188 ** 0.0011 -0.0015 0.0027 *
age 0.0009 *** 0.0064 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0112 ***
Age2 0.0001 ***
Employment -0.0064 ** 0.0343 ** -0.0072 *** 0.0450 *** 0.0325 ***
Employment2 0.0050 *** 0.0151 *** 0.0050 *** 0.0139 *** 0.0015 **
Foreign 0.0238 *** 0.0533 * 0.0307 *** 0.0846 *** 0.0112 *
Herﬁndahl 0.3768 *** -0.0235 0.5955 *** 0.6423 0.3201 ***
Ind. Wage -0.0306 0.1522 -0.2116 *** -0.6109 *** -0.1604 ***
Agglomeration -0.0030 *** -0.0176 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0214 *** -0.0019 *
Ex. R&D 0.2824 * -0.4282 0.3101 *** -0.1312 0.1774 **
Ih. R&D -0.1245 ** 0.0456 -0.1213 * 0.1244 0.0685 *
Unionisation 0.1091 *** 0.4626 ** 0.0585 0.3159 0.0429 *
Constant 0.2722 * -2.3585 *** 1.3790 *** 2.3781 ** 0.9491 ***
Observations 66,470 66,171 79,361 78,912 79,361
R-Square .0853 .0892 .038
Firm FE No No No No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table C.8: Current and lagged OLS, Probit and FE estimation results for stage 2
The problem of the wage measure is that just a high wage in an industry might not reﬂect
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that the wage of low skilled workers is necessarily higher in those sectors. Therefore Girma
and Görg (2004) diﬀerentiate between wages of skilled and unskilled labour. Because of
a change in the SOC the sample is split into two parts, one using SOC 1990 for the years
1998  2001 and another one using SOC 2000 for the years 2002  2008. Results are
presented in tables C.9  C.10 in the last two bottom columns. We ﬁnd a negative but
insigniﬁcant relationship between low skilled industry wages and vertical integration using
SOC 1990 in manufacturing and in the tradable service sector. The SOC 2003 is only
signiﬁcantly negative for high-skilled wages in the tradable service sector. Concluding,
we cannot ﬁnd a clear evidence for Girma and Görg's cost-savings argument.
The other columns in tables C.9  C.10 test the results if alternative covariates were
considered. The base column shows the baseline results and the Hetero. column the
results if the heterogeneity measure based on all ﬁrms was used. In the Hetero. 3
columns we present the results for the heterogeneity measure based on a three year
average productivity growth. In the C4 column the Herﬁndahl index was substituted
with the C4 concentration index. The coeﬃcients always keep the same size, but are
only signiﬁcant in the tradable service sector. To check if the in-house R&D measure
is reliable, a scientiﬁc staﬀ to total employment ratio for every industry was calculated.
The results are presented in the Scientist column. While there is no change in the non-
R&D variables, the eﬀect of external R&D is smaller in manufacturing, but positive, and
the scientiﬁc employment ratio is still negative. In the tradable service sector the size
of the external R&D coeﬃcient becomes signiﬁcant and larger, but now the sign of the
scientiﬁc staﬀ variable is negative. Finally, instead of using the 99th percentile ﬁrm as
technological leader of an industry, the most productive ﬁrm was employed. Results are
part of column Frontier, robust and hardly change in any sector.
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Manufacturing
Variables Base Hetero. Hetero. 3 Inter. C4
Hetero. -0.0111 -0.0110 -0.0114
Base Hetero. -0.0212 *
3y. av. Het. -0.0398
Frontier 0.0070 ** 0.0084 *** 0.0057 * 0.0071 ** 0.0070 **
Age2 -0.0000 * -0.0000 -0.0001 ** -0.0000 * -0.0000 *
Employment 0.0466 *** 0.1210 *** 0.0479 *** 0.0467 *** 0.0466 ***
Employment2 0.0108 *** 0.0098 *** 0.0108 *** 0.0108 ***
Foreign 0.0013 0.0014 0.0020 -0.0107 0.0013
Foreign×ex. R&D 0.1291
Foreign×ih. R&D 0.0519
Foreign×Union 0.0241
Herﬁndahl 0.0534 0.0528 0.0533 0.0541
C4 0.0344
Ind. Wage 0.0102 0.0079 0.0027 0.0106 0.0078
Agglomeration -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
Ex. R&D 0.3236 * 0.3094 0.2808 0.3200 0.3417 *
Ih. R&D -0.2390 * -0.2365 * -0.2333 * -0.2943 ** -0.2505 **
Unionisation -0.0304 * -0.0318 * -0.0300 -0.0346 * -0.0322 *
Constant -0.0578 -0.1474 0.0199 -0.0577 -0.0495
Observations 65,446 65,448 58,882 65,446 65,446
R-Square .037 .0351 .0311 .0371 .037
Variables Sci. Emp. Front. max SOC90 SOC03
Hetero. -0.0110 -0.0113 0.0065 -0.0252 **
Frontier 0.0071 ** 0.0038 0.0065 *
max. Frontier 0.0035 *
Age2 -0.0000 * -0.0000 * -0.0000 -0.0001 **
Employment 0.0465 *** 0.0440 *** -0.0038 0.0450 ***
Employment2 0.0108 *** 0.0109 *** 0.0061 ** 0.0083 ***
Foreign 0.0011 0.0015 0.0101 -0.0026
Herﬁndahl 0.0584 0.0498 0.0636 -0.0017
Ind. Wage 0.0081 0.0080
LS wage 90 -0.0167
HS wage 90 0.0013
LS wage 03 0.0237 *
HS wage 03 0.0072
Agglomeration -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0020
Ex. R&D -0.0222 0.3298 * 1.8808 0.4457 *
Ih. R&D -0.2445 ** -0.4137 -0.4261 **
Sci. staﬀ -0.0264
Unionisation -0.0307 * -0.0322 * -0.0443 -0.0071
Constant -0.0469 -0.0347 0.2638 * -0.0947
Observations 65,446 65,446 18,415 44,626
R-Square .0369 .037 .00577 .0202
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table C.9: Robustness checks for manufacturing sector in stage 2
298
Tradable Services
Variables Base Hetero. Hetero. 3 Inter. C4
Hetero. -0.0162 *** -0.0164 *** -0.0168 ***
Base Hetero. 0.0146 **
3y. av. Het. 0.0954 ***
Frontier 0.0046 ** 0.0050 *** 0.0051 ** 0.0046 ** 0.0047 **
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Employment 0.0385 *** 0.0356 *** 0.0455 *** 0.0383 *** 0.0386 ***
Employment2 -0.0005 -0.0015 * -0.0005 -0.0005
Foreign 0.0007 0.0009 0.0013 -0.0128 0.0010
Foreign×ex. R&D 0.2864
Foreign×ih. R&D -0.1217
Foreign×Union 0.0821
Herﬁndahl 0.3407 *** 0.3803 *** 0.3560 *** 0.3440 ***
C4 0.0529 *
Ind. Wage -0.0981 *** -0.0988 *** -0.1052 *** -0.0990 *** -0.0935 ***
Agglomeration -0.0026 * -0.0026 * -0.0022 * -0.0026 * -0.0026 *
Ex. R&D 0.1117 0.0859 0.0212 0.0778 0.0455
Ih. R&D 0.0684 * 0.0697 * 0.0871 * 0.0851 * 0.0869 *
Unionisation 0.0425 0.0340 0.0130 0.0346 0.0472 *
Constant 0.6362 *** 0.6166 *** 0.5958 *** 0.6432 *** 0.6053 ***
Observations 66,470 66,470 60,989 66,470 66,470
R-Square .0263 .0261 .0226 .0264 .0261
Variables Sci. Emp. Front. max SOC90 SOC03
Hetero. -0.0165 *** -0.0177 *** -0.0030 -0.0150 **
Frontier 0.0045 ** 0.0044 0.0060 **
max. Frontier 0.0042 ***
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 *** 0.0000 *
Employment 0.0386 *** 0.0379 *** -0.0202 * 0.0497 ***
Employment2 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0060 *** -0.0022 **
Foreign 0.0005 0.0010 0.0365 * 0.0101
Herﬁndahl 0.3813 *** 0.3489 *** 0.1221 0.1427
Ind. Wage -0.0977 *** -0.0997 ***
LS wage 90 -0.0097
HS wage 90 0.1089 **
LS wage 03 0.0186
HS wage 03 -0.0785 ***
Agglomeration -0.0026 * -0.0026 * -0.0053 * -0.0022
Ex. R&D 0.2793 ** 0.1117 -0.0852 -0.1783
Ih. R&D 0.0606 0.1489 0.1478 **
Sci. staﬀ -0.0011
Unionisation 0.0485 * 0.0298 -0.0607 -0.0373
Constant 0.6331 *** 0.6719 *** -0.5084 0.4265 **
Observations 66,470 66,470 16,498 49,200
R-Square .0263 .0266 .0153 .0126
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table C.10: Robustness checks for the tradable service sector in stage 2
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Manufacturing Tradable Services
Variables OLS lag OLS curr FIX curr OLS lag OLS curr FIX curr
Hetero. -180 523 980 -3,456 *** -3,328 *** -2,259 ***
Frontier 1,712 *** 843 ** -266 2,237 *** 1,708 *** 719 ***
Age2 17 *** 7 ***
Emp. -10,004 *** -10,558 *** -10,408 *** -2,039 *** -2,481 *** 743
Emp.2 3,030 *** 3,144 *** 3,665 *** 1,196 *** 1,218 *** 514 ***
Foreign 9,241 *** 8,862 *** -45 7,523 *** 8,334 *** 1,648
Herﬁndahl 4,012 8,730 2,949 48,551 ** 61,354 *** 28,254 *
Ind. Wage 2,532 6,347 4,142 * -1,057 -15,935 *** -12,089 ***
Agglom. -325 -208 872 ** -300 * -200 -286
Ex. R&D 59,755 32,826 -38,193 -16,060 12,069 14,720
Ih. R&D -30,935 -15,103 17,966 904 -14,274 9,774 *
Unionisation -4,759 -7,385 * -5,037 * 10,575 * 8,913 14,882 ***
Constant -45,001 -68,930 * 6,645 12,355 109,391 *** 101,140 ***
Observations 65,446 76,766 76,766 66,470 79,361 79,361
R-Square .172 .174 .0309 .081 .0824 .0163
Firm FE No No Yes No No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Region FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Manufacturing
Variables Base FIX C4 Sci. Emp. Frontier Hetero. 3
Hetero. -335 -337 -281 -383
3y. av. Het. 111
Frontier 1,047 ** 1,047 ** 1,062 ** 725
max. Frontier 347
Age2 9 *** 9 *** 9 *** 9 *** 8 **
Employment -4,659 *** -4,659 *** -4,659 *** -5,172 *** -5,360 ***
Employment2 2,302 *** 2,302 *** 2,301 *** 2,324 *** 2,321 ***
Foreign -1,026 -1,026 -1,027 -996 -1,785
Herﬁndahl 1,992 2,446 1,578 3,038
C4 1,006
Ind. Wage -422 -483 -60 -741 -1,804
Agglomeration 339 340 339 355 75
Ex. R&D -18,999 -18,364 7,215 -18,272 -27,846
Ih. R&D 4,490 4,090 3,749 8,737
Sci. staﬀ -12,460
Unionisation -4,066 -4,094 -4,176 -4,256 -5,375 *
Constant 26,859 27,027 25,126 29,595 32,205
Observations 65,446 65,446 65,446 65,446 58,882
R-Square .0146 .0146 .0147 .0145 .0128
Tradable Services
Hetero. -1,993 ** -2,054 ** -2,005 ** -2,270 ***
3y. av. Het. 10,753 **
Frontier 1,153 *** 1,168 *** 1,148 *** 1,041 ***
max. Frontier 837 ***
Age2 2 2 2 1 1
Employment 2,659 *** 2,674 *** 2,671 *** 2,376 *** 3,125 ***
Employment2 178 179 * 175 193 * 84
Foreign -275 -244 -307 -179 34
Herﬁndahl 37,311 ** 40,319 ** 39,592 ** 35,645 *
C4 6,191
Ind. Wage -6,385 ** -5,908 ** -6,436 ** -6,772 ** -9,040 ***
Agglomeration -459 ** -458 ** -457 ** -465 ** -489 **
Ex. R&D -1,822 -8,813 18,968 -1,586 -24,873
Ih. R&D 15,325 ** 17,227 ** 13,676 * 19,092 **
Sci. staﬀ 7,165
Unionisation 15,468 *** 16,009 *** 15,844 *** 12,727 *** 10,699 **
Constant 63,374 *** 60,233 *** 63,579 *** 71,298 *** 75,196 ***
Observations 66,470 66,470 66,470 66,470 60,989
R-Square .0124 .0123 .0123 .0126 .0096
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table C.12: Robustness checks for stage 3
301
D. The Eﬀects of Fragmentation on Employment and
Productivity
D.1. More Information on Exiting Plants
In which sectors and regions did most of the exiting vertically integrated local units
appear? There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the tradable service sector and man-
ufacturing. Table D.1 shows in the ﬁrst column the total number of local units and in
the second column the number of closed local units. In the third column we can ﬁnd the
share of closed local units to total number of local units in this industry and in the last
column the proportion of closed local units of this industry to total number of closed local
units. In manufacturing, most of the fragmentation happened for retail outlets, followed
by diﬀerent manufacturing industries. This is a surprising result, because we look at
the closure of forward vertically integrated local units and we would expect retail outlets
being downstream local units. A look at the input-output table reveals that a small
but positive amount of goods from SIC 52 are used as intermediaries in manufacturing
sectors. Therefore we will keep those observations. Nearly six percent of all closed local
units have conducted business activities. In the tradable service sector three-fourth of
all fragmented local units are from SIC 74 (other business activities) followed by SIC 72
(Computer and Related Activities). 86 percent of closed local units are covered by the
top 5 industries.
Diﬀerences between the manufacturing and the tradable service sector also appear in the
regional distribution of plant closures (see table D.2). 20 percent of all closed local units
of service ﬁrms were located in London, followed by South East and South West. In
manufacturing, fragmentation is more equally distributed over the whole country. Most
closed local units of manufacturing ﬁrms are from the South West, followed by the North
West and the West Midlands.
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Manufacturing
SIC Total no of Plants Exiting Plants Firm Ind. Share Total Share
52 15,465 952 513 6.16 11.46
22 28,053 680 416 2.42 8.19
15 26,390 658 355 2.49 7.92
28 27,773 652 541 2.35 7.85
29 20,396 616 473 3.02 7.42
74 5,270 546 491 10.36 6.57
Tradable Services
74 260,334 6,870 1,293 2.64 72.04
72 32,345 934 371 2.89 9.79
85 1,249 175 54 14.01 1.83
45 952 141 96 14.81 1.48
70 1,592 115 85 7.22 1.21
Notes:
15 Manufacturing of Food products, Beverages and Tobacco
22 Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media
25 Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products
28 Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Equipment
29 Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment Not Elsewhere Classiﬁed
45 Construction
52 Retail, Except of Motor veh. & motorc.; Repair of personal & household goods
70 Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities
72 Computer and Related Activities
74 Other Business Activities
85 Health and Social Work
Table D.1: Number of exiting local units per 2 digit SIC code for period 1998  2008.
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Manufacturing
GOR Total no of Plants Exiting Plants ﬁrms Ind. Share Total Share
J 32,354 1,057 821 3.27 12.73
B 31,040 972 737 3.13 11.70
F 29,058 880 660 3.03 10.59
G 24,506 804 605 3.28 9.68
H 21,886 771 554 3.52 9.28
D 27,133 763 564 2.81 9.19
K 22,558 714 529 3.17 8.60
X 23,105 695 505 3.01 8.37
E 22,711 686 524 3.02 8.26
Tradable Services
H 53,763 1,868 630 3.47 19.5
J 48,762 1,675 531 3.44 17.5
K 26,786 1,147 269 4.28 12.0
B 32,567 874 311 2.68 9.16
F 22,698 743 253 3.27 7.79
X 31,684 713 287 2.25 7.48
G 26,110 698 287 2.67 7.32
D 22,022 623 248 2.83 6.53
E 15,675 515 195 3.29 5.40
Notes:
B North West
D Yorkshire and The Humber
E East Midlands
F West Midlands
G East England
H London
J South East
K South West
X Scotland
Table D.2: Number of exiting local units per government oﬃce region for period 1998  2008.
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D.2. More Information on Descriptive Statistics
Table D.3 presents descriptive statistics for the tradable service sector, if the outlier has
not been dropped.
Tradable Services
t* Obs. Employment Net Emp. R. Turn. R. Firm Prod.
-2 64 38.88 33.42 3,014 85.96
-1 64 35.89 30.00 3,091 79.74
0 64 36.06 30.34 2,830 88.28
1 64 33.22 33.22 2,729 89.00
2 64 33.45 33.45 2,737 81.52
3 64 34.98 34.98 2,871 95.31
t* No. of Plants Foreign Concent. Unionisation Ih. R&D
-2 2.33 0.12 0.07 0.26 5.57
-1 2.33 0.09 0.06 0.24 5.67
0 2.33 0.06 0.06 0.20 5.69
1 1.33 0.07 0.07 0.19 4.18
2 1.33 0.06 0.07 0.17 6.27
3 1.33 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.56
Table D.3: Descriptive statistics of treatment group with outlier.
In the following tables we show descriptive statistics for the unbalanced samples.
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Manufacturing
t* Obs. Employment Net Emp. R. Turn. R. Firm Prod. No. of Plants Foreign Concent. Unionisation Ih. R&D
Treatment Group
-2 310 179.85 146.91 15,337 74.85 3.09 0.25 0.10 0.46 0.02
-1 310 179.54 148.76 15,727 76.24 3.09 0.23 0.10 0.46 0.02
0 310 176.91 148.93 15,546 78.09 3.09 0.19 0.11 0.44 0.02
1 310 157.72 157.72 15,311 107.26 2.26 0.17 0.11 0.43 0.03
2 310 153.11 153.11 14,862 99.17 2.15 0.17 0.12 0.41 0.02
3 310 145.66 145.66 14,568 90.61 2.07 0.16 0.13 0.41 0.02
4 310 146.24 146.24 13,683 84.73 2.12 0.18 0.12 0.40 0.02
5 310 137.51 137.51 13,214 89.60 1.94 0.20 0.13 0.39 0.03
VI Control Group
-2 5,840 78.86 78.86 8,496 85.15 1.84 0.10 0.10 0.45 0.03
-1 5,840 79.81 79.81 8,586 83.78 1.84 0.11 0.10 0.44 0.03
0 5,840 81.04 81.04 8,721 81.28 1.84 0.11 0.10 0.43 0.03
1 5,840 83.96 83.96 8,640 78.44 1.90 0.10 0.11 0.42 0.03
2 5,840 86.63 86.63 9,072 76.80 1.97 0.10 0.11 0.40 0.03
3 5,840 88.79 88.79 9,668 76.43 2.04 0.09 0.11 0.38 0.03
4 5,840 90.43 90.43 10,469 76.02 2.13 0.09 0.11 0.37 0.03
5 5,840 92.12 92.12 10,687 74.77 2.22 0.09 0.12 0.35 0.03
ALL Comparison Group
-2 14,189 68.21 68.21 7,017 90.56 1.72 0.09 0.09 0.45 0.03
-1 14,189 69.28 69.28 7,117 89.66 1.72 0.10 0.10 0.44 0.03
0 14,189 70.29 70.29 7,195 88.12 1.72 0.10 0.10 0.43 0.03
1 14,189 72.89 72.89 7,254 84.43 1.80 0.09 0.10 0.41 0.03
2 14,189 74.35 74.35 7,573 82.79 1.85 0.09 0.11 0.39 0.04
3 14,189 75.05 75.05 7,897 83.17 1.88 0.08 0.11 0.38 0.04
4 14,189 75.65 75.65 8,266 84.39 1.92 0.09 0.11 0.36 0.04
5 14,189 76.25 76.25 8,408 82.44 1.95 0.09 0.11 0.34 0.04
Table D.4: Descriptive statistics for control and treatment groups in the manufacturing sector using the unrestricted balanced sample
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Manufacturing
t* Obs. Employment Net Emp. R. Turn. R. Firm Prod. No. of Plants Foreign Concent. Unionisation Ih. R&D
Treatment Group
-3 367 89.83 75.11 8,201 63.74 2.23 0.13 0.21 0.44 0.35
-2 423 94.62 78.20 8,048 63.77 2.27 0.09 0.22 0.44 0.40
-1 423 89.08 74.19 7,709 66.56 2.27 0.08 0.22 0.42 0.32
0 423 84.45 70.63 7,657 64.91 2.27 0.07 0.24 0.40 0.35
1 423 70.82 70.82 6,967 80.10 1.27 0.07 0.25 0.39 1.07
2 366 63.04 63.04 6,205 79.61 1.25 0.06 0.26 0.37 0.43
3 319 64.33 64.33 6,390 78.88 1.23 0.07 0.27 0.37 0.42
4 221 55.46 55.46 4,875 74.29 1.23 0.08 0.25 0.37 0.49
5 165 59.56 59.56 5,636 78.96 1.26 0.12 0.26 0.38 0.37
6 105 57.26 57.26 5,559 76.29 1.30 0.10 0.28 0.38 0.41
VI Control Group
-3 5,211 53.49 53.49 4,737 63.45 2.25 0.11 0.22 0.44 0.35
-2 6,284 54.55 54.55 4,832 63.46 2.26 0.10 0.22 0.43 0.37
-1 6,284 54.19 54.19 4,866 63.41 2.26 0.09 0.23 0.41 0.41
0 6,284 53.75 53.75 4,873 63.26 2.26 0.08 0.23 0.40 0.46
1 6,284 52.96 52.96 4,867 63.30 2.26 0.08 0.24 0.38 0.50
2 5,211 51.45 51.45 4,793 63.39 2.25 0.07 0.24 0.37 0.52
3 4,245 50.74 50.74 4,819 63.95 2.24 0.06 0.24 0.36 0.54
4 3,382 50.57 50.57 4,924 65.00 2.23 0.06 0.25 0.35 0.54
5 2,591 50.16 50.16 5,040 66.09 2.23 0.06 0.26 0.33 0.55
6 1,871 50.01 50.01 5,141 67.73 2.23 0.06 0.26 0.33 0.55
ALL Comparison Group
-3 10,261 48.26 48.26 4,416 68.35 2.17 0.10 0.22 0.43 0.34
-2 12,447 49.49 49.49 4,487 68.01 2.18 0.09 0.22 0.43 0.35
-1 12,447 49.10 49.10 4,497 67.78 2.18 0.08 0.23 0.41 0.40
0 12,447 48.72 48.72 4,479 67.09 2.18 0.08 0.23 0.40 0.46
1 12,447 47.94 47.94 4,446 66.95 2.18 0.07 0.24 0.38 0.49
2 10,261 46.15 46.15 4,345 67.10 2.17 0.06 0.24 0.37 0.53
3 8,319 44.70 44.70 4,300 67.85 2.17 0.06 0.25 0.36 0.54
4 6,615 44.17 44.17 4,315 68.80 2.16 0.06 0.25 0.35 0.54
5 5,073 43.56 43.56 4,343 69.44 2.16 0.06 0.26 0.34 0.56
6 3,665 43.36 43.36 4,426 70.71 2.16 0.06 0.27 0.33 0.56
Table D.5: Descriptive statistics for control and treatment groups in the manufacturing sector using the restricted unbalanced sample
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Manufacturing
t* Obs. Employment Net Emp. R. Turn. R. Firm Prod. No. of Plants Foreign Concent. Unionisation Ih. R&D
Treatment Group
-3 549 108.75 90.17 9,852 68.12 2.58 0.16 0.10 0.44 0.05
-2 680 145.12 120.46 12,347 69.94 2.81 0.14 0.11 0.44 0.03
-1 680 141.85 118.89 12,131 71.80 2.81 0.13 0.11 0.43 0.02
0 680 137.14 115.63 12,090 71.12 2.81 0.13 0.12 0.41 0.03
1 680 121.26 121.26 11,586 90.20 1.96 0.12 0.12 0.40 0.03
2 595 117.10 117.10 11,398 90.51 1.91 0.12 0.12 0.39 0.03
3 525 117.21 117.21 11,700 84.14 1.92 0.12 0.13 0.38 0.03
4 385 130.32 130.32 11,757 81.12 2.10 0.16 0.12 0.39 0.03
5 296 134.57 134.57 12,727 88.41 1.93 0.20 0.13 0.39 0.03
6 205 158.43 158.43 18,493 91.16 2.10 0.22 0.13 0.40 0.02
VI Control Group
-3 9,493 76.92 76.92 8,037 80.76 1.94 0.10 0.10 0.44 0.03
-2 11,668 79.30 79.30 8,422 80.33 1.94 0.10 0.10 0.43 0.03
-1 11,668 79.54 79.54 8,549 79.32 1.94 0.10 0.10 0.42 0.03
0 11,668 80.43 80.43 8,763 78.12 1.94 0.10 0.11 0.40 0.03
1 11,668 83.42 83.42 8,955 75.60 2.03 0.10 0.11 0.39 0.03
2 10,117 86.16 86.16 9,187 74.33 2.08 0.10 0.11 0.38 0.03
3 8,601 87.89 87.89 9,652 74.36 2.12 0.09 0.11 0.37 0.03
4 7,136 89.46 89.46 10,211 74.14 2.17 0.09 0.11 0.36 0.03
5 5,691 90.40 90.40 10,370 73.92 2.22 0.09 0.12 0.35 0.03
6 4,236 92.86 92.86 10,650 73.85 2.28 0.09 0.12 0.35 0.03
ALL Comparison Group
-3 22,788 68.16 68.16 6,999 88.78 1.77 0.09 0.10 0.44 0.03
-2 28,326 69.36 69.36 7,142 88.96 1.77 0.09 0.10 0.43 0.03
-1 28,326 69.71 69.71 7,230 87.71 1.77 0.09 0.10 0.42 0.03
0 28,326 70.30 70.30 7,344 86.30 1.77 0.09 0.10 0.40 0.04
1 28,326 72.60 72.60 7,521 83.28 1.87 0.09 0.11 0.39 0.04
2 24,237 73.92 73.92 7,671 82.11 1.91 0.09 0.11 0.38 0.04
3 20,477 74.01 74.01 7,818 82.82 1.93 0.08 0.11 0.37 0.04
4 16,999 74.60 74.60 8,069 81.17 1.95 0.09 0.11 0.36 0.04
5 13,604 75.35 75.35 8,245 80.37 1.96 0.09 0.11 0.34 0.04
6 10,220 76.91 76.91 8,513 80.70 1.98 0.09 0.11 0.34 0.03
Table D.6: Descriptive statistics for control and treatment groups in the manufacturing sector using the unrestricted unbalanced
sample
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Tradable Services
t* Obs. Employment Net Emp. R. Turn. R. Firm Prod. No. of Plants Foreign Concent. Unionisation Ih. R&D
Treatment Group
-2 134 64.03 55.53 4,708 126.73 2.84 0.14 0.05 0.26 0.10
-1 134 64.59 55.71 4,734 138.34 2.84 0.10 0.04 0.25 0.09
0 134 65.97 57.28 4,323 115.51 2.84 0.09 0.04 0.22 0.11
1 134 64.61 64.61 5,011 99.94 2.01 0.09 0.03 0.19 0.10
2 134 67.38 67.38 4,507 84.07 1.93 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.10
3 134 68.35 68.35 4,692 92.27 1.88 0.10 0.04 0.16 0.07
VI Control Group
-2 3,897 25.32 25.32 2,540 116.45 1.79 0.07 0.04 0.29 0.19
-1 3,897 26.98 26.98 2,778 116.08 1.79 0.07 0.04 0.27 0.17
0 3,897 28.91 28.91 2,971 114.67 1.79 0.07 0.04 0.24 0.18
1 3,897 32.20 32.20 3,246 117.93 1.88 0.07 0.04 0.22 0.18
2 3,897 36.96 36.96 3,394 96.20 2.01 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.21
3 3,897 41.16 41.16 3,697 93.83 2.15 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.22
ALL comparison Group
-2 27,134 31.16 31.16 2,210 90.27 1.87 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.06
-1 27,134 32.80 32.80 2,414 90.24 1.87 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.06
0 27,134 34.56 34.56 2,524 86.32 1.87 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.06
1 27,134 37.74 37.74 2,701 82.07 1.95 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.06
2 27,134 40.88 40.88 2,817 74.43 2.01 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.07
3 27,134 43.16 43.16 2,937 73.90 2.07 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.07
Table D.7: Descriptive statistics for control and treatment groups in the tradable service sector using the unrestricted balanced
sample
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Tradable Services
t* Obs. Employment Net Emp. R. Turn. R. Firm Prod. No. of Plants Foreign Concent. Unionisation Ih. R&D
Treatment Group
-3 82 31.79 26.59 1,935 131.52 2.34 0.08 0.08 0.26 0.35
-2 94 39.30 33.21 3,028 86.05 2.32 0.10 0.08 0.25 4.00
-1 94 39.12 32.80 3,701 99.39 2.32 0.10 0.07 0.23 4.05
0 94 38.61 32.39 3,563 103.34 2.32 0.08 0.07 0.20 4.28
1 94 31.24 31.24 2,914 99.21 1.32 0.07 0.07 0.18 3.38
2 81 32.15 32.15 2,731 82.74 1.27 0.05 0.07 0.16 5.06
3 64 34.98 34.98 2,871 95.31 1.33 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.56
4 40 40.00 40.00 6,536 264.06 1.33 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.52
5 24 50.54 50.54 5,974 176.24 1.25 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.72
6 16 61.00 61.00 8,311 247.02 1.19 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.73
VI Control Group
-3 2,160 12.61 12.61 842 66.65 2.18 0.07 0.10 0.29 2.16
-2 2,637 13.31 13.31 882 66.51 2.20 0.06 0.10 0.28 2.77
-1 2,637 13.27 13.27 890 66.33 2.20 0.06 0.10 0.26 3.60
0 2,637 13.30 13.30 879 66.35 2.20 0.05 0.10 0.23 4.79
1 2,637 13.22 13.22 866 66.69 2.20 0.05 0.10 0.21 5.59
2 2,160 12.43 12.43 828 68.12 2.18 0.04 0.10 0.20 6.52
3 1,737 12.13 12.13 822 69.40 2.16 0.04 0.10 0.19 7.56
4 1,376 11.96 11.96 830 70.11 2.17 0.04 0.10 0.18 7.15
5 1,051 12.04 12.04 852 71.27 2.17 0.04 0.10 0.15 6.70
6 755 12.18 12.18 889 73.20 2.17 0.04 0.10 0.15 5.96
ALL Comparison Group
-3 12,447 18.64 18.64 925 59.26 2.19 0.03 0.06 0.25 0.92
-2 14,959 18.97 18.97 971 59.97 2.19 0.03 0.06 0.24 1.19
-1 14,959 19.19 19.19 1,002 60.38 2.19 0.02 0.06 0.22 1.53
0 14,959 19.39 19.39 1,009 60.00 2.19 0.02 0.06 0.19 2.00
1 14,959 19.53 19.53 1,021 59.64 2.19 0.02 0.06 0.17 2.33
2 12,447 19.39 19.39 989 58.82 2.19 0.02 0.06 0.16 2.69
3 10,181 19.46 19.46 981 58.01 2.18 0.01 0.06 0.15 3.09
4 8,151 19.69 19.69 986 57.07 2.18 0.01 0.06 0.14 2.93
5 6,295 19.92 19.92 996 56.75 2.18 0.01 0.06 0.12 2.75
6 4,572 20.20 20.20 990 56.26 2.19 0.01 0.06 0.12 2.43
Table D.8: Descriptive statistics for control and treatment groups in the tradable service sector using the restricted unbalanced
sample
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Tradable Services
t* Obs. Employment Net Emp. R. Turn. R. Firm Prod. No. of Plants Foreign Concent. Unionisation Ih. R&D
Treatment Group
-3 153 44.49 36.56 2,925 151.11 2.54 0.09 0.04 0.26 0.07
-2 174 60.61 51.65 4,058 116.32 2.55 0.11 0.04 0.25 0.08
-1 174 61.80 52.52 4,538 127.69 2.55 0.10 0.04 0.24 0.07
0 174 62.93 53.55 4,419 121.89 2.55 0.09 0.04 0.21 0.09
1 174 56.84 56.84 4,259 104.50 1.72 0.07 0.04 0.19 0.11
2 147 58.03 58.03 3,833 84.43 1.78 0.05 0.04 0.17 0.11
3 117 58.89 58.89 3,749 87.25 1.72 0.09 0.04 0.16 0.07
4 77 73.55 73.55 5,926 168.94 1.87 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.06
5 50 90.82 90.82 6,067 123.67 1.92 0.10 0.03 0.14 0.05
6 35 114.14 114.14 8,551 151.52 1.83 0.09 0.04 0.14 0.04
VI Control Group
-3 4,099 24.44 24.44 2,283 108.68 1.88 0.07 0.04 0.28 0.19
-2 5,127 25.44 25.44 2,511 109.21 1.87 0.07 0.04 0.28 0.20
-1 5,127 26.96 26.96 2,819 120.25 1.87 0.07 0.04 0.25 0.19
0 5,127 29.87 29.87 2,962 117.47 1.87 0.07 0.04 0.23 0.17
1 5,127 34.07 34.07 3,008 100.78 1.97 0.07 0.04 0.21 0.17
2 4,411 37.44 37.44 3,289 94.39 2.04 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.21
3 3,722 39.40 39.40 3,570 93.63 2.13 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.22
4 3,065 41.92 41.92 3,710 89.12 2.25 0.07 0.04 0.18 0.23
5 2,419 45.52 45.52 4,161 109.45 2.35 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.24
6 1,793 50.34 50.34 4,277 110.96 2.43 0.08 0.04 0.15 0.15
ALL Comparison Group
-3 27,955 29.51 29.51 2,115 82.61 1.88 0.03 0.04 0.25 0.07
-2 35,215 30.24 30.24 2,169 85.56 1.86 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.07
-1 35,215 31.81 31.81 2,320 86.55 1.86 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.07
0 35,215 33.60 33.60 2,427 83.12 1.86 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.06
1 35,215 36.49 36.49 2,536 76.53 1.97 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.07
2 30,051 39.63 39.63 2,698 73.72 2.02 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.07
3 25,507 41.75 41.75 2,824 73.32 2.08 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.08
4 21,311 44.25 44.25 2,884 73.56 2.12 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.08
5 17,105 47.33 47.33 3,024 74.68 2.15 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.08
6 12,900 50.83 50.83 3,194 72.54 2.18 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.07
Table D.9: Descriptive statistics for control and treatment groups in the tradable service sector using the unrestricted unbalanced
sample
311
D.3. More Information on Regression Results
In this section we present regression results using the unbalanced samples.
Variables Restricted VI Restricted All Unrestr. VI Unrestr. All
t*-2 -0.005 *** -0.006 *** 0.009 *** 0.006 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
t*-1 -0.011 *** -0.011 *** 0.024 *** 0.024 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
t*0 -0.018 *** -0.017 *** 0.041 *** 0.043 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
t*1 -0.026 *** -0.024 *** 0.077 *** 0.078 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
t*2 -0.033 *** -0.032 *** 0.111 *** 0.106 ***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006)
t*3 -0.041 *** -0.041 *** 0.134 *** 0.119 ***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008)
t*4 -0.050 *** -0.050 *** 0.155 *** 0.129 ***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009)
t*5 -0.058 *** -0.058 *** 0.175 *** 0.138 ***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010)
t*6 -0.064 *** -0.064 *** 0.197 *** 0.149 ***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012)
fragi×t
*
-1 -0.006 -0.006 -0.027 *** -0.029 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
fragi×t
*
0 -0.009 -0.011 -0.054 *** -0.057 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
fragi×t
*
1 -0.285 *** -0.287 *** -0.321 *** -0.325 ***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022)
fragi×t
*
2 -0.278 *** -0.279 *** -0.359 *** -0.355 ***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.023)
fragi×t
*
3 -0.278 *** -0.279 *** -0.396 *** -0.384 ***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.026) (0.025)
fragi×t
*
4 -0.299 *** -0.300 *** -0.431 *** -0.407 ***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.029)
fragi×t
*
5 -0.333 *** -0.333 *** -0.507 *** -0.472 ***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.034)
fragi×t
*
6 -0.346 *** -0.346 *** -0.566 *** -0.519 ***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.042) (0.040)
Constant 3.038 *** 2.893 *** 3.368 *** 3.225 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50,882 97,217 97,221 226,881
R-Square .0744 .0532 .0511 .0301
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table D.10: Regression results for total employment eﬀects in manufacturing using unbal-
anced restricted and unrestricted samples
312
Variables Restricted VI Restricted All Unrestr. VI Unrestr. All
t*-2 -0.005 ** -0.006 *** 0.010 *** 0.006 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
t*-1 -0.011 *** -0.011 *** 0.025 *** 0.024 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
t*0 -0.018 *** -0.017 *** 0.042 *** 0.043 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
t*1 -0.025 *** -0.024 *** 0.077 *** 0.078 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
t*2 -0.033 *** -0.032 *** 0.111 *** 0.106 ***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006)
t*3 -0.041 *** -0.041 *** 0.134 *** 0.119 ***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008)
t*4 -0.050 *** -0.050 *** 0.155 *** 0.129 ***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009)
t*5 -0.058 *** -0.058 *** 0.175 *** 0.139 ***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010)
t*6 -0.063 *** -0.064 *** 0.197 *** 0.149 ***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012)
fragi×t
*
-1 0.002 0.001 -0.020 ** -0.022 **
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
fragi×t
*
0 -0.003 -0.004 -0.044 *** -0.048 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
fragi×t
*
1 0.105 *** 0.103 *** 0.033 0.030
(0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.024)
fragi×t
*
2 0.105 ** 0.104 ** -0.017 -0.013
(0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.027)
fragi×t
*
3 0.111 ** 0.110 ** -0.053 -0.041
(0.037) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030)
fragi×t
*
4 0.091 * 0.091 * -0.100 ** -0.076 *
(0.041) (0.041) (0.035) (0.033)
fragi×t
*
5 0.056 0.056 -0.180 *** -0.145 ***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.039) (0.038)
fragi×t
*
6 0.052 0.052 -0.239 *** -0.192 ***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.045) (0.043)
Constant 3.013 *** 2.880 *** 3.349 *** 3.217 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50,879 97,214 97,216 226,876
R-Square .0153 .0162 .0406 .0259
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table D.11: Regression results for indirect employment eﬀects in manufacturing using un-
balanced restricted and unrestricted samples
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Variables Balanced VI Balanced All Unbalan. VI Unbalan. All
t*-2 0.011 ** 0.011 *** 0.012 *** 0.013 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
t*-1 0.027 *** 0.022 *** 0.029 *** 0.025 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
t*0 0.029 ** 0.022 *** 0.034 *** 0.027 ***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
t*1 0.030 * 0.024 ** 0.024 ** 0.016 **
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
t*2 0.039 * 0.034 ** 0.024 * 0.023 **
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007)
t*3 0.046 * 0.044 ** 0.037 ** 0.041 ***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008)
t*4 0.055 * 0.056 *** 0.045 ** 0.058 ***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010)
t*5 0.068 * 0.071 *** 0.057 *** 0.077 ***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.011)
t*6 0.087 ** 0.095 *** 0.074 *** 0.101 ***
(0.030) (0.021) (0.019) (0.012)
fragi×t
*
-1 -0.000 0.005 0.009 0.013
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
fragi×t
*
0 0.011 0.017 0.020 0.027
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
fragi×t
*
1 0.246 *** 0.252 *** 0.227 *** 0.235 ***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.024) (0.023)
fragi×t
*
2 0.210 *** 0.216 *** 0.217 *** 0.218 ***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.028) (0.027)
fragi×t
*
3 0.236 *** 0.238 *** 0.235 *** 0.231 ***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.029) (0.027)
fragi×t
*
4 0.220 *** 0.219 *** 0.204 *** 0.192 ***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030)
fragi×t
*
5 0.257 *** 0.253 *** 0.255 *** 0.235 ***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.039) (0.037)
fragi×t
*
6 0.248 *** 0.240 *** 0.288 *** 0.262 ***
(0.065) (0.062) (0.045) (0.042)
Constant 3.836 *** 3.876 *** 4.036 *** 4.080 ***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50,808 96,952 97,068 226,444
R-Square .0109 .00734 .00727 .00565
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table D.12: Regression results for ﬁrm average labour productivity eﬀects in manufacturing
using unbalanced restricted and unrestricted samples
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Variables Balanced VI Balanced All Unbalan. VI Unbalan. All
t*-2 -0.003 0.003 ** 0.016 ** 0.018 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
t*-1 -0.007 * 0.007 *** 0.065 *** 0.063 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
t*0 -0.012 * 0.009 *** 0.119 *** 0.111 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004)
t*1 -0.015 * 0.011 *** 0.195 *** 0.172 ***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.017) (0.005)
t*2 -0.019 * 0.013 ** 0.289 *** 0.231 ***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.022) (0.007)
t*3 -0.024 ** 0.016 ** 0.346 *** 0.265 ***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.025) (0.009)
t*4 -0.030 ** 0.019 ** 0.395 *** 0.292 ***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.029) (0.010)
t*5 -0.035 ** 0.022 ** 0.450 *** 0.323 ***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.032) (0.012)
t*6 -0.040 ** 0.024 ** 0.499 *** 0.355 ***
(0.015) (0.008) (0.036) (0.013)
fragi×t
*
-1 0.043 * 0.032 -0.034 * -0.031 *
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015)
fragi×t
*
0 0.053 * 0.036 -0.044 -0.036
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
fragi×t
*
1 -0.210 *** -0.233 *** -0.285 *** -0.260 ***
(0.063) (0.062) (0.054) (0.052)
fragi×t
*
2 -0.204 ** -0.233 ** -0.361 *** -0.303 ***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.063) (0.060)
fragi×t
*
3 -0.202 ** -0.239 ** -0.405 *** -0.323 ***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.076) (0.073)
fragi×t
*
4 -0.246 ** -0.291 *** -0.480 *** -0.376 ***
(0.079) (0.078) (0.081) (0.077)
fragi×t
*
5 -0.277 ** -0.330 *** -0.544 *** -0.417 ***
(0.097) (0.096) (0.102) (0.098)
fragi×t
*
6 -0.291 ** -0.352 *** -0.594 *** -0.449 ***
(0.096) (0.095) (0.125) (0.121)
Constant 1.960 *** 2.318 *** 2.283 *** 2.501 ***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.015) (0.005)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,470 114,612 41,287 276,880
R-Square .0457 .00798 .115 .0695
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table D.13: Regression results for total employment eﬀects in tradable service sector using
unbalanced restricted and unrestricted samples
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Variables Balanced VI Balanced All Unbalan. VI Unbalan. All
t*-2 -0.003 0.003 ** 0.017 ** 0.018 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
t*-1 -0.007 * 0.007 *** 0.065 *** 0.063 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
t*0 -0.012 * 0.009 *** 0.119 *** 0.111 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004)
t*1 -0.015 * 0.011 *** 0.196 *** 0.172 ***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.017) (0.005)
t*2 -0.019 * 0.013 ** 0.289 *** 0.231 ***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.022) (0.007)
t*3 -0.024 ** 0.016 ** 0.347 *** 0.265 ***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.025) (0.009)
t*4 -0.030 ** 0.019 ** 0.395 *** 0.292 ***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.029) (0.010)
t*5 -0.035 ** 0.021 ** 0.450 *** 0.323 ***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.032) (0.012)
t*6 -0.040 ** 0.024 ** 0.500 *** 0.355 ***
(0.015) (0.008) (0.036) (0.013)
fragi×t
*
-1 0.060 0.049 -0.013 -0.010
(0.037) (0.037) (0.025) (0.024)
fragi×t
*
0 0.074 * 0.056 -0.020 -0.012
(0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.030)
fragi×t
*
1 0.161 * 0.138 * 0.089 0.113
(0.070) (0.070) (0.066) (0.064)
fragi×t
*
2 0.180 * 0.150 0.020 0.079
(0.083) (0.083) (0.076) (0.074)
fragi×t
*
3 0.158 0.122 -0.029 0.053
(0.093) (0.092) (0.092) (0.089)
fragi×t
*
4 0.104 0.058 -0.104 0.001
(0.094) (0.093) (0.098) (0.095)
fragi×t
*
5 0.044 -0.009 -0.154 -0.027
(0.110) (0.109) (0.124) (0.120)
fragi×t
*
6 0.008 -0.053 -0.219 -0.074
(0.111) (0.110) (0.144) (0.140)
Constant 1.948 *** 2.316 *** 2.271 *** 2.500 ***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.015) (0.005)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,470 114,612 41,287 276,880
R-Square .0155 .00355 .116 .0697
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table D.14: Regression results for indirect employment eﬀects in tradable service sector
using unbalanced restricted and unrestricted samples
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Variables Balanced VI Balanced All Unbalan. VI Unbalan. All
t*-2 -0.004 0.018 *** 0.002 0.016 ***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002)
t*-1 -0.002 0.037 *** 0.006 0.032 ***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004)
t*0 -0.018 0.041 *** -0.009 0.034 ***
(0.021) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005)
t*1 -0.023 0.044 *** -0.040 * 0.019 **
(0.025) (0.010) (0.020) (0.007)
t*2 -0.029 0.058 *** -0.076 ** 0.024 **
(0.032) (0.013) (0.024) (0.008)
t*3 -0.034 0.074 *** -0.077 ** 0.044 ***
(0.038) (0.016) (0.028) (0.010)
t*4 -0.027 0.092 *** -0.078 * 0.067 ***
(0.044) (0.019) (0.031) (0.011)
t*5 -0.016 0.105 *** -0.077 * 0.084 ***
(0.050) (0.022) (0.035) (0.012)
t*6 0.007 0.127 *** -0.079 * 0.099 ***
(0.056) (0.024) (0.038) (0.014)
fragi×t
*
-1 0.008 -0.019 0.042 0.024
(0.051) (0.050) (0.034) (0.033)
fragi×t
*
0 0.041 -0.006 0.029 -0.007
(0.061) (0.059) (0.045) (0.044)
fragi×t
*
1 0.206 ** 0.150 * 0.150 * 0.099
(0.077) (0.075) (0.060) (0.057)
fragi×t
*
2 0.212 ** 0.138 0.106 0.014
(0.079) (0.075) (0.075) (0.072)
fragi×t
*
3 0.219 * 0.123 0.087 -0.027
(0.094) (0.088) (0.078) (0.075)
fragi×t
*
4 0.101 -0.006 0.155 0.017
(0.170) (0.166) (0.106) (0.103)
fragi×t
*
5 0.178 0.068 0.226 0.072
(0.178) (0.172) (0.116) (0.112)
fragi×t
*
6 0.083 -0.024 0.248 0.077
(0.262) (0.257) (0.163) (0.160)
Constant 3.635 *** 3.545 *** 3.968 *** 3.754 ***
(0.022) (0.009) (0.017) (0.006)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,378 114,233 41,088 276,102
R-Square .00141 .00455 .00383 .00226
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table D.15: Regression results for ﬁrm average labour productivity eﬀects in tradable service
sector using unbalanced restricted and unrestricted samples
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